Badaber Uprising

Badaber Uprising
Part of the Soviet war in Afghanistan and Operation Cyclone
Date April 26–27, 1985 Location Badaber, Peshawar District, Pakistan Result Mujahideen/Pakistani victory Uprising was suppressed
Belligerents
Soviet prisoners Republic of Afghanistan prisoners	Afghan mujahideen Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Viktor Vasil'evich Duhovchenko	Burhanuddin Rabbani
Strength
12 Soviet and 40 Afghanistan captives	~300 Afghan mujahideen, Pakistan 11th Army corps, ~50 foreign military instructors
Casualties and losses
All 52 captives killed	~100-120 mujahideen 40-90 Pakistani soldiers killed

Badaber Uprising was an armed uprising by Soviet Union and Republic of Afghanistan (RA) captives held at the Badaber fortress-jail in Pakistan on April 26 and 27, 1985, against much larger units of Pakistan's regular army accompanied by Afghan mujahideen. The attempt of the captives to liberate themselves failed. As a result of the two-day assault of the fortress-jail Badaber by the guards with accompanying artillery shelling, all the captives were killed.

Background

The Badaber refugee camp, 24 km from Peshawar, acted as the military training center for Afghan rebels who opposed the Soviet presence in their country. They trained under supervision by military instructors from USA, Pakistan, Republic of China and Egypt. The Badaber base belonged to Jamiat-e Islami of Afghanistan, one of the most influential and major opposition groups that resisted Soviet influence in Afghanistan supported by the US Operation Cyclone.

Soviet and DRA captives were brought to the base in 1983-1984 after being held in zindans by rebel units. They were assigned heavy duties that included work in a quarry and loading of ordnance. As of 1985, 25 Soviet and about 60 Afghan captives were held in Badaber.

Communication with the shuravis or Soviet Afghans was prohibited during the period of imprisonment. Anyone trying to talk was whipped.

The uprising and the revolt

On 26 April 1985, at about 18:00 pm, a group of captives rose in rebellion against their captors. They used the moment when only two of 70 mujahideen were guarding the prison; the others were gathered on the drill square to perform evening prayers (namaz). The captives entered the armoury, took weapons and ammunition and tried to escape. Some sources say that the main objective was to capture the fortress' radio center and go on-air and report the prison's location.

The escape was blocked when Haist Gol, the Badaber head guard, came to know about it and raised the alarm. He took all possible measures to prevent the escape of the captives. The captives were forced to stay in the base and seized the key points in the fortress. Mujahideen detachments, as well as infantry, tank and artillery units of 11th Pakistan Army Corps quickly blocked the fortress area. Several attempts to recapture the fortress were repelled by the defending captives.

Burhanuddin Rabbani, then leader of Jamiat-e Islami, arrived at the base on 21:00 pm and began negotiations. He proposed that the captives surrender and promised their lives would be spared. The defending captives put forth demands to meet with a Soviet or Afghanistan ambassador in Pakistan and representatives from the Red Cross. They threatened to blow up the armoury if their demands were not met. Rabbani rejected these demands, fuelling attacks that continued all night.

By 08:00 am on 27 April, it became clear that the revolt would not end. Rabbani missed being hit by rockets fired from the fortress, but his bodyguard received serious shrapnel wounds in the attack. The Jamiat-e Islami leader decided to finish the battle with an all-out assault on the fort. He drew on artillery units, in particular rocket systems 9K51 Grad, tanks and Pakistan Air Force helicopters to use against the defenders.

How the revolt ended is viewed differently by each side. Some say that one of the artillery shells struck the armoury building, setting off an overwhelming explosion. The series of explosions practically levelled the prison at Badaber. Three wounded and shell-shocked survivors were dragged to the walls and blown up by attackers using hand grenades.

Other sources said that the defenders blew the armoury up themselves, after it became clear that the battle was in vain.

Casualties

The defending captives

The identities of the captives are largely unknown. Among them, Junior Sergeant Saminj Nikolay Grigoriyevich was posthumously awarded the Kazahstan Republic Order of Valor, 3rd degree December 12, 2003 and Private Zverkovich Alexandr Nikolaevich was posthumously recognized in memory of the 10th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan.

The prison guards

According to different sources, approximately 100 to 120 mujahideen and 40 to 90 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The explosion destroyed the Badaber base, 3 9K51 Grad multiple rocket launchers, thousands of shells and rockets, about 40 cannons, mortars and machine-guns. The fortress' chancellery was also destroyed along with the list of captives.

Aftermath

The incident caused alarm among Pakistani government officials and Afghan mujahideen. On April 29, 1985, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the president of Pakistan, decided to classify all information related to the incident. On the same day, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the lead of the Hezbi Islami, issued an order stating: "Do not capture shuravi soldiers in the future, but annihilate them at the taking place." The intelligence reports from the Aerospace Service Center on April 28, 1985 shocked the Soviet government as well: "The crater size on the image received by communication satellite reaches 80 meters."

On May 9, 1985, a representative of the International Red Cross visited the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad and confirmed the armed uprising of prisoners of war.

On May 11, 1985, Soviet ambassador noted a protest of the Soviet government to Pakistan President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, which is stated: "The Soviet side holds full responsibility for what had happened to the Government of Pakistan and expects that it will make appropriate conclusions about the effects posed by his complicity in the aggression against the DRA and thereby against the Soviet Union." However, no other measures against Pakistan had been taken by USSR.

The remarkable "restraint" shown by the Soviets given their known history of seeking retribution, has led to public speculation in Pakistan that the April 10th 1988 Ojhri Camp incident and possibly the 17th August 1988 mysterious crash of General Zia ul Haq's C-130 may have been the work of KHAD and/or the KGBin retaliation for the brutal treatment of the Soviet POWs.

On May 16, 1985, UN permanent representative of DRA M. Zarif sent a letter concerning this incident to the UN Secretary-General, which was circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

According to Colonel Yousaf Mohammad, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence officer, the incident "could quickly get out of hand, or lead to international confrontation". The fact of uprising was concealed by both Pakistan and USSR governments for many years until the dissolution of the USSR. Six names of participants in the uprising were given to Alexander Rutskoy committee by Shahryar Khan, the deputy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, only in 1992.

In 2002, the application for award of three uprising participants, the Russians Igor Vas'kov, Nicholay Dudkin and Sergei Levchishin, was sent by the Warriors-Internationalists Affairs Committee‎ to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. The response was negative: "Unfortunately, there is no basis to proceed with the application for award".

Mass culture

The Russian / Kazakhstan movie Peshavarskiy Vals released in 1994 was based on this incident.

See also

• Burhanuddin Rabbani
• Inter-Services Intelligence
• Operation Cyclone

References

• Afghanistan - The Bear Trap (The Defeat of a Super-power). Yousaf, Mohammad & Adkin, Mark. 2006. ISBN 81-87330-15-5.
• Трагедия и доблесть Афгана. Александр Ляховский. 1995. ISBN 5-85844-047-9. (Russian)
• "Восстание в тюрьме Бадабера." - according to the newspaper "Pobratim", #6. 2005. (Russian)
• Мятежные узники "Бадабера". A. Korobov. Boevoe bratstvo magazine, 2005. (Russian)
• "Мы чести воина не уронили". B. Malorodov. Boevoe bratstvo magazine, 2006. (Russian)
• "К подвигу всечасно не готовлясь, он был всечасно к подвигу готов". E. Tibilova. Yuzhnaya Osetiya magazine, October 7, 2006. (Russian)
• "Прокляты и забыты?" A.Pochtaryov. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 13, 2004 (Russian)