Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/88 was an important episode in the Angolan Civil War (1975 to 2002). Between 9 September and 7 October 1987, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), in an attempt to destroy the guerrillas of UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), advanced into southeastern Angola from Cuito Cuanavale to attack UNITA at Mavinga. The South African Defence Force (SADF), whose primary objective was to protect UNITA in southern Angola in order to prevent the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) from using southern Angola to launch attacks into South West Africa, once more intervened on UNITA’s behalf. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which took place over about six months, was at that time the biggest battle on African soil since World War II.
The southwards FAPLA/Cuban advance against UNITA was halted with heavy casualties and was abandoned, and the battle then stalemated. Cuba and FAPLA switched their attention westward, the SADF removed the bulk of its resources to counter the new threat, and all sides resumed negotiations. Both sides claimed victory in the battle.
The Angolan Civil War played out against the backdrop of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers tried to influence the outcome of the civil war through proxies.
For 13 years until 1974, three armed groups fought for Angola's independence from Portugal: the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (with its armed wing FAPLA), led by Agostinho Neto; the conservative National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto and supported by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre; and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi (a former Maoist who broke away from the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), later sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and South Africa).
After the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 in Portugal, the new revolutionary government of Portugal let go of Portugal's African overseas possessions, including Angola. The Treaty of Alvor comprised a series of agreements between the three rebel factions and Portugal that were to pave the way to independence. Under its terms, a transitional government was formed, elections were scheduled for the end of the year, and 11 November 1975 was slated as Angola's independence day. Fighting between the three rebel factions started soon after the transitional government took office on 31 January 1975, with each movement gaining control of their traditional areas of influence by mid-1975: The MPLA in the capital and central Angola, the FNLA in the north and UNITA in the south. The FNLA was effectively eliminated in the 1970s, and the struggle for control continued between the Soviet backed MPLA government and the United States and South African backed UNITA movement. The MPLA government of Angola and SWAPO were supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union and some countries of the Eastern bloc, while UNITA was supported by the West, albeit clandestinely, foremost the United States and South Africa.
After the Cubans had helped the MPLA gain power in 1975 they considered it necessary to stay in the country until conditions stabilized in favour of the MPLA. The Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries supplied the Angolan army (FAPLA) with armament, advisors and specialized technical staff. UNITA managed, with South African and US support, to pose a threat to the MPLA government. UNITA received backing from the US, most notably in the form of Stinger missiles that helped repel the air superiority of the FAPLA forces. South Africa provided UNITA with military support in the form of occasional cross-border missions from South West Africa (modern Namibia).
Despite the termination of the League of Nations mandate by the UN General Assembly in 1966, which South Africa refused to recognise, South Africa had continued to govern South-West Africa (Namibia). 1966 saw the beginning of the armed resistance by the SWAPO and South African counter insurgency operations. After Angola’s independence in 1975, SWAPO gained the support of the Angolan government and operated against the South African forces from bases in Southern Angola. The South African government's strategic concern was thus to ensure continued UNITA control over regions bordering Namibia, so as to prevent the SWAPO guerrillas from receiving Angolan support and gaining a springboard in southern Angola from which to launch attacks into South West Africa. Its security strategy was shaped by the doctrines of pre-emptive interventionism and counter-revolutionary warfare. Following the South African Operation Protea in August 1981, in which it temporarily occupied 50.000 km² of Cunene province, UNITA took effective administrative control of most of Cunene in January 1982.
Operação Saludando Octubre ("Operation Greeting October")
Because of the UNITA insurgency, the central government never managed to gain control of the whole country; UNITA had control of much of south-eastern Angola. Whenever it was threatened, South Africa intervened on its behalf. South Africa kept the whole southern border in Angola and at times up to 50,000 km² of Cunene province occupied and conducted invasions and raids into the country.
In 1987, as part of the Angolan government campaign against UNITA and for the control of south-eastern Angola, the Angolan army launched campaign Operação Saludando Octubre to drive UNITA forces from their stronghold cities of Mavinga, a former Portuguese military base and Jamba in the southeast of the country just above the Caprivi Strip. As in previous campaigns, planning and leadership was taken over by the Soviets and the higher ranks in the units were taken over by Soviet officers. Major-General Ryabchenko would command the Angolan forces in the battle.[unreliable source?] Soviet command did not include the Cuban forces in Angola and the Cubans initially did not engage in combat but took over support functions. FAPLA's equipment was upgraded including 150 T-55 tanks and Mi-24 helicopters. The Soviets dismissed the advice of the Cubans, as in the campaigns before, who warned that the operation would create another opportunity for a South African intervention. It was decided to commence the attack from Cuito Cuanavale.
