Battle of Polygon Wood
|Battle of Polygon Wood|
|Part of Battle of Passchendaele (World War I)|
Australian infantry wearing respirators
|British Empire||German Empire|
|Commanders and leaders|
| Douglas Haig
| Erich Ludendorff
Crown Prince Rupprecht
Sixt von Armin
|7 British divisions
2 Australian divisions
|Casualties and losses|
|13,500: 21–30 September|
The Battle of Polygon Wood took place during the second phase of the Third battle of Ypres in World War I and was fought near Ypres in Belgium 26 September – 3 October 1917, in the area from the Menin Road to Polygon Wood and thence north, to the area beyond St. Julien.[Note 1] Much of the woodland had been destroyed by the huge quantity of shellfire from both sides since 16 July and the area had changed hands several times. General Herbert Plumer continued the series of British general attacks with limited objectives. The British attacks were led by lines of skirmishers, followed by small infantry columns organised in depth, (a formation which had been adopted by the Fifth Army in August) with a vastly increased amount of artillery support, the infantry advancing behind five layers of creeping bombardment on the Second Army front.
The advance was planned to cover 1,000–1,500 yards (910–1,370 m) and stop on reverse slopes which were easier to defend, enclosing ground which gave observation of German reinforcement routes and counter-attack assembly areas. Preparations were then made swiftly to defeat German counter-attacks, by mopping-up and consolidating the captured ground with defences in depth. The attack inflicted a severe blow on the German Fourth Army, causing many losses, capturing a significant portion of Flandern I, which threatened the German hold on Broodseinde ridge. The better weather continued to benefit the British attackers by drying the ground, raising mist which obscured British infantry attacks made around dawn, then clearing to reveal German Eingreif formations to air and ground observation, well in advance of their arrival on the battlefield. German defensive arrangements were changed hastily after the battle to try to counter British offensive superiority.
- 1 Background
- 2 Prelude
- 3 Battle
- 4 Aftermath
- 5 Notes
- 6 Footnotes
- 7 References
- 8 External links
The preliminary operation to capture Messines ridge (7–14 June) had been followed by a strategic pause as the British repaired their communications behind Messines ridge, completed the building of the infrastructure necessary for a much larger force in the Ypres area and moved troops and equipment north from the Arras front. After delays caused by local conditions, the Battles of Ypres had begun on 31 July with the Battle of Pilckem ridge, which was a substantial local success for the British, taking a large amount of ground and inflicting many casualties on the German defenders. The German defence had nonetheless recovered some of the lost ground in the middle of the attack front and restricted the British advance on the Gheluvelt plateau further south. British attacks had then been seriously hampered by unseasonal heavy rain during August and had not been able to retain much of the additional ground captured on the plateau on 10, 16–18, 22–24 and 27 August due to the determined German defence, mud and poor visibility.
Sir Douglas Haig ordered artillery to be transferred from the southern flank of the Second Army and more artillery to be brought into Flanders from the armies further south, to increase the weight of the attack on the Gheluvelt plateau.[Note 2] The principal role was changed from the Fifth to the Second Army and the boundary between the Second and Fifth armies was moved north towards the Ypres–Roulers railway, to narrow the frontages of the Second Army divisions in the area. A pause in British attacks was used to reorganise and to improve supply routes behind the front line, to carry 54,572 long tons (55,448 t) of ammunition above normal expenditure, to gun positions which had been moved forward onto captured ground and for the infantry and artillery reinforcements to arrive and practice for the next attack. The useasonal rains stopped and the ground began to dry and the cessatioon of British attacks misled the Germans, who risked moving some units away from Flanders. The offensive had resumed on 20 September, using similar step-by-step methods to those of the Fifth Army after 31 July, with a further evolution of technique based on the greater mass of artillery made available, to enable the consolidation of captured ground with sufficient strength and organisation to defeat German counter-attacks. At the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, most of the British objectives had been captured and held, with substantial losses being inflicted on the six German ground-holding divisions and their three supporting Eingreif divisions. British preparations for the next step began immediately and both sides studied the effect of the battle and the implications it had for their dispositions.
