Battle of Cartagena de Indias

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Battle of Cartagena de Indias
Part of the War of Jenkins' Ear
Defensa de Cartagena de Indias por la escuadra de D. Blas de Lezo, año 1741.jpg
British attack on Cartagena de Indias by Luis Fernández Gordillo.
Oil on canvas, Naval Museum of Madrid.
Date March–May 1741
Location Cartagena de Indias, Viceroyalty of New Granada (present-day Colombia)
Result Decisive Spanish victory
Belligerents
 Great Britain Spain Spain
Commanders and leaders
Kingdom of Great Britain Edward Vernon
Kingdom of Great Britain Thomas Wentworth
Spain Blas de Lezo
Spain Sebastián de Eslava
Strength
27,400- 30,000 military personnel:[1][2]
  • 12,000 regulars, marines and militia[3]
  • 15,398 Royal Navy sailors[4]

29 ships of the line
22 frigates[5]
135 transports and other craft[6]

3,000- 4,000 military personnel:[7]
  • 2,700 regulars[8] and 400 marines
  • 600 sailors and 300 militia[9][10]
  • 600 native archers

6 ships of the line and numerous shore-based guns

Casualties and losses
9,500–11,500 dead[11][12][13]
7,500 wounded and sick
1,500 guns lost[14]
6 Royal Navy ships lost[15][16]
17 Royal Navy ships of the line heavily damaged[13][17]
4 frigates and 27 transports lost[18]
800 dead[19]
1,200 wounded[20]
6 ships lost
5 forts
3 batteries
395 cannon

The Battle of Cartagena de Indias was an amphibious military engagement between the forces of Britain under Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon and those of Spain under Admiral Blas de Lezo. It took place at the city of Cartagena de Indias in March 1741, in present-day Colombia. The battle was the most significant of the War of Jenkins' Ear and one of the largest naval campaigns in British history. The war later was subsumed into the greater conflict of the War of the Austrian Succession. The battle resulted in a major defeat for the British Navy and Army. The battle marked a turning point in South American history, as Spain preserved her military supremacy in that continent until the nineteenth century.[21]

The defeat caused heavy losses for the British: 50 ships lost, badly damaged or abandoned, and losses of 18,000 soldiers and sailors,[22] mostly due to disease that also took a heavy toll among the Spanish forces, especially yellow fever.[23]

Background[edit]

The War of Jenkins' Ear was a conflict between Great Britain and Spain that lasted from 1739 to 1748. Under the 1729 Treaty of Seville, the British had agreed not to trade with the Spanish colonies except under limited conditions, under the Asiento de Negros slave trade and the Annual Ship under the Navio de Permiso. The Asiento allowed Britain a monopoly to supply 5,000 slaves a year to the Spanish colonies. The Navio de Permiso permitted a single yearly trading ship, the Annual Ship, which could carry 1000 tons of imports to the yearly trade fair in Porto Bello.[24] Upon receiving these concessions from Spain, the British government granted a monopoly for both to the South Sea Company.[25] The merchants and bankers in Britain, who were the driving force behind Britain's international commerce and trading, demanded more access to the lucrative Spanish markets of the Caribbean Basin. In turn, the Spanish colonists desired British-made goods, so a burgeoning black market of smuggled goods developed.[26]

By the terms of the treaty, the Spanish were permitted to board British vessels in Spanish waters. After one such boarding in 1731, Robert Jenkins, captain of the ship Rebecca, claimed that a Spanish coast guard officer had severed his ear.[27] Jenkins exhibited his pickled ear to the House of Commons. This served to heighten the "war fever" developing against Spain, which was also driven by the British desire for commercial and military domination of the Atlantic basin. To much cheering, the British Prime Minister, Robert Walpole, reluctantly declared war on October 23, 1739,[28] reportedly saying, "They may ring their bells now; they will be wringing their hands before long."[29]

Spanish Caribbean[edit]

The Spanish Caribbean trade had a network of four main ports: Vera Cruz, Mexico; Cartagena, Colombia; Porto Bello (now Portobelo), Panama; and the main port through which all the trade of those three ports came, Havana, Cuba. On November 22, 1739 the British captured Portobelo in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. The British attack was part of an attempt to damage Spain's finances. The poorly defended port was attacked by six ships of the line[30] under Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon.[31] The relative ease of this capture, although it was quickly recaptured by the Spanish after Vernon's fleet departed, caused jubilation in Britain.

Vernon was given command of the very large naval force, which was one quarter of the British Royal Navy, of a major land and sea amphibious expedition under the overall command of Lord Cathcart.[32] The first goal of the expedition was to capture Havana, the most important of the Spanish ports because it had facilities where ships could be refitted and, by 1740, it had become Spain's largest and most active shipyard.[33] Lord Cathcart died en route and it remained unclear who was in command overall. Cathcart's untimely demise resulted in dissension in the British command, preventing the coordination needed for this complex operation.[34]

The despatch of the large fleet and troop contingent had been demanded by the public[35] led by the merchant class lobbies,[36] especially, and the South Sea Company, in particular, which refused to accept the compromise agreements made by the governments of Spain and Britain. The Duke of Newcastle[37] advocated the public's demands before Parliament. Vice-Admiral Vernon was an active and ardent supporter[38] of war against Spain and advocated offensive action both in Parliament and before the Admiralty.[39] The decision to mount a large West Indies expedition was reached in December 1739.[40] Walpole, who opposed the war categorically,[41] and Vernon, who favored small squadron actions, were dissatisfied with the situation. Vernon, despite his earlier failed small squadron raid on Cartagena, was not convinced that a large-scale attack on a heavily fortified city would prove to be as successful as his smaller Portobello assault had been. He feared, particularly, that a prolonged siege would lead to heavy attrition from disease, a typical situation given the limited medical knowledge of the time.[42]

Objectives[edit]

Britain's objective was to capture and permanently retain[43] Spain's four ports of the Caribbean basin. By taking control of these ports, the British would effectively control the entry and exit routes to South America. The British would have bases from which to launch attacks into the interior, and Spain would have limited access to deep water ports on the eastern coast of their American colonies and therefore be unable to resupply their inland forces. Control of these ports would provide the British with a key control of the area and allow them, in time, to acquire the whole of Spain's American empire.[44] However, Britain had no place to build and refit ships in the Caribbean, as Spain did with the dockyards[45] at Havana, and without a dockyard no fleet could remain in the area for any length of time without breaking down. Quick capture of Havana and its dry dock was imperative and it was the favored objective of Newcastle and Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty,[46] but Britain's divided ministry left the course of the campaign up to Vernon and others at a Council of War held in Jamaica. They followed Vernon, who preferred Cartagena as their initial objective as it was a good port and to windward of Britain's existing Caribbean bases and Vernon thought Havana too well defended to be the initial target.[47]

The city of Cartagena de Indias[edit]

Map of Cartagena de Indias from Gentleman's Magazine 1740.

