|Part of the Politics series|
|Basic forms of
Authoritarianism is a form of government. Juan Linz, whose 1964 description of authoritarianism is influential, characterized authoritarianism regimes are political systems characterized by four qualities: (1) "limited, not responsibile, political pluralism"; that is, constraints on political institutions and groups (such as legislatures, political parties, and interest groups), (2) a basis for legitimacy based on emotion, especially the identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems" such as underdevelopment or insurgency; (3) neither "intensive nor extensive political mobilization" and constraints on the mass public (such as repressive tactics against opponents and a prohibition of antiregime activity) and (4) "formally ill-defined" executive power, often shifting or vague.
Linz distingushed new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats, and others); unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.
Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others. Linz identified the two most basis subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureacratic-military authoritation regimes. Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties, and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties"; an example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I. Bureacratic-military authoritarian regumes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality. Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such as South Korea under Park Chung-hee.
Linz also has identified several three other subtypes authoritarian regime: corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy," and post-totalitarian. Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatist institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups"; this type has been studied most extensively in Latin America. Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democractic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights," such as in South Africa under apartheid. Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police, and state-controlled mass media) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially." Examples include the Soviet Eastern bloc states in the mid-1980s.
Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist. Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutitions and formal rules." Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manuipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups." Examples include Argentina under Perón and Egypt under Nasser.
Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.
Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors," the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties, and little tolerance for meaningful opposition.
A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society, while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime, and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination.
Authoritarian political systems may be weakened through "inadequate performance to demands of the people." Vestal writes that the tendency to respond to challenges to authoritarianism through tighter control instead of adaptation is a significant weakness, and that this overly rigid approach fails to "adapt to changes or to accommodate growing demands on the part of the populace or even groups within the system." Because the legitimacy of the state is dependent on performance, authoritarian states that fail to adapt may collapse.
Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a single-party state) or other authority. The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.
John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism. Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.
Authoritarianism and totalitarianism 
Totalitarianism is an extreme version of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:
|Role conception||Leader as function||Leader as individual|
|Ends of power||Public||Private|
(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic 'mystique' and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.
(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings, largely content to control, and often maintain, the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable 'function' to guide and reshape the universe.(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy.
Thus, compared to totalitarian systems, authoritarian systems may also leave a larger sphere for private life, lack a guiding ideology, tolerate some pluralism in social organization, lack the power to mobilize the whole population in pursuit of national goals, and exercise their power within relatively predictable limits.
Authoritarianism and democracy 
Authoritarianism and democracy are not fundamentally opposed to one another, it is thus perfectly possible for democracies to possess strong authoritarian elements, for both feature a form of submission to authority. An illiberal democracy (or procedural democracy) is distinguished from liberal democracy (or substantive democracy) in that illiberal democracies lack the more democratic features of liberal democracies, such as the rule of law, an independent judiciary, along with a further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another. More recent research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few Militarized Interstate Disputes causing less battle deaths with one another, and that democracies have few civil wars.
- Poor democracies tend to have better education, longer life expectancy, lower infant mortality, access to drinking water, and better health care than poor dictatorships. This is not due to higher levels of foreign assistance or spending a larger percentage of GDP on health and education. Instead, the available resources are more likely to be managed better.
- Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector, or income inequality.
- A prominent economist, Amartya Sen, has theorized that no functioning country labeled as having a liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine. This includes democracies that have not been very prosperous historically, like India, which had its last great famine in 1943 and many other large-scale famines before that in the late nineteenth century, all under British rule. (However, some others ascribe the Bengal famine of 1943 to the effects of World War II. The government of India had been becoming progressively more democratic for years. Provincial government had been entirely so since the Government of India Act of 1935.)
- Refugee crises almost always occur in the least democratic countries. Looking at the volume of refugee flows for the last twenty years, the first eighty-seven cases occurred in most authoritarian countries.
- Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. However it should be noted that those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.
- Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption: parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption. Freedom of information legislation is important for accountability and transparency. The Indian Right to Information Act "has already engendered mass movements in the country that is bringing the lethargic, often corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing power equations completely."
- Of the eighty worst financial catastrophes during the last four decades, only five were in countries labeled as democracies. Similarly, those labeled as "poor democracies" are half as likely as countries labeled as non-democracies to experience a 10 percent decline in GDP per capita over the course of a single year.
- One study has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least amount of terrorism are the most and least democratic nations.
Authoritarian states 
Since there is no precise, universally agreed definition of authoritarianism, there is no definitive list of states that are authoritarian. But several annual measurements attempt to do so, including the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (which classifies 51 states as authoritarian) and Freedom House's Freedom in the World report.
