Barry McCaffrey

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Barry Richard McCaffrey
Barry McCaffrey.jpg
McCaffrey in February 1994
4th Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
In office
February 29, 1996 – January 4, 2001
President Bill Clinton
Preceded by Lee P. Brown
Succeeded by John P. Walters
Personal details
Born (1942-11-17) November 17, 1942 (age 71)
Taunton, Massachusetts, U.S.[1]
Military service
Allegiance  United States of America
Service/branch  United States Army
Years of service 1964–1996
Rank US-O10 insignia.svg General
Commands 24th Infantry Division
U.S. Southern Command

Barry Richard McCaffrey (born November 17, 1942) is a retired United States Army general, news commentator and business consultant. He received three Purple Heart medals for injuries sustained during his service in Vietnam, two Silver Stars for valor, and two Distinguished Service Crosses — the second-highest U.S. Army award for valor.[2] He was inducted into U.S. Army Ranger Hall of Fame at U.S. Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning in 2007.[3] He served as an adjunct professor at U.S. Military Academy and its Bradley Professor of International Security Studies from 2001 to 2008. He received West Point Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy's Distinguished Graduate Award in 2010.[4][5] He is currently a military analyst for NBC and MSNBC as well as president of his own consulting firm, BR McCaffrey Associates.[6] He serves on many boards of directors of national corporations. He is an outspoken advocate for insurance parity, for drug courts[7][8] and veterans' courts,[9] and is a frequent speaker at conferences.[10][11]

Education[edit]

McCaffrey graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover in 1960 and U.S. Military Academy (Class of 1964) and earned an M.A. in Civil Government from American University in 1970. He also attended Harvard University's National Security Program and Business School Executive Education Program.[12][13] His postgraduate military education included United States Army War College, Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute's program in Vietnamese,[14] and Armor School Advanced Course.[15]

Military career[edit]

Following his graduation from West Point in 1964, McCaffrey was commissioned into the infantry.[16]

His combat tours included action in the Dominican Republic with 82nd Airborne Division in 1965, advisory duty with Army of the Republic of Vietnam from 1966–67, and company command with 1st Cavalry Division from 1968–69.[16] During the course of his service, he was twice awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Purple Heart three times for injuries sustained in combat, and the Silver Star twice.[14]

General McCaffrey's peacetime assignments included tours as an instructor at U.S. Military Academy from 1972–75, Assistant Commandant at U.S. Army Infantry School; Deputy U.S. Representative to NATO; Assistant Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); and Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff.[16]

"Left Hook" attack[edit]

During Operation Desert Storm, McCaffrey commanded 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Under his command, the division conducted the "left hook" attack 370 km into Iraq, one of the boldest military maneuvers ever undertaken, leading to decisive battle victory in the First Gulf War and also putting troops in place for the final battle of the war.

In his book "Prodigal Soldiers," James Kitfield recounted McCaffrey's "left hook" attack plan. McCaffrey commanded "two entire Army corps deep into Iraqi territory. If successful, and no army in history had ever moved a force that size over 300 miles on the time line General Norman J. Schwarzkopf was reciting, the move would flank the Republican Guard divisions in Kuwait and cut off all avenues of retreat ... The briefing left McCaffrey slightly stunned. He was part of the flanking force, and his mind was already starting to race over a logistics problem the war colleges would call a potential war-stopper, yet he had one overriding thought: We're not going to fight a war of attrition, or a limited war. It was a revelation. He saw now that the Army was going to play to its strengths and the enemy's weakness. By God, we learned. We learned (from the lessons of Vietnam)."[17]

In their book "The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf,"[18] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor wrote more about the "left hook" attack:

"It was the largest air assault in Army history and gave the (French 6th) Division a staging area for launching attacks in western Iraq and attacking Highway 8, the east-west route along the Euphrates (River).

"Racing ahead with his fuel trucks, McCaffrey's division was roaring northward, with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment providing protection to its flank. McCaffrey was speeding toward the Euphrates River at a remarkable 30 miles an hour over rocky terrain. McCaffrey was hurrying to link up with Peay's 101st, cut Highway 8, and then turn east to attack the Republican Guard ...

"As dawn broke, Rhame's 1st Mechanized Infantry Division clear lanes through the minefields and, instead of sending troops to clear the trenches of Iraqi soldiers, Rhame sent bulldozers to plow over the trench line, entombing any Iraqis who resisted or were too slow to surrender.

"The armored bulldozers were not a novel killing machine. They were used in both World War II and Vietnam for the same purpose. Nor were they more brutal than the pounding the Iraqi front lines took from artillery, tons of bombs, fuel-air explosives, and napalm used by allied forces. The divisions efforts to publicize its exploits after the war backfired when news reports said that thousands of Iraqi troops may have been buried alive. A classified log prepared by the division officiers at the time, however, put the number of Iraqis buried at 150, and after the war, the Iraqis managed to unearth only several dozen bodies. ...

"On the morning of February 27 (1991), Barry McCaffrey flew to Jalibah airfield to meet with his commanders. Located 30 miles south of Highway 8, the east-west road that ran to Basra, Jalibah had been one of Iraq's main airfields during the war. But now it was pockmarked with the burned and twisted wreckage of Iraqi MiG-29s and other fighters that McCaffrey's 24th Division had blasted in a four-hourfight to seize the airfield.

"After leaving his helicopter, the general made his way over to Col. Paul Kern, the commanded of the division's 2nd brigade. Kern had deployed his command post -- to M-577 armored personnel carriers full of communications equipment -- within a protective cordon of M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, which guarded the perimeter of the airfield.

"No general was more aggressive than McCaffrey. Her had been badly wounded in Vietnam, but it had not shaken his confidence or his ardor for battle. Unlike the VII Corps planners, McCaffrey was not in awe of the Iraqis. Dug into their fighting holes and with no air force to protect them, the Iraqi army was like a bunch of 'tethered goats,' McCaffrey recalled after the war.

"Schwarzkopf had a soft spot for the general, who commanded his old unit. Just before McCaffrey's divison moved to its attack positions in the Saudi desert, Schwarzkopf flew up to give a pep talk to one of the division's reconnaissance teams. Before returning to his helicopter, Schwarzkopf grabbed McCaffrey by his uniform. With tears welling in his eyes, the commander to McCaffrey that once the ground war started, there would be no stopping until the Army had destroyed the Republican Guard. President (George H. W.) Bush has assured Schwarzkopf of that. That moment was chiseled in McCaffrey's memory.