Cartagena of Indies, in the eighteenth century, was a large and rich city of over 10,000 people. It was the capital of the province of Cartagena and the main town had significant fortifications that had been recently repaired, increased and improved with outlying forts, batteries and works. Its harbor was considered one of the finest in the world and it served the galleons of the commercial fleet, Galeones a Tierra Firme y Perú, that annually conveyed through Havana to Spain the immense revenues of gold and silver from New Granada and Peru.[48]

Founded by Pedro Heredia in 1533, it had been the target of conquest in the past and was captured by the English, under Francis Drake, in 1585 and by the French, under Baron de Pointis in 1697. The city faces the Caribbean to the west, to the south its bay has two entrances: Boca Chica (Little Mouth) and Boca Grande (Big Mouth). Boca Chica was the only deep water entrance and was so narrow it allowed the passage of only one ship at a time. This entrance was defended on one side by the Fort San Luis with a couple of small outworks on the peninsula of Terra Bomba and on the other side by the fascine battery Baradera. Beyond Boca Chica was the great lagoon of the outer harbor with an entry channel into the inner harbor between two peninsulas, each defended by a fort. The walls of the city itself mounted some 160 cannon and the suburbs 140 guns. The city was surrounded by a water-filled ditch and its gates supported by recently built bastions. The suburbs were also surrounded by a wall and ditch. About a quarter mile south from the city on a hill was Fort San Lazaro, a square fifty feet on a side with three demi-bastions. The position of Fort San Lazaro commanded the city itself and the plain around the hill.[49] There was also a small hill nearby that commanded Fort Lazaro, but there was no fresh water source available outside Cartagena and the fort. The road from the best landing point, the beach at Texar de Gracias, to Fort Lazaro was three miles long.[50]

Battle[edit]

A map of the trading part of the West Indies created 1741 in honour of Vernon shows Boca Chica, Cartagena – 2nd from the bottom left.
Sir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister of Great Britain, from the studio of Jean-Baptiste van Loo, 1740.

The Battle of Cartagena pitted a British invasion force of 186 ships[51] including: 29[52] Ships of the Line;[53] 22 frigates, 2 hospital ships, various fire ships and bomb ships armed with a total of some 2,000 cannon; 80 troop transports and 50 merchant ships. There were at least 27,400 military personnel, of which the land force totaled 12,000[54] including: two British regular infantry regiments, the 15th Foot and 24th Foot, 6,000 newly raised marines[55] and some 3,600 American colonial troops, commanded by Colonel William Gooch (the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia), in four battalions designated as the 43rd Regiment of Foot, arriving from the North American colonies on another 40 transports.[56]

The Spanish force defending Cartagena was composed of 2,700 to 3,000 Spanish regulars[57] from the regiments Aragon, España and that of Toledo, Lisboa and Navarra just arrived in October 1740, brought by Vice-admiral Torres; a colonial regiment from Cartagena; an unspecified number of sailors; 5 companies of militia and 600 Indian archers, perhaps 4,000[58] to 6,000 defenders,[59] manning six Ships of the Line and strategic fortifications — under the command of the Governor General of Cartagena, Don Blas de Lezo and the Viceroy of New Granada, Sebastián de Eslava. Blas de Lezo, a Basque,[60] was an experienced, wily and tenacious Spanish Naval commander, whose previous career was as daring and spectacular as any naval officer of his day. Lezo, who had lost an arm, a leg and an eye in the service of Spain, made use of every advantage, strategy and tactic available to him.[61]

Preliminary maneuvers[edit]

British soldier of the 15th Regiment of Foot 1740s from the Cloathing Book of 1740

The expedition was very slow leaving Britain. Initially, contrary winds delayed the sailing until most of the shipboard provisions were consumed and a steep increase of sickness[62] occurred among the ship crews. Then news of the sailing of the French squadrons and a Spanish squadron caused further delay while the British fleet was reinforced in response.[63] The expedition suffered from manpower shortages in the navy, which required drafting two full infantry regiments, the 34th and 36th, to fill crew requirements Cathcart was ordered by the government to transfer 600 of his marines to provide marines for the men of war.[64] These delays cost the British three months of valuable campaign time. The 3,600 Americans were transported to Jamaica from New York on 40 transports escorted by some British men of war and arrived much sooner on December 3, 1740. The Americans were originally under the command of General Spotswood, Governor of Virginia, who was to be second-in command under Cathcart, however Spotswood died and was replaced by Gooch as commander of the Americans. They found on their arrival that no arrangements had been made by the British government for their provisions.[64] The lack of provision and climate immediately began to take a toll on the Americans, while the fleet from Britain was suffering from typhus, scurvy and dysentery;[65] by January 1741 the land forces had already suffered 500 dead, including Lord Cathcart the commander in chief, and 1,500 sick.[64] With both Cathcart and Spotswood dead, command of the land forces went to Thomas Wentworth, who had no previous combat command experience. In Jamaica, 300 African slaves, called 'Macheteros', were added to the expedition as a work battalion. Additional delays before and after embarking from Jamaica cost more precious time, including a brief skirmish with a French squadron. Both the British and the Spanish were well aware that with onset of the two-month rainy season in May, the so-called 'sickly season', which would last from May to November,[66] would also begin.[67]

The Spanish had received reinforcements but were already suffering severely from diseases as well. Similar to the British, but not as disruptive to operations, there was dissension between Lezo and Eslava. In particular, Lezo favored a very strong, all-out defense of Boca Chica channel; Eslava's opposition led to an under-manning of some of the forward defenses, allowing the British an easier initial landing.[68]

Attack on Fort San Luis at Boca Chica[edit]

Sebastián de Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada from an 18th-century painting

The British expedition arrived off Cartagena on March 4 with no overall commander but with decisions being made by councils of war, with General Wentworth commanding the land forces and Vernon the sea forces. The navy had lost so many sailors by this time as a result of the epidemics that one third of the land forces were needed to fill out the crews.[69] Although the city of Cartagena was fronted on one side by the ocean, the shore and surf were so rough as to preclude any attempt to approach it from sea. The other access channel, Boca Grande, was too shallow to allow the passage of ocean-going ships. The channel of Boca Chica was the only deep-draft passage into the harbor of Cartagena. It ran between two narrow peninsulas and was defended on one side by the fort of San Luis, Boca Chica Castle, with four bastions having some 49 cannons, 3 mortars and a garrison of 300 soldiers under the command of the chief engineer, Carlos Des Naux. A boom stretched from the island of La Bomba to the southern peninsula on which was Fort San Jose with 13 cannon and 150 soldiers. Also supporting the entrance were the 6 Spanish line ships.[70]