Taking notice of the massive military build-up, South Africa warned UNITA. The Angolan campaign was initially successful and made considerable gains into south-eastern Angola. The South African government became aware that UNITA would not be able to withstand the onslaught. On 15 June it decided to intervene and authorised covert support. On 4 August 1987 the SADF launched Operation Moduler which was to stop the Angolan advance on Mavinga to prevent a rout of UNITA. The SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion crossed into Angola from their base at the border town of Rundu.
Objectives and outcomes
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was part of the Angolan Civil War. The MPLA strategic objective was to destroy UNITA, win the civil war and thus take sole control of the entire country. As part of that process their army (FAPLA) advanced south-east from Cuito Cuanavale to attack UNITA at Mavinga.
The South African strategic objective was to prevent SWAPO from using southern Angola to launch attacks into South West Africa. To achieve this the SADF supported UNITA in southern Angola, and when FAPLA advanced from Cuito Cuanavale to attack UNITA at Mavinga, the SADF intervened to protect UNITA by stopping that advance.
The FAPLA attack was comprehensively smashed by the SADF intervention, with FAPLA and its Cuban allies suffering heavy casualties. The SADF objective was thus achieved, in that the FAPLA advance was halted outside Cuito Cuanavale, and was abandoned shortly thereafter. The Cuban/Angolan objective was thereafter reduced to securing the town of Cuito Cuanavale on the west of the river from capture. The SADF had a political imperative to avoid casualties wherever possible. There was never an attempt made to capture the town of Cuito Cuanavale, and the SADF had orders to avoid the town unless it fell into their hands without a fight. 
Although the SADF achieved its objective of smashing the advance and protecting UNITA, FAPLA/Cuba also claimed victory in the battle. In a speech to the Cuban people delivered while visiting Cuba in 1991, Nelson Mandela repeatedly reiterated this view, and claimed that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale "marked an important step in the struggle to free the continent and our country of the scourge of apartheid." This perspective locates the outcome of the battle within the context of the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola and the independence of Angola.
The UNITA strategic objective was to survive, and ultimately to rule the country. They succeeded in surviving, and they continue to contest elections, but have never won a parliamentary majority.
Also known as the Battle of the Lomba River, this battle took place near the town of Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. To the South African Defence Force it took the form of four phases, which ran consecutively as a single overall battle. These were:
- Operation Moduler - The aim of which was to halt and reverse the FAPLA advance on the UNITA strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba.
- Operation Hooper - The aim of which was to inflict maximum casualties on the retreating FAPLA forces after they had been halted, to ensure there were no further attempts to resume the advance.
- Operation Packer - The aim of which was to force the FAPLA forces to retreat to the west of the Cuito River, and to provide UNITA with a sustainable self-defence.
- Operation Displace – The aim of which was to maintain a deterrence to any resumed advance against UNITA, while the bulk of the troops and equipment were withdrawn.
On 4 August 1987 the SADF launched Operation Moduler, which was to stop the Angolan advance on Mavinga to prevent a rout of UNITA. The SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion crossed into Angola from their base at the border town of Rundu.
In August FAPLA's 16th, 21st (both light infantry), 47th (armoured) and 59th (mechanized) brigades, about 6000 men and 80 tanks plus artillery and support vehicles, departed from Cuito Cuanavale to cross the Lomba River. They received air support from the airbase at Menongue, including MiG 23s deployed in ground attacks. Four more brigades were kept to defend Cuito Cuanavale and its approaches.
Facing them were the UNITA forces composed of the 3rd Regular, 5th Regular, 13th Semi-Regular and 275th Special Forces Battalions, supported by about 1000 SADF troops with armoured vehicles and artillery. On 28 August FAPLA reached the northern banks of the Lomba River on route to Mavinga, where they were engaged by the SADF.
