Battle of the North Cape
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|Battle of the North Cape|
|Part of World War II|
Members of HMS Duke of York 's gun crews at Scapa Flow after the Battle of North Cape. The personnel are wearing anti-flash gear.
|Germany|| United Kingdom
|Commanders and leaders|
|Erich Bey †||Bruce Fraser|
|1 battleship||1 battleship
1 heavy cruiser
3 light cruisers
|Casualties and losses|
|1 battleship sunk
|1 battleship slightly damaged
1 heavy cruiser damaged
1 destroyer damaged
The Battle of the North Cape was a Second World War naval battle which occurred on 26 December 1943, as part of the Arctic Campaign. The German battleship Scharnhorst, on an operation to attack Arctic Convoys of war matériel from the Western Allies to the USSR, was brought to battle and sunk by superior Royal Navy forces—the battleship HMS Duke of York plus several cruisers and destroyers—off Norway's North Cape.
The battle was the last battle between big gun capital ships in the war between Britain and Germany. The British victory confirmed the massive strategic advantage held by the British, at least in surface units.
Operation Ostfront was an attempt by the German Kriegsmarine to intercept the expected Arctic convoys. In late December 1943, these would be the Russia-bound convoy JW 55B and the Home-bound convoy RA 55A.
On 22 December 1943, a Luftwaffe aircraft sighted JW 55B and commenced shadowing. Three days later, on 25 December, Scharnhorst (Captain Fritz Hintze) with the Narvik-class destroyers Z-29, Z-30, Z-33, Z-34 and Z-38 left Norway's Alta Fjord under the overall command of Konteradmiral Erich Bey.
JW 55B consisted of 19 cargo vessels under the command of the Commodore, retired Rear-Admiral Maitland Boucher, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and three other vessels, and an ocean escort of eight Home Fleet destroyers led by the destroyer HMS Onslow.
Also in the area was convoy RA 55A, returning to the United Kingdom from Russia. RA 55A consisted of 22 cargo ships, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and four other vessels, and an ocean escort of six Home Fleet destroyers led by the destroyer HMS Milne.
Escorting the convoys to Russia was the responsibility of the Home Fleet and its Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser. Fraser wished to neutralise Scharnhorst, a major threat to the convoys, and planned a confrontation over Christmas 1943 in which convoy JW 55B would be used to draw the enemy out. The previous convoy, JW 55A, had arrived safely at Murmansk with its normal escorts and additional protection from Force 1 commanded by Vice Admiral Robert Burnett in his flagship light cruiser HMS Belfast with the cruisers HMS Norfolk and Sheffield.
Fraser expected and hoped that Scharnhorst would attempt to attack JW 55B. At a conference of the captains of the ships in his force Fraser described his plan to intercept Scharnhorst at a position between the convoy and the enemy's Norwegian base before approaching the enemy within 12,000 yd (11,000 m) in the Arctic night, illuminating with star-shell, and opening fire using fire-control radar.
Convoy JW 55B had left Loch Ewe on 20 December, and by 23 December it was clear from intelligence reports that it had been sighted and was being shadowed by enemy aircraft. Fraser then put to sea with Force 2 consisting of his flagship the battleship HMS Duke of York, the cruiser HMS Jamaica and S-class destroyers HMS Savage, Scorpion, Saumarez, and HNoMS Stord of the exiled Royal Norwegian Navy. Fraser was anxious not to discourage Scharnhorst from leaving its base, so did not approach before it was necessary to do so.
As JW 55B and its escorts approached the area of greatest danger on the same day, the 23rd, travelling slowly eastward 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) off the coast of north Norway, Burnett and Force 1 set out westward from Murmansk while Fraser with Force 2 approached at moderate speed from the west. Scharnhorst sailed from its base at Altenfjord on the evening of 25 December and set course for the convoy's reported position as a south-westerly gale developed.