British offensive preparations
|24 September||0.0||74||50% cloud|
|Weather data from
McCarthy, C. Passchendaele:
The day-by-day Account (1995)
On 21 September Haig instructed the Fifth and Second Armies to make the next step across the Gheluvelt Plateau on a front of 8,500 yards (7,800 m). I ANZAC Corps would conduct the main advance of about 1,200 yards (1,100 m) to complete the occupation of Polygon Wood and the south end of Zonnebeke village. The Second Army altered its Corps frontages soon after the attack of 20 September so that each attacking division could be concentrated on a 1,000 yards (910 m) front. Roads and light railways were built behind the new front line to allow artillery and ammunition to be moved forward, beginning on 20 September; in fine weather this was finished in four days. As before Menin Road, bombardment and counter-battery fire began immediately, with practice barrages fired daily as a minimum. Artillery from VIII and IX Corps in the south acted to threaten attacks on Zandvoorde and Warneton. Haig intended that later operations would capture the rest of the ridge from Broodseinde, giving the Fifth Army scope to advance beyond the ridge north-eastwards and allow the commencement of Operation Hush.
The huge amounts of shellfire from both sides had cut up the ground and destroyed roads. New road circuits were built to carry supplies forward, especially artillery ammunition. Heavier equipment bogged in churned mud so had to be brought forward by wagons along roads and tracks, many of which were under German artillery observation from Passchendaele ridge, rather than being moved cross-country. The I Anzac Corps had 205 heavy artillery pieces, one gun for every 9 metres (9.8 yd) of front and many field artillery brigades with 18-pdr guns and 4.5-inch howitzers, which with the guns of the other attacking corps were moved forward 2,000 yards (1,800 m) from 20–24 September. Assembled forward of the artillery were heavy Vickers machine guns of the divisional machine gun companies, 56 for the creeping machine-gun barrage and 64 "SOS" guns for emergency barrages against German counter–attacks and to prolong the barrage towards the final objective.
The frontages of VIII and IX Corps were moved northwards so that X Corps could take over 600 yards (550 m) of front up to the southern edge of Polygon Wood, which kept each of the frontages of the two Australian divisions of I Anzac Corps to 1,000 yards (910 m). 39th Division took over from 41st Division ready to attack Tower Hamlets (on the Bassevillebeke spur), 33rd Division replaced 23rd Division beyond the Menin Road and 5th and 4th Australian Divisions replaced 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions in Polygon Wood. A German attack on 25 September between Menin Road and Polygon Wood occurred as 33rd Division was taking over from 23rd Division and for a time threatened to delay preparations for the British operation, due next day. Some ground was captured by the Germans and part of it was then recaptured by 33rd Division. Plumer ordered that the flank guard protecting the I Anzac Corps on 26 September be formed by 98th Brigade of 33rd Division while 100th Brigade recaptured the lost ground.
Plan of attack
Dispersed and camouflaged German defences, using shell-hole positions, pillboxes and the holding back of much of the German infantry for counter-attacks, had meant that as British advances became weaker and disorganised by losses, fatigue, poor visibility and the channelling effect of waterlogged ground, they met more and fresher German defenders. To overcome the German defensive system, which had been made more formidable by the unusually rainy weather in August, making movement much more difficult and forcing the British to keep to duck board tracks, easy to identify and bombard, objectives had been chosen which provided British infantry with good positions from which to face German counter-attacks, rather than to advance to the maximum distance before digging-in. The Fifth Army had set objectives much closer than 3,000–3,500 yards (2,700–3,200 m) after 31 July[Note 3] and the Second Army methods of September were based on SS 144 The Normal Formation for the Attack (February 1917) reflecting the experience of the fighting in August and exploiting opportunities made possible by the reinforcement of the Flanders front with another 626 artillery pieces by Sir Douglas Haig, during the operational pause before 20 September. The methods based on the Second Army Note of 31 August, had proved themselves on 20 September and were to be repeated.
