Battle of Ain Jalut
|Battle of Ain Jalut|
|Part of the Mongol raids in Palestine|
|Mamluk Sultanate|| Mongol Empire
Kingdom of Georgia
|Commanders and leaders|
| Saif ad-Din Qutuz
|Light cavalry and horse archers, heavy cavalry, infantry, hand cannoneers||Cavalry and horse archers, 500 Cilician Armenian knights and retinues, infantry|
|20,000 ||20,000 including|
|Casualties and losses|
|heavy||almost entire army destroyed|
The Battle of Ain Jalut (or Ayn Jalut, in Arabic: عين جالوت, the "Spring of Goliath") took place on 3 September 1260 between Muslim Mamluks and the Mongols in the southeastern Galilee, in the Jezreel Valley, not far from Zir'in. The battle marked the high-water point of Mongol conquests, and was the first time a Mongol advance had ever been permanently beaten back in direct combat on the battlefield.
After previous battlefield defeats, the Mongols had always returned and avenged their loss, ultimately defeating their enemies. The Battle of Ain Jalut marked the first time they were unable to do so. The Mongol Ilkhanate leader Hulagu Khan was not able to advance into Egypt, and the Khanate he established in Persia was only able to defeat the Mamluks once in subsequent expeditions, briefly reoccupying Syria and parts of Galilee for a few months in 1300.
Preceding events 
|This section does not cite any references or sources. (September 2011)|
When Möngke Khan became Great Khan in 1251, he immediately set out to implement his grandfather Genghis Khan's plan for world empire. To lead the task of subduing the nations of the West, he selected his brother, another of Genghis Khan's grandsons, Hulagu Khan.
Assembling the army took five years, and it was not until 1256 that Hulagu was prepared to begin the invasions. Operating from the Mongol base in Persia, Hulagu proceeded south. Mongke Khan had ordered good treatment for those who yielded without resistance, and destruction for those who did not. In this way Hulagu and his army had conquered some of the most powerful and longstanding dynasties of the time. Other countries in the Mongols' path submitted to Mongol authority, and contributed forces to the Mongol army. By the time that the Mongols reached Baghdad, their army included Cilician Armenians, and even some Frankish forces from the submitted Principality of Antioch. The Hashshashin in Persia fell, the 500-year-old Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad was destroyed (see Battle of Baghdad), and so too fell the Ayyubid dynasty in Damascus. Hulagu's plan was to then proceed southwards through the Kingdom of Jerusalem towards the Mamluk Sultanate, to confront the major Islamic power.
Mongol envoys to Egypt 
From the King of Kings of the East and West, the Great Khan. To Qutuz the Mamluk, who fled to escape our swords. You should think of what happened to other countries and submit to us. You have heard how we have conquered a vast empire and have purified the earth of the disorders that tainted it. We have conquered vast areas, massacring all the people. You cannot escape from the terror of our armies. Where can you flee? What road will you use to escape us? Our horses are swift, our arrows sharp, our swords like thunderbolts, our hearts as hard as the mountains, our soldiers as numerous as the sand. Fortresses will not detain us, nor armies stop us. Your prayers to God will not avail against us. We are not moved by tears nor touched by lamentations. Only those who beg our protection will be safe. Hasten your reply before the fire of war is kindled. Resist and you will suffer the most terrible catastrophes. We will shatter your mosques and reveal the weakness of your God and then will kill your children and your old men together. At present you are the only enemy against whom we have to march.
The campaign 
The power dynamic then changed due to the death of the Great Khan Mongke (while on an expedition to China), requiring Hulagu and other senior Mongols to return home to decide upon his successor. A potential Great Khan, Hulagu took the majority of his army with him, and left a much smaller force west of the Euphrates of only around one or two tumens (10,000–20,000 men) under his best general, the Nestorian Christian Naiman Turk Kitbuqa Noyan.
Upon receiving news of Hulagu's departure, Mamluk Sultan Qutuz quickly assembled a large army at Cairo and invaded Palestine. In late August, Kitbuqa's forces proceeded south from their base at Baalbek, passing to the east of Lake Tiberias through Galilee.
The Mongols, for their part, attempted to form a Franco-Mongol alliance with (or at least, demand the submission of) the remnant of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, now centered on Acre, but Pope Alexander IV had forbidden this. Tensions between Franks and Mongols had also increased when Julian of Sidon caused an incident which resulted in the death of one of Kitbuqa's grandsons. Angered, Kitbuqa had sacked Sidon. The Barons of Acre, contacted by the Mongols, had also been approached by the Mamluks, seeking military assistance against the Mongols.
Though the Mamluks were the traditional enemies of the Franks, the Barons of Acre recognized the Mongols as the more immediate menace, and so the Crusaders opted for a position of cautious neutrality between the two forces. In an unusual move, they agreed that the Egyptian Mamluks could march north through the Crusader territories unmolested, and even camp to resupply near Acre. When news arrived that the Mongols had crossed the Jordan River, Sultan Qutuz and his forces then proceeded southeast toward the spring at Ain Jalut in the Jezreel Valley.
