80th Infantry (Reserve) Division (United Kingdom)
|80th Infantry (Reserve) Division|
The shoulder insignia of the division
|Active||1 January 1943 – 1 September 1944|
|Role||Training and deception|
The 80th Infantry (Reserve) Division was a British Army division formed at the beginning of 1943, during the Second World War. For the twenty months that the division existed, it was a training formation. New recruits to the army were assigned to the division to complete their training. Once fully trained, the recruits were allocated to formations fighting overseas. Notably, the formation was used as a source of reinforcements for the 21st Army Group, which was fighting in Normandy. After all available British army troops left the United Kingdom for France, the division was disbanded.
In addition to the actual formation, a phantom 80th Infantry Division was formed to aid the deception effort that supported the invasion of France. This phantom division was part of the notional British Fourth Army, which was part of the threatened Allied landing at the Pas de Calais. The overall deception plan was successful, and affected the German response to the Allied invasion. The phantom division was "disbanded" towards the end of the war.
During the Second World War, the divisions of the British Army were divided between "Higher Establishment" and "Lower Establishment" formations. The former were intended for deployment overseas and combat, whereas the latter were strictly for home defence in a static role. During the winter of 1942–43, three infantry divisions were placed on the "Lower Establishment" and renamed "Reserve Divisions". On 1 January 1943, these three were supplemented by the raising of a new reserve division, the 80th Infantry, placed under the command of Major-General L. H. Cox. The four reserve divisions were used as training units. Soldiers who had completed their Corps training were assigned to these divisions.[a] The soldiers were given five weeks of additional training at the section, platoon and company level, before undertaking a final three-day exercise. Troops would then be ready to be sent overseas to join other formations. Training was handled in this manner to relieve the "Higher Establishment" divisions from being milked for replacements for other units and to allow them to intensively train without the interruption of having to handle new recruits.[b]
During its existence, the 80th Division was assigned to Western Command. The division was spread out across Western Command's area of responsibility[c] with at least one battalion based in Bowerham Barracks, Lancaster, Lancashire and another based around Shropshire. The Imperial War Museum comments that the division insignia of a troopship was derived from "one of the prime functions of the Division [that being] to find drafts for overseas postings". The design included "two long and prominent bow waves from the ship", which resulted in the troops giving it the nickname the "torpedoed troopship".
On 30 June 1944, the 48th, 76th, 77th Holding and the 80th training divisions, had a combined total of 22,355 men, of which only about 1,100 were immediately available as replacements for the 21st Army Group.[d] The remainder were ineligible for service abroad due to age or medical reasons including not being considered fit for combat. Over the next six months, up to 75 per cent of the men in these divisions would be deployed to reinforce 21st Army Group. Stephen Hart comments that, by September, the 21st Army Group "had bled Home Forces dry of draftable riflemen" due the losses suffered during the Normandy Campaign, leaving the army in Britain (with the exception of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division) with just "young lads, old men, and the unfit". On 1 September 1944, the division was disbanded. Major-General Cox took command of the 38th Infantry (Reserve) Division, which took over the role of the 80th Division.
Operation Bodyguard was the codename for the deception plan designed to protect Operation Overlord. Fortitude North was part of the plan and aimed to make the Germans believe that the notional 250,000-strong British Fourth Army, based in Scotland, would assault Norway. The deception plan aimed to keep German garrison of nearly half a million men, stationed in Norway to resist such an aattack. Following the invasion of Normandy, the Fourth Army was "transferred" south to reinforce the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), another fictitious formation. Fortitude South aimed to convince the Germans that FUSAG, had 500,000 men in more than fifty divisions and would launch the main Allied invasion in the Pas De Calais, 45 days after the Normandy landings. The goal of the operation was to persuade the Germans not to move the 15th Army, of 18 divisions, to Normandy.