The attack of 20 September had used the extra infantry made available by narrowing attack frontages and increasing the number of divisions, to have greater depth than those of August, with several widely spaced lines of infantry in front of section columns, snaking round shell-holes and patches of mud, ready to surround German pillboxes, with increased numbers of support waves ready to leap-frog through and reserves ready to intervene during delays and German counter-attacks. Intermediate objectives were chosen which required a shorter distance to be covered and the number of infantry attacking the first objective were reduced, since the German garrisons in the forward defended areas were small and dispersed. British troops involved in the first advance were lightly equipped, to allow them to move more quickly to avoid German counter-barrages and get through the relatively empty area up to the first objective. The number of units leap-frogging through to the next objective was increased and the distance to the final objective further reduced, to match the increasing density of German defences; the creeping barrage was arranged to move more slowly to the final objective. Particular units were allotted to "mop-up" and occupy areas behind the most advanced troops, to make certain that pockets of Germans overrun by the foremost troops were killed or captured, before they could emerge from shelter and re-join the battle. The formation used by the infantry was altered so that those in the leading waves were further apart and followed by files or small groups, ready to swarm around German defences uncovered by the skirmish lines, each unit keeping a sub-unit in close reserve, brigades a reserve battalion, battalions a reserve company and companies a reserve platoon.[Note 4] Increased emphasis was placed on Lewis-guns, rifle-fire and rifle-grenades. Hand-grenades were given less emphasis in favour of more rifle training. The proportion of smoke ammunition for rifle grenades and Stokes mortars was increased, to blind the occupants of German pillboxes as they were being surrounded. All units were required to plan an active defence against counter-attack, using the repulse of German infantry as an opportunity to follow up and inflict more casualties.
X Corps was to advance to create a defensive flank on the right, attacking with the 33rd and 39th divisions either side of the Menin road. I Anzac Corps with the 5th and 4th Australian divisions would make the main attack on the remainder of Polygon Wood and the southern part of Zonnebeke village in two stages, 800–900 yards (730–820 m) to the Butte and Tokio pillbox then after a one hour pause for consolidation, a final advance beyond Flandern I and the Tokio spur. To the north, V Corps of the Fifth Army with the 3rd and 59th divisions was to reach a line Zonnebeke – Hill 40 – Kansas Farm crossroads, using the smoke and high explosive barrage (rather than shrapnel) demonstrated by the 9th Division on 20 September. A brigade of the 58th Division, (XVIII Corps) was to attack up Gravenstafel spur towards Aviatik Farm. The relief of V Corps by II Anzac Corps to bring the ridge as far north as Passchendaele into the Second Army area was delayed, as the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions were still battleworthy.
German defensive preparations
Tower Hamlets spur overlooked the ground south towards Zandvoorde. The upper valleys of the Reutelbeek and Polygonebeek further north commanded the German counter-attack assembly areas in the low ground north of the Menin road. The large mound in Polygon Wood, the Butte de Polygone gave observation of the east end of the Gheluvelt plateau towards Becelaere and Broodseinde and had been fortified with machine gun emplacements and barbed wire obstacles. Polygon Wood formed part of the German third (Wilhelm) position; large numbers of dugouts and foxholes were constructed within it. After the defeat of 20 September, the German Fourth Army made changes to its defensive methods. At a conference on 22 September it was decided to increase the artillery effort between battles, half for counter-battery fire and half against British infantry. The accuracy of German artillery fire was to be improved by increasing the amount of artillery observation available to direct fire during British attacks. Infantry raiding was to be stepped up and counter-attacks to be made more quickly. By 26 September the ground-holding divisions had been reorganised so that the regiments were side-by-side, covering a front of about 1,000 yards (910 m) each with the battalions one-behind-the-other, the first in the front line, one in support and the third in reserve, over a depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Each of the three ground-holding divisions on the Gheluvelt plateau had an Eingreif division in support, double the ratio on 20 September.