In a series of bitter fights between 9 September and 7 October, SADF and UNITA achieved their primary objective of preventing the FAPLA from crossing the river. The Soviets withdrew their advisors and left the FAPLA without senior leadership, and FAPLA forces crumbled and ran. FAPLA suffered heavy losses, with all four brigades losing about 60-70% of their strength. Throughout the battle, FAPLA had lost 1059 dead and 2118 wounded, along with 61 tanks, 83 armoured vehicles and 20 rocket launchers. The SADF lost 17 killed and 41 wounded, plus 5 armoured vehicles. The SADF also captured a highly sophisticated SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system – the first time the weapon had fallen into western hands. The Angolan army headed into a retreat over 190 km back to Cuito Cuanavale, which it desperately held on to.
Chester Crocker, who was the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan Administration, said that: "In some of the bloodiest battles of the entire civil war, a combined force of some 8000 UNITA fighters and 4000 SADF troops not only destroyed one FAPLA brigade but badly damaged several others out of a total FAPLA force of some 18 000 engaged in the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of FAPLA losses ranged upward of 4000 killed and wounded….Large quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or fell into UNITA and SADF hands when FAPLA broke into a disorganized retreat... The 1987 military campaign represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its strategy. ... As of mid-November, the UNITA/SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down thousands of FAPLA's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters."
On 29 September, South African and UNITA forces, having gained the upper hand, launched a counter-attack. The objective was to inflict a crushing blow to the FAPLA, so that they would not consider another offensive in the following year. The restrictions previously placed on the SADF by their political masters were lightened, and the SADF committed tanks for the first time. The 4th SA Infantry Battalion was added to the mix, bringing the SADF strength up to about 3000 men – the biggest of the entire campaign.
During this phase the SADF units were supported by heavy artillery and air strikes. The airstrip at Cuito Cuanavale was extensively bombarded, causing the Cubans to withdraw their aircraft to Menongue and to abandon the Cuanavale airstrip.
On 9 November the SADF attacked the FAPLA 16th brigade. Air strikes and artillery were used, and tanks went into battle alongside the armoured vehicles. UNITA infantry also participated. The 16th brigade was mauled, and withdrew in disarray back across the river. The battle ended after half a day, when the SADF vehicles ran low on ammunition and broke off the attack. FAPLA had 10 tanks destroyed and 3 captured, various artillery pieces destroyed or captured, and 75 men killed. The SADF had 7 killed and 9 wounded, plus one armoured vehicle destroyed, one damaged and a tank damaged.
The second attack, on 11 November, again targeted the 16th brigade. Again 16th brigade escaped annihilation by crossing the river, but this time they lost 14 tanks and 394 men. The SADF had 5 men killed and 19 more wounded, with 2 armoured vehicles destroyed and one tank damaged. The recovery, under fire, of a crippled tank and the subsequent re-entry of a minefield where the tank was extracted from to rescue a wounded soldier, earned Captain Petrus van Zyl and Lieutenant De Villers Vosloo of 32 Battalion both Honoris Crux decorations.
The FAPLA 21st brigade withdrew rapidly across the river, and was pursued. On 17 November they were engaged again, and suffered 131 men killed, along with 9 tanks destroyed and about 300 other vehicles. The SADF lost 6 dead and 19 wounded, plus 4 armoured vehicles. A final attack on 25 November bogged down in heavy bush, and was eventually abandoned.
Operation Moduler achieved the objective of halting the FAPLA advance against UNITA, and inflicted heavy losses on FAPLA.
By November, the SADF had cornered the remnants of three FAPLA units on the east of the Cuito River, across from the town itself and was poised to destroy them. The quite demoralised 59th FAPLA motorised infantry brigade, 21st and 25th FAPLA light infantry brigades, in positions near Tumpo and east of the Cuito River, were effectively cut off due to SADF artillery control of both the bridge and airstrip and to UNITA guerrilla control of the road from Menongue, which they had mined and were prepared to ambush. With no functioning armour or artillery remaining, the FAPLA-units faced annihilation.
On 15 November, the Angolan government requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. In Fidel Castro's view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Thus, [Castro responded immediately by sending — in what was called "Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR" — materiel and 15 000 elite troops, retaking the initiative from the Soviets. The first Cuban reinforcements in Cuito arrived by helicopter on 5 December with about 160–200 technicians, advisers, officers, and special forces.
