Battle of Adwa
|Battle of Adwa|
|Part of the First Italo-Ethiopian War|
Ethiopian forces, assisted by St George (top), win the battle. Painted 1965-75.
|Ethiopian Empire||Kingdom of Italy|
|Commanders and leaders|
| Menelik II
Mikael of Wollo
| Oreste Baratieri
|120,000 (100,000 firearms) [nb 1],
40 or so artillery guns (some antiquated)
56 artillery guns
|Casualties and losses|
The Battle of Adwa (also known as Adowa, or sometimes by the Italian name Adua) was fought on 1 March 1896 between the Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy near the town of Adwa, Ethiopia, in Tigray. It was the climactic battle of the First Italo-Ethiopian War, securing Ethiopian sovereignty.
As the 20th century approached, most of Africa had been carved up among the European powers. The two independent exceptions were the young Republic of Liberia on the west coast of the continent and the Ethiopian Empire in the strategic Horn of Africa. The newly unified Kingdom of Italy was a relative newcomer to the colonial scramble for Africa. Italy had two recently obtained African territories: Eritrea and Somaliland. Both were near Ethiopia on the Horn of Africa and both were impoverished. Italy sought to improve its position in Africa by conquering Ethiopia and joining it with its two territories.
In 1889, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with then Negus[nb 2] Menelik of Shewa. The treaty ceded territories previously part of Ethiopia, namely the provinces of Bogos, Hamasien, Akkele Guzay, Serae, and parts of Tigray. In return, Italy promised Menelik's rule, financial assistance and military supplies. A dispute later arose over the interpretation of the two versions of the document. The Italian-language version of the disputed Article 17 of the treaty stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia was obliged to conduct all foreign affairs through Italian authorities. This would in effect make Ethiopia a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy. The Amharic version of the article however stated that the Emperor could use the good offices of the Kingdom of Italy in his relations with foreign nations if he wished. However, the Italian diplomats claimed that the original Amharic text included the clause and that Menelik knowingly signed a modified copy of the Treaty.
The Italian government decided on a military solution to force Ethiopia to abide by the Italian version of the treaty. As a result, Italy and Ethiopia faced off in what was later to be known as the First Italo-Ethiopian War. In December 1894, Bahta Hagos led a rebellion against the Italians in Akkele Guzay, in what was then Italian controlled Eritrea. Units of General Oreste Baratieri's army under Major Pietro Toselli (it) crushed the rebellion and killed Bahta. The Italian army then occupied the Tigrayan capital, Adwa. In January 1895, Baratieri's army went on to defeat Ras Mengesha Yohannes in the Battle of Coatit, forcing Mengesha to retreat further south.
By late 1895, Italian forces had advanced deep into Ethiopian territory. On 7 December 1895, Ras[nb 3] Makonnen, Ras Welle Betul and Ras Mengesha Yohannes commanding a larger Ethiopian group of Menelik's vanguard annihilated a small Italian unit at the Battle of Amba Alagi. The Italians were then forced to withdraw to more defensible positions in Tigray, where the two main armies faced each other. By late February 1896, supplies on both sides were running low. General Oreste Baratieri, commander of the Italian forces, knew the Ethiopian forces had been living off the land, and once the supplies of the local peasants were exhausted, Emperor Menelik's army would begin to melt away. However, the Italian government insisted that General Baratieri act.
On the evening of 29 February, Baratieri, about to be replaced by a new governor, General Baldissera, met with his brigadiers Matteo Albertone, Giuseppe Arimondi, Vittorio Dabormida, and Giuseppe Ellena, concerning their next steps. He opened the meeting on a negative note, revealing to his brigadiers that provisions would be exhausted in less than five days, and suggested retreating, perhaps as far back as Asmara. His subordinates argued forcefully for an attack, insisting that to retreat at this point would only worsen the poor morale. Dabormida exclaiming, "Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat." Baratieri delayed making a decision for a few more hours, claiming that he needed to wait for some last-minute intelligence, but in the end announced that the attack would start the next morning at 9:00. His troops began their march to their starting positions shortly after midnight.
The Italian army comprised four brigades totaling 17,978 troops, with fifty-six artillery pieces. However, it is likely that fewer fought in the actual battle on the Italian side: Harold Marcus notes that "several thousand" soldiers were needed in support roles and to guard the lines of communication to the rear. He accordingly estimates that the Italian force at Adwa consisted of 14,923 effectives. One brigade under General Albertone was made up of Eritrean askari led by Italian officers. The remaining three brigades were Italian units under Brigadiers Dabormida, Ellena and Arimondi. While these included elite Bersaglieri and Alpini units, a large proportion of the troops were inexperienced conscripts recently drafted from metropolitan regiments in Italy into newly formed "d'Africa" battalions for service in Africa. Additionaly a limited number of troops were drafted from the Cacciatori d'Africa units of local Italian settlers.