The Fourth Army included the imaginary VII Corps, which after being transferred south to FUSAG, included the newly created fictitious 80th Infantry Division that was supposedly based in Canterbury. The creation of the fictitious division arose from an actual reorganization of British forces within the United Kingdom. The War Office had decided to disband several "Lower Establishment" divisions, which included the 80th Infantry (Reserve) Division. The Fortitude deception staff seized upon this opportunity to retain the division as a phantom unit. A cover story was established to explain the change in the division's status. It was claimed that with the war nearing an end, several Territorial Army divisions would revert to their peacetime recruiting role and release their equipment and resources to other units. For the 80th, this was the 38th Division. With the transfer of equipment, the 80th was notionally raised to the "Higher Establishment", readied for war, and joined VII Corps. The phantom 80th, retaining the insignia of the real division, "consisted" of the 50th, 208th and 211th brigades. Joan Pujol Garcia, the British double agent known as Garbo who played a vital role in Fortitude, reported to the Germans that the 80th Division was undertaking assault training.[e] To aid in the deception, signallers from the 61st Infantry Division maintained wireless traffic, to give the Germans the impression of an actual 80th Division.
Fortitude South has been credited with ensuring the German 15th Army was not deployed against the Allied invasion force too soon and ensuring the success of Operation Overlord. Gerhard Weinberg stated that the Germans "readily accepted the existence and location" of FUSAG, believed the threat to the Pas de Calais was real and "it was only at the end of July" they realized a second assault was not coming, "by that time, it was too late to move reinforcements". However, Mary Barbier wrote "it is time to consider that the importance of the deception has been overrated". She argues that 15th Army was largely immobile and not combat-ready,[f] that despite the deception numerous German divisions - including the 1st SS Panzer Division, which was held in reserve behind the 15th Army - from across Western Europe were transferred to Normandy to repel the invasion, and the Germans had realized as early as May that a real threat to Normandy existed. Barbier further commented that while the Germans believed the deception, due to "preconceived ideas about the importance of the Pas De Calais", the Allied staff overestimated the effectiveness of the deception because they held a "preconceived notion of what FORTUTUDE would accomplish" and due to the 15th Army not being thrown upon the invasion force. Following the Battle of Normandy, the phantom 80th Division was "transferred" around the east coast of England, moving back and forth between VII Corps and the equally bogus II Corps. The division was eventually 'disbanded' in April 1945.
General officer Commanding
|Appointed||General Officer Commanding|
|1 January 1943||Major-General L. H. Cox|
Order of Battle
|80th Infantry (Reserve) Division|
45th Infantry Brigade
Main article: 45th Infantry Brigade
211th Infantry Brigade
Main article: 211th Infantry Brigade
- Having entered military service, a recruit was assigned to the General Service Corps. They would then undertake six weeks training at a Primary Training Centre and take aptitude and intelligence tests. The recruit would then be posted to a Corps Training Centre that specialized in the arm of the service they were joining. For those who would be joining the infantry, Corps training involved a further sixteen week course. For more specialized roles, such as signallers, it could be up to thirty weeks.
- As an example, the 5th Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry trained and provided over 4,000 replacements to its sister battalions as well as the North Staffordshire Regiment between the beginning of 1944 and the end of the war.
- The North West of England, the West Midlands, and Wales.
- The war establishment—the paper strength—of a "Higher Establishment" infantry division in 1944 was 18,347 men.
- To simulate the amphibious assault training of a division, required the work of just eight officers and 28 other soldiers. 
- Barbier highlights that the army was made up of seven static divisions trained for defensive operations, and a further two were Luftwaffe Field Divisions. Furthermore, the army lacked equipment, transport, and was under-trained.
- Joslen 2003, p. 103.
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- Holt 2004, p. 186.
- sitframlingham (21 June 2004). "The Lure of Walberswick". British Broadcasting Corporation. WW2 People's War: An archive of World War Two memories - written by the public, gathered by the BBC. Retrieved 13 April 2015.
- "badge, formation, 80th Infantry (Reserve) Division". Imperial War Museum. Retrieved 16 March 2015.
- Hart 2007, p. 52.
- Joslen 2003, pp. 130–131.
- Hart 2007, p. 48.
- Hart 2007, p. 51.
- Hart 2007, pp. 49–50.
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- Hesketh 2000, p. 296.
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- Buckley 2006, p. 180.
- Buckley 2006, pp. 180-181.
- Joslen 2003, p. 290.
- Joslen 2003, p. 374.
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- "The Soldiers of Gloucestershire Museum". Retrieved 14 April 2015. Photographs of Major-General L. H. Cox during his army service, including ones taken during early 1944 in Winchcombe when he was general officer commanding the division.