"When it came time to launch the ground war, McCaffrey issues a top secret attack order that seemed like a call to a holy war and alluded to the assurance he had received from Schwarzkopf. 'Soldiers of the Victory Division -- we now begin a great battle to destroy an aggressor army and free two million Kuwaiti people,' the order read. 'We will fight under the American flag and with the authority of the United Nations. By force of arms, we will make the Iraqi war machine surrender the country they hold prisoner. There will be no turning back when we attack into battle."[18]

A subsequent Rand Corporation report, "Technology's Child: Schwarzkopf and Operation Desert Storm,"[19] further described the battle plan:

"Since Saddam had most of his forces in southern Kuwait and along the Gulf coast to the east, the ground plan called for moving VII Corps several hundred miles in a wide arc to the west, and attacking through Iraq to hit the Republican Guard. It would amount to a gigantic left hook. Massive, swift, crushing tank attacks were central to the plan ... The idea was to force Saddam to move his hundreds of thousands of troops from dug-in positions so they could be picked-off with superior US air and ground fire ... For deception, Schwarzkopf instructed XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps to maintain their forces in assembly areas near Kuwait, to keep Iraqi forces focused on those two avenues of approach. As soon as the air war began, the Iraqis would be pinned down and both corps would shift laterally several hundred miles to the west without interference ... The ground war lasted just 100 hours before President Bush, in consultation with his military commanders, called a halt. Of 42 Iraqi divisions in the theater at the beginning of the war, 27 were destroyed and an additional six were rendered combat-ineffective. However, (more than) half the Republican Guard, including the nearly intact Hammurabi Division, escaped the enveloping "left hook," leaving a legacy of controversy about whether General Frederick Franks’ VII Corps had moved quickly enough. When the Iraqis finally fled from Kuwait, they jammed the road north out of the city with vehicles and booty, which the coalition air power then blocked and savaged. The vivid descriptions of the resulting carnage were probably a significant factor in the decision to halt military operations.",[19] extensively quoting from It Doesn't Take A Hero, the autobiography of General Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre.[20]

Describing the "left hook" battle plan and its aftermath, Schwarzkopf and Petre wrote, "General McCaffrey's mission was to leapfrog his units 300 miles north and to occupy and 80-mile-by-60-mile zone with the Marines digging in around Al Jubayl. General J. H. Binford Peay III was to establish bases along McCaffrey's left flank, from which his helicopters and troops could defend a 100-mile arc of desert to the north and west. A brigade of the 101st would also serve temporarily as a screen, ranging forward of the U.S. positions to detect, delay, and disrupt any enemy attack. Eventually, Colonel Doug Starr's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment would arrive to take over that mission ... On Saturday morning, March 2 (1991), two days after to shooting supposedly had stopped, I came into the war room (in Riyadh) to discover that we'd just fought a major battle in the Euphrates valley. Evidently, two battalions of the Republican Guard had gotten tired of waiting to cross the pontoon bridge as Basra the night before and had headed west on Highway 8. Twice, they'd encountered Bradley Fighting Vehicles operating as scouts for the 24th Mech(anized Division, under McCaffrey's command) and both times had opened fire with antitank missiles. At dawn, they'd run into a U.S. blocking position and had opened fire again. McCaffrey had replied with a full-scale tank and helicopter counterattack, smashing the Iraqi column and taking 3,000 prisoners without suffering a single casualty. To me, this wasn't altogether bad news: the Republican Guard had shown characteristic arrogance by spotting what looked like a weak U.S. force -- not suspecting that an entire U.S. Army division was in the way -- and deciding, "Let's shoot 'em up." I was glad that the President's cease-fire statement had reserved our forces the right to shoot back if attacked. Yet the incident underscored the urgency of setting cease-fire terms that would definitively separate the two sides."[20][21]

On February 27, 1991, C-SPAN documented the terms of President George H. W. Bush's cease-fire statement, including the terms of engagement:

"With the remarks, 'Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army has been defeated,' President Bush began his announcement to the nation on the U.S. and coalition forces' victory in the Persian Gulf war. He cautioned against euphoria, but urged the nation to continue their support for the U.S. armed forces serving in the Middle East. He called for Iraq to release all coalition forces' P.O.W.'s and to comply with all United Nations resolutions concerning Kuwait. President Bush also announced a conditional cease-fire to take place at midnight, E.S.T., which is 8:00 A.M. Iraqi time. The cease-fire would allow Iraqi forces to return to Iraq from Kuwait as long as they did not fire upon coalition forces."[22]

In a paper entitled "Detecting Massed Troops with the French SPOT Satellites: A Feasibility Study for Cooperative Monitoring,"[23] Vipin Gupta of Sandia National Laboratories and LTC George Harris, Commander, 250th Military Intelligence Battalion, extensively described and illustrated pre-battle and post-battle satellite images:

  • "The forward deployment positions and attack maneuvers of the coalition ground forces" (a map from McCaffrey's post-battle report, "24th Infantry Division Ground Operations")
  • "Deployment of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division from its forward assembly area at As Sarrar to its pre-attack position at Nisab. 75% of the division’s tentage was left behind at As Sarrar in order to enhance the division’s attack mobility ... (and) the role the 24th played in the left hook maneuver" (also from McCaffrey's report)
  • "Features identified in the 20 August 1990 SPOT image along the Saudi-Iraqi border near the towns of Nisab and Ash Shubah. The image was acquired three weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait when no coalition forces were present in this area."
  • "Features identified in the 29 January 1991 SPOT image covering the same ground area ... acquired one day after the US 24th Mechanized Infantry Division completed its deployment into the area"
  • "20 August 1990 SPOT image around Ash Shubah town ... (the) enhanced image clearly shows the town, Tapline Road, and oil pipeline. It also shows most of the Bedouin trails"
  • "Enlargement of 29 January 1991 SPOT image around Ash Shubah town. Acquired two weeks after the initiation of Operation Desert Storm, the image shows numerous new encampments west of Ash Shubah as well as several single pixel features which were inferred to be small tents and vehicles. The enlargement also shows a new primary supply route and bypass road. The inset is a map section from the historical archives that show the specific units that were deployed near Ash Shubah"
  • "Enlargement of 29 January 1991 SPOT image showing two fan shaped features in the open desert. Based on the layout and the trail patterns, the features were identified as firing ranges for mechanized units. The image shows the entrance at the central hub, the firing stations, and the direction of fire. The larger range could accommodate a mechanized company and the smaller range could accommodate a mechanized platoon"
  • "Enlargement of 29 January 1991 SPOT image showing linear traces next to a north-south trail. The trace configuration is consistent with the appearance of vehicle lines positioned close together for protection, line-of-sight communication, and possible forward attack advancement"