On 25 September a German attack on the front of the 20th Division (XIV Corps) was prevented by artillery fire but on the X Corps front, south of I Anzac Corps a bigger German attack took place. Crown Prince Rupprecht had ordered the attack to recover ground on the Gheluvelt plateau and to try to gain time for reinforcements to be brought into the battle zone to bolster the defensive system. Two regiments of the 50th Reserve Division attacked either side of the Reutelbeek, with the support of 44 field and 20 heavy batteries of artillery, four times the usual amount of artillery for one division. The attack on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front from the Menin road to Polygon Wood, to recapture pillboxes and shelters in the Wilhelm Line 500 yards (460 m) away, had been due to begin at 5:15 a.m., but the barrage fell short onto the German assembly area and the German infantry had to fall back until it began to creep forward at 5:30 a.m. The German infantry managed to advance on the flanks, about 100 yards (91 m) near the Menin road and 600 yards (550 m) north of the Reutelbeek, close to Black Watch Corner, with the help of a number of observation and ground-attack aircraft and a box-barrage, which obstructed the supply of ammunition to the British defenders, before fire from the 33rd Division troops being attacked and the 15th Australian Brigade along the southern edge of Polygon wood, forced them under cover, after recapturing some of the Wilhelm Line pillboxes near Black Watch Corner. A number of attempts to reinforce the attacking troops failed, due to British artillery observers isolating the advanced German troops (also with a box-barrage). The Australian advance the next day began with uncertainty as to the security of their right flank.
In X Corps, the 19th Division of IX Corps provided flanking artillery fire, machine-gun fire and a smoke screen for the 39th Division, keeping a very thinly occupied front line which in consequence received much German retaliatory artillery fire at first, which fell on unoccupied ground, then diminished and became inaccurate during the day. The 39th Division attacked at 5:50 a.m. with two brigades. The "Quadrilateral" further down Bassevillebeek spur, which commanding the area around Tower Hamlets was captured; the right brigade had been caught in the boggy ground of the Bassevillebeek, its two tanks in support got stuck near Dumbarton Lakes. Soon after arriving in the "Quadrilateral" it was counter-attacked by part of the German 25th Division and pushed back 200 yards (180 m). The left brigade passed through Tower Hamlets to reach the final objective and consolidated behind Tower Trench, with an advanced post in the north-west of Gheluvelt Wood.
The right brigade of the 33rd Division advanced to recapture the ground lost in the German attack the day before and was stopped 50 yards (46 m) short of its objective, until a reserve company assisted and gained touch with the left brigade of the 39th Division to the south. On the left of the brigade the old front line was regained by 1:30 p.m. and posts established beyond the Reutelbeek. The 98th Brigade on the left attacked with reinforcements from the reserve brigade at 5:15 a.m. so as to advance 500 yards (460 m) with the troops at Black Watch Corner in action the previous day. At 2:20 a.m. the brigade had gained Jerk House and met the 5th Australian Division to the north. A German barrage forced a delay until 5:30 a.m. but the German bombardment increased in intensity and the advance lost the barrage, reaching only as far as Black Watch Corner. A reserve battalion was sent through the 5th Australian Division sector to attack south-east at noon, which enabled the brigade to regain most of the ground lost the day before, although well short of the day's objectives. A German counter-attack at 2:30 p.m. was driven off and more ground re-taken by the 100th Brigade on the right. A pillbox near the Menin road taken at 4:00 p.m. was the last part of the area captured by the German attack the previous day to be re-taken. A German counter-attack at 5:00 p.m. was stopped by artillery fire.