After a week of bombardment, the British planned to land near the smaller access channel, Boca Chica, with 300 grenadiers. The Spanish defenders of two small, nearby forts, San Iago and San Philip, were driven off by a division of three ships of the fleet under Chaloner Ogle which suffered some 120 casualties with the Shrewsbury alone losing 100 killed and wounded as well as taking serious damage from cannon fire from Fort San Luis.[71] The grenadiers landed that evening and were followed on March 22 by the whole of the British land forces: the two regular regiments and the six regiments of marines.[72] Of the American land forces only 300 were allowed ashore as most of the American troops of the four battalions had been dispersed to serve aboard the Ships of the Line to replace Vernon's losses in sailors and were not available for amphibious operations.[73] They were followed in a few days by the artillery. After the army made camp, the Americans and the Jamaicans constructed a battery in two weeks[74] and its twenty 24 pounder guns began battering the fort. A squadron of five ships, consisting of the Boyne, Prince Frederick, Hampton Court, Tilbury, and Suffolk, led inshore by Commodore Lestock, also attempted to batter the fort into submission for two days but had the worst of it, making no impression on the fort and having many men killed and three ships heavily damaged and disabled.[75]

The British artillery on land, after three days of firing night and day, made a breach in the main fort[76] while part of the fleet assisted. Another part of the fleet engaged the Spanish ships, two of which Lezo scuttled and another, the "Galicia", he set on fire. The two scuttled Spanish ships partially blocked the channel and the Galicia was captured by the British before it could sink. The British attacked Fort San Luis by land and sea on April 5. The infantry advanced on the breach; however, the Spanish had already retreated to fortifications in the inner harbor. Over the following week, the landing force re-embarked and entered the harbor. The operation against Boca Chica cost the British army 120 killed and wounded, additionally 250 died from the diseases of yellow fever and malaria, and 600 sick were hospitalized.[77]

Attack on Fort San Lazaro[edit]

Spanish Admiral Don Blas de Lezo, portrait by an unknown 18th century painter.

The next council of war decided to attempt to isolate Cartagena from the land side by an assault of Fort San Lazaro, called in some accounts San Felipe de Barajas. With the capture of San Luis and other outlying defensive works, the fleet passed through the Boca Chica channel into the lagoon that made up the harbor of Cartagena. The Spanish withdrew to concentrate their forces at Fort San Lazaro and the city. Vernon goaded Wentworth into an ill-considered, badly planned assault on the fort, an outlying strong-point of Cartagena, which Vernon refused to support with the fleet making specious excuses about the depth of the harbor. The ships cleared the beach with cannon fire and Wentworth landed on April 16 at Texar de Gracias.[78]

After the British gained the inner harbor and captured some outlying forts, de Lezo strengthened the last main bastion of Fort San Lazaro by digging a trench around it and clearing a field of fire on the approach. He had to hold the fort as it commanded the city[79] and, in British hands, a bombardment would force Cartagena to surrender in a short time. Lezo defended the trench with some 650 soldiers and garrisoned the fort with another 300, while keeping in hand a reserve of 200 marines and sailors. The British advanced from the beach and had to pass a narrow defile. There they met a Spanish force that briefly contested that passage before giving way.[80]

Gooch's Marines, 43rd regiment of foot from the Cloathing Book of 1740

The only British engineer with the expedition had been killed at fort San Luis; no one could construct a battery to breach the walls. The British decided to storm the fort outright in a coup de main, walls unbreached, during a night attack. The night attack would allow the assault of the northern side of the fort facing Cartagena because, in the dark, the guns of Cartagena would not be able to give supporting fire. The southern side had the lowest and most vulnerable walls and the grenadiers would attempt to quickly storm and carry the parapets. But the attack started late and the initial advance on Lazaro was made near dawn at 4 am April 20 by a forlorn hope of 50 picked men followed by 450 grenadiers commanded by Colonel Wynyard. The main body was 1,000 men of the 15th and 24th regiments commanded by Colonel Grant, then a mixed company from the 34th and 36th regiments[81] and some unarmed Americans carrying scaling-ladders for the fort's high walls and wool packs[82] to fill in the trench. Finally, there was a reserve of 500 marines under Colonel Wolfe.[83]

The column was led by two Spanish deserters as guides who misled the British on the southern low walled side. Wynyard was led to a steep approach and, as the grenadiers scrambled up the slope, they were received with a deadly volley of musket fire at thirty yards from the Spanish in the entrenchments. The grenadiers deployed into line and advanced, slowly trading fire. On the north face, Grant fell early and the leaderless troops traded fire with the Spanish. Most of the Americans dropped the ladders they carried and took cover. Those ladders brought forward were too short by ten feet.[84] After an hour, the sun rose and as the guns of Cartagena opened fire on the British, casualties mounted. At eight o'clock, when a column of Spanish infantry coming from the gates of Cartagena threatened to cut the British off from their ships, Wentworth ordered a retreat. The assault failed, with a loss of 600 casualties from a force of approximately 2,000. Sickness and disease increased the casualties of the expedition. During the period surrounding the attack on Fort San Lazaro, Wentworth's land forces were reduced from 6,500 effectives to 3,200.[85][86]

British withdrawal[edit]

British Admiral Edward "Old Grog" Vernon.

Don Blas de Lezo's plan had been that, given the overwhelming force against him, he would attempt to conduct a fighting withdrawal and delay the British long enough until the start of the rainy season at the end of April. The tropical downpours would delay campaigning for another 2 months. Further, the longer the enemy had to remain mostly crowded on ships at sea and in the open on land, the more likely that insufficient supply, discomfort and especially disease would become his allies and the deadly enemies of the British. De Lezo was aided by the contempt that Vernon and Wentworth had for each other, which prevented their cooperation after the initial landing.[87]

Another important factor in the defeat of the British force was the fact that Cartagena's defensive fortifications had been repaired and improved over the past year. Although De Lezo was pressed to the limit, his plan worked and the Spanish prevailed. The rains came and the British had to board their ships, where close quarters made disease even more deadly. By April 25, Vernon and the council decided to retreat to Jamaica, and by mid-May they were gone. By May 7, only 1,700 men of the land forces were fit for service and no more than 1,000 in condition to land against the enemy; within a month of leaving Cartagena, another 1,100 died. British strength was reduced to 1,400 and American to 1,300.[88]

The expedition and battle lasted for 67 days and ended with the British fleet withdrawing in defeat, with 18,000 dead or incapacitated, mostly by disease.[89] The Spanish also suffered severely from disease including Blas de Lezo himself, who died a few weeks after falling ill from the plague from unburied bodies.[90] In addition a total of 50 British ships were lost, badly damaged, disabled or abandoned for lack of crews. There were nineteen ships of the line damaged, four frigates and twenty-seven transports lost.[91] Of the 3,600 American colonists, who had volunteered, lured by promises of land[92] and mountains of gold,[93] most died of yellow fever, dysentery, and outright starvation. Only 300[94] returned home, including Lawrence Washington, who renamed his Virginia plantation, Mount Vernon after Admiral Vernon.