General Arnaldo Ochoa, a veteran of the 1976 Angola campaign and of tank battles in Ethiopia, was made overall commander of the forces on the government side. Ochoa and Castro were to have serious disagreements in the conduct of the war in Angola. These tensions were to have repercussions both during the war where Castro's interference with defense plans may have cost the Cubans dozens of lives and in the aftermath of Angolan hostilities a year later when Ochoa was arrested, tried and executed by firing squad after being found guilty of treason. General Cintras Frias was made commander at Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban's initial priority was securing Cuito Cuanavale, but while reinforcements were arriving at the besieged garrison they made preparations for a second front to the west of Cuito Cuanavale in Lubango where the SADF had been operating unhindered for 8 years.
The SADF units received fresh troops and equipment, but the units were reduced to about 2000 men and 24 tanks for the rest of the operation. The new arrivals had to be acclimatised first. The SADF objective was defined as being to destroy the enemy east of the river or at least to drive them back across the river, inflicting maximum casualties but suffering minimum losses of their own. The river crossings were to be fortified and handed over to UNITA, and the SADF were to withdraw from Angola as soon as that was achieved. The order was that the town of Cuito Cuanavale would not be attacked unless it fell into SADF hands almost without a fight.
The bombardment started on 2 January 1988, with a mix of artillery and air strikes, and a UNITA infantry attack that failed. On 3 January the SADF destroyed the important bridge across the Cuito River using a smart bomb. The Cubans managed to construct a wooden footbridge in its place which they baptised Patria o Muerte (fatherland or death). They partly buried disabled tanks so that their turrets could be used as fixed artillery pieces.
32 Battalion and elements of other units harried the road convoys for weeks, destroying several hundred tanks and other vehicles, and inflicting an unknown number of casualties.
On 13 January the SADF attacked the 21st brigade, starting with air strikes and artillery bombardments. Over two days the FAPLA unit was driven out of their positions, and lost 7 tanks with 5 more captured, various other vehicles destroyed and captured, and 150 men dead or captured. UNITA lost 4 dead and 18 wounded, and the SADF had one man wounded and one armoured vehicle damaged. However the SADF was again unable to exploit the momentum, due to a shortage of reserves and supplies. UNITA occupied the captured positions, and the SADF withdrew, but UNITA lost the positions later to a FAPLA counter-attack. A large Cuban and FAPLA column was on the way from Menongue for the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, but progress in the rainy season was slow due to the need to clear the UNITA minefields and guard against possible ambushes. They did not reach Cuito Cuanavale in time to take part in the first engagement.
The next attack was only on 14 February, against the positions of 21st brigade that UNITA had lost, and the neighbouring positions of the 59th brigade. They were counter-attacked by Cuban tanks. Both 21st brigade and 59th brigade were forced to withdraw. The FAPLA lost 500 men and a further 32 Cuban soldiers, along with 15 tanks and 11 armoured vehicles. The SADF had 4 killed and 11 wounded, plus some vehicles damaged. FAPLA withdrew to the Tumpo (river) triangle, a smaller area east of the river and across from Cuito Cuanavale. The terrain was ideally suited to defence, and they laid extensive minefields.
In a skirmish on 19 February a FAPLA position was disrupted, and it resulted in the FAPLA 59th brigade being withdrawn across the river. However the SADF had two vehicles damaged in the minefield. In the following days the Cubans stepped up their air attacks against South African positions. On 25 February another assault on the bridgehead ran into a minefield, and bogged down. FAPLA lost 172 men, plus 10 Cubans, and 6 tanks. The SADF lost 4 killed and 10 wounded, plus several vehicles damaged. However the bridgehead survived, and the objective of driving the enemy across the river had still not been achieved.
This concluded Operation Hooper.
Fresh troops and equipment were brought in, designated 82 Mechanised brigade, and yet another attempt was made on 23 March to drive the FAPLA back across the bridge. Once again it bogged down in minefields. Although the SADF suffered no losses, UNITA was taking heavy casualties, and the assault "was brought to a grinding and definite halt". Artillery fire was mounting and air attacks were intense, so to avoid casualties the attack was called off. Several damaged SADF tanks were abandoned in the minefield, and were subsequently captured by the Cubans. This provided a huge propaganda victory for Castro. The SADF equipment, men and supplies were exhausted, and the SADF command determined that destroying the small FAPLA force remaining on the eastern bank of the river was not worth further casualties. The objective of protecting UNITA was deemed to have been achieved, and Operation Packer ended.
A small SADF force continued to harry the FAPLA in the Tumpo region, to create the impression that the full force was still present, and to prevent the FAPLA from resuming their advance against UNITA. For months it continued to shell Cuito Cuanavale and the airstrip across the river using their long-range G-5 artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km. This continued until the end of August, after which all SADF troops returned to South West Africa.
Eventually Cuban troop strength in Angola increased to about 55,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south. Due to the international arms embargo since 1977, South Africa’s aging air force was outclassed by sophisticated Soviet-supplied air defence systems and air-strike capabilities fielded by the Cubans and Angolans and it was unable to uphold the air supremacy it had enjoyed for years; its loss in turn proved to be critical to the outcome of the battle on the ground. The Cuito airstrip was kept in repair, but since it was under constant observation by the SADF artillery and air force it could not be safely used by fixed wing aircraft.
The SADF used a mix of British, French, Israeli, captured Soviet and indigenously developed weaponry. Their allies, UNITA used a mix of Soviet and South African-supplied weaponry. The United States covertly supplied UNITA guerillas with Stingers for anti-aircraft defense. The South Africans were hampered by United Nations Security Council Resolution 418, an international arms embargo that prevented them from acquiring materiel such as modern aircraft. The Cubans and FAPLA were armed with Soviet weaponry.
|Type||Angola (FAPLA), Cuba (FAR)||South Africa (SADF), UNITA|
|AFVs||T-34-85, T-54B, T-55, T-62, PT-76, SU-100 World War II vintage self-propelled guns were not used.||Olifant, Ratel IFV, Eland Mk7|
|APCs/IFVs||BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50, BTR-60PB, BRDM-2, BMP-1 and MT-LB (tracked light-armoured towing vehicle)||Buffel, Casspir|
|Artillery||Zis-2 (57 mm),ZIS-3 (76 mm), D-44 (85 mm), D-30 (122 mm), ML-20 (152 mm), D-1 (152 mm), M-46 (130 mm) BM-21 Grad (MLR) and BM-14||G5 howitzer, G6 Self-Propelled Gun, Valkiri 127mm Multiple rocket launcher, Ordnance QF 25 pounder|
|Aircraft||MiG-23ML, MiG-21bis, MiG-23BM||Dassault Mirage F-1, Blackburn Buccaneer, Dassault Mirage III, English Electric Canberra, Impala,|
|Transport Aircraft||AN-26 AN-12, AN-22, IL-76||C-130B Hercules and C-160Z Transall|
|Helicopters||Mi-8/Mi-17, Mi-24/Mi-35||Super Frelon, Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma, Westland Wasp, Aérospatiale Alouette III, Atlas Oryx|
|Reconnaissance/observation||MiG-21R, Antonov An-30||Bosbok, UAV's|
|AAW||2K12 Kub/Kwadrat, 9K33 Osa-AK, S-125 Pechora, S-75 Dvina, ZSU-23-4 Shilka, ZU-23-2 Zeushka, Strela-2M, Strela-3, Strela-10, Igla, ZPU-4, ZPU-2, ZGU-1||Cactus, Tigercat, Bofors 40 mm, Ystervark self-propelled 20 mm AA vehicles, FIM-92 Stinger (used by UNITA)|
|Infantry weapons and anti tank support||AK-47, AKM, AKMS, RPK, RPD, PK, PKM, DShK, DShKM, KPV KPVT, 9K11 Malyutka, RPG-7, B-10 recoilless rifle, B-11 recoilless rifle||Heckler & Koch G3, R1, R4 assault rifle, FN MAG, M2 Browning, M40 recoilless rifle, RPG-7, ENTAC, MILAN and ZT3 Ingwe anti-tank guided missiles|
|Air-to-Air Missiles||K-13, R-60||Matra 530, V3B, R.550 Matra Magic|
Trucks used by FAPLA Engesa-15, Engesa-25, Engesa-50 (Brazilian) Mercedes (West Germany) Pegaso (Spain) IFAW50 (GDR) GAZ-66, ZIL-131, URAL-375/URAL-4320 GAZ-51 and GAZ-63 (were used by Cubans outside Cuito) KAMAZ and ZIL-130 (civil trucks): ZIL-157 (all were used outside Cuito)
Jeeps UAZ-469 UAZ-69 (GAZ-69) (used by Cubans outside Cuito) Niva Land Rover 109 Land Rover 110 Land Rover Defender
Miniubuses RAF-2203 and UAZ-452
Pistols Walther P38 TT-33 (TT) MP (Makarov) APS (Stechkin) Beretta 92
Before and during the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, US-brokered peace negotiations were in progress to remove all foreign belligerents from Angola. This was linked to the attempt to secure independence for Namibia. After the battles all sides resumed negotiations.
