Assassination of Park Chung-hee

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Park Chung-hee, president of South Korea, was assassinated on Friday, October 26, 1979 at 7:41pm during a dinner at a Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) safehouse inside the Blue House presidential compound, Gungjeong-dong, Seoul by Kim Jae-kyu, who was the director of KCIA and the president's security chief. Park was shot in the chest and head, and died almost immediately. Four bodyguards and a presidential chauffeur were also killed.

It is simply known as "10.26" or the "10.26 incident" in South Korea.

There is still a great deal of controversy on Kim's motive and whether it was a planned act as part of a coup d'état or was an impulsive, spur-of-the-moment act. The chief investigator Yi Hak-bong famously concluded that it was too careless for a deliberate act and yet too elaborate for an impulsive act.[citation needed]

Background[edit]

President Park's dictatorship[edit]

By the time of his assassination, President Park had exercised dictatorial power over South Korea for nearly 18 years.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1961 to coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities, including those of the military. Almost immediately following its creation, the KCIA was used to suppress any domestic opposition to Park's regime using its broad powers to wiretap, arrest, and torture anyone without a court order. KCIA was heavily involved in many behind-the-scene political manoeuvrings aimed at weakening the opposition parties through bribing, blackmailing, threatening, or arresting opposition lawmakers. President Park nevertheless nearly lost the presidential election to Kim Dae-jung in 1971 despite spending ten percent of the national budget on his election campaign. Park therefore established the Yushin Constitution in 1972 to ensure his perpetual dictatorship. This abolished the direct vote in presidential elections and replaced it with an indirect voting system involving delegates, allotted one third of the National Assembly seats to the president, gave the president the authority to issue emergency decrees and suspend the Constitution, gave the president the authority to appoint all judges and dismiss the National Assembly, and repealed a term limit to presidency. When opposition to the Yushin Constitution arose, Park issued a number of emergency decrees, the first of which made any act of opposition or denial of the Yushin Constitution punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years through a military tribunal.

The last year of his rule was particularly turbulent with increasing opposition from the New Democratic Party (NDP), which was emboldened after winning the 1978 election by 1.1% despite Park's complete control of the media, money, and all the institutions of government. Because of the Yushin Constitution, which allowed President Park to appoint one third of National Assembly seats, Park's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) remained in power; nevertheless, it was an embarrassing situation for Park. In May 1979, Kim Young Sam was elected as the chairman of New Democratic Party (NDP) despite intense behind-the-scene manoeuvrings by KCIA to back a more pliable candidate, Yi Chul-seung. Kim took the hardline policy of never compromising or cooperating with Park until the repeal of the Yushin Constitution. In August 1979, 2,000 policemen stormed the NDP headquarters, which was used by female workers at a wig company for their sit-in demonstration. In the process, one female worker died and many lawmakers trying to protect them were severely beaten, some requiring hospitalization. After this incident, which garnered widespread criticism of the government, Park was determined to remove Kim from the political scene in the same manner the imprisoned Kim Dae-joong was dispatched. The KCIA was duly instructed to engineer such a move.

In September 1979, the courts obliged by ordering the nullification of Kim's chairmanship of the NDP, and Park's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) expelled him from the National Assembly in a secret session on October 5, which led all 66 NDP lawmakers to submit their resignation to the National Assembly in protest. (The Carter administration in the U.S. recalled its ambassador to Seoul in protest as well.) When it became known that the government was planning to accept the resignations selectively, uprisings broke out in Kim's hometown of Busan (the second largest city in South Korea) on October 16, 1979, resulting in arson attacks on 30 police stations over several days. It was the largest demonstration since the days of President Rhee Seung Man and spread to nearby Masan on October 19, 1979 and other cities, with students and citizens calling for repeal of the Yushin Constitution. The KCIA Director, Kim, went to Busan to investigate the situation and found that the demonstrations were not riots by some college students, but more like a "popular uprising joined by regular citizens" to resist the regime. He warned President Park that the uprisings would spread to five other large cities, including Seoul. Park said that he himself would give direct orders to the security forces to fire upon demonstrators if the situation got worse. Less than a week later, he was assassinated by his own security chief.

Rivalry between Kim and Cha[edit]

While President Park faced an increasing opposition to his dictatorship outside Blue House, another kind of conflict was intensifying inside Blue House between Kim Jae-kyu, who was appointed to directorship of KCIA in December 1976, and Chief Bodyguard Cha Ji-chul, who was appointed to his position in 1974 after Park's wife Yook Yeong-su was killed in an assassination attempt by Moon Se-gwang, a Korean living in Japan.