English medal commemorating the British "victory" that never was. Vernon is depicted holding a command stick and finger pointing the Spanish city, backed by his ships. The medal says "Admiral Vernon winning the town of Carthagana". Naval Museum of Madrid.
Commemorative British medal of the supposed "victory". It shows Vernon looking down upon the Spanish admiral Blas de Lezo (Don 'Blass'). Although actually he only had one leg, Lezo is depicted with his two legs, so he could appear knelt down, giving his sword to Vernon. The medal says "The pride of Spain humbled by ad. Vernon". Naval Museum of Madrid.

During the early stage of the battle, when the Spanish forces had retreated from different defense points to regroup in the larger fortress of San Lazaro, feeling victory in his hands Vernon dispatched a messenger, Captain Laws, to Britain to inform King George of their victory on May 17. Up to 11 different commemorative medals were minted[95] in London to celebrate this "victory". In one of these medals Admiral Vernon was shown looking down upon the "defeated" Spanish admiral Don Blas de Lezo who appeared kneeling down. After the news of defeat of the British Armada reached London all the medals were ordered to be removed from circulation, and king George II forbade to talk or write about the defeat. A contemporary song was composed by a sailor from the Shrewsbury that prematurely celebrated the victory:

VERNON'S GLORY; OR, THE SPANIARDS DEFEAT.


Being an account of the taking of Carthagena by Vice-Admiral Vernon...
"...and the town surrender[ed]


To Admiral Vernon, the scourge of Spain".[96]

After the defeat, Admiral Vernon sent a letter to Blas de Lezo, which read "We have decided to retreat, but we will return to Cartagena after we take reinforcements in Jamaica", to which Blas de Lezo responded ironically, "In order to come to Cartagena, the English King must build a better and larger fleet, because yours now is only suitable to transport coal from Ireland to London".[97]

The main reasons for the British defeat were the failure of the British to find united leadership after the commander in chief, General Charles Cathcart, died of dysentery en route; the logistic inability to land siege artillery and ammunition near to Cartagena; the impediments made by Vernon that prevented involvement of his line ships to support the infantry forces; and the effective Spanish maneuvers carried out by the viceroy Sebastián de Eslava, Admiral Blas de Lezo and Colonel Carlos Suivillars.[98]

Aftermath[edit]

George II of Great Britain, 18th-century painting
Philip V of Spain, 18th-century painting

When the embarrassing news of the outcome reached London some weeks later, the British government removed these medals and prohibited the news from being disclosed and published.[99] Following the news of the disaster Robert Walpole's government soon collapsed.[100] Spain retained control over its most strategically important colonies, including the vitally crucial port in the Caribbean that helped secure the defense of the Spanish Main and its trans-Atlantic trade with Spain.

News of Britain's defeat reached Europe at the end of June, 1741 and had immense repercussions. It caused George II of Great Britain, who had been acting as mediator between Frederick the Great of Prussia and Maria Theresa supporting Austria over Prussian seizure of Silesia in December 1740, to withdraw Britain's guarantees of armed support for the Pragmatic Sanction. That encouraged France and Spain, the Bourbon allies, revealed to also be allied with Prussia, to move militarily against a now isolated Austria.[101] A greater and wider war, the War of the Austrian Succession, now began.

The staggering losses suffered by the British compromised all the subsequent actions by Vernon and Wentworth in the Caribbean and most ended in acrimonious failure[102] despite reinforcements of 1,000 troops from Jamaica and 3,000 regular infantry from Britain.[103] Vernon and Wentworth were both recalled to Britain in September 1742, with Chaloner Ogle taking command of a very sickly fleet that had less than half its sailors fit for duty.[104] By the time the Caribbean campaign ended in May 1742 ninety percent of the army had died from combat and sickness.[105] Several other British attacks took place in the Caribbean with little consequence on the geopolitical situation in the Atlantic. The weakened British forces led by Charles Knowles made raids upon the Venezuelan coast, attacking La Guaira in February 1743 and Puerto Cabello in April, though neither operation was particularly successful.[106]

The failure to take Cartagena caused what was left of the naval forces assigned to Vernon to remain in the Caribbean longer. This resulted in the weakened Mediterranean squadron being unable to prevent the Spanish from twice convoying troops totalling 25,000 to Italy in November and December 1741.[107] It was not until Commodore Richard Lestock, commander of one of Vernon's divisions at Cartagena, returned to Europe with ships from the Caribbean fleet, that Britain reinforced its presence in the Mediterranean.[108]

Historian Reed Browning describes the British Cartagena expedition as "stupidly disastrous" and quotes Horace Walpole, who in 1744 wrote: "We have already lost seven millions of money and thirty thousand men in the Spanish war and all the fruit of all this blood and treasure is the glory of having Admiral Vernon's head on alehouse signs."

References[edit]

  1. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol III, Appendix pp.25–27. Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession St. Martin's Press, New York, (1993), p. 60, Browning gives a total overall strength as perhaps 30,000 men.
  2. ^ A remarkable piece of Spanish intelligence on this expedition is found almost a year prior to the arrival of this fleet. The Governor of Spanish Florida learned from English colonists taken prisoner in the recapture of Fort Mose during the siege of St. Augustine that "they have learned of the preparation in England of a considerable expedition against Havanna, consisting of 30 ships of the line, and of a landing party of 10,000 men. I am sending this dispatch to give you this information as possibly of great importance to the service of the King." Letter from Governor Montiano, July 6, 1740, Collections of the Georgia Historical Society. (Vol. VII. – Part I) Published by Georgia Historical Society, Savannah, Ga. For an in depth analysis of the intelligence and spies used by both sides see:Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008.
  3. ^ Beatson, Hart, Duncan, Lord Mahon, Hume & other historians give a total of 12,000 land forces beginning the expedition. Including 3,600 American colonial marines—Colonel William Gooch's 43rd Regiment, commanded by the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia. Considered the origin of the United States Marine Corps.
  4. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol III, Appendix pp.25–26 gives Royal Navy crews total of 15,398 – he does not give crew totals for the 135 transports and supply ships which likely numbered 3000 to 5000, Reed Browning's estimate of 30,000 for the total force would leave a balance of some 2600 for transport crews. Hume, David. The History of England, London, 1825, pp.108–113, "The conjoined squadrons consisted of nine and twenty ships of the line...The number of seamen amounted to 15,000: that of land forces...12,000." Samuel, Arthur Michael. The Mancroft Essays, USA, 1923, pp.236–242, 'Admiral Vernon, "...now reinforced by twenty-five ships of the line and 9,000 soldiers...".
  5. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol III, Appendix pp.25–26. List of ships of the line under Vernon is 8 of 80 guns, 5 of 70 guns, 14 of 60 guns, 2 of 50 guns and 22 frigates. Hart, as well, gives 22. p.l40.
  6. ^ Smollett, Tobias George and Hume, David. History of England, Vol. II, London, 1848, p.391, Ogle's fleet being sent to Vernon for the expedition against Cartagena is stated to be "one hundred and seventy sail" when added to Vernon's squadron something very close to 186 ships is achieved and includes the supply ships and transports not mentioned elsewhere. The author, Smollett, of course, was with this expedition as surgeon and therefore an eyewitness.
  7. ^ Hart, Francis Russel. Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.146. Reed Browning estimates 3,000, p.60.
  8. ^ Fernández Duro, however, gives 1,100 regulars. Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de León, Est. tipográfico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1902, Vol. VI, p. 247.
  9. ^ This number is possibly underestimated in sources as the 6 Spanish ships of the line must have had crews similar to those British ships of that size had, i.e. 400–600 each, so that the total of 4,000 for garrison of Cartagena was mostly sailors.
  10. ^ Hart, Francis Russel. Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.146. Hart gives 300 militia.
  11. ^ Geggus David. Medical History, 1979, 23:38-58., Yellow Fever in the 1790s: The British Army in occupied Saint Domingue, p. 50, "... of the 12,000 British and Americans who laid siege to Cartagena in 1741 seventy percent perished, including seventy-seven per cent of the British." therefore: 8,400 from yellow fever alone, over 6,000 British soldiers at the siege. Similarly, Harbon, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, p.108, "...yellow fever ... killed perhaps 9,000 sailors and troops in the British forces.". Hart, Francis Russel. Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.151. "So great were the losses to the troops through disease and battle that not over one third of the land troops appear to have returned with the fleet to Jamaica." This would indicate considerably more than 8,000 dead. Similarly, Coxe, William. Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, Volume 3, London 1815, p.24 states that Havana is attacked by "...3,000 men, the discouraged and exhausted remnant of the troops which had been repulsed at Cartagena ...". Coxe also gives the overall loss of the expedition during the campaign as 20,000 lives lost. Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol I. p. 111, Beatson gives the army's strength as down to 3,000 in Jamaica.
  12. ^ Duncan, Francis. History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, London, 1879, Vol.1, p.123,"...so reduced was this force in two years by disaster and disease, that not a tenth part returned to England...'thus ended in shame, disappointment, and loss, the most important, most expensive, and best concerted expedition that Great Britain was ever engaged in'...". So too, Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, MacMillan, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.76. "Of the regiments that had sailed from St. Helen's under Cathcart in all the pride and confidence of strength, nine in every ten had perished.".
  13. ^ a b Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de León, Est. tipográfico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1902, Vol. VI, p. 250.
  14. ^ Anon..Soldados Digital, 2008, Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español This article states 1500 British guns captured, lost or damaged, but this number needs to be taken with a grain of salt, however, the article does contain references.
  15. ^ Duro, Cesáreo Fernández. Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de León, Est. tipográfico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, Madrid, 1902, Vol. VI, p. 250, "...tuvieron que incendiar seis navios y otros 17 quedaron con necesidad de grandes reparos para poder servir...".
  16. ^ . "...departing May 20th, five ships were burnt due to a lack of crew. Another sank on its way to Jamaica" [1] El desastre del ataque británico a Cartagena de Indias. Revista de Historia Naval.
  17. ^ The Hispanic American Historical Review, Volume 2, Baltimore, 1922, p. 64, gives: "... 18 of the largest... repairing considerable damage.".
  18. ^ Anon..Soldados Digital, 2008, Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español.
  19. ^ Marley, David. Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present, ABC-CLIO (1998). ISBN 0-87436-837-5, p.259, gives 600 dead.
  20. ^ All Spanish losses from: Anon..Soldados Digital, 2008, Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español.
  21. ^ The defeat is considered by some historians (See Victoria, Pablo. El día que España derrotó a Inglaterra: de cómo Blas de Lezo, tuerto, manco y cojo, venció en Cartagena de Indias a la otra "Armada Invencible", Áltera, 2005, ISBN 84-89779-68-6, p. 11.) to be comparable to that suffered by the Spanish Armada at the hands of the British Navy. At Cartagena the British casualties are ultimately estimated at over 18,000 troops and 50 ships, while the Spanish Armada lost about 10,000 troops and 63 ships. And, as with the Spanish Armada, the lost opportunity did no damage to the strategic position; the importance of the defeat is more in a loss of an opportunity for immense gain rather than damage to Britain's strategic position. Strategically, Spain and disease prevented British invasion and conquest of their American possessions. The British fleet and bad weather prevented the Armada's invasion and conquest of England.
  22. ^ Coxe, William. Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, Volume 3, London 1815. Coxe also gives the overall loss of the expedition during the campaign as 20,000 lives lost, Reed Browning considers this "not implausible." p. 382.
  23. ^ Tindal, N. The continuation of Mr. Rapin's History of England, Vol. VII, London, MDCCLIX, p. 511, "The epidemical sickness by this time had carried off not only the greatest part of the troops, but had made havock amongst the crews that had sailed from England...". Also, Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy, Conway Maritime Press, 1998, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, p. 108, "... yellow fever... killed perhaps 9,000 sailors and troops in the British forces".
  24. ^ Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession, New York, 1993 ISBN 0-312-12561-5, p.21.
  25. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for War: The Intelligence Systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008, p. 16.
  26. ^ Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The Navy in the War of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol 1, p. 2.
  27. ^ Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy', Conway Maritime Press, 1998, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, p.3.
  28. ^ Rodger N.A.M. The Command of the Ocean, 2004, p. 238. Also: Harbron, John D. Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, pp.236-237. "War of Jenkins Ear". GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on 13 September 2007. Retrieved 2007-09-24. .
  29. ^ Pearce, Edward. The Great Man: Sir Robert Walpole, London , 2007, ISBN 978-1-84413-405-2, p.402-403. Also, Fortescue, A History, p. 57.
  30. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Appendix p. 17, 3 70 guns, 2 60 guns, 1 50 guns.
  31. ^ Ruiz, Bruce. "Admiral Vernon and portobello". Panama History.com. Archived from the original on 30 October 2007. Retrieved 2007-09-24. .
  32. ^ Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession, New York, 1993 ISBN 0-312-12561-5, p. 22, "They (the British) had over 120 ships of the line in their fleet, while France had but 50 and Spain 40. In Mitch Williamson's article, British Naval Supremacy: Some Factors Newly Considered 2002, he states the Royal Navy's War Establishment Manpower at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748 is 44,861 – so Vernon's total of over 15,000 sailors represents at least 25% of Royal Navy manpower.
  33. ^ Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, pp.15-17. Havana built nearly 50% more Ships of the Line than any other Spanish dockyard during the 18th century.
  34. ^ Rodger, N.A.M., The Command of the Ocean, ISBN 0-393-06050-0 New York, 2005, page 237. "... his (Vernon's) ruthless exploitation of the army, his unscrupulous skill at claiming credit for every success and blaming the soldiers for every failure, eventually destroyed any possibility of harmonious combined operations.".
  35. ^ Rodger N.A.M.. The Command of the Ocean, 2004, pp. 237-238, "The government was unable to resist the public clamor for a major expedition to the Caribbean.". Also: Harbron, John D. Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, p. 237.
  36. ^ Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The navy in the war of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol. 1, p. 12.
  37. ^ Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West Indies, Routledge, 1963, ISBN 0-7146-1943-4, p.85. Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The navy in the war of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol. 1, p. 12.
  38. ^ Le Fevre, Peter; Harding, Richard, ed..Precursors of Nelson: British admirals of the eighteenth century, Stackpole Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8117-2901-X pp.163-164.
  39. ^ Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication, London, MCMVII, p. 124, "Destroy their settlements in America, and Spain falls. My opinion is that a strong squadron be sent to the West Indies, to distress the enemy in their very vitals, to destroy their mines, to seize their treasures, to take their ships, to ruin their settlements. Let them be attacked in as many places as possible at the same time...If once Porto-Bello and Cartagena were taken, then all will be lost to them." Vernon at the Admiralty meeting.
  40. ^ Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The navy in the war of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol 1, p. 101.
  41. ^ Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication, London, MCMVII, pp.143-144.
  42. ^ Rodger, N. A. M..The Command of the Ocean, 2004, p. 236.
  43. ^ Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West Indies, Routledge, 1963, ISBN 0-7146-1943-4, pp. 66, 68, 92–93. Also, Le Fevre, Peter; Harding, Richard, ed..Precursors of Nelson: British admirals of the eighteenth century, Stackpole Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8117-2901-X p. 168, "...by taking and holding some of her (Spain's) important colonies.". Similarly, Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The navy in the war of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol. 1, p. 16.
  44. ^ Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication, London, MCMVII, p. 140, "In that way there would have been secured for Britain the whole trade with the coast of Chili (sic) and Peru, and with the western coast of Mexico, thus crippling the power of Spain...".
  45. ^ Rodger, N. A. M.. The Command of the Ocean, 2004, p. 233.
  46. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008, p.156.
  47. ^ Dull, Jonathan R.. The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650–1815, University of Nebraska Press, 2009, ISBN 978-0-8032-1930-4, p. 46. Also, Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, University College London, 2008, p.180.
  48. ^ Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, pp.13-14.
  49. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol III, Appendix pp.24–25.
  50. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008, pp.185-186.
  51. ^ Brooke, James (October 8, 1995). "Cartagena, Caribbean Jewel". The New York Times. Archived from the original on February 9, 2010. Retrieved April 26, 2010. .
  52. ^ Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Appendix pp.25–26. List of ships of the line under Vernon is 8 of 80 guns, 5 of 70 guns, 14 of 60 guns, 2 of 50 guns and 22 frigates and other warships. Additionally, the list gives a detail breakdown of the 12,000 troops: the 15th and 24th regiments of foot, 2,000; 6,000 marines; 2,500 American and some others. Ship of the Line crews total 11,000+, no numbers are given for the frigate and transport crews on that page. On the following page a list of frigates and their crews is given for the Cartagena expedition that corresponds to that of Vernon's fleet list with a few minor variations. The total for Royal Navy sailors then (at least as paper strength, full complements) is: 15,398. This total does not include the 12,000 soldiers, nor any civilian seamen, nor the crews for the over 120 transports.
  53. ^ Hume, David. The History of England, London, 1825, p.109,"...with an equal number of frigates, fire ships, and bomb ketches...". When compared with a nearly contemporary amphibious expedition described in James Pritchard, Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French Expedition to North America. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995 ISBN 978-0-7735-1325-9 as: 10 Ships of the Line, 45 troop transports and some 10,000 sailors and soldiers it can be seen that Vernon's fleet has nearly three times as many Ships of the Line and nearly three times the soldiers and sailors and that by analogy Vernon's fleet would have around three times the total ships or more, i.e. at least 165 ships.
  54. ^ Smollett, Tobias George and Hume, David. History of England, Vol. II, London, 1848, p.392.
  55. ^ Richmond, Herbert William. The Cambridge Naval and Military Series, The navy in the war of 1739–48, Cambridge University Press, 1920, vol 1, p.101, "... regiments miscalled marines ..." not the marine contingents of warships therefore.
  56. ^ Hart, Francis Russel . Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.139. Similarly, Clark, Walter. The State Records of North Carolina, Vol.XI, pp. 42–45, Clark states in a note that the number of companies which actually sailed was 36 containing 3,600 men. Also, Marshall, P.J. and Low, A.M..The Oxford history of the British Empire: The eighteenth century, Oxford, 2001, ISBN 0-19-924677-7, p.119 gives 3,600 and p.302. gives 3,500.
  57. ^ Letter to Torres, 13 Jan. 1741, AGS, Estado Francia, Legajo 4408: “Al mismo tiempo y por propio conducto, ha participado que por carta de 28 de noviembre escrita desde Londres se daba por sujeto apreciable que se habían mudado las instrucciones de M. Carthcart que la escuadra del almirante Ogle que conduce las tropas de su cargo en lugar de ir a la Habana ira a Cartagena, por hallarse los ingleses bien informados de que no hemos enviado más de 2000 hombres y 600 reclutas”.
  58. ^ Hart, Francis Russel. Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.146, Hart gives 4,000. Reed Browning estimates 3,000, p.60.
  59. ^ Lemaitre, Eduardo (1998). Breve Historia de Cartagena. Medellin: Editorial Colina. .
  60. ^ Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy, Conway Maritime Press, 1998, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, p.108, 112.
  61. ^ Rodger N.A.M.. The Command of the Ocean, 2004, p. 238. Also: Harbron, John D..Trafalgar and the Spanish navy, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, ISBN 0-87021-695-3, pp.108 - 113.
  62. ^ Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.62, "The fleet was very sickly...". Hill, J.R., ed.. The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy, Oxford, ISBN 0-19-860527-7, 1995, p.140, Baugh, D.A. Health, Victuals, Discipline and Morale, "The worst naval typhus epidemic of the century occurred between August 1739 and October 1740 ... 25,000 fell ill and were sent to hospital ships, sick quarters and hospitals; of these, 2750 died and 1976 deserted." This represents over 50% of the seamen employed by the Navy at that time, see p.135. Similarly, Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 308, "A serious epidemic (of typhus) over the hard winters of 1739–41 wrecked the Navy's mobilization, with men falling sick faster than they could be recruited." Typhus was generally a cold weather disease.
  63. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008, p.166. Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, London, 2008, p.166, relates reports that October 1000 sailors and 400 soldiers were sick.
  64. ^ a b c Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 61-62.
  65. ^ Hudson, Geoffrey L., ed.. British military and naval medicine, 1600-1830, Chap. 7, Krimmin, Patriaca K., British Naval Health, 1700-1800, Improvement over time?, Amsterdam-New York, 2007, ISBN 978-90-420-2272-0, p. 184, the Sick and Hurt Board recorded nearly 10,000 men sick ashore in England alone in 1740.
  66. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, University College London, 2008, p.180, "... Vernon told Cathcart that it was crucial to avoid the sickly season, which lasted from May to November."
  67. ^ Rodger, N.A.M.. The Command of the Ocean, ISBN 0-393-06050-0 New York, 2005, page 160-61; Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 68. Hill, J.R., ed.. The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy, Oxford, ISBN 0-19-860527-7, 1995, p.140, Baugh, D.A.. Health, Victuals, Discipline and Morale, p. 141.
  68. ^ Anon..Soldados Digital, 2008,Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español gives details of conflict between Lezo and Eslava.