As Chris Prouty describes:
They [the Italians] had inadequate maps, old model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. (The newer Carcano Model 91 rifles were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges.) Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers were too inexperienced to have any esprit de corps. There was a shortage of mules and saddles.
Estimates for the Ethiopian forces under Menelik range from a low of 73,000 to a high of over 120,000, outnumbering the Italians by an estimated five or six times. The forces were divided among Emperor Menelik, Empress Taytu Betul, Ras Wale Betul, Ras Mengesha Atikem, Ras Mengesha Yohannes, Ras Alula Engida, Ras Mikael of Wollo, Ras Makonnen Wolde Mikael, Fitawrari[nb 4] Gebeyyehu, and Negus[nb 5] Tekle Haymanot Tessemma. In addition, the armies were followed by a similar number of traditional peasant followers who supplied the army, as had been done for centuries. Most of the army was composed of riflemen, a significant percentage of which were in Menelik's reserve; however, there were also a significant number of cavalry and infantry only armed with lances. The Kuban Cossack army officer N.S. Leontiev who visited Ethiopia in 1895, according to some sources, led a small team of Russian advisers and volunteers. Other sources assert that Leontiev did not in fact participate in the battle, rather he visited Ethiopia first unofficially in January 1895, and then officially as a representative of Russia in August 1895, but then left later that year, only to return after the battle of Adwa.
On the night of 29 February and the early morning of 1 March three Italian brigades advanced separately towards Adwa over narrow mountain tracks, while a fourth remained camped. David Levering Lewis states that the Italian battle plan
called for three columns to march in parallel formation to the crests of three mountains — Dabormida commanding on the right, Albertone on the left, and Arimondi in the center — with a reserve under Ellena following behind Arimondi. The supporting crossfire each column could give the others made the 'soldiers as deadly as razored shears'. Albertone's brigade was to set the pace for the others. He was to position himself on the summit known as Kidane Mehret, which would give the Italians the high ground from which to meet the Ethiopians.
However, the three leading Italian brigades had become separated during their overnight march and at dawn were spread across several miles of very difficult terrain. Their sketchy maps caused Albertone to mistake one mountain for Kidane Meret, and when a scout pointed out his mistake, Albertone advanced directly into Ras Alula's position.
Unbeknownst to General Baratieri, Emperor Menelik knew his troops had exhausted the ability of the local peasants to support them and had planned to break camp the next day (2 March). The Emperor had risen early to begin prayers for divine guidance when spies from Ras Alula, his chief military advisor, brought him news that the Italians were advancing. The Emperor summoned the separate armies of his nobles and with the Empress Taytu beside him, ordered his forces forward. Negus Tekle Haymanot commanded the right wing, Ras Alula the left, and Rasses Makonnen and Mengesha the center, with Ras Mikael at the head of the Oromo cavalry; the Emperor and his consort remained with the reserve. The Ethiopian forces positioned themselves on the hills overlooking the Adwa valley, in perfect position to receive the Italians, who were exposed and vulnerable to crossfire.
Albertone's askari brigade was the first to encounter the onrush of Ethiopians at 6:00, near Kidane Meret, where the Ethiopians had managed to set up their mountain artillery. Accounts of the Ethiopian artillery deployed at Adwa differ; Russian advisor Leonid Artamonov wrote that it comprised 42 Russian mountain guns supported by a team of fifteen advisers, but British historians suggest that the Ethiopian guns were Hotchkiss and Maxim pieces captured from the Egyptians or purchased from French and other European suppliers. Albertone's heavily outnumbered askaris held their position for two hours until Albertone's capture, and under Ethiopian pressure the survivors sought refuge with Arimondi's brigade. Arimondi's brigade beat back the Ethiopians who repeatedly charged the Italian position for three hours with gradually fading strength until Menelik released his reserve of 25,000 Shewans and swamped the Italian defenders. Two companies of Bersaglieri who arrived at the same moment could not help and were cut down.
Dabormida's Italian brigade had moved to support Albertone but was unable to reach him in time. Cut off from the remainder of the Italian army, Dabormida began a fighting retreat towards friendly positions. However, he inadvertently marched his command into a narrow valley where the Oromo cavalry under Ras Mikael slaughtered his brigade, while shouting Ebalgume! Ebalgume! ("Reap! Reap!"). Dabormida's remains were never found, although his brother learned from an old woman living in the area that she had given water to a mortally wounded Italian officer, "a chief, a great man with spectacles and a watch, and golden stars".
