Australian administrative law
|This article relies on references to primary sources. (October 2012)|
Australian administrative law defines the extent of the powers and responsibilities held by administrative agencies of Australian governments. It is basically a common law system, with an increasing statutory overlay that has shifted its focus toward codified judicial review and to tribunals with extensive jurisdiction.
Australia possesses well-developed ombudsman systems and Freedom of Information legislation, both influenced by comparable overseas developments. Its notice and comment requirements for the making of delegated legislation have parallels to the United States. Australia's borrowings from overseas are still largely shaped by its evolution within a system of parliamentary democracy that loosely follows a Westminster system of responsibility and accountability. At the same time, its application has been limited by a shift toward deregulation and privatisation.
- 1 History
- 2 Judicial review
- 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal
- 4 State administrative law tribunals
- 5 Ombudsman
- 6 Freedom of information
- 7 Ultra vires
- 8 Judicial remedies
- 9 See also
- 10 References
- 11 Further reading
- 12 External links
The constitutional framework and development of administrative law in Australia was highly influenced by legal developments in the United Kingdom and United States. At the end of the 19th century, the British constitutional theorist A. V. Dicey argued that there should be no separate system of administrative law such as the droit administratif which existed in France. As a result, Australian administrative law before World War II developed in an unplanned way.
The present administrative law is largely a result of growing concern about control of bureaucratic decisions in the 1960s. In response a set of committees were established in the early 1970s, whose recommendations constituted the basis for what became known as the "New Administrative Law". The most important of these, the Kerr Report, recommended the establishment of a general administrative tribunal which could review administrative decisions on the merits, codification and procedural reform of the system of judicial review, and the creation of an office of Ombudsman. These proposals were put into practice with the passing of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977; the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975; the Freedom of Information Act (now Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 No 52 1982); and the Ombudsman Act 1976.
One of the most important features of common law systems is that judicial review is conducted by the "ordinary courts of the land" and there are no special administrative or constitutional courts. This principle, prized by A. V. Dicey, is that there must be "equality before the law". Superior courts of general jurisdiction are traditionally regarded as having inherent jurisdiction to review administrative actions.
Section 75 of the Constitution of Australia provides that the High Court shall have original jurisdiction in matters "in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party", and "in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth." Section 75 prevents the federal government from removing the jurisdiction of the High Court without amending the Constitution via a referendum. It also substantially prevents the High Court's original jurisdiction being ousted by a privative clause that purports to prevent any judicial review of an administrative action. Over recent years, a number of High Court decisions have taken a more expansive view of section 75.
Under the doctrine of a strict separation of powers, courts can only review the legality of decisions and actions, not their merits. The distinction between legal review and merits review is sometimes difficult to make.
Unlike the United States, there is no "political questions" doctrine forbidding the courts from reviewing political questions. Whilst no specific exclusion exists as in the United Kingdom, it is likely that the courts would be reluctant to intervene in certain matters. Historically, the courts have generally not inquired into certain classes of administrative actions, such as decisions made under the vice-regal "prerogative powers", foreign policy, See also "Applicants WAIV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs  FCA 1186 (20 September 2002), declarations of war, national security and the award of royal honours. In recent years, the High Court has refused to rule on an Attorney-General's decision not to intervene in a case, and to intervene in the politically sensitive area of national security.
Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth  HCA 1
The common law traditionally requires a plaintiff to show standing - a sufficient interest in the matter - before being given the right to take action. Public interest standing, an emotional concern or the right of any citizen to take action to enforce a public duty, has been ruled out. While a more liberal approach appeared to be gaining traction in the 1990s, the High Court has shown a reluctance to embrace 'open' standing as favoured by Canadian courts.
The Administrative Review Council was to deliver a comprehensive survey of judicial review of administrative action by the end of 2011; as of 9 March 2012, the report has not appeared. This report has been released called report 50: http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/Publications/Reports/Documents/ARCReport50-FederalJudicialReviewinAustralia-2012.PDF
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
The AAT was established by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) as a hybrid between court and administrative agency. The most significant underlying changes introduced with the AAT are the availability of review on the merits, and a right to obtain reasons for decisions.
The workload of the AAT has grown substantially from 275 applications in 1977-1978. In the period 2004-2005, the number was 7679. The major jurisdictions include taxation, veterans' benefits, social security and workers' compensation.