The following day, in poor weather and heavy seas and with only minimal Luftwaffe reconnaissance to aid him, Rear Admiral Bey was unable to locate the convoy. Thinking he had overshot the enemy, he detached his destroyers and sent them southward to increase the search area. Admiral Fraser, preparing for a German attack, had diverted the returning empty convoy RA 55A northward, out of the area in which it was expected, and ordered JW 55B to reverse course, to allow him to close. He later ordered four of the destroyers with RA 55A; HMS Matchless, HMS Musketeer, Opportune and Virago, to detach and join him.
The now unescorted Scharnhorst encountered Burnett's Force 1 shortly after 09:00. At a distance of nearly 13,000 yd (12,000 m), the British cruisers opened fire and Scharnhorst responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on the cruisers, the German battlecruiser was struck twice, with one shell destroying the radar controls and leaving Scharnhorst virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the battlecruiser were forced to aim at the enemy's muzzle flashes. This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant, leaving Norfolk the relatively easier target. Bey, believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy.
Once he had shaken off his pursuers, Bey turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them. Burnett, instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers' speed to 24 kn (28 mph; 44 km/h), positioned Force 1 so as to protect the convoy. It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about and which was criticised in some quarters but supported by Fraser, but to Burnett's relief, shortly after noon Scharnhorst approached the cruisers once more. As fire was again exchanged, Scharnhorst scored hits on Norfolk, disabling a turret and her radar. Following this exchange, Bey decided to return to port, while he ordered the destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by a U-boat. The reported position was out of date and the destroyers missed the convoy.
Scharnhorst ran south for several hours. Burnett pursued, but both Sheffield and Norfolk suffered engine problems and dropped back, leaving Belfast dangerously exposed for a while. The lack of working radar aboard Scharnhorst prevented the Germans from taking advantage of the situation, allowing Belfast to reacquire the German ship on her radar set.
Meanwhile, the battleship Duke of York, with her four escorting destroyers already pressing ahead to try to get into torpedo launching positions, had been informed of Belfast 's contact and they themselves soon picked up Scharnhorst on radar at 16:15 and were manoeuvring to bring a full broadside to bear. At 16:17 Scharnhorst was detected by Duke of York 's Type 273 radar at a range of 45,500 yards (41,500 m) and by 16:32 Duke of York 's Type 284 radar indicated that the range had closed to 29,700 yards (27,700 m).
At 16:48, Belfast fired star shells to illuminate Scharnhorst. Scharnhorst, unprepared with her turrets trained fore and aft, was clearly visible from Duke of York. Duke of York opened fire at a range of 11,920 yd (10,900 m) and scored a hit on the first salvo disabling  Scharnhorst 's foremost turrets ("Anton" and "Bruno") while another salvo destroyed the ship's aeroplane hangar. Bey turned north, but was engaged by the cruisers Norfolk and Belfast, and turned east at a high speed of 31 kn (36 mph; 57 km/h).
Bey was able to put some more distance between Scharnhorst and the British ships to increase his prospects of success. Scharnhorst also put two 11 in (280 mm) shells through Duke of York 's masts severing a vital radar cable, but these hits could not have been known to Bey, and his ship's fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18:20 when a shell fired by Duke of York at extreme range pierced her armour belt and destroyed the No. 1 boiler room. Scharnhorst 's speed dropped to only 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), and though immediate repair work allowed it to regain to 22 kn (25 mph; 41 km/h), Scharnhorst was now vulnerable to torpedo attacks by the destroyers. Five minutes later, Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command: "We will fight on until the last shell is fired."
At 18:50 Scharnhorst turned to starboard to engage the destroyers Savage and Saumarez, but this allowed Scorpion and the Norwegian destroyer Stord to attack with torpedoes, scoring one hit on the starboard side. As Scharnhorst continued to turn to avoid the torpedoes, Savage and Saumarez scored three hits on her port side. Saumarez was hit several times by Scharnhorst 's secondary armament and suffered eleven killed and eleven wounded.