I Anzac Corps attacked with the 5th Australian Division on the right. In the 15th Australian Brigade the battalions were to advance successively but bunched up near the first objective and were stopped by pillboxes at the "racecourse" and fire from the 33rd Division area to the south. At 7:30 a.m. the right-hand battalion dug in at the boundary with the 33rd Division and the other two advanced to the second objective by 11:00 a.m. The left brigade assembled in twelve waves on a strip of ground 60 yards (55 m) deep and avoided the German barrage fired at 4:00 a.m. which fell behind them and advanced through the fog 500 yards (460 m) almost unopposed to The Butte. At some pillboxes there was resistance but many German soldiers surrendered when they were rapidly surrounded. The Butte was rushed and was found to be full of German dugouts. Two battalions passed through at 7:30 a.m. towards the second objective, a 1,000-yard (910 m) stretch of Flandern I and some pillboxes, until held up by fire from a German battalion headquarters on the Polygonebeek. A reserve battalion overran the dugouts and more pillboxes nearby, advancing to just beyond the final objective, at the junction with the 4th Australian Division to the north, taking 200 prisoners and 34 machine-guns. An attempted German counter-attack by part of the 17th Division, was dispersed by artillery and machine-gun fire.
The 4th Australian Division assembled well forward and avoided the German barrage by squeezing up into an area 150 yards (140 m) deep and attacked at 6:45 a.m. with two brigades. The right brigade attacked through a mist, took the first objective with only short delays to capture pillboxes but then mistakenly advanced into the standing barrage, which had paused for twice as long as usual, to assist the 3rd Division advance through muddier conditions to the north and had to be brought back until the barrage moved forward. The brigade reached the final objective from just short of Flandern I on the right and the edge of Zonnebeke on the left and gained touch with the 5th Australian Division further south. At 1:20 p.m. air reconnaissance reported German troops east of Broodseinde ridge and at 3:25 p.m. as the German force (from the 236th Division) massed to counter-attack it was dispersed by artillery fire. The northern brigade advanced to the final objective against minor opposition, moving beyond the objective to join with the 3rd Division to the north, which had pressed on into Zonnebeke. Attempts by the Germans to counter-attack at 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. were stopped by the protective barrage and machine-gun fire.
The southern boundary of the Fifth Army lay approximately 800 yards (730 m) south of the Ypres–Roulers railway, in the V Corps area. The 3rd Division attacked either side of the line at 5:50 a.m. The right brigade met little resistance but was briefly held up crossing the Steenbeek. The advance slowed under machine-gun fire from Zonnebeke station on the far side of the railway as Zonnebeke was entered. North of the embankment the left brigade attacked at 5:30 a.m. in a mist. The attack reached the first objective, despite crossing severely boggy ground at 7:00 a.m. The advance resumed and reached the western slope of Hill 40, just short of the final objective. A German counter-attack began at 2:30 p.m. but was stopped easily. A bigger attempt at 6:30 p.m. was defeated with rifle and machine-gun fire, as the British attack on Hill 40 resumed, eventually leaving both sides still on the western slope.
59th Division attacked with two brigades, the right brigade advancing until held up by its own barrage and took Dochy Farm at 7:50 a.m. One battalion found a German barrage laid behind the British creeping barrage, which crept back with it and caused many casualties. The advance continued beyond the final objective to Riverside and Otto Farms but when the protective barrage fell short, Riverside was abandoned. The left brigade advanced and took Schuler Farm, Cross Cottages, Kansas, Martha, Green and Road Houses then Kansas Cross and Focker pillboxes. As the brigade reached the final objective Riverside, Toronto and Deuce Houses were captured. A German counter-attack between 5:30 p.m. and 6:50 p.m. pushed back some advanced posts, which with reinforcements were regained by 11:00 p.m.