The paper concluded, "The positive identification of troop positions was facilitated by the dramatic appearance of numerous secured encampments and the sudden disappearance of normal civilian traffic ... The observation of the new, redundant trail network further suggested that the new inhabitants in the area were indeed military forces ... After these forces were found, more detailed analysis revealed the logistical areas, training grounds, and troop positions. Each feature was identified from its topographic location, layout, configuration, and associated level of activity."[23]

On November 13, 1993, CDR Daniel S. Zazworsky, USN, wrote an unclassified analysis of the "left hook" attack,[24] saying, "Major General McCaffrey, commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), also recognized the importance of capturing enemy resources for his own forces use. On the leading edge of the left hook envelopment, he was bringing enough fuel with him in a huge logistics tail behind him. But he was hauling most of it in HEMTTs (heavy expanded-mobility tactical trucks) which themselves required huge amounts of fuel and, therefore, ordered his artillery gunners not to shoot Iraqi tank trucks or POL dumps or gas stations along the road. He told them 'We just might need the fuel too, and anyone who blows it up will answer to me.' While there is certainly utility in capturing enemy resources, the brevity of the war left it unclear whether or not LTGEN William G. Pagonis' and General McCaffrey's efforts would have been sufficient to enable the US to conduct a significantly prolonged offensive. Nor is it clear how useful enemy munitions and other equipment would have been. Perhaps General McCaffrey and Colonel Paul Kern, commander of 2nd Brigade, gave us a hint to the answer to that question. Within hours of locating a huge Iraqi stockpile of fuel-air bombs at Jalibah airfield inside Iraq, Kern had them destroyed them. Later, McCaffrey indicated that it would take a week to destroy all the ammunition dumps and military supplies around the airfield ... Destroying captured enemy munitions conveys the message that they were either not needed...or not wanted. Lt. Colonel Dave Oberthaler, Logistics Staff Officer with the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) in the KTO (Kuwaiti Theater of Operations), also raises a valid concern with regard to captured Iraq fuel, food and drink - indicating that fear of contamination would have kept U.S. forces from using them. He also points out another problem with relying on captured enemy equipment. Often the destruction of that enemy equipment is a high priority. For example, captured Iraqi transportation equipment (primarily HEMTTs), would have been very useful to U.S. ground forces. However, these units were also a top priority target for the coalition air forces."[25][26]

Seymour Hersh's allegations[edit]

In an opinion column published on May 22, 2000, in The New Yorker entitled "Annals of War: Overwhelming Force,"[27] Seymour Hersh wrote, "Barry McCaffrey has the best resume of any retired combat general in the United States Army. The son of a distinguished general, he attended Phillips Academy, in Andover, Massachusetts, and West Point, and in 1966 was assigned to South Vietnam as a platoon leader. He served two combat tours, winning two Distinguished Service Crosses, two Silver Stars, and three Purple Hearts. He returned from Vietnam with a shattered left arm, which was saved only after two years of operations and rehabilitation. McCaffrey's career continued to be exemplary: he earned a master's degree, taught at West Point, and, as he moved up through the ranks, became an outspoken leader within the Army for women's rights and the rights of minorities ... In June of 1990, as a two-star major general, McCaffrey was put in charge of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He was then 47, and the Army's youngest division commander. Two months later, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and McCaffrey took the 24th's tanks, guns, and more than 18,000 soldiers (eventually, there were 26,000) from its home base to Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Persian Gulf War. The 24th's mission was to drive more than 200 miles into Iraq -- the famed "left hook" maneuver—and block the retreat of Iraqi forces from the war zone in Kuwait. In an account written after the war, U.S. News & World Report praised McCaffrey for leading what one officer called "the greatest cavalry charge in history." More promotions came McCaffrey's way, and he eventually earned four stars, the Army's highest peacetime rank ... McCaffrey announced his retirement from the Army in January 1996, when President Clinton brought him into the Cabinet as the director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. In that position, McCaffrey serve(d) as the architect of and main spokesman for the Clinton Administration's $1.6-billion plan to provide, among other things, more training and weapons for the Colombian Army in an effort to cut drug production and export."

Hersh then discussed an accusation by an unnamed person that during the Gulf War in 1991, McCaffrey commanded his troops to kill retreating Iraq soldiers after a ceasefire had been declared and then failed to properly investigate reports of killings of unarmed persons and an alleged massacre of hundreds of Iraqi POWs. Hersh's column quoted "senior officers decrying the lack of discipline and proportionality in the McCaffrey-ordered attack." One colonel told Hersh that it "made no sense for a defeated army to invite their own death ... It came across as shooting fish in a barrel. Everyone was incredulous."[28]

In the same issue of New Yorker, its editor-in-chief David Remnick wrote an editorial supporting Hersh's research and conclusions.[29] Remnick wrote, "In Iraq, General McCaffrey led the 24th Infantry Division in an epic "left hook" tank drive, designed to shut off an Iraqi retreat from Kuwait. He and his troops won extraordinary praise for a four-day march under bleak conditions. Hersh, however, in the course of conducting hundreds of interviews and reviewing thousands of pages of government and Army documents, found a number of operations by men under McCaffrey's command that are, at a minimum, unsettling. His detailed account, published here this week, describes how, on March 2, 1991 - two days after the declaration of a ceasefire, when Iraqi forces were in flight, McCaffrey attacked a line of retreating Iraqi vehicles and troops, unleashing an assault that lasted several hours and was all but uncontested. In testimony before the Senate and in written answers to questions from Hersh (whose repeated requests for an interview were declined), McCaffrey said that his men were fired on and he had no choice but to respond in force-with the full might of his division."

Remnick continued, "Many military men have supported General McCaffrey's version of events, but many officers and enlisted men who have talked to Hersh for the record say either that there was no Iraqi fire at all or that there was so little, and of such minor consequence, that it hardly warranted the onslaught -- and bloodshed -- that followed. The question is one of proportionality: Did an Army general (who is now, as it happens, in the President's Cabinet) go too far?"[29]

Subsequently, an Army investigation cleared McCaffrey of any wrongdoing. Hersh dismissed the findings of the investigation, writing that "few soldiers report crimes, because they don't want to jeopardize their Army careers." Hersh describes his interview with Private First Class Charles Sheehan-Miles, who later published a novel about his experience in the Gulf: "When I asked Sheehan-Miles why he fired, he replied, 'At that point, we were shooting everything. Guys in the company told me later that some were civilians. It wasn't like they came at us with a gun. It was that they were there – 'in the wrong place at the wrong time.' Although Sheehan-Miles is unsure whether he and his fellow-tankers were ever actually fired upon during the war, he is sure that there was no significant enemy fire: 'We took some incoming once, but it was friendly fire,' he said. 'The folks we fought never had a chance.' He came away from Iraq convinced that he and his fellow-soldiers were, as another tanker put it, part of 'the biggest firing squad in history.'"[28]

McCaffrey's and Colin Powell's rebuttals to Hersh's allegations[edit]

McCaffrey denied the charges that on three occasions, he or his men of the 24th infantry division either fired on enemy soldiers who had surrendered in an "unprovoked attack", or "went too far" in responding to a non-existent threat. He attacked what he called Hersh's "revisionist history" of the Gulf War. BBC reported that "General McCaffrey said an army investigation had previously cleared him of any blame and he accused the New Yorker of maligning young soldiers.... White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said President Bill Clinton felt the charges were unsubstantiated."[30]

According to Georgie Anne Geyer of the Chicago Tribune from May 2000, Hersh’s accusations were disputed by a number of military personnel, who later claimed to have been misquoted by the journalist. She argues that this may have been Hersh’s misguided attempt to break another My Lai story, and that he "could not possibly like a man such as McCaffrey, who is so temperamentally and philosophically different from him…” Finally, she suggests that Hersh may also have been motivated to attack the general for McCaffrey’s role as the drug czar.[31]

Hersh also alleged that McCaffrey violated Department of Defense policy by denying reporters access to his battle plans and the actual battleground. In fact, however, McCaffrey welcomed famed war correspondent Joseph L. Galloway. On May 26, 2006, Knight Ridder Washington, D.C. bureau chief John Walcott, honored Galloway, saying, "Mike Ruby, Merrill McLoughlin, and I sent Joe (Galloway) to Schwarzkopf's headquarters in Riyadh with the kind of simple request that editors like to make: Go get the best seat in the war ... General Schwarzkopf sent Joe to Maj. Gen. Barry McCaffrey's 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which he said had the most complex and dangerous assignment in his battle plan, the famous left hook. Almost as soon as he arrived at division headquarters, Joe was ushered into the TOC, the Tactical Operations Center. The cover was lifted off the division's battle maps, which of course were Top Secret-and-change ... Joe asked General McCaffrey why he could see the secret battle plan. "I trust you because Norm trusts you," Barry replied, 'but most of all, I trust you because you're coming with us.'"[32]

Lieutenant General Steven Arnold, interviewed by Hersh for the article, was one of the officers who later claimed to have been misquoted. He wrote to the editor of The New Yorker, saying, "I know that my brief comments in the article were not depicted in an entirely accurate manner and were taken out of context…. When the Iraqi forces fired on elements of the 24th Infantry Division, they were clearly committing a hostile act. I regret having granted an interview with Mr. Hersh. The tone and thrust of the article places me in a position of not trusting or respecting General Barry McCaffrey, and nothing could be further from the truth."[33]

Similar criticism of Hersh's allegations came from General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Iraq War. In a May 2000 interview with Sam Donaldson for the television news program This Week, Powell described the Hersh article as "attempted character assassination on General McCaffrey."

On May 22, 2000, The New Yorker discussed Hersh's allegations, as did Newsweek on May 29, 2000. "Five-Hour Air, Armor Assault - The March 2 attack on the Iraqi Republican Guard “Hammurabi” tank division is ordered by Army General Barry McCaffrey (the general who commanded the already-famous “left hook” maneuver days before — see February 23, 1991 and After), in response to what McCaffrey says is an attack on his forces with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The decision surprises some in the Allied command structure in Saudi Arabia and causes unease among civilian and military leaders in Washington, who worry about the public relations ramifications of an attack that comes days after a cease-fire was implemented (see February 28, 1991). McCaffrey himself later calls the attack “one of the most astounding scenes of destruction I have ever participated in.” The “Hammurabi” division is obliterated in the assault."[34]

Military career after the Gulf War[edit]

General McCaffrey's last command in the Army was United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the unified command responsible for U.S. military activities in Central America and South America. He commanded SOUTHCOM, whose headquarters were then in the Republic of Panama, from 1994 to 1996. Besides managing military personnel, as part of his duties in Panama, McCaffrey supported humanitarian operations for over 10,000 Cuban refugees in 1996. It was also during his last military position that he created the first Human Rights Council and Human Rights Code of Conduct for U.S. Military Joint Command.[35] He wrote in August 1995 in "Human Rights and the Commander" in Joint Force Quarterly, "There is a common assumption that respect for an enemy’s soldiers and its civilian populace can stand in the way of a successful military campaign. Instead, respect for human rights increases the efficacy of security forces, both military and law enforcement."[36]

McCaffrey was the youngest and most highly decorated four-star general in the army at the time of his retirement from the military in 1996.[37]

On June 1, 1996, at the commencement ceremony at United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, Secretary of Defense William Perry commended McCaffrey's performance during the Gulf War. Perry said, "Whatever else is required of you in your Army career, you will first of all need to be a warrior. And you could find no better role model than Barry McCaffrey. Barry became one of America's greatest warriors. He led forces into combat in Vietnam, where he was grievously wounded. In Desert Storm, General McCaffrey's 24th Infantry Division led the famous left hook that caught the Iraqi army by surprise, and led America to one of its most convincing battlefield victories ever. He then went to SOUTHCOM at a crucial time and seized the opportunities presented by the ascendancy of democracy in our hemisphere. General McCaffery's attributes as a warrior -- guts, brains and tenacity -- are key to success on today's battlefield. Now he is putting those same skills to work as a civilian, leading America's war against drugs."[38][39]

On February 17, 2003, Mark Mazzetti and Kevin Whitelaw, in an article entitled "Six Deadly Fears: The U.S. military is confident of victory in Iraq–but at what price?" in U.S. News and World Report, quoted McCaffrey, "whose 24th Mechanized Infantry Division helped execute the famous 'left hook' attack against an Iraqi Army stronger than today's in Operation Desert Storm, puts it this way: "The Iraqis have no good military options. There is no technique, no tool that they can now adopt that will have any military significance on the outcome of the conflict ... Most likely, Saddam would use artillery-delivered mustard gas and nerve agents against U.S. ground elements advancing on Baghdad. If so, says McCaffrey, 'it's going to create conditions of abject misery, but it will have no impact on the pace of the operation.'"[40][41]

ONDCP Director[edit]

Barry McCaffrey was director of Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) under President Bill Clinton from 1996 to 2001. He was confirmed unanimously by the U.S. Senate on February 29, 1996.[42] As director of ONDCP, McCaffrey sat in President Clinton's Cabinet.[43]

McCaffrey came to this position with experience interdicting drug smugglers from South America, as head of the Southern Command.[44] He disliked the metaphor of a "war" on drugs, preferring to call it a malignancy for which he advocated treatment; at the same time, he also headed an initiative that began in 1999 to eliminate coca farming in Colombia.[44]

As director of ONDCP, McCaffrey wrote and published the first "National Drug Control Strategy"[45] The book-length white paper proposed a comprehensive 10-year plan; profiled drug abusers and trends in youth drug abuse; listed health consequences; estimated the cost of drug-related crime; recognized that illegal drugs remain widely available; presented strategic goals and objectives for demand and supply reduction and measures of effectiveness; and proposed a comprehensive approach including initiatives aimed at youth and initiatives to reduce drug-related crime and violence, to reduce health and social problems, to shield America's frontiers, and to reduce drug availability; and asked for resources to implement the strategy.[46][47] [48]

[edit]

During McCaffrey's tenure, ONDCP implemented a policy of buying paid anti-drug advertising on television and also paying television producers to embed anti-drug messages into major television programs. WB network's senior vice president for broadcast standards Rick Mater acknowledged, "The White House did view scripts. They did sign off on them – they read scripts, yes."[43] Running the campaign for the ONDCP was Alan Levitt, who estimated that between 1998 and 2000 the networks received nearly $25 million in benefits.[43] One example was with Warner Brothers' show, Smart Guy. The original script portrayed two young people using drugs at a party. Originally depicted as cool and popular, after input from the drug office, "We showed that they were losers and put them [hidden away to indulge in shamed secrecy] in a utility room. That was not in the original script."[43] Other shows including ER, Beverly Hills, 90210, Chicago Hope, The Drew Carey Show and 7th Heaven also put anti-drug messages into their stories.[43]

Details about the program were published by Salon on January 13, 2000.[43] McCaffrey defended the program, saying that “We plead guilty to using every lawful means to save America’s children”, and President Clinton defended McCaffrey.[49] Clinton said on January 14, 2000, "[I]t’s my understanding that there’s nothing mandatory about this, that there was no attempt to regulate content, or tell people what they had to put into it – of course, I wouldn’t support that."[50] McCaffrey opposed efforts in Congress to extend the national anti-drug media campaign to include messages against underage drinking.[44]

Comments on the War on Terror and the Iraq War[edit]

McCaffrey has harshly criticized American treatment of detainees during the War on Terror. According to McCaffrey: "We should never, as a policy, maltreat people under our control, detainees. We tortured people unmercifully. We probably murdered dozens of them during the course of that, both the armed forces and the C.I.A."[51][52] He "supports an investigation of the government lawyers who knowingly advocated illegal torture, and he specifically cited Bush's White House counsel and attorney general in the same discussion, emphasizing that 'we better find out how we went so wrong.'"[53]

In June 2005, McCaffrey surveyed Iraq on behalf of U.S. Central Command and wrote an optimistic report afterwards.[54] In the report, McCaffrey described U.S. senior military leadership team as superb and predicted the insurgency will reach its peak from January-to-September 2006, allowing for U.S. force withdrawals in the late summer of 2006. A year later, however, after visiting Iraq again, his assessment was grim: "Iraq is abject misery ... I think it's a terribly dangerous place for diplomats and journalists and contractors and Iraqi mothers. Trying to go about daily life in that city is a real nightmare for these poor people." He called Abu Ghraib "the biggest mistake that happened so far."[55] In an official memorandum,[56] McCaffrey nevertheless expressed optimism about the operation's longer term future:

"The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme – but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded ... There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a 10-year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3–5 years. We have few alternatives to the current U.S. strategy, which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?"

His assessment noted several negative areas as well as very positive areas in the struggle for democracy in the country. McCaffrey returned a third time in March 2007 and followed the visit with a third memorandum.[57] The grimness of the 2006 assessment was repeated, additionally asserting a concern about the effect of the continuing war on the readiness of the small-sized U.S. military. He tempered his optimism about the future, saying, "There are encouraging signs that the peace and participation message does resonate with many of the more moderate Sunni and Shia warring factions."

Other military analysis[edit]

In April 2008, New York Times published a front-page report by David Barstow confirming that military analysts hired by ABC, CBS and NBC to present observations about the conduct of the war in Iraq had undisclosed ties to the Pentagon and/or military contractors.[58] McCaffrey was "at the heart of the scandal" detailed by Barstow.[59] In late November 2008, the New York Times published another front-page article by Barstow, this time specifically profiling General McCaffrey. It detailed his free movement between roles as a paid advocate for defense companies, media analyst and a retired officer.[58] An earlier report[60] with some of the same information had appeared in The Nation in April 2003 but was not widely picked up. McCaffrey and his consulting firm BR McCaffrey Associates LLC responded to The Times piece, stating that he is "absolutely committed to objective, non-partisan public commentary." The response highlighted his military record, as well as his history of criticizing the execution of the Iraq War and specifically Rumsfeld.[61] Journalist Glenn Greenwald later wrote that there had been "extensive collaboration between NBC and McCaffrey to formulate a coordinated response to David Barstow's story."[62]

On January 24, 2009, in an article entitled "The Generals’ Second Careers,"[63] New York Times Public Editor (ombudsman) Clark Hoyt rebutted Barstow's allegations. He wrote,

"Last April, The Times published an investigation of a Pentagon public relations program intended to win favorable coverage of the Bush administration’s war on terror through retired officers working as military analysts on television. The report, 'Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand,' revealed a program that gave the analysts talking points and unusual access to top officials — contacts, the article said, that some of the officers hoped would benefit military contractors with whom they had ties. Nine days ago, the Defense Department’s inspector general concluded that the program did not violate Pentagon policies and regulations, and said investigators found no case in which an officer used information or contacts obtained through the program to get a competitive advantage for a contractor.

"Steve Capus, the president of NBC News, said in a letter to me that the report 'undercuts the premise' of The Times article. I don’t agree, and I think the Inspector General's report was a highly flawed response to an important piece of journalism that his own network is taking into account as it rewrites ethics guidelines. But I think Capus had a legitimate issue with how The Times article was presented.

"The article, by David Barstow, raised the question of whether the information program was proper but never said it was illegal or against regulations. And if no officer got a benefit for a commercial client from it, that was not because some didn’t try. John C. Garrett, a retired Army colonel, an analyst for Fox News and a lobbyist for a firm that represents military contractors, said in the article that the access he gained through the information program helped him identify business opportunities for clients.

"Further, the inspector general’s office left its conclusions open to question by erroneously identifying several retired officers as having no ties to military contractors when in fact they did.

"Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the report was 'disappointing.' He said a couple of its conclusions didn’t square with its own evidence.

"For example, the report said that one retired general was excluded from the briefings because he criticized the conduct of the war in Iraq, and that a senior public affairs official urged the Pentagon to cultivate a core of 'reliably friendly' analysts 'that we can count on to carry our water.' Yet the inspector general found 'insufficient evidence' that the Pentagon was trying to reward favorable commentators and punish critics. Levin said he hoped coming investigations by the Government Accountability Office and the Federal Communications Commission 'will be more objective and insightful.'

"Capus questioned why The Times assigned Barstow to cover the inspector general’s report. 'Doesn’t that present an inherent conflict?' he asked. It would if the report had made Barstow himself the issue, but investigative reporters routinely write follow-up articles, and Barstow’s was a straightforward account that said the inspector general 'found no wrongdoing.'

"NBC, with some reason, felt unfairly stung by The Times’s report — a 7,500-word article, 20 photographs and 5 graphics. Nine photos of retired officers talking on television — four of them on NBC or MSNBC — dominated the front page. They included the most celebrated of all military analysts, Barry R. McCaffrey, the retired Army four-star general who just happened to be the man excluded from the Pentagon’s information program for criticizing Donald Rumsfeld’s management of the Iraq war.

"'If you are going to show photographs of our people and list their names, then it’s fair to ask, what are you specifically suggesting they said on air that was influenced by the Pentagon P.R. campaign?' Capus asked me at the time. I thought it was a good question. The article barely mentioned McCaffrey and another NBC analyst, Gen. Wayne Downing, who died in 2007, yet included them in what a reader could reasonably interpret as a virtual rogue’s gallery of analysts spouting the Pentagon line.

"Matthew Purdy, The Times’s investigations editor, said the photos were intended to show 'the ubiquitousness' of the analysts on television, and that the article made their roles clear. But all it said about Downing and McCaffrey was that they were part of a group created before the war to help make the case for ousting Saddam Hussein, they had consulting firms, and they sat on boards of military contractors. It didn’t account for McCaffrey’s attacks on Rumsfeld.

"What readers were not told was that this was the first of a two-part package and that the second article would focus on McCaffrey. That article was not published for seven more months, while Barstow continued reporting.

"On Nov. 30, under the front-page headline 'One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex,' Barstow wrote that McCaffrey represented an exclusive club of mostly retired generals whose 'war commentary can fit hand in glove with undisclosed commercial interests and network executives are sometimes oblivious to possible conflicts of interest.' The article cited a letter that McCaffrey wrote to Gen. David Petraeus, then the commander in Iraq, on behalf of a small company trying to sell armored vehicles. He praised Petraeus, whom he has known and championed for more than 30 years, on CNBC the same week and testified to Congress in favor of more armored vehicles in Iraq, an argument he had made before being retained by the contractor.

"Television viewers had no idea about the association with the contractor, and David McCormick, the vice president for broadcast standards at NBC News, told me he could not recall if he knew.

"McCaffrey was outraged by the coverage of him, though he had refused repeated requests to be interviewed by Barstow, instead issuing a short statement defending his integrity. In two conversations with me, he said he couldn’t imagine how The Times could publish the first article about 'generals shilling for the Pentagon without mentioning me as a hero, the antithesis of that hypothesis.'

"Indeed, the inspector general’s report said that investigators took sworn testimony from a senior Pentagon official that McCaffrey was 'disinvited' from briefings because he provided an 'unfavorable perspective on the war.' The finding seems to contradict a letter to the editor in The Times from Lawrence Di Rita, who oversaw the public affairs operation for a time and said he was 'unaware of any decision' to cut off McCaffrey’s access.

"The second article did describe McCaffrey’s criticism but said that after he was frozen out, he was shaken by the experience and 'began to backpedal, professing his ‘greatest respect’ for Mr. Rumsfeld to Tim Russert.'

"McCaffrey acknowledged that there was 'a lull' in his criticism after 'I was being pounded. I was having speeches canceled. ... I was out on an ice floe there.' He said Baghdad had fallen, and everyone was declaring victory.

"He said that nothing he said or didn’t say was because of business interests: 'Oh, for God’s sake. I can’t even begin to respond to that. That’s not who I am.'

"Barstow said he never intended to say that McCaffrey did anything illegal or unethical. He said he was describing how the world works and raising the issue of disclosure of potential conflicts.

"McCaffrey, a much-decorated, thrice-wounded war hero, unhappily became the symbol of an entrenched system of insider access, overlapping interests and lack of public disclosure. It is an issue of high interest in Barack Obama’s Washington. Even as they testified to McCaffrey’s integrity, some of his most ardent supporters recognized that the system presented multiple opportunities for conflicts of interest. Ralph Peters, who wrote a biting criticism of Barstow’s second article in The New York Post, said he didn’t think retired flag officers should be allowed to work in the military industry 'since their inherent influence is simply too great.'

"McCormick said NBC has 'taken to heart' issues raised in The Times coverage as it rewrites its rules on disclosure by contributors like McCaffrey. McCaffrey said he will follow any disclosure rules, as long as they apply to everybody, not just retired military officers."[63]

Post-government service[edit]

After McCaffrey retired from government service at the end of the Clinton Administration, he continued to provide his expertise to a wide spectrum of clients He is currently a military analyst for NBC and MSNBC,[6] and president of his own consulting firm, BR McCaffrey Associates.

In October 2004, McCaffrey was elected by the board of directors of HNTB Corporation[64] to serve as the board chairman of a newly formed subordinate company, HNTB Federal Services. In January 2008, McCaffrey was elected to board of directors of The HNTB Companies, an employee-owned organization of infrastructure firms with 63 offices nationwide—known and respected for their work in transportation, tolls, bridges, aviation, rail, architecture and urban design and planning.

McCaffrey also serves on the boards of directors of Atlantic Council of the United States, DynCorp International, Global Linguist Solutions, McNeil Technologies, and CRC Health Group,[65] a nationwide for-profit chain of addiction treatment centers and behavioral therapy programs for related disorders.

He is also a member of Council on Foreign Relations, an Associate of the Inter-American Dialogue, a principal for Council on Excellence in Government, a member of the CSIS U.S.-Mexico Binational Council, chairman of Vietnam Veterans Memorial Education Center Advisory Board, a senior executive associate for Army Aviation Association of America, and a member of the board of advisors of National Infantry Foundation. McCaffrey also participates in U.S. Army Fires Center, Senior Field Artillery Advisory Council, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.[13]

McCaffrey is an outspoken advocate for parity (coverage by health insurers of behavioral disorders coequal to their coverage of other diseases) and of drug courts[7][8] and veterans' courts[9] and is a frequent speaker at conferences.[10][66]

Honors and awards[edit]

  • State Department Superior Honor Award, 1992, as member of principal negotiation team for the START II Nuclear Arms Control Treaty[13][67][68][69][70]
  • August 27, 2002—Keynote speaker at the 2002 Innovative Government Forum (IGF) in Sacramento, California[71]
  • May 6, 2003 -- "Barry McCaffrey; Excerpts from a Monitor Breakfast on the Long-Term Impact of the Iraq War, interviewed by David T. Cook for Christian Science Monitor[72]
  • 2004 -- James Cardinal Gibbons Medal (Highest Honor), The Catholic University of America, awarded to honor any person who, in the opinion of the CUA Alumni Association's Board of Governors, has rendered distinguished and meritorious service to the Roman Catholic Church, the United States of America, or The Catholic University of America.[73]
  • December 18, 2008 -- "Four-Star Gen. McCaffrey Given Key to City by Dearborn, MI Mayor O'Reilly"—reported by Channel 9, WAFB Detroit[74]
  • February 12, 2009 -- "Transition to Power: Challenges Facing the New Administration Presentation to National Defense Industrial Association’s Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 20th Annual Symposium & Exhibition"—presentation by Gen. McCaffrey[75]
  • 2010 -- Government Security News Extraordinary Leadership and Service in Homeland Security Award[76]
  • 2010 Distinguished Graduate Award, West Point Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy[35]
  • March 2012—General (Ret.) Alexander M. Haig Jr. Guardian of Liberty Award from West Point Society of Philadelphia[77]
  • June 13, 2012—General McCaffrey was awarded the Martin and Toby Adler Distinguished Service Award in Palm Springs, CA from the College on Problems of Drug Dependence.[78]
  • Honored Guest at West Point Society of New York 2012 Founder’s Day Celebration Dinner[79]
  • United States Military Academy West Point Notable Graduates[80]
  • Covered extensively in Shirley Ann Warshaw's book Presidential Profiles: The Clinton Years[81]
  • Honorary Companion of the District of Columbia Commandery of the Military Order of Foreign Wars.

See also[edit]

