Atheist's Wager
![The Greek word "atheoi" ("[those who are] without God") as it appears on the early 3rd-century Papyrus 46](/wiki/File:Ephesians_2,12_-_Greek_atheos.jpg)
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The Atheist's Wager is an atheistic response to Blaise Pascal's Wager. While Pascal suggested that it is better to take the chance of believing in a god that might not exist rather than to risk losing infinite happiness by disbelieving in a god that does, the Atheist's Wager suggests that:
You should live your life and try to make the world a better place for your being in it, whether or not you believe in god. If there is no god, you have lost nothing and will be remembered fondly by those you left behind. If there is a benevolent god, he will judge you on your merits and not just on whether or not you believed in him.[1]
The premise for the wager is often expressed in terms of an alleged quote from Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius:
Live a good life. If there are gods and they are just, then they will not care how devout you have been, but will welcome you based on the virtues you have lived by. If there are gods, but unjust, then you should not want to worship them. If there are no gods, then you will be gone, but will have lived a noble life that will live on in the memories of your loved ones.
However, there is no indication that he ever wrote the quote attributed to him.
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[edit] Explanation
The Wager states that if you were to analyze your options in regard to how to live your life, you would come out with the following possibilities:[1]
- You may live a good life and believe in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to heaven: your gain is infinite.
- You may live a good life without believing in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to heaven: your gain is infinite.
- You may live a good life and believe in a god, but no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a positive legacy to the world; your gain is finite.
- You may live a good life without believing in a god, and no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a positive legacy to the world; your gain is finite.
- You may live an evil life and believe in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to hell: your loss is infinite.
- You may live an evil life without believing in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to hell: your loss is infinite.
- You may live an evil life and believe in a god, but no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a negative legacy to the world; your loss is finite.
- You may live an evil life without believing in a god, and no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a negative legacy to the world; your loss is finite.
The following table shows the values assigned to each possible outcome:
| Belief in god (B) | No belief in god (¬B) | |
|---|---|---|
| Good life (L) | +∞ (heaven) | +∞ (heaven) |
| Evil life (¬L) | -∞ (hell) | -∞ (hell) |
| Belief in god (B) | No belief in god (¬B) | |
|---|---|---|
| Good life (L) | +X (positive legacy) | +X (positive legacy) |
| Evil life (¬L) | -X (negative legacy) | -X (negative legacy) |
Given these values, the option to live a good life (L) clearly dominates the option of living an evil life (¬L), regardless of belief in a god (B or ¬B).
[edit] The apparent false dichotomy
Being a variation of Pascal's Wager, the Atheist's Wager seemingly suffers from the logical fallacy of the false dichotomy, relying on the assumption that the only possibilities are:
- a benevolent god exists and punishes or rewards according to one's actions, or
- a benevolent god does not exist.
The Atheist's Wager equates a "benevolent god" to a god that punishes or rewards according to actions, implicitly assuming that a god that acts otherwise (such as the god of Pascal's wager, which rewards faith instead) is not a benevolent god.
This premise allows the second proposition to not only cover the possibility of the absence of any god, but also all possible gods that are not "benevolent"/punish and reward according to one's actions, thus covering all possibilities and making the dichotomy legitimate.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
[edit] References
- Martin, Michael (1990). Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press. pp. 232–238.