The AAT was designed to be accessible. Applications, once free, now cost A$777, except for veterans, social security beneficiaries, students, health concession card holders and the indigent, who account for about 80 to 85 percent of applicants. Fees are refundable if the application is successful.
State administrative law tribunals
Some of the states and territories of Australia also have tribunals similar to the AAT. They vary in terms of the degree of formality, focus on mediation, procedure and jurisdiction.
New South Wales
The Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales was established in 1998.
The State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia was established in 2004.
The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal was established in 2009.
In other states and territories
Both at Commonwealth and State level, there is an office of Ombudsman, with wide power to investigate action that relates to matters of administration.
In recent times the office of the Ombudsman has been the subject of tight budgetary constraints. Privatisation of formerly government functions has also removed many activities from the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Freedom of information
Australia was the first country with a Westminster system government to introduce freedom of information legislation, following the model established in the United States in 1966. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) provides access to government information. Similar legislation is now in force in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the individual States of Australia.
Freedom of information is designed to allow individuals access to personal and governmental information, and to allow individuals the opportunity to challenge and where appropriate have their personal information amended. It is also intended to provide open government.
A party may lodge an application under the Act to seek access to a document of an agency or a Minister. Whether an item can be classified as a document for FOI purposes is assessed with regard to their relation to "the affairs of an agency or department."  This means that many political, administrative and personal documents are beyond the reach of an application. Applications are made to the agency or Minister concerned.
There is a fee involved in making that application to the Commonwealth Government, although similar State legislation has often made access to personal information free.
In the 1999 Needs to Know report, the Ombudsman reported that the average charge per request rose from $123 in 1994-1995 to $239 in 1997-1998. There is evidence that these charges are being used to discourage applicants from pursuing claims.
A basic principle involved in the FOI regime is that standing is not an issue: that all members of the public should be entitled to access of government information irrespective of the purpose for which the information is sought. However, one obvious exception has been in the disclosure of personal information. Personal information is almost always exempted from disclosure, in order to protect individuals' private information.
Another very important object underlying the Act is the general intention of Parliament that government information should be disclosed and to encourage this disclosure. Accordingly, the Act uses language which indicates the discretion to deny access to information is just that: a discretion, and thereby encourages agencies to disclose documents or matter even where it may be exempt. There has also been an acknowledgement that general public interest arguments also should influence an agency decision to disclose.
|General exemptions to FOI|
There is a long list of general exemptions to freedom of information. Certain agencies, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, are given a blanket exemption. Exemptions also apply to documents held by contractors and those relating to commercial activities. Even within the scope of permitted material, there must be regard to the statutory boundary that Parliament has imposed.
Ministers can issue conclusive certification that a document or documents are exempt because disclosure would not be in the public interest.
Parties unhappy with the decision of the agency or Minister may go to the next stage of external review, where the original decision to disclose or not disclose will be reconsidered. Under the Commonwealth Act, this external review function is undertaken by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Some States have this external review function vested in an Information Commissioner. Appeals from the AAT would be to the Federal Court, and would ordinarily only be on errors of law.
Simple ultra vires
Decision-making or regulation-making power must be clearly authorised by statute. This 'authority to decide' is known as jurisdiction. The High Court has applied the principle that no general power enables a government, the Governor-General or any other delegated legislation-maker to make regulations "which go outside the field of operation which the Act marks out for itself". This ultra vires, known as jurisdictional error is where the decision maker either: exceeds the jurisdiction, by ‘flouting a statutory limitation, breaching natural justice, asking the wrong question or being wrongly constituted’ i.e. the decision is invalid; or fails to exercise its jurisdiction to make a particular decision.
Abuse of power
Administrative decisions, including those exercising a discretionary power, must be designed to achieve a purpose or object authorised by the empowering legislation.
The doctrine of procedural fairness, or natural justice, stems from common law and was associated with the jurisprudential tradition of natural law. The courts have emphasised its flexible character, with Justice Brennan referring to the "chameleon-like" character of its rules.
The right to procedural fairness is assumed to exist in administrative decision-making environments, except where it is clearly excluded by statute. Since the 1960s, the courts have tended to extend the right to procedural fairness to matters where not only legal rights are at stake but also the "legitimate expectations" of protection of various interests, notably commercial interests, employment, individual liberty and reputation.
However, there is no obligation to accord natural justice beyond the statute. An example of procedural fairness, is the right that a defendant has in being able to respond to a case being made against oneself.