The rivalry stemmed largely from Cha's increasing encroachment into KCIA turf and arrogant behavior that belittled Kim in public. Almost universally disliked yet feared, Cha served Park in close proximity and became his favorite and most trusted advisor in the process. Cha appropriated tanks, helicopters, and troops from the Army so that the presidential security apparatus had a division-level firepower under Cha's direct command.

The rivalry between Cha and Kim, whose KCIA was until then the most feared government apparatus, was heightened further with a series of political crises in late 1979 as they clashed over the approach in dealing with growing opposition to the regime. In the NDP's election for its chairman in 1979, KCIA backed Yi Chul-seung to prevent the election of hardliner Kim Young Sam, but Cha Ji-chul interfered in KCIA's political sabotage with its own behind-scene manoeuvrings. When Kim Young Sam was elected as the NDP chairman, Cha laid the blame on KCIA, which infuriated Director Kim.

Later when NDP chief Kim Young Sam called on the U.S. to stop supporting Park's regime in an interview with New York Times reporter Henry Stokes, Cha pushed for Kim's expulsion from the National Assembly,[1] which Director Kim feared to be a disastrous development [2] (as it turned out to be true when it led to uprisings in Busan and Masan). Cha easily bested his opponent as his hardline approach was favored by Park, and he blamed worsening development on Director Kim's weak leadership of KCIA at every opportunity. As Cha came to control the scheduling of President Park's meetings and briefings and thus access to the president, KCIA briefings, which were usually the first business in the morning, were pushed down to afternoons. By October, there were wide rumors that Kim would be soon replaced as KCIA director.

Event[edit]

On the day of assassination, Park and his entourage visited ribbon-cutting ceremonies for a dam in Sap-gyeo-cheon and a KBS TV transmitting station in Dang-jin. KCIA Director Kim was expected to accompany him since the TV station was under KCIA jurisdiction, but Chief Bodyguard Cha blocked him from riding in the same helicopter with President Park. Director Kim angrily excused himself from the trip.

After the trip, President Park instructed KCIA to prepare for one of his numerous banquets - on the average of ten per month according to KCIA Chief Agent Park Seon-ho, one of the conspirators - at a KCIA safehouse in Gungjeong-dong, Jongno-gu, Seoul, South Korea. It was to be attended by President Park, KCIA Director Kim, Chief Bodyguard Cha, Chief Secretary Kim Gye-won, and two young women - rising singer Shim Soo-bong and a college student named Shin Jae-soon. When Director Kim was notified of the banquet, he called Korean Army Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa 15 minutes later to invite him to the KCIA safehouse and arranged to have him dine with KCIA Deputy Director Kim Jeong-seop in a nearby KCIA building in the same compound.[3] Just before the dinner, Director Kim told Chief Secretary Kim Gye-won that he would get rid of Chief Bodyguard Cha. It is not clear whether Kim Gye-won misheard or misunderstood Director Kim or he ignored Kim's words.

During the dinner, volatile political issues including demonstrations in Busan and the opposition leader Kim Young Sam were discussed with President Park and Chief Bodyguard Cha taking a hardline and Director Kim calling for moderate measures while Chief Secretary Kim was trying to steer the topic of discussion to small talk. President Park rebuked Director Kim for not being repressive enough in dealing with protesters and Kim Young Sam, whom Park said should be arrested. Each time discussion drifted to other subjects, Chief Bodyguard Cha continued to bring up the inability of KCIA to end the crisis and suggested that demonstrators and opposition lawmakers should be "mowed down with tanks." The rebukes from President Park and especially Cha riled up Director Kim. Director Kim left the dining room to convene with his closest subordinates - former Marine colonel and KCIA Chief Agent Park Seon-ho and Army colonel and Director Kim's secretary Park Heung-ju (no relations) - and said to them: "Chief of Staff and Deputy Director are here as well. Today is the day." Asked if President Park is included as a target, Kim said yes.[4]

Kim reentered the meeting room with a semi-automatic pistol Walther PPK, shot Chief Bodyguard Cha in the arm and then President Park in the left chest. He attempted to fire again on Cha, but the gun jammed. Cha fled to a bathroom adjacent to the dining room. Kim came back with his subordinate's gun and again shot at Cha in the abdomen and Park in the head, who was dead by then. Upon hearing the initial shots, Park Seon-ho held two bodyguards in the waiting room at gunpoint and ordered them to put hands up in hope of preventing further bloodshed especially since he was a friend with one of the bodyguards. When the other bodyguard attempted to reach for a gun, Park shot them both to death. At the same time, Colonel Park Heung-ju and two other KCIA agents stormed the kitchen and killed the remaining bodyguards. President Park, Chief Bodyguard Cha, three presidential bodyguards, and a presidential chauffeur died in the end.[5]