The battle 
The opposing forces met at Ain Jalut on September 3, 1260, both sides numbering about 20,000 men. The first to advance were the Mongols, whose force also included troops from the Kingdom of Georgia and about 500 knights from the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, both of which had submitted to Mongol authority. The Mamluks had the advantage of knowledge of the terrain, and Qutuz capitalized on this by hiding the bulk of his force in the highlands, hoping to bait the Mongols with a smaller force under Baibars. The two armies fought restlessly for many hours, with Mamluk leader Baibars most of the time implementing hit-and-run tactics, in order to provoke the Mongol troops and at the same time preserve the bulk of his troops intact. When the Mongols carried out another heavy assault, Baibars – who it is said had laid out the overall strategy of the battle since he had spent much time in that region, earlier in his life, as a fugitive – and his men feigned a final retreat, drawing the Mongols into the highlands to be ambushed by the rest of the Mamluk forces, who were concealed among the trees in the highlands. The Mongol leader Kitbuqa, already provoked by the constant fleeing of Baibars and his troops, committed a grave mistake; instead of suspecting a trick, Kitbuqa decided to march forwards with all his troops on the trail of the fleeing Mamluks. When the Mongols reached the highlands, Mamluk forces appeared from hiding and began to fire arrows and attack with their cavalry. The Mongols then found themselves surrounded on all sides by the Mamluk forces.
The Mongol army fought very fiercely and very aggressively to break out. Some distance away, Qutuz watched with his private legion. When Qutuz saw the left wing of the Mamluk army almost destroyed by the desperate Mongols seeking an escape route, Qutuz threw away his combat helmet, so that his warriors could recognize him. He was seen the next moment rushing fiercely towards the battlefield, urging his army to keep firm and advanced towards the damaged side followed by his own unit. The Mongols were pushed back and fled to a vicinity of Bisan followed by Qutuz's forces but they managed to gather and returned to the battlefield making a successful counterattack. However, the battle shifted in favor of the Mamluks, who now had both the geographic and the psychological advantage, and eventually some of the Mongols were forced to retreat. When the battle ended, the Mamluk heavy cavalrymen had accomplished what had never been done before, beating the Mongols in close combat.
The Battle of Ain Jalut is also notable for being the earliest known battle where explosive hand cannons (midfa in Arabic) were used. These explosives were employed by the Mamluk Egyptians in order to frighten the Mongol horses and cavalry and cause disorder in their ranks. The explosive gunpowder compositions of these cannon were later described in Arabic chemical and military manuals in the early 14th century.
On the way back to Cairo after the victory at Ain Jalut, Qutuz was assassinated by several emirs in a conspiracy led by Baibars. Baibars became the new Sultan. His successors would go on to capture the last of the Crusader states in The Holy Land by 1291. The Mongols were again beaten at the First Battle of Homs less than a year later, and completely expelled from Syria.
Internecine conflict prevented Hulagu Khan from being able to bring his full power against the Mamluks to avenge the pivotal defeat at Ain Jalut. Berke Khan, the Khan of the Kipchak Khanate in Russia, had converted to Islam, and watched with horror as his cousin destroyed the Abbasid Caliph, the spiritual head of Islam. Muslim historian Rashid-al-Din Hamadani quoted Berke as sending the following message to Mongke Khan, protesting the attack on Baghdad (not knowing Mongke had died in China): "He (Hulagu) has sacked all the cities of the Muslims, and has brought about the death of the Caliph. With the help of God I will call him to account for so much innocent blood." The Mamluks, learning through spies that Berke was both a Muslim and not fond of his cousin, were careful to nourish their ties to him and his Khanate.
After the Mongol succession was finally settled, with Kublai as the last Great Khan, Hulagu returned to his lands by 1262, and massed his armies to attack the Mamluks and avenge Ain Jalut. However, Berke Khan initiated a series of raids in force which lured Hulagu north, away from the Levant to meet him. Hulagu suffered severe defeat in an attempted invasion north of the Caucasus in 1263. This was the first open war between Mongols, and signaled the end of the unified empire.
Hulagu was only able to send a small army of two tumens in his only attempt to attack the Mamluks after Ain Jalut, and it was repulsed. Hulagu Khan died in 1265 and was succeeded by his son Abaqa.
- Runciman, Steven, A History of The Crusades, Vol. III, The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.312
- Cowley, p.44, states that both sides were evenly matched at 20,000 men. Cline says that "In short, the . . . armies that were to meet at 'Ayn Jalut were probably of approximately the same size, with between ten thousand and twenty thousand men in each.", p. 145. Fage & Oliver, however, state that "the Mongol force at Ayn Jalut was nothing but a detachment, which was vastly outnumbered by the Mamluk army", p. 43.
- Tschanz, David W. "Saudi Aramco World : History's Hinge: 'Ain Jalut".
- René Grousset (1970). The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. Rutgers University Press. pp. 361 & 363. ISBN 0-8135-1304-9.
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- Ahmad Y Hassan, Gunpowder Composition for Rockets and Cannon in Arabic Military Treatises In Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
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- Although medieval historians give conflicting accounts, modern historians assign responsibility for Qutuz's assassination to Baibars, as Baibars had been promised Syria as a reward for his efforts in Ain Jalut but when it was time to claim his prize, Qutuz commanded him to be patient. See Perry (p. 150), Amitai-Preiss (p. 47, "a conspiracy of amirs, which included Baybars and was probably under his leadership"), Holt et al. (Baibars "came to power with [the] regicide [of Qutuz] on his conscience"), and Tschanz. For further discussion, see article on "Qutuz".
- The Mongol Warlords quotes Rashid al Din's record of Berke Khan's pronouncement; this quote is also found in Amitai-Preiss's The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War.
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- Tschanz, David W. (July/August 2007). "History's Hinge: 'Ain Jalut". Saudi Aramco World. Archived from the original on 12 September 2007. Retrieved 2007-09-24.