The main statutory remedies are those available at the federal level under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), or under similar judicial review legislation at the State level in Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, and the Australian Capital Territory.
- Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth  HCA 5 AustLII
- See sections 5-7.
- A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edition (London: Macmillan, 1959).
- Section 75(iii).
- Section 75(v).
- See Re Refugee Review Tribunal, Ex parte Aala 204 CLR 8; see also, Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 43 ALR 587 AustLII; see also, Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia  HCA 2 AustLII
- Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference  HCA 16 AustLII; see also Re Judiciary & Navigation Acts  HCA 20 AustLII; see also Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274 AustLII
- Tabag v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs  Federal Law Review 13(3) Austlii
- Re Ditfort; Ex Parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1988) 19 FCR 347.
- In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service  AC 374, the House of Lords accepted that specific exclusions exist.
- See Ruddock v Vadarlis  FCA 1329; See also Pape v The Commissioner of Taxation  HCA 23 AustLII; See also "State of New South Wales v Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd  NSWCA 174 AustLii; see also Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd  HCA 40 AustLII.
- Batemans Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247.
- Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25.
- for criterion see Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1979) 146 CLR 493 AustLII; See also: Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27 AustLII; "Re Mactiernan; Ex Parte Coogee Coastal Action Coalition Incorporated"  WASC 264 ; See also: Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs (SA) (1995) HC AustLII; See also Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd  HCA 49 AustLII; see also Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers v Secretary, Department of Transport  FCA 443 AustLII.
- Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493. See also Right To Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health and Family Planning Inc (Vic) (1995) 128 ALR 238
- see Truth About Motorways v Macquarie.
- For the Canadian approach, see Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance)  2 SCR 607.
- s 28 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act AustLII
- "Workload and performance", Administrative Appeals Annual Report 2004-2005
- Standard fee as of 1 July 2006. See AAT fees.
- Ruddle, Elizabeth H. "A beginners guide to VCAT Civil Jurisdiction". Victorian Bar Association. Retrieved 22 October 2012.
- "Who we are". Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Government of Victoria. Retrieved 22 October 2012.
- Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997
- Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT): http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/alt_a1989-46co/current/pdf/alt_a1989-46co.pdf
- Parnell and Prime Minister of Australia (No.2)  AICmr 12.
- Needs to Know: Own motion investigation into the administration of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 in Commonwealth agencies (Accessed 2 July 2006).
- See Part IV Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act) 1982 (Cth) Austlii
- See Parnell and Prime Minister of Australia  AICmr 10 (21 December 2011) Austlii
- Sections 11A, 11B FOI Act.
- Sections 33A(2), 3(4) FOI Act.
- Section 16 ADJR Act AustLII
- Project Blue Sky v ABA  HCA 28 AustLII
- Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 524.
- Shanahan v Scott (1957) 96 CLR 245. See also Foley v Padley  HCA 50 AustLii
- Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte  HCA 7 AustLII; see also Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 AustLII
- Schlieske v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs  FCA 48 (4 March 1988)AustLII; see also, Thompson v Randwick Corporation (1950) 81 CLR 87 (9 September 1950) AustLII
- Kioa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (West) (1985) 159 CLR 550. See also G Johnson, "Natural justice and legitimate expectation in Australia" (1985) 15 Federal Law Review 39.
- Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth  HCA 2; 211 CLR 476; 195 ALR 24; 77 ALJR 454; as per Gleeson CJ at .
- Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 AustLII
- See also Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 AustLII
- Salemi v McKellar (1977) 137 CLR 396
- "Kioa v West" (1985) 159 CLR 550
- Link text, additional text.
- Creyke, Robin; McMillan, John (2009). Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (2 ed.). Chatswood (Sydney): LexisNexis. ISBN 978-0-409-32367-2.
- Douglas, Roger (2009). Douglas and Jones's Administrative Law (6 ed.). Leichhardt (Sydney): Federation Press. ISBN 978-1-86287-722-1.
- McDonald, Peter Cane, Leighton (2012). Principles of administrative law : legal regulation of governance (2nd ed. ed.). South Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195576092.
- Administrative Appeals Tribunal
- Migration Review Tribunal
- National Native Title Tribunal
- Refugee Review Tribunal
- Council of Australasian Tribunals
- Freedom of information
- "Freedom of information", Attorney-General's Department
- Office of the Information Commissioner (NSW)
- Freedom of Information Review
- Research bodies