Battle of Cape Spartivento
|Battle of Cape Spartivento|
|Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean of World War II|
Top: Italian heavy cruiser Bolzano during the battle.
Bottom: British aircraft carrier Ark Royal during the battle.
|Commanders and leaders|
|James Somerville||Inigo Campioni|
1 heavy cruiser
5 light cruisers
1 anti-aircraft cruiser
6 heavy cruisers
|Casualties and losses|
|1 heavy cruiser damaged||1 destroyer damaged|
The Battle of Cape Spartivento, known as the Battle of Cape Teulada in Italy, was a naval battle during the Battle of the Mediterranean in the Second World War. It was fought between naval forces of the British Royal Navy and the Italian Regia Marina on 27 November 1940.
On the night of 11–12 November 1940, the British incapacitated or destroyed half of the Italian battleships during the Battle of Taranto. Until then, the Italians had left their battlefleet in harbour, using it as a threat against British shipping, even if it never left port, as a fleet in being. The Italian Navy, however, didn't decline battle if given the opportunity.
On the night of 17 November, an Italian force consisting of two battleships (Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare) and a number of other units were about to intercept British cruisers and two aircraft carriers, HMS Ark Royal and Argus, on their way to deliver aircraft to Malta (Operation White). The British convoy was warned of their approach and immediately turned about and returned to Gibraltar, sending off their aircraft (two Blackburn Skuas and 12 Hawker Hurricanes) prematurely. One Skua and eight Hurricanes were lost at sea, as they ran out of fuel well before they could reach their destination. Seven airmen were lost.
This Italian success in disrupting the aerial reinforcement of Malta seriously upset British plans for a further convoy to supply the island (Operation Collar). The convoy was then rerun, with much more support, including ships from Gibraltar, Force H and Alexandria, Force D. The convoy from Gibraltar was spotted by the Italian intelligence service, and once again the Italian fleet sailed out to intercept it. The first Italian naval unit to make visual contact with the convoy was the torpedo boat Sirio on the night of 27 November. After launching two torpedoes from long range, which missed their target, Sirio sent a report of seven enemy warships heading to the east.
The British, aware of the Italian fleet's movements, sent their forces north to intercept them before they could come anywhere near the cargo ships. At 09:45 on 27 November, an IMAM Ro.43 reconnaissance floatplane from the heavy cruiser Bolzano discovered a British squadron steaming to the east, 17 nmi (32 km) north of Chetaïbi.
Shortly after, at 9:56, Somerville received the report of his own aircraft from the carrier HMS Ark Royal about the presence of five cruisers and five destroyers. The British Admiral assumed that these were Italian units closing for battle. Force D had not yet arrived from Alexandria and the British were outgunned, but only fifteen minutes later, Force D was spotted and the tables turned. The two forces were fairly even; although the Italian ships had better range and heavier fire, the British had an aircraft carrier, which had recently proven itself to be equal to a battleship at Taranto. However, the Italian commander had been given orders to avoid combat unless it was heavily in his favour, so a decisive battle was out of the question.
Admiral Somerville deployed his forces into two main groups, with five cruisers under Rear Admiral Lancelot Holland in front and two battleships and seven destroyers in a second group to the south. Much further south, HMS Ark Royal was preparing to launch a force of Fairey Swordfish. The Italians were organised into three groups, two from six heavy cruisers and seven destroyers and a third of two battleships and another seven destroyers in the rear. At 12:07, after a report received from Gorizia's floatplane, it was clear a battle was about to start with evenly matched forces, so the Italian commander ordered the cruiser groups to re-form on the battleships and prepare to depart. However, by this point, the lead cruiser formation had already angled toward the British and was committed to combat.
At 12:22, the lead groups of both cruiser forces came into range and Fiume opened fire at 23,500 m. Rapid fire between the two forces continued as the distance between them dropped, but the Italians outgunned the British. The battleship HMS Ramillies helped even the odds, but she was too slow to maintain formation and dropped out of battle after a few salvoes at 12:26. Four minutes later, Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino, commander of the Italian cruiser group, received order to disengage, although the battle was slightly in their favour. Iachino ordered an increase in speed to 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h), laid smoke and started to withdraw. At this time, the Italian destroyer Lanciere was hit by a broadside from HMS Manchester and seriously damaged, although she was towed to port after the battle. The heavy cruiser HMS Berwick was hit at 12:22 by a single 203 mm (8 in) shell, which knocked out her "Y" turret, killed seven men, wounded nine others and ignited a fire that took an hour to subdue. A second hit at 12:35 destroyed the after breaker (electrical switchboard) room and cut power to the ship's aft section, including the remaining aft turret. For the next few minutes, the tables turned in favour of the British when the battlecruiser HMS Renown closed the distance on the Italian cruisers. This advantage was soon negated, however, when at 13:00, Vittorio Veneto opened fire from 27,000 m. Vittorio Veneto fired 19 rounds in seven salvoes from long range and that was enough for the now outgunned British cruisers, which turned back at the fourth salvo. In fact, as giant water-spouts erupted around HMS Berwick and HMS Manchester, Holland ordered smoke, and his ships fled southeast to close with Renown. Both forces withdrew, the battle lasting a total of 54 minutes and causing little damage to either side.
After the battle Winston Churchill demanded Somerville's scalp, having questioned the admiral's offensive spirit ever since his objections to attacking the French at Mers-el-Kébir. However, a board of inquiry exonerated Somerville, who enjoyed the strong support of several fellow admirals. As for Campioni, although he had a mandate to be conservative, he had presided over the loss of Italy's best opportunity to deal the British a sharp setback in a fleet action. His days of command at sea were numbered. As Iachino remarked, "the use of these ships which constituted at that moment nearly all of our fleet's effective units after the blow at Taranto, was decided by Supermarina mainly for reasons of morale, and to demonstrate that our combative spirit remained intact.
Order of battle
- Admiral Angelo Iachino
- Admiral Inigo Campioni
- Admiral Lancelot Holland
- Admiral Sir James Somerville
- not entered in battle
- escort and convoy
Media related to Battle of Cape Spartivento at Wikimedia Commons
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- The Battle of Cape Teulada
- Battaglia di Capo Teulada - Plancia di Commando