The remaining two brigades under Baratieri himself were outflanked and destroyed piecemeal on the slopes of Mount Belah. Menelik watched as Gojjam forces under the command of Tekle Haymonot made quick work of the last intact Italian brigade. By noon, the survivors of the Italian army were in full retreat and the battle was over.
The Italians suffered about 7,000 killed and 1,500 wounded in the battle and subsequent retreat back into Eritrea, with 3,000 taken prisoner; Ethiopian losses have been estimated around 4,000–5,000 killed and 8,000 wounded. In their flight to Eritrea, the Italians left behind all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles, as well as most of their transport. As Paul B. Henze notes, "Baratieri's army had been completely annihilated while Menelik's was intact as a fighting force and gained thousands of rifles and a great deal of equipment from the fleeing Italians." The 3,000 Italian prisoners, who included General Albertone, appear to have been treated as well as could be expected under difficult circumstances, though about 200 died of their wounds in captivity. However, 800 captured askaris, regarded as traitors by the Ethiopians, had their right hands and left feet amputated. Augustus Wylde records when he visited the battlefield months after the battle, the pile of severed hands and feet was still visible, "a rotting heap of ghastly remnants." Further, many had not survived their punishment, Wylde writing how the neighborhood of Adwa "was full of their freshly dead bodies; they had generally crawled to the banks of the streams to quench their thirst, where many of them lingered unattended and exposed to the elements until death put an end to their sufferings." There does not appear to be any foundation for reports that some Italians were castrated and these may reflect confusion with the atrocious treatment of the askari prisoners.
Baratieri was relieved of his command and later charged with preparing an "inexcusable" plan of attack and for abandoning his troops in the field. He was acquitted on these charges but was described by the court martial judges as being "entirely unfitted" for his command.
Public opinion in Italy was outraged. Chris Prouty offers a panoramic overview of the response in Italy to the news:
When news of the calamity reached Italy there were street demonstrations in most major cities. In Rome, to prevent these violent protests, the universities and theatres were closed. Police were called out to disperse rock-throwers in front of Prime Minister Crispi's residence. Crispi resigned on 9 March. Troops were called out to quell demonstrations in Naples. In Pavia, crowds built barricades on the railroad tracks to prevent a troop train from leaving the station. The Association of Women of Rome, Turin, Milan and Pavia called for the return of all military forces in Africa. Funeral masses were intoned for the known and unknown dead. Families began sending to the newspapers letters they had received before Adwa in which their menfolk described their poor living conditions and their fears at the size of the army they were going to face. King Umberto declared his birthday (14 March) a day of mourning. Italian communities in St. Petersburg, London, New York, Chicago, Buenos Aires and Jerusalem collected money for the families of the dead and for the Italian Red Cross.
The Russian support for Ethiopia led to the advent of a Russian Red Cross mission. The Russian mission was a military mission conceived as a medical support for the Ethiopian troops. It arrived in Addis Ababa some three months after Menelik's Adwa victory.
Follow-up to Ethiopian victory
Emperor Menelik decided not to follow up on his victory by attempting to drive the routed Italians out of their colony. The victorious Emperor limited his demands to little more than the abrogation of the Treaty of Wuchale. In the context of the prevailing balance of power, the emperor's crucial goal was to preserve Ethiopian independence. In addition, Ethiopia had just begun to emerge from a long and brutal famine; Harold Marcus reminds us that the army was restive over its long service in the field, short of rations, and the short rains which would bring all travel to a crawl would soon start to fall. At the time, Menelik claimed a shortage of cavalry horses with which to harry the fleeing soldiers. Chris Prouty observes that "a failure of nerve on the part of Menelik has been alleged by both Italian and Ethiopian sources." Lewis believes that it "was his farsighted certainty that total annihilation of Baratieri and a sweep into Eritrea would force the Italian people to turn a bungled colonial war into a national crusade" that stayed his hand.
As a direct result of the battle, Italy signed the Treaty of Addis Ababa, recognizing Ethiopia as an independent state. Almost forty years later, on 3 October 1935, after the League of Nations's weak response to the Abyssinia Crisis, the Italians launched a new military campaign endorsed by Benito Mussolini, the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. This time the Italians employed vastly superior military technology such as tanks and aircraft, as well as chemical warfare, and the Ethiopian forces were soundly defeated by May 1936. Following the war, Italy occupied Ethiopia for five years (1936–41), before eventually being driven out during World War II by British Empire and Ethiopian patriot forces.