Aftermath[edit]

After killing President Park, KCIA Director Kim asked Chief Secretary Kim to secure the safehouse and ran to the nearby KCIA building where Army Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa was waiting. Jeong heard the shootings and was discussing them with KCIA Deputy Director Kim Jeong-seop when Director Kim came in breathless to tell them that an emergency situation occurred. In the car, Kim notified Jeong that President Park had died, but without explaining how he died. Kim hoped that Jeong and Chief Secretary Kim would support him in the coup as both were appointed to their position on his recommendation, and Chief Secretary Kim was especially close with him. The car initially headed to KCIA Headquarters in Namsan district but eventually went to Army Headquarters in Yongsan district since the Army would have to be involved in declaring emergency martial law. Many historians believe that Kim made a critical mistake in not going to KCIA HQ where he would be in control. However, his failure to gain Jeong's support sealed the fate of the conspirators.

Meanwhile, Chief Secretary Kim took President Park's body to the Army hospital and ordered doctors to save him at all costs (without revealing Park's identity), and went to Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha to reveal what happened that night. When Chief of Staff Jeong learned of what happened from Chief Secretary Kim, he ordered Major General Chun Doo-hwan, commander of Security Command who later became the president of South Korea through a military coup, to arrest Director Kim and investigate the incident. Director Kim was arrested after he was lured to a secluded area outside Army HQ on the pretext of meeting with Army Chief of Staff. Eventually, everyone involved in the assassination was arrested, tortured, and later executed. In the process, Chun Doo-hwan emerged as a new political force by investigating and subjugating KCIA, the most feared government agency until then, under his Security Command and later by arresting the chief martial law administrator Jeong Seung-hwa (and Chief Secretary Kim) on suspicion of conspiring with Director Kim. Both were eventually released but after Chun Doo-hwan seized power with a military coup in May 1980. Both had been on the death row at one time.[6]

Theories on motive[edit]

Kim Jae-kyu's motive in killing his long-time benefactor President Park has been controversial and the subject of much discussion. There are many theories on Kim's true motive of killing Park. The following are just some of these theories.

Motive[edit]

  • It was unplanned, impulsive act on the spur of the-moment.
    • Kim did not hide the gun in the second floor study of the same building but had to go to another building to get a gun.
    • Kim had virtually no plan for aftermath following assassination of Park.
    • Kim went to Army HQ instead of KCIA HQ.
    • Kim notified his closest subordinates of the assassination plan just before its execution. (Park Seun-ho's only regret toward Kim was that Kim did not give him enough instructions or explanations, which prevented Park from handling the aftermath more effectively at KCIA.)
    • Kim was severely rebuked by Cha and President Park for incompetence during the dinner. For several months, he had been under extreme pressure with a series of political crises, Cha's aggressive encroachment into KCIA turf, President Park turning deaf ears to his urgent warnings and always siding with Cha, and failing health.
  • Kim deliberately planned the assassination of President Park.
    • Kim invited Army Chief of Staff to a dinner at 4:15 pm after learning that he would have a dinner with President Park at 4:00pm. Kim appears to have decided on assassination at 4:15 pm at the latest.
    • It was not customary for Kim to carry a gun to dinner with President Park.
    • Kim claimed that he had been planning to end Park's dictatorship for seven years (The Yusin Constitution of 1972 was ratified seven years before that).[citation needed] He claimed that he attempted to assassinate Park three times: in 1974 and twice in 1979.[citation needed] There are some pieces of evidence that partially corroborate these statements, which will be discussed later.
    • In April 1979, Kim invited the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to a dinner in the manner similar to the day of assassination. Kim, however, called off the assassination plan.[citation needed]
    • Shortly before the dinner banquet, Kim told Chief Secretary Kim Gye-won that he would get rid of Chief Bodyguard Cha Ji-chul.
    • Kim was not entirely misguided in trusting Chief Secretary Kim, Army Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa, and the mood of the military, which was under pressure to crack down on demonstrations in Busan and Masan. Jeong largely followed Kim's lead until Chief Secretary Kim Gye-won revealed the truth of situation to Jeong. Furthermore, Jeong said that Park's assassination was not a tragedy for the entire country and people and that Park's regime acted wrongfully in some cases while Kim was on trial. He even quoted Kim's statements word for word to make his point and appeared to defend Kim's actions. Chief Secretary Kim was a close friend of Director Kim since the former saved the latter in a car accident. Both were recommended to their position by Director Kim. After Park's assassination, 50 out of 52 generals in the military voted to repeal the Yushin Constitution, which was a significant rebuke of Park's regime. Although the military dictatorship continued under Chun Doo-hwan, the Yushin Constitution was repealed a year later on October 27, 1980.
    • The main proponents of the theory that the assassination was unplanned were Kim Gye-won and Jeong Seung-hwa, who had a vested interest in portraying the event as an impulsive act as they were both suspected[by whom?] of being co-conspirators.