During that process Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO units under General Cintras Frías opened a second front to the west at Lubango with a force of 40,000 Cuban troops and a 30,000 of Angolan forces, and with support from MiG-23 fighter bombers. Various engagements took place over the next three months, starting near Calueque on 15 March 1988. This eventually gave rise to Operation Excite/Hilti and Operation Displace, in which skirmishes took place in Donguena, Xangongo, Techipa and other cities. The battles in the Southwest front ended when Cuban MiG-23s bombed Calueque Dam, causing the last South African loss of life in the conflict when they killed 12 soldiers from 8 SAI. Just before the air attack over Calueque, a heavy combat happened in the area when 3 columns of the FAPLA/FAR forces advanced towards Calueque dam. SADF forces, composed of regulars, 32 Bn and SWATF troops, halted the Cuban offensive inflicting approximately 300 casualties among the enemy forces.
The Cubans claimed to have killed 20 SADF troops, but the clash discouraged the Cubans from undertaking further ground engagements. On 8 June 1988, the South African government issued call-ups to 140,000 men of the Citizen Force reserves, however when hostilities ceased the call-up was cancelled. Following the battles the South Africans recognised that further confrontation with the Cubans would unnecessarily escalate the conflict and with all risks considered then retired the combat groups still operating in Angola back to Namibia. On the other side, the Cubans were shocked at the heavy casualties suffered and placed their forces on maximum alert awaiting a revenge attack from the South Africans, which never came. With the withdrawal of the SADF into Namibia an 27 June the hostilities ceased, and a formal peace treaty was signed at Ruacana on 22 August 1988. A peace accord, mediated by Chester Crocker, was finally signed on 22 December 1988 in New York, leading to the withdrawal of all foreign belligerents and to the independence of Namibia.
On a visit to Cuba, Nelson Mandela told the Cuban people that the FAPLA-Cuban "success" at Cuito and in Lubango was "a turning point for the liberation of our continent and my people" as well as the Angolan civil war and the struggle for Namibian independence.
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is commemorated in several countries in southern Africa. The 20th anniversary in 2008 was especially celebrated in Namibia.
- "Cuito Cuanavale: Fallen MK soldiers to be remembered". South Africa: Mail and Guardian.
- Heribert Adam; Kogila Moodley (1993). "II - From Confrontation to Negotiation". The Opening of the Apartheid Mind. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
- "The Battle At Cuito Cuanavale". The Namibian. 3 July 2009. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
- George (2005)
- Gleijeses (2007)
- On the other hand, Gen. Geldenhuys of the SADF estimated, as quoted in The New York Times, 20 April 1988, that in the period prior to 25 February, Cuban forces numbered about 1000.
- Jaster (1990), p. 17. "The South Africans assembled [at Mavinga] a considerable force: …totalling some 3000 men, plus another 1500–2000 Namibian troops from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF)"
- Jaster (1990), p. 19. "Fighting continued on a large scale, with an estimated 4000 SADF and SWATF troops, 8000 UNITA and 10000 FAPLA forces..."
- Estimates vary. Renée-Jacques Lique, editor of Afrique Express (Montreuil, France) says "D'un côté 7 000 soldats de l'armée d'Afrique du Sud et 10 000 combattants de l'UNITA, le mouvement rebelle angolais de Jonas Savimbi. De l'autre, 20 000 soldats gouvernementaux angolais des FAPLA (Forces armées populaires de libération de l'Angola) et 5 000 soldats d'élites cubains.…La bataille de Cuito Cuanavale dure huit jours : du 12 au 20 janvier. Les FAPLA et les Cubains en sortent vainqueurs au prix de 4 600 morts. Les troupes sud-africaines sont stoppées, mais plus important encore, dans le même temps, Cubains et Angolais ont avancé sur la Namibie. On the one side, 7000 soldiers of the South African Army and 10,000 combatants of UNITA, the Angolan rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi. On the other, 20,000 Angolan Government soldiers of FAPLA and 5000 elite Cuban soldiers... The battle of Cuito Cuanavale lasted eight days: from 12–20 January. The FAPLA and the Cubans were victorious at the cost of 4,600 dead. The South African troops were stopped but, even more importantly, at the same time Cubans and Angolans had advanced on Namibia." On the other hand, Karl Maier, journalist for The Washington Post and The Economist, on a visit to the front on 28 February 1988, repeated an estimate of 10,000 combined FAPLA/Cuban forces defending the town: Maier (1996), p. 29.
- Marcum (1990), p. 135. "UNITA and the SADF pursued retreating MPLA forces to the advanced air base and provincial capital of Cuito Cuanavale. There they laid siege to what became known as the Stalingrad of Angola, from December 1987 to March 1988. Caught in a conventional action for which it was ill-prepared, UNITA suffered some 3000 battle dead from among the ranks of its best units."
- Mills & Williams (2006)
- "The Battle Of Cuito Cuanavale". Paratus (SADF Magazine). March 1989. Retrieved 8 April 2011.
- "Replaying Cuito Cuanavale". History Today. Retrieved 2014-08-04.
- Professors Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley. "2". The Opening of the Apartheid Mind. University of California Press.
- Jaster (1990), pp. 8–11.
- Turton, Anthony (2010). Shaking Hands with Billy. Durban: Just Done Productions Publishing (published 1 December 2010). pp. 239, 453, 459,. ISBN 978-1-920315-58-0. OL 22656001M.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1988), Chapter 2, pp. 42–61.
- Walker (2004), p. 177.
- Table of Contents[dead link]
- George (2005), p. 183.
- George (2005), p. 201.
- Scholtz (2013), p. 253
- Scholtz (2013), p. 279
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 316-319, 338-339
- George (2005), p. 214.
- Vanneman (1990), p. 76.
- Scholtz (2013), p. 265
- Martin & Broadhead (2004), p. 16.
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 268-277
- George (2005), pp. 206–208.
- Crocker (1992): .
- Scholtz (2013), p. 288
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 290-291
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 292-297
- Scholtz (2013), p. 301
- Nortje (2003), p. 88
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 304-309
- Niddrie (1988), p. 2.
- Vanneman (1990), p. 79.
- Bole-Richard (1988), Le Monde's Johannesburg correspondent reported that these units had been without resupply for three weeks. See also Benemelis (1988), cap. 18.
- Bole-Richard (1988)
- Ricardo Luis (1989), p. 6.
- Barber, Simon in: Castro explains, why Angola lost battle against the SADF, 27 July 1989
- George (2005), p. 218.
- George (2005), p. 215.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1988), p. 59.
- George (2005), pp. 210–212.
- Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, 5 December 1987, Freedom of Information Act
- "Resolution 602". Unscr.com. Retrieved 2014-08-04.
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 320-321
- Ricardo Luis (1989)
- Holt (2005), p. 84.
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 334-337
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 321-324
- Scholtz (2013), p. 332
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 341-345
- Stührenberg, Michael in: Die Zeit 17/1988, Die Schlacht am Ende der Welt, p. 11
- George (2005), p. 227.
- Scholtz (2013), p. 357
- Scholtz (2013), pp. 345-350
- George (2005), p. 234.
- "Cuito Cuanavale revisited | Analysis | Analysis | Mail & Guardian". Mg.co.za. Retrieved 2014-08-04.
- Trainor (1988)
- Pazzanita (1991), p. 105. "The SADF and UNITA had relaxed the siege of the town by May, 1988, although at least several hundred South Africans remained on the outskirts."
- Scholtz (2013), p. 358
- McFaul (1990), p. 126. "...Castro boldly responded that Pretoria was "no longer in a position to request anything south of Angola. Instead of attacking inside Namibia, however, the Cuban forces moved east along the border to cut off the South Africans still camped near Cuito Cuanavale. By August 1988, the strategy had worked, leaving some 400-500 South African soldiers completely surrounded for several months".
- Cock & Nathan (1989), p. 23.
- Maier (1996), p. 31. "some observers estimate that 500,000 people have died in the fighting and the famine and disease it has provoked."
- Payne, Richard J., Opportunities and dangers of Soviet-Cuban expansion: Toward a Pragmatic U.S. Policy, State University of New York Press, (Albany 1988), p. 182
- Crawford, Neta; Klotz, Audie (1999). How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa. Macmillan Press. pp. 63–66.
- Benemelis (1988)
- Some estimates say only 10,000–20,000 Cubans: Gleijeses, Piero (May 2007). "Cuba and the Independence of Namibia", Cold War History, Volume 7, Issue 2. pp. 285–303., and Jaster (1990), p. 22.
- George (2005), pp. 243–246.
- Kasrlis, Ronnie (2008-03-23). "Turning point at Cuito Cuanavale". Independent Online. Retrieved 2015-02-06.
- Benemelis, Juan (1988). Las Guerras Secretas de Fidel Castro. Fundación Elena Mederos. ISBN 978-1-890829-21-6.
- Bole-Richard, Michel (23 January 1988). "Angola: une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA". Le Monde (in French). p. 5.
- Cock, Jacklyn; Nathan, Laurie (1989). War and Society: the Militarisation of South Africa. New Africa Books. ISBN 978-0-86486-115-3.
- Crocker, Chester A. (1992). High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-03432-5.
- George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991. London, New York: Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-415-35015-0.
- Gleijeses, Piero (11 July 2007). "Cuito Cuanavale revisited: analysis". Mail & Guardian Online.
- Holt, C. (2005). At Thy Call We Did Not Falter. Zebra Press. ISBN 978-1-77007-117-9.
- Jaster, Robert S. (1990). The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa. Adelphi Papers 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. ISBN 978-0-08-040974-0.
- Maier, Karl (1996). Angola: Promises and Lies. London: Serif. ISBN 978-1-897959-22-0.
- Marcum, John (1990). "South Africa and the Angola-Namibia Agreement". In Owen Ellison Kahn. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies. ISBN 978-0-88738-361-8.
- Martin, James W.; Broadhead, Susan Herlin (2004). Historical Dictionary of Angola (2nd ed.). Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-8108-4940-2.
- McFaul, Michael (1990). "Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola". International Security 14 (3): 99–135. JSTOR 2538933.
- Mills, Greg; Williams, David (2006). Seven Battles that Shaped South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg. ISBN 978-0-624-04298-3.
- Niddrie, David (1988). "Angola: The siege of Cuito Cuanavale". Africa Confidential 29 (3).
- Nortje, Piet (2003). 32 Battalion. Cape Town: Struik Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86872-914-2.
- Pazzanita, Anthony (1991). "The conflict resolution process in Angola". Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1): 83–114. doi:10.1017/s0022278x00020759. JSTOR 160994.
- Radu, Michael; Arnold, Anthony (1990). The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-88738-307-6.
- Ricardo Luis, Roger (1989). Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale. Havana: Editora Politica.
- Scholtz, Leopold (2013). The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989. Cape Town: Tafelberg (NB Publishers) (published 15 May 2013). ISBN 9780624054108. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- Trainor, Bernard E. (12 July 1988). "South Africa's strategy on Angola falls short, enhancing Cubans' role". The New York Times.
- Treaster, Joseph B. (28 July 1988). "Castro faults Soviet tactics in war in Angola". The New York Times.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission (29 October 1988). Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Report) 2.
- Vanneman, Peter (1990). "Soviet foreign policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s: a strategy of coercive diplomacy". In Owen Ellison Kahn. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies. pp. 69–94. ISBN 978-0-88738-361-8.
- Walker, John Frederick (2004). A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-4068-5.
- Polack, Peter (2013). Last Hot Battle of the Cold War. Casemate. ISBN 978-1612001951.
- Gennady Shubin; Andrei Tokarev, eds. (2011). Bush War : the road to Cuito Cuanavale : Soviet soldiers' accounts of the Angolan war (English ed.). Jacana Media. ISBN 9781431401857.
- The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
- Angola National Security
- Angola and Southwest Africa: A Forgotten War (1975-89)
- Aid to UNITA - Operations MODULAR, HOOPER and PACKER
- Operations Modular and Hooper 1987-88
- 7th South African Infantry Battalion and Cuito Cuanavale
- Cuban Tanks at Cuito Cuanavale
- Cuban MiG-23 Fighters at Cuito Cuanavale (Spanish)
- South African Tanks at Cuito Cuanavale
- U.S. Marine Corps Paper: Fighting Columns in Small Wars (Partially devoted to SADF Angolan Operations during this time period)
- South African Bush War Veterans Site
- Nelson Mandela Speech in Cuba 1991