"The confrontation between Italy and Ethiopia at Adwa was a fundamental turning point in Ethiopian history," writes Henze. On a similar note, the Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde observed that "few events in the modern period have brought Ethiopia to the attention of the world as has the victory at Adwa".
The Russian Empire had sold some artillery pieces to the Ethiopian forces and paid enthusiastic compliments to the Ethiopian success. One of the documents of that time stated "The Victory immediately gained the general sympathy of Russian society and it continued to grow." The unique outlook which polyethnic Russia exhibited to Ethiopia disturbed many supporters of European nationalism during the twentieth century. The Russian Cossack captain Nikolay Leontiev with a small escort was present at the battle as an observer.
This defeat of a colonial power and the ensuing recognition of African sovereignty became rallying points for later African nationalists during their struggle for decolonization, as well as activists and leaders of the Pan-African movement. As the Afrocentric scholar Molefe Asante explains,
After the victory over Italy in 1896, Ethiopia acquired a special importance in the eyes of Africans as the only surviving African State. After Adowa, Ethiopia became emblematic of African valour and resistance, the bastion of prestige and hope to thousands of Africans who were experiencing the full shock of European conquest and were beginning to search for an answer to the myth of African inferiority.
On the other hand, many writers have pointed out how this battle was a humiliation for the Italian military. One student of Ethiopia, Donald N. Levine, points out that for the Italians Adwa "became a national trauma which demagogic leaders strove to avenge. It also played no little part in motivating Italy's revanchist adventure in 1935". Levine also noted that the victory "gave encouragement to isolationist and conservative strains that were deeply rooted in Ethiopian culture, strengthening the hand of those who would strive to keep Ethiopia from adopting techniques imported from the modern West – resistances with which both Menelik and Ras Teferi/Haile Selassie would have to contend".
- Battle of Annual
- Battle of Isandlwana
- Battle of the Little Bighorn
- Massacre of Elphinstone's Army
- St. Clair's Defeat
- Pankhurst, The Ethiopians, p. 190
- von Uhlig, Siegbert, Encyclopaedia Aethiopica: A-C (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003), p. 108.
- Piero Pastoretto. "Battaglia di Adua". Archived from the original on May 31, 2006. Retrieved 2006-06-04. (Italian)
- Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913, 1975 (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1995), p. 170
- David Levering Lewis, The Race for Fashoda (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p. 116. ISBN 1-55584-058-2
- Lewis, Fashoda, pp. 116f. He breaks down their numbers into 10,596 Italian officers and soldiers and 7,104 Eritrean askaris.
- Marcus, Menelik II, p. 173
- Thomas Pakenham, page 481 "The Scramble for Africa", ISBN 0-349-10449-2
- George Fitz-Hardinge Berkley The Campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik, London: Constable 1901.
- Raffaele Ruggeri, page 82 Le Guerre Coloniali Italiane 1885/1900, Editrice Militare Italiana 1988
- Prouty, Empress Taytu and Menilek II (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1986), p. 155. ISBN 0-932415-11-3.
- Pankhurst has published one collection of these estimates, Economic History of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie University, 1968), pp. 555–57. See also Herausgegeben von Uhlig, Siegbert, Encyclopaedia Aethiopica: A-C. Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003, p. 108.
- Pétridès (as well as Pankhurst, with slight variations) break the troop numbers down (over 100,000 by their estimates) as follows: 35,000 infantry (25,000 riflemen and 10,000 spearmen) and 8,000 cavalry under Emperor Menelik; 5,000 infantry under Empress Taytu; 8,000 infantry (6,000 riflemen and 2,000 spearmen) under Ras Wale; 8,000 infantry (5,000 riflemen and 3,000 spearmen) under Ras Mengesha Atikem, 5,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula Engida; 6,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 5,000 Oromo cavalry under Ras Mikael of Wollo; 25,000 riflemen under Ras Makonnen; 8,000 infantry under Fitawrari Gebeyyehu; 5,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under Negus Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, von Uhlig, Encyclopaedia, p. 109.
- RUSSIAN MISSION TO ABYSSINIA.
- Who Was Count Abai?.
- The activities of the officer the Kuban Cossack army N.S. Leontjev in the Italian-Ethiopic war in 1895–1896
- – WITH THE ARMIES OF MENELIK II by Alexander K. Bulatovich
- Leonid Artamonov, a Russian general, geographer and traveler, military adviser of Menelik II, as one of Russian officers of volunteers attached to the forces of Ras Tessema (wrote: Through Ethiopia to the White Nile).
- Raymond Jonas, "The Battle of Adwa" (Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 310-314.
- von Uhlig, Encyclopaedia, p. 109.