Murderer[edit]

  • Kim assassinated Park out of jealousy of Chief Bodyguard Cha when he was losing his status and power as No.2 man in the regime.
    • Kim had been a loyal henchman to President Park throughout his career, who placed him in the innermost sanctum of power. As KCIA Director, he was virtually No.2 man in the regime and was responsible for all the crimes that KCIA perpetrated as the regime's weapon of repression including tortures, unlawful imprisonments, and murders such as the brutal arrest of female factory workers in September 1979 and the infamous assassination of former KCIA director Kim Hyung-wook in Paris in October 1979. KCIA's very function was to defend the Yushin Constitution and suppress internal enemies of Park's regime, which included the opposition parties, democracy activists, leftist students, and intellectuals. His role as the KCIA director, whose chief job was to maintain Park's dictatorship, makes it hard to believe that he was indeed a believer in democracy. (However, it is also possible that Kim sought to become a mitigating influence on Park and KCIA, and he pursued moderate measures and preferred compromise over brute force.)
    • When Kim shot Park, his rallying cry was not about democracy but rather reflected his resentment of Chief Bodyguard Cha.
    • Kim worked tirelessly to sabotage the opposition party's election and prevent Kim Young Sam's chairmanship of the party.
    • As Kim testified in his trial, his relationship with Park was that of real brothers. They came from the same hometown and were classmates at the Korean Army Academy.
  • Kim assassinated Park for democracy.
    • Kim said in court:
I shot the heart of Yushin like a beast. I did that for democracy of this country. Nothing more, nothing less.
    • He gave five motives for assassinating Park in his last statement at the trial:
firstly, to restore free democracy; secondly, to prevent further bloodshed of Korean people; thirdly, to prevent North Korean aggression; fourthly, to completely restore the close relationship with our strong ally the United States, which fell to the worst point since the founding of South Korea and advance our national interest through closer cooperation in defense, diplomacy, and economy; and fifthly, to restore Korea's honor in the international community by cleansing the bad image of Korea as a dictatorship country.
    • According to people close to Kim, President Park promised to voters in the 1971 presidential election that it would be his last term on Kim's suggestion. Kim was very disappointed when Park broke his promise and ratified the Yushin Constitution, which guaranteed Park's dictatorship for life.
    • According to Kim's subordinates when he was the commander of Third Army Group in 1972, Kim was very disturbed by the Yushin Constitution. Kim claimed that he planned to arrest Park and force his resignation if he were to visit his base during his tour of military bases. The wire fence of a small house in the base that were to detain Park was indeed modified to prevent exit from within rather than entry from without.
    • Declassified U.S. diplomatic cables revealed that Kim was thought of as an unusual KCIA director who often spoke of democracy and a more approachable figures who often carried Washington's messages on human rights to President Park.
    • He also made contacts with opposition leaders, which was revealed long after his death. According to the eldest son of the widely respected opposition leader Jang Jun-ha, Jang told him that Kim was a patriotic soldier who would one day work together with them for democracy.[7] They pretended to run into each other accidentally when they met, according to Jang's son. Kim claimed to his lawyer that his first attempt to assassinate Park was in September 14, 1974 when he was appointed to be Minister of Construction. A newsreel of this event does show something protruding out of Kim's pocket when he shook hands with Park. According to Rev. Yi Hae-hak, a cellmate with Jang Jun-ha when Jang was sentenced to fifteen years for a petition campaign against the Yushin Constitution, Jang knew of Kim's plan to assassinate Park and was very disappointed that it did not take place. (In 1975, Jang died in a suspicious circumstance while climbing a mountain. According to Jang's son, Kim helped Jang's family financially in secret. When Kim later became KCIA director, he met Jang's son to tell him with deep regret that Jang's death was not accidental but that the regime was involved.[8]
    • According to Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan, another leading figure in the democracy movement, Director Kim (then KCIA deputy director) came to see him whenever there was a political crisis and once asked him to talk to President Park to come up with a "third way," that is, to somehow amend the Yushin Constitution in a way that is acceptable to Park. He was surprised when Kim compared President Park to "a sick patient." Deputy director Kim believed Cardinal Kim, as a Catholic cardinal, was the only person who could speak frankly to Park without repercussion and was disappointed when the talk was fruitless.[9] Kim's association with two key figures of the democracy movement - Jang Jun-ha and Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan - led some to reconsider Kim's motive in assassinating Park.
    • In 1979, he often wrote calligraphy about freedom and democracy, which were found in his house after his arrest. Kim asked his relative and consul serving in Japan to draft a "third way" compromise which would allow Park to maintain military power but yield political power to a civilian government.[10]