Due to the torpedo hits, Scharnhorst's speed again fell to 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), allowing Duke of York to rapidly close the range. With Scharnhorst illuminated by starshells "hanging over her like a chandelier", Duke of York and Jamaica resumed fire, at a range of only 10,400 yd (9,500 m). At 19:15, Belfast joined in from the north. The British vessels subjected the German ship to a deluge of shells, and the cruisers Jamaica and Belfast fired their remaining torpedoes at the slowing target. Scharnhorst 's end came when the British destroyers Opportune, Virago, Musketeer and Matchless fired a further 19 torpedoes at her. Wracked with hits and unable to flee, Scharnhorst finally capsized and sank at 19:45 on 26 December, her propellers still turning, at an estimated position of . She was later identified and filmed at Coordinates: . Of her total complement of 1,968, only 36 were pulled from the frigid waters, 30 by Scorpion and six by Matchless. Neither Rear Admiral Bey nor Captain Hintze were among those rescued, although both were reported seen in the water after the ship sank, nor were any other officers. Scorpion tried to rescue Bey but he foundered. Fraser ordered the force to proceed to Murmansk, making a signal to the Admiralty: "Scharnhorst sunk", to which the reply came: "Grand, well done".
Later in the evening of 26 December, Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on board Duke of York: "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today".
The loss of Scharnhorst demonstrated the vital importance of radar in modern naval warfare. While the German battleship should have been able to outgun all of her opponents save the battleship Duke of York, the early loss of radar-assisted fire control combined with the problem of inclement weather left her at a significant disadvantage. Scharnhorst was straddled by 31 of the 52 radar-fire-controlled salvos fired by Duke of York. In the aftermath of the battle, the Kriegsmarine commander, Großadmiral Karl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment." 
Stord and Scorpion fired their torpedoes from an easterly direction. Stord fired her eight torpedoes as she was about 1,500 yd (1,400 m) from Scharnhorst, while also firing her guns. After the battle Admiral Fraser sent the following message to the Admiralty: "... Please convey to the C-in-C Norwegian Navy. Stord played a very daring role in the fight and I am very proud of her...". In an interview in The Evening News on 5 February 1944 the commanding officer of HMS Duke of York, Captain Guy Russell, said: "... the Norwegian destroyer Stord carried out the most daring attack of the whole action...".
- Angus Konstam (2009), The Battle of North Cape, Pen & Sword Books Ltd., UK, ISBN 978-1-84415-856-0.
- Watts, P.46
- Macintyre, Donald, CAPT RN "Shipborne Radar" United States Naval Institute Proceedings September 1967 p.79
- Watts, P.48. Turret "Bruno" was later brought back into action.
- Watts, p.51: "Two 11" shells from one of her salvoes passed through the masts of the Duke of York, severing all the wireless aerials, and more serious still, the wires leading from the radar scanner to the Type 284 gunnery control radar set. Lt H. R. K. Bates RNVR climbed the mast and managed to repair the broken wires..."
- Watts, p.50
- Claasen (2001) p. 232
- Watts, p.55-55.
- Macintyre, p.437.
- Bredemeier P. 258
- Claasen (2001) p. 233
- Claasen, Adam R. A. (2001). Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. pp. 228–233. ISBN 978-0-7006-1050-1.
- Fritz-Otto Busch, The Sinking of the Scharnhorst (Robert Hale, LTD., London, 1956), ISBN 0-86007-130-8, the story of the Battle of North Cape and the final battle as told by a Scharnhorst survivor.
- Donald MacIntyre, The Naval War against Hitler (Willmer Bros. Birkenhead, 1971), ISBN 0-7134-1172-4
- Fraser, Bruce A. (1947-08-05). "Sinking of the German Battlecruiser Scharnhorst on the 26th December 1943". Supplement to the London Gazette No. 38038 (The London Gazette). Retrieved 2010-10-03.
- Roskill, Stephen W. (1960). The Offensive Part I, 1st June 1943–31st May 1944. History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series. The War at Sea 1939–1945. Volume III. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Watts, A. J., The Loss of the Scharnhorst, London, Allan 1972, ISBN 0-7110-0141-3
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