- Lewis, Fashoda, p. 117.
- In the attached map, this is labelled "Chidane Meret", which is immediately above (west) of the hill "Rajò".
- Sean McLachlan, page 37 "Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896", ISBN 978-1-84908-457-4
- George Fitz-Hardinge Berkeley, Campaign of Adowa (1902), quoted in Lewis, Fashoda, p. 118.
- Pankhurst. The Ethiopians, pp. 191–2.
- Henze, Layers of Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 170.
- Chris Prouty notes that Albertone was given into the care of Azaj Zamanel, commander of Empress Taytu's personal army, and "had a tent to himself, a horse and servants". Empress Taytu, pp. 169f.
- Augustus B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London: Methuen, 1901), p. 213
- Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, p. 214
- Prouty has collected the few documented experiences of these POWs, none of whom claim to have been treated inhumanely (Empress Taytu, pp. 170–83). She repeats the opinion of the Italian historian Angelo del Boca, that "the paucity of the record is attributable to the glacial welcome received in Italy by the returning prisoners for having lost a war, and the fact that they were subjected to long interrogations when they debarked, were defrauded of their back pay, had their mementoes confiscated and were ordered not to talk to journalists" (p. 170).
- Giuseppe Maria Finaldi, Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa: Italy's African Wars in the Era of Nation-Building, 1870-1900 (2010)
- Prouty, Empress Taytu, pp. 159f.
- The Russian Red Cross Mission
- Marcus, Menelik II, p. 176.
- Prouty, Empress Taytu, p. 161.
- Lewis, Fashoda, p. 120.
- Henze, Layers of Layers of Time, p.180.
- Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 81.
- Cossacks of the emperor Мenelik II
- Professor Kinfe Abraham, "The Impact of the Adowa Victory on The Pan-African and Pan-Black Anti-Colonial Struggle," Address delivered to The Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 8 February 2006
- Molefe Asante, quoted in Rodney Worrell, Pan-africanism in Barbados, (New Academia Publishing: 2005) p. 16
- "The Battle of Adwa as a 'Historic' Event", Ethiopian Review, 3 March 2009 (Retrieved 9 March 2009)
- Berkeley, G.F.-H. (1902) The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik, Westminister: A. Constable, 403 pp., OCLC 11834888
- Brown, P.S. and Yirgu, F. (1996) The Battle of Adwa 1896, Chicago: Nyala Publishing, 160 pp., ISBN 978-0-9642068-1-6
- Bulatovich, A.K. (nd) With the Armies of Menelik II: Journal of an Expedition from Ethiopia to Lake Rudolf, translated by Richard Seltzer, OCLC 454102384
- Bulatovich, A.K. (2000) Ethiopia Through Russian Eyes: Country in Transition, 1896–1898, translated by Richard Seltzer, Lawrenceville, N.J. : Red Sea Press, ISBN 978-1-5690211-7-0
- Henze, P.B. (2004) Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia, London: Hurst & Co., ISBN 1-85065-522-7
- Jonas, R.A. (2011) The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire, Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, ISBN 978-0-6740-5274-1
- Lewis, D.L. (1988) The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa, 1st ed., London: Bloomsbury, ISBN 0-7475-0113-0
- Marcus, H.G. (1995) The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844–1913, Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, ISBN 1-56902-010-8
- Pankhurst, K.P. (1968) Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800–1935, Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie I University Press, 772 pp., OCLC 65618
- Pankhurst, K.P. (1998) The Ethiopians: A History, The Peoples of Africa Series, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, ISBN 0-631-22493-9
- Rosenfeld, C.P. (1986) Empress Taytu and Menelik II: Ethiopia 1883–1910, London: Ravens Educational & Development Services, ISBN 0-947895-01-9
- Uhlig, S. (ed.) (2003) Encyclopaedia Aethiopica, 1 (A-C), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, ISBN 3-447-04746-1
- Worrell, R. (2005) Pan-Africanism in Barbados: An Analysis of the Activities of the Major 20th-Century Pan-African Formations in Barbados, Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, ISBN 0-9744934-6-5
- Zewde, Bahru (1991) A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974, Eastern African Studies series, London: Currey, ISBN 0-85255-066-9
- With the Armies of Menelik II, emperor of Ethiopia at www.samizdat.com
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Adua.|
- Historynet: Ethiopia's Decisive Victory at Adowa
- Who Was Count Abai?
- "The Colony of Eritrea from its Origins until March 1, 1899" from 1899 which details the Battle of Adwa from the World Digital Library
- Painting depicting the Battle of Adwa, Catalogue No. E261845, Department of Anthropology, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution