Arcesilaus and Carneades
|Main interests||Platonism, Academic skepticism|
|Notable ideas||Founder of Academic skepticism|
Arcesilaus (//; Ancient Greek: Ἀρκεσίλαος; 316/5–241/0 BC) was a Greek philosopher and founder of the Second or Middle Academy—the phase of Academic skepticism. Arcesilaus succeeded Crates as the sixth head (scholarch) of the Academy c. 264 BC. He did not preserve his thoughts in writing, so his opinions can only be gleaned second-hand from what is preserved by later writers. He was the first Academic to adopt a position of philosophical skepticism, that is, he doubted the ability of the senses to discover truth about the world, although he may have continued to believe in the existence of truth itself. This brought in the skeptical phase of the Academy. His chief opponents were the Stoics and their belief that reality could be comprehended with certainty.
Arcesilaus was born in Pitane in Aeolis. His early education was provided by Autolycus the mathematician, with whom he migrated to Sardis. Afterwards, he studied rhetoric in Athens; but adopted philosophy and became a disciple first of Theophrastus and afterwards of Crantor. He subsequently became intimate with Polemo and Crates, and eventually became head of the school (σχολάρχης).
Diogenes Laërtius says that, like his successor Lacydes, he died of excessive drinking, but the testimony of others (e.g. Cleanthes) and his own precepts discredit the story, and he is known to have been much respected by the Athenians.
Arcesilaus committed nothing to writing, his opinions were imperfectly known to his contemporaries, and can now only be gathered from the confused statements of his opponents. This makes his philosophy difficult to evaluate and partly inconsistent. This led scholars to see his skepticism in several ways. Some see his philosophy as completely negative or destructive of all philosophical views. Others regard him as taking the position that nothing can be known on the basis of his philosophical arguments. Others claimed he held no positive views on any philosophical topic, including the possibility of knowledge.
On the one hand, he is said to have restored the doctrines of Plato in an incorrupted form; while, on the other hand, according to Cicero, he summed up his opinions in the formula, "that he knew nothing, not even his own ignorance." There are two ways of reconciling the difficulty: either we may suppose him to have thrown out such aphorisms as an exercise for his pupils, as Sextus Empiricus, who calls him a Sceptic, would have us believe; or he may have really doubted the esoteric meaning of Plato, and have supposed himself to have been stripping his works of the figments of the Dogmatists, while he was in fact taking from them all certain principles.
The Stoics were the chief opponents of Arcesilaus; he attacked their doctrine of a convincing conception (katalêptikê phantasia) as understood to be a mean between science and opinion - a mean which he asserted could not exist, and was merely the interpolation of a name. It involved a contradiction in terms, as the very idea of phantasia implied the possibility of false as well as true conceptions of the same object.
It is a question of some importance as to how the Academic skepticism of the Middle and New Academy was distinguished from that of Pyrrhonism. Admitting the formula of Arcesilaus, "that he knew nothing, not even his own ignorance," to be an exposition of his real sentiments, it was impossible in one sense that skepticism could proceed further: but the Academic skeptics do not seem to have doubted the existence of truth in itself, only our capacities for obtaining it. It differed also from the principles of the pure skeptic in the practical tendency of its doctrines: while the object of the one was the attainment of perfect equanimity, the other seems rather to have retired from the barren field of speculation to practical life, and to have acknowledged some vestiges of a moral law within, at best but a probable guide, the possession of which, however, formed the real distinction between the sage and the fool. Slight as the difference may appear between the speculative statements of the two schools, a comparison of the lives of their founders and their respective successors leads to the conclusion, that a practical moderation was the characteristic of the Academic skeptics.
Commentary on Arcesilaus
I have seen changes in all nations and men, and thus after many changes of judgement regarding true justice, I have recognized that our nature was but in continual change, and I have not changed since; and if I changed, I would confirm my opinion. The sceptic Arcesilaus, who became a dogmatist.
- Tiziano Dorandi, Chapter 2: Chronology, in Algra et al. (1999) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, page 48. Cambridge.
- Eusebius of Caesarea: Praeparatio Evangelica VI
- Cicero, Academica, i. 12
- Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. 234
- Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 18.
- Cicero, Academica, ii. 24.
- Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. ii. 158, Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. 3, 226.
- This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). "article name needed". Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Arcesilaus.|
- Arcesilaus entry by Charles Brittain in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Arcesilaus entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Diogenes Laërtius, Life of Arcesilaus, translated by Robert Drew Hicks (1925).