The first large-scale Asian–African or Afro–Asian Conference—also known as the Bandung Conference—was a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, which took place on April 18–24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. The twenty-five countries that participated at the Bandung Conference represented nearly one-fourth of the Earth's land surface and a total population of 1.5 billion people. The conference was organised by Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and India and was coordinated by Ruslan Abdulgani, secretary general of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by any nation. The conference was an important step toward the Non-Aligned Movement.
The conference of Bandung was preceded by the Bogor Conference (1949).
The conference reflected what the organisers regarded as a reluctance by the Western powers to consult with them on decisions affecting Asia in a setting of Cold War tensions; their concern over tension between the People's Republic of China and the United States; their desire to lay firmer foundations for China's peace relations with themselves and the West; their opposition to colonialism, especially French influence in North Africa and its colonial rule in Algeria; and Indonesia's desire to promote its case in the dispute with the Netherlands over western New Guinea (Irian Barat).
Plans for the conference were announced in December 1954.
Major debate centered around the question of whether Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia should be censured along with Western colonialism. A consensus was reached in which "colonialism in all of its manifestations" was condemned, implicitly censuring the Soviet Union, as well as the West. China played an important role in the conference and strengthened its relations with other Asian nations. Having survived an assassination attempt on the way to the conference, the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, displayed a moderate and conciliatory attitude that tended to quiet fears of some anticommunist delegates concerning China's intentions.
Later in the conference, Zhou Enlai signed on to the article in the concluding declaration stating that overseas Chinese owed primary loyalty to their home nation, rather than to China – a highly sensitive issue for both his Indonesian hosts and for several other participating countries. Zhou also signed an agreement on dual nationality with Indonesian foreign minister Sunario.
A 10-point "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation," incorporating the principles of the United Nations Charter was adopted unanimously:
- Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations
- Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small
- Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country
- Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
- (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of the big powers
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries
- Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country
- Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
- Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation
- Respect for justice and international obligations.
The final Communique of the Conference underscored the need for developing countries to loosen their economic dependence on the leading industrialized nations by providing technical assistance to one another through the exchange of experts and technical assistance for developmental projects, as well as the exchange of technological know-how and the establishment of regional training and research institutes.
United States involvement
For the US, the Conference accentuated a central dilemma of its Cold War policy: by currying favor with Third World nations by claiming opposition to colonialism, it risked alienating its colonialist European allies. The US security establishment also feared that the Conference would expand China's regional power. In January 1955 the US formed a "Working Group on the Afro-Asian Conference" which included the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The OIR and USIA followed a course of "Image Management" for the US, using overt and covert propaganda to portray the US as friendly and to warn participants of the Communist menace.
The United States of America, at the urging of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, shunned the conference and was not officially represented. However, the administration issued a series of statements during the lead-up to the Conference. These suggested that the US would provide economic aid, and attempted to reframe the issue of colonialism as a threat by China and the Eastern Bloc.
Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-N.Y.) attended the conference, sponsored by Ebony and Jet magazines instead of the U.S. government. Powell spoke at some length in favor of American foreign policy there which assisted the United States's standing with the Non-Aligned. When Powell returned to the United States to report on the conference, the House of Representatives honored him for his contributions.
African American author Richard Wright attended the conference with funding from the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Wright spent about three weeks in Indonesia, devoting a week to attending the conference and the rest of his time to interacting with Indonesian artists and intellectuals in preparation to write several articles and a book on his trip to Indonesia and attendance at the conference. Wright's essays on the trip appeared in several Congress for Cultural Freedom magazines, and his book on the trip was published as The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference. Several of the artists and intellectuals with whom Wright interacted (including Mochtar Lubis, Asrul Sani, Sitor Situmorang, and Beb Vuyk) continued discussing Wright's visit after he left Indonesia.
Outcome and legacy
The conference was followed by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo in September (1957) and the Belgrade Conference (1961), which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. In later years, conflicts between the nonaligned nations eroded the solidarity expressed at Bandung.
To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Conference, Heads of State and Government of Asian-African countries attended a new Asian-African Summit from 20–24 April 2005 in Bandung and Jakarta. Some sessions of the new conference took place in Gedung Merdeka (Independence Building), the venue of the original conference. The conference concluded by establishing the New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP).
The 2005 Asian African Summit yielded, inter-alia, the Declaration on the New Asian African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the Joint Ministerial Statement on the New Asian African Strategic Partnership Plan of Action, and the Joint Asian African Leaders’ Statement on Tsunami, Earthquake and other Natural Disaster. The aforementioned declaration of NAASP is a manifestation of intra-regional bridge-building forming a new strategic partnership commitment between Asia and Africa, standing on three pillars, i.e. political solidarity, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural relations, within which governments, regional/sub-regional organizations, as well as peoples of Asian and African nations interact.
The 2005 Asian African Summit was attended by 106 countries, comprising 54 Asian countries and 52 African countries . The Summit concluded a follow-up mechanism for institutionalization process in the form of Summit concurrent with Business Summit every four years, Ministerial Meeting every two years, and Sectoral Ministerial as well as Technical Meeting if deemed necessary.
- Kingdom of Afghanistan
- Kingdom of Cambodia
- People's Republic of China
- Republic of Egypt
- Ethiopian Empire
- Gold Coast
- Imperial State of Iran
- Kingdom of Iraq
- Kingdom of Laos
- Kingdom of Libya
- Kingdom of Nepal
- Saudi Arabia
- Syrian Republic
- Democratic Republic of Vietnam
- State of Vietnam
- Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen
Some nations were given "observer status". Such was the case of Brazil, who sent Ambassador Bezerra de Menezes.
- Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization
- Cold War
- Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
- Non-Aligned Movement
- Third World
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