  • Tan, Michelle—March 11, 2013 -- "McCaffrey: No good end in Afghanistan"—in Air Force Times*Naylor, Sean D. -- April 9, 2007 -- "McCaffrey: 'Little time left' for Iraq success"—in Air Force Times[82]
  • Lubold, Gordon—November 27, 2006 -- "Quality of volunteer force deteriorating, McCaffrey says: 'We need 19-year-old boys and girls in good health'"—in Air Force Times[83]
  • Baker, Glenn—March 2002 -- "Gens. McCaffrey and Wilhelm visit Cuba with CDI (Center for Defense Information) group"—in Defense Monitor[84]
  • Naylor, Sean D. -- April 8, 1996 -- "McCaffrey's next challenge: Drugs"—in Army Times[85]
  • Evers, Stacey—December 2, 1995 -- "Jane's interview (with US Southern Command Commander-in-Chief General Barry McCaffrey)"—in Jane's Defence Weekly[86]
  • Hedrick, Miles—November 19, 1995 -- "Vietnam Lessons Made Good," in Daily Press—review of James Kitfield's book "Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War"[87]
  • Kitfield, James -- "Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War"—extensively quotes McCaffrey[88][89]
  • Hollis, Patrecia S. -- February 1994 -- "Artillery -- The most important factor on the battlefield: interview with LtGen Barry R. McCaffrey"—in Field Artillery[90]
  • January 1994 -- "Lt. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey Slated for USSOUTHCOM Post"—in Army[91]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Tucker, Spencer C. (2010). The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 778. ISBN 9781851099481. 
  2. ^ "Clinton Names General McCaffrey as "Drug Czar" Nominee". National Drug Strategy Network - The Criminal Justice Foundation. 1996. 
  3. ^ "US Army Ranger Hall of Fame". US Army Ranger Hall of Fame. Retrieved October 28, 2013. 
  4. ^ "2010 DISTINGUISHED GRADUATE AWARD GEN (R) BARRY MCCAFFREY '64". West Point Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy. 2010. 
  5. ^ Bartelt, Eric. “West Point Honors Five Distinguished Graduates”, The Official Homepage of the United States Army, News Archives (May 14, 2010).
  6. ^ a b "Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) MSNBC and Nightly News Military analyst". www.NBCnews.com. January 17, 2008. 
  7. ^ a b http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/former-drug-czar-barry-mccaffrey-actress-melanie-griffith-national-drug-courts-assn--urban-institute-news-conference-friday-may-30-on-groundbreaking-study-drug-treatment-would-unclog-nations-prisons-drug-courts-must-be-expanded-to-treat-15-m-57294357.html
  8. ^ a b "Breaking Our Addiction to Prison". Huffington Post. July 27, 2009. 
  9. ^ a b Henneberger, Melinda (December 2, 2013). "Veterans court program helps warriors battle addiction, mental health crises". The Washington Post. 
  10. ^ a b http://www.phoenixhouse.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Schwarzman-PSA-dinner-advisory-4-28-04.pdf
  11. ^ http://weinerpublic.com/McCaffrey.html
  12. ^ "Home Speakers Profile Barry McCaffrey". World Affairs Council of Northern California. Retrieved October 18, 2013. 
  13. ^ a b c http://security.nationaljournal.com/contributors/gen-barry-mccaffrey.php
  14. ^ a b "Full Biography of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)". McCaffrey Associates. February 15, 2011. 
  15. ^ Spencer C. Tucker (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts. ABL-CLIO. Retrieved October 18, 2013. 
  16. ^ a b c "General Barry R. McCaffrey". Strategic Studies Institute, US Army. Retrieved May 17, 2013. 
  17. ^ http://www.amazon.com/dp/157488123X/ref=rdr_ext_tmb
  18. ^ a b http://www.amazon.com/The-Generals-War-Inside-Conflict/dp/0316321001
  19. ^ a b http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR775/MR775.chap5.pdf
  20. ^ a b http://books.google.com/books?id=c5L8qTgsLnUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Schwarzkopf+Petre+%22It+Doesn%E2%80%99t+Take+a+Hero%22
  21. ^ http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/16896-1
  22. ^ http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/16819-1
  23. ^ a b http://cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand98-85973.pdf
  24. ^ http://www.weinerpublic.com/ADA266598.pdf
  25. ^ Joseph L. Galloway (11 March 1991). "The Point of the Spear". U.S. News & World Report. p. 36. 
  26. ^ "Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Oberthaler, Operations Faculty, Naval War College, Newport, RI". 22 April 1993 and 5 May 1993. 
  27. ^ http://cryptome.org/mccaffrey-sh.htm
  28. ^ a b Forbes, Daniel (May 15, 2000). "Gulf War crimes?". Salon. 
  29. ^ a b http://www.jeffpolachek.com/petermcwilliams.info/mailarchive/2000/052400_new_yorkers_editor_on_mccaffrey_story.txt
  30. ^ "General hits at Gulf 'insults'". BBC News. May 16, 2000. 
  31. ^ Geyer, Georgie Anne (May 19, 2000). "Seymour Hersh's Gulf War misconceptions". Chicago Tribune.  (subscription required)
  32. ^ http://www.editorandpublisher.com/PrintArticle/Knight-Ridder-Bureau-Chief-Pays-Tribute-to-Galloway-at-Retirement-Party
  33. ^ McCaffrey, Barry R. (May 22, 2000). "The New Yorker's Revisionist History". The Wall Street Journal.  (subscription required)
  34. ^ http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/topic.jsp?topic=topic_personnel
  35. ^ a b http://www.westpointaog.org/page.aspx?pid=4039
  36. ^ http://www.ndu.edu/press/militarization-of-law-enforcement.html
  37. ^ "Gen. Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) Distinguished Leader, International Affairs Expert and National Security Analyst, NBC News". NBC News. Retrieved October 18, 2013. 
  38. ^ http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=910
  39. ^ http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=40800
  40. ^ http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/iraq/archives/17six.htm
  41. ^ http://solutions.synearth.net/page/139/
  42. ^ Fuller, Jim. "Global Cooperation Vital in Addressing Drug Concerns: An Interview with General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Policy", Narcotics: A Global Challenge, p. 1 (Electronic Journals of the U.S. Information Agency, DIANE Publishing, July 1996).
  43. ^ a b c d e f Forbes, Daniel (January 13, 2000). "Prime Time Propaganda". Salon.
  44. ^ a b c Fisher, Gary. Rethinking Our War on Drugs: Candid Talk about Controversial Issues (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).
  45. ^ McCaffrey, Gen. Barry R. National Drug Control Strategy (DIANE Publishing, May 1, 1997).
  46. ^ National Drug Control Strategy.
  47. ^ The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996
  48. ^ Public Broadcasting System (PBS) (October 2000)."Frontline interview"
  49. ^ Szasz, Thomas. Pharmacracy: Medicine and Politics in America, p. 136 (Syracuse University Press, 2003).
  50. ^ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 2000-2001, January 1 to June 26, 2000, p. 62 (Government Printing Office, 2001).
  51. ^ Greenwald, Glenn (June 30, 2009). "The suppressed fact: Deaths by U.S. torture". Salon.
  52. ^ Horton, Scott (May 7, 2009). "The Bush Era Torture-Homicides". Harper's.
  53. ^ Melber, Ari (May 18, 2009). "Why the New Torture Defense Is a Good Offense". The Nation.
  54. ^ McCaffrey, Barry R. (June 27, 2005). "Trip Report – Kuwait and Iraq". U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on July 24, 2005. 
  55. ^ The Situation Room (transcript). CNN. May 30, 2006.
  56. ^ McCaffrey, Barry R. (May 4, 2006). "The Bottom Line – Observations from Iraqi Freedom". Chaos Manor Special Reports. 
  57. ^ McCaffrey, Barry R. (March 26, 2007). "Visit Iraq and Kuwait, 9-16 March 2007". Iraq's Inconvenient Truth. Archived from the original on April 13, 2008. 
  58. ^ a b Barstow, David (November 29, 2008). "One Man's Military-Industrial-Media Complex". The New York Times. 
  59. ^ Greenwald, Glenn (April 21, 2009). "The Pulitzer-winning investigation that dare not be uttered on TV". Salon.
  60. ^ Benaim, Daniel; Motaparthy, Priyanka; Kumar, Vishesh (April 21, 2003). "TV's Conflicted Experts". The Nation. 
  61. ^ "Barstow Article in New York Times Sun. Nov. 30 Not Supported by Facts of Gen. McCaffrey's Focus on Improving National Security". PR Newswire. November 30, 2011. 
  62. ^ Greenwald, Glenn (December 1, 2008). "The ongoing disgrace of NBC News and Brian Williams". Salon.
  63. ^ a b Hoyt, Clark (January 25, 2009). "The Generals' Second Careers". The New York Times. 
  64. ^ http://www.hntb.com
  65. ^ http://www.crchealth.com
  66. ^ http://weinerpublic.com/actions
  67. ^ http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/01/1996-01-24-mccaffrey-named-national-drug-control-policy-director.html
  68. ^ https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/168386NCJRS.pdf
  69. ^ http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/DigitalLibrary/AdminHistories/Box%20041-050/Box%20047/1504630-ondcp-national-drug-control-strategy-1993-2000-4.pdf
  70. ^ http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/85275.pdf
  71. ^ http://www.waterworld.com/articles/2002/05/general-mccaffrey-slated-to-speak-at-innovative-government-forum.html
  72. ^ http://www.questia.com/library/1P2-32603446/barry-mccaffrey-excerpts-from-a-monitor-breakfast#articleDetails
  73. ^ http://www.cuatoday.com/s/817/internal.aspx?sid=817&gid=1&pgid=1369
  74. ^ http://www.wafb.com/story/9546380/slideshow?widgetid=86735
  75. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009SOLIC/McCaffrey.pdf
  76. ^ http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/21598
  77. ^ http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/?attachment_id=726
  78. ^ http://www.cpddblog.com/2012_06_01_archive.html
  79. ^ http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/?page_id=19
  80. ^ http://www.usma.edu/about/SitePages/Notable%20Graduates.aspx
  81. ^ http://www.scribd.com/doc/126033163/Shirley-Anne-Warshaw-the-Clinton-Years-Presiden-Bookos-org
  82. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2007_117432/136340.html
  83. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2006_153341/133569.html
  84. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2002_112418/37987.html
  85. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/1995_115723/7846.html
  86. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/scampi/citations/gsa/115000/112585.html
  87. ^ http://articles.dailypress.com/1995-11-19/news/9511170267_1_mccaffrey-s-24th-division-vietnam-war-chuck-horner
  88. ^ http://www.amazon.com/Prodigal-Soldiers-Generation-Officers-Revolutionized/dp/157488123X/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top
  89. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2013_201482/201345.html
  90. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/1994_143404/32843.html
  91. ^ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/scampi/citations/gsa/150225/42981.html

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

Military offices
Preceded by
GEN George A. Joulwan
United States Southern Command
1994—1996
Succeeded by
GEN Wesley K. Clark
Political offices
Preceded by
Lee P. Brown
Director of the National Drug Control Policy
1996–2001
Succeeded by
John P. Walters