  69. ^ Dull, Jonathan R.. The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650–1815, University of Nebraska Press, 2009, ISBN 978-0-8032-1930-4, p.46, "... more than a third of them were needed to fill out the crews...". Also, Le Fevre, Peter; Harding, Richard, ed..Precursors of Nelson: British admirals of the eighteenth century, Stackpole Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8117-2901-X p. 169.
  70. ^ Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication, London, MCMVII, p.153.
  71. ^ Smollett, Tobias and Roscoe, Thomas. The miscellaneous works of Tobias Smollett, London, 1844. Contains Smollett's long version of Expedition to Carthagena, p. 606.
  72. ^ Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the navy: a memoir and vindication"", London, 1907, p.154. Also, The London Gazette, Number 8015, May 1741, p.1, "... the two Regiments of Harrison and Wentworth, and the six Regiments Marines landed without opposition.".
  73. ^ Offen Lee, Gooch's American Regiment, 1740-1742, America's First Marines, Fortis Press, ISBN 978-0-9777884-1-5, pp. 37-38.
  74. ^ Offen Lee, Gooch's American Regiment, 1740-1742, America's First Marines, Fortis Press, ISBN 978-0-9777884-1-5, p. 31.
  75. ^ Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol. II, pp.93-94. Also, Clowes, W. Laird. The Royal Navy, a history from the earliest times to present, London, 1898, Vol. III, p.71-72. Smollett: Micellaneous works, p.606.
  76. ^ Smollett: Micellaneous works, p.606.
  77. ^ Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.66.
  78. ^ Fortesque, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 66-68. Beatson, Robert., Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol. I, p.101.
  79. ^ Ibañez, I.R.. Mobilizing Resources for war: the intelligence systems during the War of Jenkin's Ear, University College London, 2008, p.179.
  80. ^ Fortesque, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 67. Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, London, 1804, Vol.I, p. 102.
  81. ^ released from duty as ships' crew.
  82. ^ Similar to a sand bag but filled with wool 5 feet high 15 inches in diameter. Duane, William. A Military Dictionary: Or, Explaination of the Several Systems of Discipline, Philadelphia, 1810, p. 639.
  83. ^ The father of James Wolfe of Quebec fame.
  84. ^ Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, MacMillan, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.70.
  85. ^ Knowles, Charles.An Account of the expedition to Carthagena, London, 1743, p.45. Similarly, The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. 11, 1741, p. 331. Also, Fortesque, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 72.
  86. ^ Samuel, Arthur Michael. The Mancroft Essays, USA, 1923, pp.236–242, 'Admiral Vernon, "...now reinforced by twenty-five ships of the line and 9,000 soldiers...of the six thousand that had been landed more than half were either dead or dying. Lord Mahon. History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles, Vol. III, Boston, 1853, p.64, "... he found, in less than two days, his effective force (emphasis added) dwindle from 6600 to 3200 men." Similarly, Tindal, The continuation of Mr. Rapin's History of England V.7, p.509, "... they were reduced from 6,645 to 3,200, of whom 1200 were Americans, and unfit for service.".
  87. ^ Smollett, Tobias George and Hume, David. History of England, Vol. II, London, 1848, p.394, "...each proved more eager for the disgrace of his rival than zealous for the honour of the nation.". Also, Rodger, N. A. M.. The Command of the Ocean, ISBN 0-393-06050-0 New York, 2005, page 237. "... his ruthless exploitation of the army, his unscrupulous skill at claiming credit for every success and blaming the soldiers for every failure, eventually destroyed any possibility of harmonious combined operations." Similarly, Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 79,"Nevertheless it was Vernon who was mainly responsible for the fatal friction between the army and the navy.".
  88. ^ Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 73–74. Similarly, Hart, Francis Russel. Admirals of the Caribbean, Boston, 1922, p.151. "So great were the losses to the troops through disease and battle that not over one third of the land troops appear to have returned with the fleet to Jamaica.".
  89. ^ Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, pp. 72–79, gives a detailed account of the rapid and devastating withering away of the land forces to disease.
  90. ^ Meisel Ujueta, Alfonso (1982). Blas de Lezo:vida legendaria del marino Vasco. Barranquilla, Colombia: Litografía Dovel,. p. 1982. 
  91. ^ "..departing May 20th, five ships were burnt due to a lack of crew. Another sank on its way to Jamaica". Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español[2] gives a total of 50 ships lost.
  92. ^ Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West Indies, Routledge, 1963 ISBN 0-7146-1943-4, pp.92–93. Offen Lee, Gooch's American Regiment, 1740-1742, America's First Marines, Fortis Press, ISBN 978-0-9777884-1-5, pp. 3, 63-64.
  93. ^ Conway, Stephens. War, state, and society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland, Oxford, 2006, ISBN 0-19-925375-7, p.230.
  94. ^ Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army, MacMillan, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.76. Also, Marshall, P.J. and Low, A.M..The Oxford history of the British Empire: The eighteenth century, Oxford, 2001, ISBN 0-19-924677-7, p. 278, gives loss as "four-fifths".
  95. ^ Fernández Duro, Cesáreo. Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y Aragón, Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid, Vol. VI, p.251. "I have seen in numismantic collections up to 11 different models"
  96. ^ Navy Records Society (Great Britain) Publications of the Navy Records Society Vol. XXXIII, Naval Songs and Ballards,1907, pp.181–184, a must read, absolutely hilarious in context, it also has specific details about the fleets that correspond to other sources such as "Thirty ships of the line...", "Don Blas with six ships...".
  97. ^ Victoria, Pablo (2005). El día que España derrotó a Inglaterra : de cómo Blas de Lezo, tuerto, manco y cojo, venció en Cartagena de Indias a la otra "Armada Invencible". Barcelona: Áltera. ISBN 84-89779-68-6. .
  98. ^ Membrillo Becerra, Francisco Javier (2011). La Batalla de Cartagena de Indias. pp. 267–275. ISBN 978-84-615-3894-2. 
  99. ^ Victoria, Pablo (2005). El día que España derrotó a Inglaterra : de cómo Blas de Lezo, tuerto, manco y cojo, venció en Cartagena de Indias a la otra "Armada Invencible". Barcelona: Áltera. ISBN 84-89779-68-6. 
  100. ^ For a good account of the mood of London and Vernon's enmity to Walpole see: Ford, Douglas. Admiral Vernon and the Navy: A Memoir and Vindication London, MCMVII, pp.141–145,"The debate in Parliament was one the most exciting and memorable ever heard...the climax lay in Walpole's alleged misconduct in relation to the war, and that, in turn, practically meant his failure to give proper support to Admiral Vernon....But Walpole's victory was of the sort that presages ultimate defeat."; p. 147, "In January, 1742, Pulteney again marshalled his forces, and moved for the appointment of a committee to examine papers capable of affording evidence as to the conduct of the war with Spain." Walpole would resign the first week of February, 1742.
  101. ^ Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession, New York, 1993 ISBN 0-312-12561-5, pp.58–66, " 'now America must be fought for in Europe', Britain's Lord Hardwicke. If Britain could not prevail where it could muster all its maritime advantages, what fatality might await it when it engaged-as now it must-under severe disadvantages?".
  102. ^ Dull, Jonathan R.. The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650–1815, University of Nebraska Press, 2009, ISBN 978-0-8032-1930-4, p. 47. Conway, Stephens. War, state, and society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland, Oxford, 2006, ISBN 0-19-925375-7, p.14, " ... arguments between the naval and military commanders made effective cooperation impossible.". Animosity was such that Gov. Trelawny of Jamaica and Sir Chaloner Ogle drew swords on each other at a council. Fortesque, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p. 76.
  103. ^ Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.75, Royal Scots, the 6th, the 27th foot.
  104. ^ Hill, J.R., ed.. The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy, Oxford, ISBN 0-19-860527-7, 1995, p.140, Baugh, D.A. Health, Victuals, Discipline and Morale p.141, "In early 1742, only 3,000 of 6,600 on Sir Chanon Ogle's large West India squadron were fit for duty.".
  105. ^ Duncan, Francis. History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, London, 1879, Vol.1, p.123,"...so reduced was this force in two years by disaster and disease, that not a tenth part returned to England...'thus ended in shame, disappointment, and loss, the most important, most expensive, and best concerted expedition that Great Britain was ever engaged in'...". So too, Fortescue, J.W.. A History of the British Army, London, 1899, Vol. II, p.76. "Of the regiments that had sailed from St. Helen's under Cathcart in all the pride and confidence of strength, nine in every ten had perished.". Coxe, William. Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, Volume 3, London 1815. Coxe also gives the overall loss of the expedition during the campaign as 20,000 lives lost, Reed Browning considers this "not implausible." p. 382.
  106. ^ Rodger p.238.
  107. ^ Conway, Stephens. War, state, and society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland, Oxford, 2006, ISBN 0-19-925375-7, p.16.
  108. ^ Browning, Reed The War of the Austrian Succession, New York, 1993 ISBN 0-312-12561-5, pp.80–81.