Central Intelligence Agency and other theories[edit]

  • One theory is that the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the assassination of President Park to prevent development of a nuclear weapon by South Korea, which Park was pursuing. Later the United States recognized Chun Doo-hwan's legitimacy on the condition of abandoning the nuclear weapons program.
    • Kim claimed that the United States was behind him. The United States Ambassador denied any American involvement in his diplomatic cable to the State Department. On the other hand, diplomatic cables show that United States Ambassador William Gleysteen worried about the possibility of Kim claiming that he and his predecessor incited him to assassinate Park. In any case, it is possible that Kim believed that his coup would have the support of the United States if successful. In 1999, Gleysteen said that the U.S. became unwittingly involved in Park's assassination without explaining further.[11]
    • Kim had frequent meetings with Robert G. Brewster, CIA chief in Seoul, and other American diplomats. He met with United States Ambassador William Gleysteen on the day of assassination, just five hours before the shooting.[12]
    • Kim cited the worsening of the American-South Korean diplomatic relations as one of reasons for assassinating President Park.
    • Another theory is that Kim was protected by the CIA and was even seen alive after his "alleged" execution. However, this claim is not widely believed.
  • Kim planned and then assassinated President Park to seize power for himself (the official announcement of Chun Doo-hwan's investigation.)
  • Kim had momentary insanity from hepatic encephalopathy related to his liver disease. However, his physician Kim Jeong-Ryong claimed that his liver disease was well controlled and not serious enough to affect daily activities.
  • There was a combination of various factors that led to the assassination - i.e. Kim had planned to assassinate Park, but the actual assassination was a more or less impulsive act in connection with Chief Bodyguard Cha.
  • Only Kim can know the true circumstance and motive of his assassination of Park. (This appears to be the most widely accepted view as there are many contradictions about him.)

Korean Central Intelligence Agency conspirators[edit]

  • Kim Jae-kyu: Hanged on May 24, 1980.
  • Park Heung-ju: Kim Jae-kyu's secretary and formerly aide-de-camp to Kim; Executed by firing squad on March 6, 1980. He was executed earlier than others because he was on active military service.
  • Park Seon-ho, a senior KCIA agent and a pupil of Kim Jae-kyu when the latter was a middle school teacher: Hanged on May 24, 1980.
  • Yoo Seong-ok, a driver in the KCIA safehouse: Hanged on May 24, 1980.
  • Lee Ki-ju, head of safehouse security service: Hanged on May 24, 1980.
  • Kim Tae-won, safehouse security agent: Hanged on May 24, 1980. He did not actually kill any victim, but fired an automatic rifle upon their bodies under Park Seon-ho's order to disguise the shooting as an attack by a North Korean commando.
  • Seo Young-jun, safehouse security agent: Released after imprisonment.

Except Kim Jae-kyu, Park Heung-ju, and Park Seon-ho, other co-conspirators followed the superior's order without knowing whom and why they were shooting.

Witnesses[edit]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ KBS 1 TV, Cha Ji-chul: "The President Is the State", Modern History in Biography
  2. ^ Jeong Se-woon, Making President YS, Part 3, Sisa Onuel, April 27, 2009.
  3. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  4. ^ MBC TV, People of Gungjeong-dong, Now We Can Tell the Story
  5. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  6. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  7. ^ Kahm, Myung-guk (Nov 6, 2005). "Secret Promise between Jang Jun-ha and Kim Jae-kyu". Sunday Journal. 
  8. ^ KBS 1 TV. "Jang Jun-ha Part 2, Modern History in Biography". 
  9. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  10. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  11. ^ MBC TV, Why Did Kim Jae-kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story, April 4, 2004
  12. ^ Jong-lim Ohn, Why is the U.S. secret documents on Kim Jae-kyu still classified?", NewDaily

External links[edit]