In XVIII Corps, the 58th Division attacked with one brigade at 5:50 a.m. In a thick mist some of the British troops lost direction and were then held up by fire from Dom Trench and a pillbox, after these were captured the advance resumed until stopped at Dear House, Aviatik Farm and Vale House, about 400 yards (370 m) short of the final objective. A German counter-attack pushed the British back from Aviatik Farm and Dale House and an attempt to regain them failed. Another attack at 6:11 p.m. reached Nile on the divisional boundary with the 3rd Division. German troops trickling forward to Riverside and Otto pillboxes were stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire.
Aircraft of the Australian Royal Flying Corps flew over the infantry on contact patrol, the aeroplanes were distinguished by black streamers on the rear edge of their left wings and called for signals from the ground by sounding a klaxon horn or dropping lights, to which infantry responded with red flares to communicate their position; the pilot would report to the Australian divisional headquarters. The Royal Flying Corps ("RFC") began operations on the night of 25–26 September when 100 and 101 Squadrons attacked German billets and railway stations. Mist rose before dawn and ended night flying early; there was a low cloud present at 5:50 a.m. when the infantry advanced, which made observation difficult. Contact-patrol and artillery observers managed to observe progress on the ground and reported 193 German artillery batteries to British artillery. Fighters flying at about 300 feet (91 m) attacked German infantry and artillery; German aircraft tried this against British troops with some success, although ground fire shot five of them down. Six more German aircraft were shot down by RFC and Royal Naval Air Service ("RNAS") pilots over the battlefield. Operations further afield were reduced due to the low cloud but three German airfields were attacked and an offensive patrol over the front line intercepted German bombers and escorts and drove them off.
German Fourth Army
Despite difficulties at the extremities of the attack front, by mid-morning most British objectives had been gained and consolidated. The Germans launched several counter-attacks, with the Eingreif divisions supported by the equivalent of ten normal divisional artilleries. Clearing weather assisted early observation of the German counter-attacks, most of which were repulsed by accurate and heavy artillery and small-arms fire, causing many German casualties. At Zonnebeke a local counter-attack by the 34th Fusilier Regiment (3rd Reserve Division) was attempted around 6:45 a.m., with part of the 2nd battalion (in support) advancing to reinforce the 3rd Battalion holding the front line and the reserve battalion (1st) joining the counter-attack, after advancing west over Broodseinde ridge. The order reached the troops south of the Ypres–Roulers railway quickly, who attacked immediately. The companies south of Zonnebeke advanced and were overrun by British troops on the Grote Molen spur and taken prisoner. Closer to the railway, troops reached the lake near Zonnebeke church and were pinned down by a British machine-gun already dug-in nearby. The counter-attack order was delayed north of the railway and the counter-attack there did not begin until the 1st Battalion (in reserve) arrived. The battalion was able to descend the slope from Broodseinde covered by mist and smoke, which led to few losses but some units losing direction. The British barrage near the village caused many casualties but the survivors pressed on through it and at 7:30 a.m. reached the remnants of the 3rd Battalion near the level crossing north of the village, just in time to hold off a renewed British attack 200 yards (180 m) short of their position, as stray German troops trickled in. By mid-morning the mist had cleared, allowing German machine-gunners and artillery to pin the British down around Grote Molen spur and Frezenburg ridge, forestalling a British attack intended for 10:00 a.m..
Around noon, British aircraft on counter-attack patrol, began to send wireless messages warning of German infantry advancing towards all of the front attacked. Similar reports from the ground began in the early afternoon. In the centre German infantry from the 236th Division, 234th Division and 4th Bavarian Division were advancing north of Becelaere–Broodseinde–Passchendaele Ridge, while the 17th Division advanced south of Polygon wood. British artillery immediately bombarded these areas, disrupting the German deployment and causing the German attacks to be disjointed. A German officer later wrote of severe delays and disorganisation caused to German Eingreif units by British artillery-fire and air attacks. A counter-attack either side of Molenaarelsthoek was stopped dead at 3:25 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. German troops advancing around Reutel to the south, were heavily bombarded as were German artillery positions in Holle Bosch, ending the German advance. A German attack then developed near Polderhoek, whose survivors managed to reach the British infantry and were seen off in bayonet fighting. Observation aircraft found German troops massing against Tower Hamlets, on the Bassevillebeek spur and artillery and machine-gun barrages stopped the attack before it reached the British infantry. At 6:50 p.m. the Germans managed to organise an attack from Tower Hamlets to north of Polygon Wood; such German infantry as got through the barrages were "annihilated" by the British infantry. German counter-attacks were only able to reach the new front line and reinforce the remnants of the front divisions.