Bibliography[edit]

  • Anon..Soldados Digital, 2008, Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta un Ejemplo Del Espíritu Militar Español.
  • Beatson, Robert. Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, Vol. I; Vol. III, Appendix, London, 1804.
  • Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession St. Martin's Press, New York, (1993): ISBN 0-312-12561-5.
  • Conway, Stephens. War, state, and society in mid-eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland, Oxford, 2006 ISBN 0-19-925375-7.
  • Clark, Walter, ed.. The State Records of North Carolina, Winston and Goldsboro, Vol.XI, 1895-1907.
  • Coxe, William. Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, Volume 3, London 1815.
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  • Eslava, Sebastián de. Diario de todo lo ocurrido en la expugnacion de los fuertes de Bocachica, y sitio de la ciudad de Cartagena de las Indias Madrid, 1741. [3]
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  • Smollett, Tobias and Roscoe, Thomas. The miscellaneous works of Tobias Smollett, London, 1844. Contains Smollett's long version of Expedition to Carthagena, pp. 603 – 611.
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Additional reading[edit]

Primary sources[edit]

  • Eslaba, Sebastian de; Mur, Pedro de. Diario de todo lo ocurrido en la expugnacion de los fuertes de Bocachica, y sitio de la ciudad de Cartagena de las Indias. 1741. [4]
  • Diario de lo ocurrido en Cartagena de Indias desde el 13 de marzo hasta el 21 de mayo de 1741. Se relata la batalla de Cartagena de Indias. 1741 [5]
  • Knowles, Charles. An Account of the expedition to Carthagena', London, 1743. [6]
  • Authentic papers relating to the expedition against Carthagena being the Resolutions of the Councils of War, London, 1744. [7]
  • Smollett, Tobias; Roscoe, Thomas. The miscellaneous works of Tobias Smollett , Long version of Smollet's Expedition to Carthagena, London 1844, pp. 603–611. [8]

Fiction[edit]

  • Smollet, Tobias. The Adventures of Roderick Random. 1748. Historical novel based on Smollett's own experiences at Cartagena.
  • Hall, Charles W.. Cartagena or the Lost Brigade. 1898. Historical novel of the North American contingent at Cartagena.
  • Michener, James A.. Caribbean, a Novel, Random House, 2005, ISBN 0-8129-7492-1. Historical novel containing the John Pembroke account of Cartagena.
  • Vázquez, Alber. Mediohombre. Inedita, 2009. ISBN 978-84-92400-56-0.
  • Régniez, Philippe. Blas de Lezo. In French. Les Editions de La Reconquête, 2012, Assomption.
  • In the detective/historical novel "Watery Grave" by Bruce Alexander © 1996, the main character, the blind judge Sir John Fielding, describes how, as a junior officer, he was blinded at the battle of Cartagena (3 pages)

External links[edit]

Coordinates: 10°23′07″N 75°32′19″W / 10.38528°N 75.53861°W / 10.38528; -75.53861