Examples of states which are frequently characterized as authoritarian:
- People's Republic of China - "some scholars have deemed the Chinese system a 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Lieberthal), a 'negotiated state' or a 'consultative authoritarian regime.'"
- Russia under Vladimir Putin - described as "really a mixture of authoritarianism and managed democracy"
- Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyazov
- Cuba under Fidel and Raúl Castro
- Saudi Arabia under the House of Saud.
Examples of states which were previously authoritarian, but are no longer:
- Burma from a 1962 coup until a transition to democracy beginning in 2011.
- South Korea from the early 1970s until a transition to democracy in 1987.
- Spain under Francisco Franco from 1936 to 1975, when the Spanish transition to democracy began after Franco's death.
- Taiwan from the 228 Incident of 1947 until a transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- Libya under Muammar Gaddafi's rule.
- Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.
- Brazil during both the Estado Novo period under Getúlio Vargas (1937–1945) and under military government from a 1964 coup until a transition to democracy in the early and mid-1980s.
- Argentina under the Argentine Revolution period of military rule (1966-1973) and later during the justicialismo rule of Juan Perón (populist authoritarianism).
- Chile under Pinochet.
Authoritarianism in history 
In contrast to the varying manifestations of authoritarianism, more democratic forms of governance as a standard mode of political organization became widespread only after the Industrial Revolution had established modernity. Tyrants and oligarchs bracketed the flourishing of democracy in ancient Athens; and kings and emperors preceded and followed experimentation with democratic forms in the Roman Republic. In the 15th century, Vlad Dracula is credited for being the first ruler of Wallachia and Transylvania to rule by Authoritarianism.
With the decline of authoritarianism as a legitimate method of government after World War II and the commencement of the Nuremberg Trials in Germany, psychologists from around the world began to ask questions as to how individuals from Germany and other authoritarian states were compelled to commit crimes against humanity.
One experiment by Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram attempted to answer whether or not accomplices in the Holocaust were acting with a shared sense of morality (i.e. All accomplices believed that the individuals in the Holocaust deserved to die) or if they were acting according to the situations they were exposed to (i.e. Soldiers, expected to follow orders, did so, even if those orders directly contradicted their personal beliefs). The initial results of the Milgram experiment identified that 65% of its participants would lethally harm another human being if they were ordered to do so. Variations of this experiment were conducted around the world with similar results. Milgram hypothesised that these results were due to two separate factors:
- The theory of conformism', an individual who has no ability or expertise to make decisions will leave decision making to the group. And,
- The agentic state theory, whereby a person views him/herself as an agent for the execution of another person’s will. Due to this, the individual no longer identifies himself as being responsible for his actions.
See also 
- Richard Shorten, Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 256 (note 67).
- Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, p. 40-50 (citing Linz 1964).
- Todd Landman, Studying Human Rights (Routledge, 2003), p. 71 (citing Linz 1964 and others).
- Mark J. Gasiorowski, The Political Regimes Project, in On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (ed. Alex Inketes), 2006, p. 110-11.
- Theodore M. Vesta, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State. Greenwood, 1999, p. 17.
- Duckitt, J. (1989). "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct". Political Psychology 10 (1): 63–84. doi:10.2307/3791588. JSTOR 3791588.
- Kemmelmeier, M.; Burnstein, E.; Krumov, K.; Genkova, P.; Kanagawa, C.; Hirshberg, M. S.; Erb, H. P.; Wieczorkowska, G. et al. (2003). "Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies". Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 34 (3): 304. doi:10.1177/0022022103034003005.
- Sondrol, P. C. (2009). "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner". Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (3): 599. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00015868.
- Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellington, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). "Towards A Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War 1816-1992". American Political Science Review 95: 33–48. Archived from the original on 2004-04-06.
- Ray, James Lee (200l3). A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program From Progress in International Relations Theory, edited by Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman. MIT Press.
- "The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace". Carnegie Council.[dead link]
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- Sen, A. K. (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3–1. doi:10.1353/jod.1999.0055.
- Rummel RJ (1997). Power kills: democracy as a method of nonviolence. New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-56000-297-2.
- Daniel Lederman, Normal Loaza, Rodrigo Res Soares, (November 2001). "Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2708. SSRN 632777. Retrieved February 19, 2006.
- "AsiaMedia :: Right to Information Act India's magic wand against corruption". Asiamedia.ucla.edu. 2006-08-31. Retrieved 2012-02-02.
- Harvard News Office (2004-11-04). "Harvard Gazette: Freedom squelches terrorist violence". News.harvard.edu. Retrieved 2012-02-02.
- Ming Xia, China Rises Companion: Political Governance, New York Times. See also Cheng Li, The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China (September 2012), The China Quarterly, Vol. 211; Perry Link and Joshua Kurlantzick, China's Modern Authoritarianism (May 25, 2009), Wall Street Journal; Ariana Eunjung Cha, China, Cuba, Other Authoritarian Regimes Censor News From Iran (June 27, 2009), Washington Post.