The 236th Division (Eingreif) attacked south of the Ypres–Roulers railway and 4th Bavarian Division (Eingreif) for 2,000 yards (1,800 m) to the north, with field artillery and twelve aircraft attached to each division and the 234th Division in support. British counter-attack patrols easily observed the advance and as the lines of German troops breasted Broodseinde ridge at 2:30 p.m., a huge bombardment enveloped them. German field artillery accompanying the infantry was hit and blocked the roads, causing delays and disorganisation. German infantry had many casualties, as they advanced down the slope in good visibility. The 236th Division lost so many men that it was only able to reinforce the troops of the 3rd Reserve Division, found east of the Zonnebeke–Haus Kathé road on Grote Molen spur, chasing a few Australian souvenir hunters out of Molenaarelsthoek. The 4th Bavarian Division had to find a way across the mud and floodings of the Paddebeek east of Klein Molen spur, losing 1,340 casualties to reach the survivors of the 3rd Reserve Division (Polygon Wood–Klein Molen) and the 23rd Reserve Division (Klein Molen–St. Julien). A renewal of the British attack at 6:00 p.m. and the German counter-attack over Hill 40 and Klein Molen met, the mélee leaving both sides where they began.
British artillery fire slowed the advance of the Eingreif units, which took up to two hours to cover one kilometre and arrived at the front line exhausted. The 17th Division had replaced the 16th Bavarian Division as the Eingreif division covering the forces near Zandvoorde, just before the battle began. At 10:00 a.m. movement orders arrived and parts of the division advanced north-west towards Terhand, where the first layer of the British barrage (directed by artillery-observation aircraft) was met, delaying the arrival of advanced units in their assembly areas until 1:00 p.m.. The order to advance took until 2:00 p.m. to reach all units and then the advance resumed through crater fields and the British bombardment, having to disperse to avoid swamps and the worst of the British artillery fire. Polderhoek was not reached until 4:10 p.m. and as soon as the first battalions crossed the skyline near Polderhoek Château they were hit by artillery and machine-gun fire from three sides and the counter-attack "withered away". The German attacks stopped at 8:30 p.m. and after a quiet night, troops from X and I Anzac corps occupied Cameron House and the head of the Reutelbeek valley near Cameron Covert. The German Official History later recorded that the German counter-attacks found well-dug-in (eingenistete) infantry and in places more British attacks.
Each of the three German ground-holding divisions attacked on 26 September had an Eingreif division in support, which was twice the ratio of 20 September. No ground captured by the British had been regained and the counter-attacks had managed only to reach ground held by the remnants of the front-line divisions. Second Army Intelligence estimated that ten divisional artilleries had supported the German troops defending the Gheluvelt Plateau, doubling the Royal Artillery casualties compared to the previous week.
British losses were 15,375 casualties; 1,215 being killed. Der Weltkrieg recorded 13,500 casualties from 21–30 September, to which the British Official Historian controversially added 30% for lightly wounded.[Note 5] The 4th Australian Division suffered 1,717 casualties. The 5th Australian Division had 5,471 dead and wounded in the period 26–28 September.
Though smaller than in 1917, Polygon Wood is still large. The remains of three German pillboxes captured by the Australians lie deep among the trees but few trench lines remain. The Butte is still prominent and mounted on top of it is the AIF 5th Division memorial, the usual obelisk. It faces the Butte's military cemetery at the other end of which is a New Zealand memorial to the missing of the sector, the Buttes New British Cemetery (New Zealand) Memorial.
On 27 September in the X Corps area, the 39th Division stopped three German counter-attacks with artillery fire. In the 33rd Division, after a report that Cameron House had been captured, a battalion attacked past it and reached the blue line. The 98th Brigade to the north attacked towards the 5th Australian Division against fierce German resistance, reaching the Australians at Cameron Covert at 3:50 p.m. After an intense barrage on the 3rd Division, (in V Corps, astride the Ypres–Roulers railway) the Germans attacked at Bostin Farm and were repulsed after severe fighting. The battlefield quietened until 30 September, when a morning attack by regiments of the fresh 8th and 45th Reserve divisions and the Fourth Army Sturmbattalion, with flame-throwers and a smoke screen, on the 23rd Division (X Corps) front, north of the Menin Road was defeated. Another German attempt at 5.30 a.m. on 1 October with support from ground-attack aircraft, pushed two battalions back 150 yards (140 m); three later attacks were repulsed. Further north the Germans attacked the 7th Division at 6:15 a.m. and were stopped by artillery and small-arms fire. A renewed attack at 9:00 a.m. also failed and when preparations for a third attack were seen at Cameron Covert and Joist Trench, an artillery bombardment stopped all activity. Joist Farm was lost by the 21st Division during a German attack on Polygon Wood and Black Watch Corner and the line stabilised east of Cameron House. German attacks near the Menin Road on the 37th Division front in IX Corps and the 5th Division (X Corps) on 3 October failed.
- The name Polygon Wood (German-Polygonwald, or French-Bois de Polygone) was derived from the shape of a plantation forest that lay along the axis of the Australian advance on 26 September 1917. The wood was sometimes known as Racecourse Wood, as there was a track within it. Before the Great War, Polygon Wood was used by the Belgian Army and within it stands a large mound, known as the Butte, which was used as a rifle range; there was also a small airfield near the area.
- From 28 August – 12 September, 240 field guns and howitzers, 386 medium and heavy guns and howitzers arrived from the Third and Fourth armies.
- Several writers have followed the Official Historian in ascribing these changes to the influence of Plumer and the Second Army staff, once Haig transferred the main offensive effort from the Fifth Army in late August. The narrative of the Official History makes it clear that the Fifth Army methods used in July and August and those of the Second Army from September to the end of the battle were similar and that the changes were evolutionary. The practice of troops behind the most advanced infantry moving forward in artillery formation or columns, had been used on 31 July at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. The attacks of 10 and 16–18 August were limited advances to reach the black and green lines (second and third objectives) of the 31 July attack, where these had not been reached on the II and XIX corps fronts.
- SS 144 (February 1917) reiterated the platoon organisation laid down in SS 143 and recommended an attacking frontage of 200 yards (180 m) for a battalion, with wide intervals between each man, line and wave to create a dispersed attack in depth. Where one or two objectives were to be captured, the first wave should advance to the final objective, with troops in following waves to mop-up and occupy captured ground. Where more objectives were set, the first wave was to stop at the first objective, mop-up and dig in, ready to receive German counter-attacks, as following waves leap-frogged beyond them to the further objectives and did the same, particularly when enough artillery was present to provide covering fire for all of the depth of the attack. The leap-frog method was chosen for the September attacks, whereas in July and August both methods had been used.
- 236th (Eingreif), 10th Ersatz, 50th Reserve Division (1,850 casualties) 23rd Reserve (Eingreif), 17th (Eingreif), 19th Reserve and 4th Bavarian (Eingreif) divisions.
- Gibbs 1918, p. 359.
- Edmonds 1948, p. 290.
- Sheldon 2007, pp. 185–186.
- Edmonds 1948, pp. 24–25.
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