- Thomas Fuller, In Hard Times, Open Dissent and Repression Rise in Vietnam (April 23, 2013), New York Times
- Nikolay Petrov and Michael McFaul, The Essence of Putin's Managed Democracy (October 18, 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Tom Parfitt, Billionaire tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov who is running in 4 March election says it is time for evolution not revolution (January 11, 2012), Guardian; Richard Denton, Russia's 'managed democracy' (May 11, 2006), BBC News.
- Turkmenistan's 'iron ruler' dies (December 21, 2006), BBC News.
- Ariana Eunjung Cha, China, Cuba, Other Authoritarian Regimes Censor News From Iran (June 27, 2009), Washington Post; Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution (July 16, 2001), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (2011), Harvard University Press, pp. 5, 14-15; Kira D. Baiasu, Sustaining Authoritarian Rule, Fall 2009, Volume 10, Issue 1 (September 30, 2009), Northwestern Journal of International Affairs.
- Nebil Husayn, Authoritarianism in Bahrain: Motives, Methods and Challenges, AMSS 41st Annual Conference (September 29, 2012); Parliamentary Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Bahrain (January 13, 2011), Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
- Thomas Carothers, Q&A: Is Burma Democratizing? (April 2, 2012), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; President Discusses Burma/Myanmar in Transition at World Affairs Council Sacramento (April 3, 2013), Asia Foundation; Louise Arbour, In Myanmar, Sanctions Have Had Their Day (March 5, 2012), New York Times.
- Hyug Baeg Im, The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea, World Politics Vol. 39, Issue 2 (January 1987), pp. 231-257
- The Other R.O.K.: Memories of Authoritarianism in Democratic South Korea (October 11, 2011), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Sangmook Lee, Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea, July 2007, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, No.1, pp. 99-125.
- Richard Gunther, The Spanish Model Revisited, in The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model, (eds. Diego Muro & Gregorio Alonso), Taylor & Francis 2010, p. 19.
- Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin, Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?, The China Quarterly, No. 136, Special Issue: Greater China (December 1993), pp. 805-839; Shirley A. Kan, Congressional Research Service, Democratic Reforms in Taiwan: Issues for Congress (May 26, 2010); Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (1996), eds. Charles Chi-Hsiang Chang & Hung-Mao Tien; Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game:Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West (2010), Oxford University Press, pp. 217-222.
- Gaddafi's 41-Year-Long Rule, Washington Post; Martin Asser, The Muammar Gaddafi Story (October 21, 2011), BBC News; Alistair Dawber, One Libyan in three wants return to authoritarian rule (February 16, 2012), Independent.
- Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (2004); Andrea M. Perkins, Mubarak's Machine: The Durability of the Authoritarian Regime in Egypt (M.A. thesis, April 8, 2010, University of South Florida).
- James M. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Political Economy of Policy-making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1967-70, in Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (1985), eds. Philip J. O'Brien & Paul A. Cammack, Manchester University Press.
- Todd L. Edwards, Argentina: A Global Studies Handbook (2008), pp. 45-46; Steven E. Sanderson, The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development (1992), Stanford University Press, p. 133; William C. Smith, Reflections on the Political Economy of Authoritarian Rule and Capitalist Reorganization in Contemporary Argentina, in Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (1985), eds. Philip J. O'Brien & Paul A. Cammack, Manchester University Press.
- Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective (University of California Press, 1988); James M. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (1996; ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Howard J. Wiards, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "ism" (1997), pp. 113-14.
- Steven E. Sanderson, The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development (1992), Stanford University Press, p. 133; Carlos Huneeus, Political Mass Mobilization Against Authoritarian Rule: Pinochet's Chile, 1983-88, in Civil Resistance and Power Politics:The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (2009), Oxford University Press (eds. Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash).
- Treptow, Kurt W. “Vlad III Dracula and his Relations with the Boyars and the Church.” East European Monographs, No. DXIX. Columbia University Press: New York, 1998. p.27–40
- Blass, Thomas (2004). The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. Basic Books. ISBN 0-7382-0399-8.
- Milgram, Stanley (1974). Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View. Harpercollins. ISBN 0-06-131983-X.
- The Milgram Experiment | A lesson in depravity, the power of authority, and peer pressure
Works cited 
- Juan J. Linz, An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain, in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (eds. Eric Allard & Yrjo Littunen) (Helsinki: Academic, 1964)</ref>
- Not The End Of History? Democracy vs Authoritarianism Debated
- Growth of Authoritarianism in America
- Are we entering the age of the autocrat? Francis Fukuyama, Washington Post, August 24, 2008