Battle of Ramadi (2006)

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Battle of Ramadi (2006)
Part of the Iraq War
Ramadi august 2006 patrol.jpg
US soldiers take up positions on a street corner during a foot patrol in Ramadi, August 2006
Date June 17, 2006 - November 15, 2006
Location Ramadi, Iraq
Result Indecisive
(Some regarded it as an Insurgent victory,[1] others as a Coalition victory[2][3])
Belligerents
United States United States
Flag of Iraq (2004-2008).svg New Iraqi Army
Mujahideen Shura Council (Iraq)
Commanders and leaders
United States COL Sean MacFarland
United States LTC Ronald Clark
Strength
United States 5,500 soldiers and Marines[4]
Iraq 2,000 Iraqi Army soldiers[5]
unknown
Casualties and losses
US:
80+ killed,[6]
200+ wounded
Iraq:
30 troops and policemen killed[7]
750 killed (U.S. estimate) [8]

The Battle of Ramadi in 2006 (sometimes referred to as the Second Battle of Ramadi) was fought during the Iraq War from June 2006 to November 2006 for control of the capital of the Al Anbar Governorate in western Iraq. A combined force of U.S. Soldiers, U.S. Marines, U.S. Navy SEALs, and Iraqi Security Forces fought insurgents for control of key locations in Ramadi, including the Government Center and the General Hospital. Coalition strategy relied on establishing a number of patrol bases called Combat Operation Posts throughout the city.

U.S. military officers believe that insurgent actions during the battle led to the formation of the Anbar Awakening. In August, insurgents executed a tribal sheik who was encouraging his kinsmen to join the Iraqi police and prevented his body from being buried in accordance with Islamic laws. In response, Sunni sheiks banded together to drive insurgents from Ramadi. In September 2006, Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Risha formed the Anbar Salvation Council, an alliance of approximately 40 Sunni tribes.[9]

U.S. Navy SEAL Michael A. Monsoor was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for actions during the battle. On September 29, 2006, he threw himself upon a grenade which threatened the lives of the other members of his team. Monsoor had previously been awarded the Silver Star in May for rescuing an injured comrade in the city.

The battle also marked the first use of chlorine bombs by insurgents during the war. On October 21, 2006, insurgents detonated a car-bomb with two 100-pound chlorine tanks, injuring three Iraqi policemen and a civilian in Ramadi.

Background[edit]

Further information: Battle of Ramadi (2004)

Since the fall of Fallujah in 2004, Ramadi had been the center of the insurgency in Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq, a front group for Al-Qaida in Iraq, had declared the city to be its capital.[10] The city of 500,000, located 110 kilometres west of Baghdad, had been under the control of the insurgency except for a few places where the Marines had set up remote outposts, that were virtually under siege. Law and order had broken down, and street battles were common.[11]

Prelude[edit]

On April 17th, the prelude to the second battle of Ramadi began. Observation post Virginia, The Government center, the snake pit outpost, and Camp Ramadi all simultaneously came under heavy attack by forces led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Observation post Virginia was the target of a heavily armed vehicle-born suicide bomber. The Insurgent drove an armored yellow dump truck loaded with approximately one thousand pounds of explosives through the gate of the outpost and detonated it. Insurgents with small arms and RPGs moved in on the post and a major firefight ensued. The Marines of 3rd Battalion 8th Marines Lima Company eventually repelled the attack, killing dozens of insurgents, with only a few Marines wounded in the attack. On or before April 25, 2006 an internet video showing the attack on Observation Post Virginia and of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi planning the attack was released, bearing the logo of the organization of the Mujahideen Shura Council (Iraq).

Marines during an operation to prevent and disrupt insurgency activity in Ramadi, April 25, 2006

On June 14, U.S. and Iraqi forces in Baghdad began Operation Together Forward, an operation intended to curb the sectarian killings in the capital.

In early June 2006, the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st U.S. Armored Division and elements from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division were deployed to the Ramadi area from Tal Afar and Kuwait respectively and began preparations to take on the insurgents in the capital of Al Anbar province, Ramadi. Word of an offensive already gotten to the 400,000 citizens of the city who feared another Fallujah style attack. But the U.S. commander of 1/1 AD, ColonelSean Macfarland (now a major general commanding III Corps at Fort Hood) decided to take it slowly and softly, without using heavy close air support, artillery or tank fire. By June 10, U.S. troops had "cordoned off" the city. U.S. air strikes on residential areas were escalating, and US troops took to the streets with loudspeakers to warn civilians of a fierce impending attack.[12]

The objective of the operation was to cut off resupply and reinforcements to the insurgents in Ramadi by gaining control of the key entry points into the city. U.S. forces also planned to establish new combat outposts (COPs) and patrol bases throughout the city, moving off their forward operating bases in order to engage the population and establish relationships with local leaders.

On June 17, there were several skirmishes with the insurgents which killed two American soldiers.[13]

Insurgents attack Ramadi Government Center[edit]

US troops take cover from small arms fire while investigating a car bomb explosion in Tameem, Ramadi, August 10, 2006

The operation had some initial success but the effect that the Americans wanted to achieve did not happen. Very soon the American forces were bogged down in heavy street fighting throughout the city. Insurgents launched hit and run attacks on the newly established outposts, which were sometimes assaulted by as many as 100 insurgents at a time. In a major battle on July 24, al Qaeda forces sustained heavy casualties when they launched a number of attacks throughout the city.

The main target throughout the campaign was the Ramadi Government Center which was garrisoned by U.S. Marines who had sandbagged and barricaded the building. In an attempt to reduce attacks, U.S. forces demolished several buildings around the government center and planned to convert it into a park area.

Roadside bomb attacks and ambushes of patrols on the streets happened nearly every time the Marines went outside the wire. Sniper attacks were also a constant threat to Marines during the battle. There were also several suicide-bombing attacks on the outposts. One sniper had used the fourth story of the Ramadi General Hospital to kill a number of Marines before he was counter-sniped.[14][15]

Ramadi General Hospital captured[edit]

Iraqi police prepare to enter the Ramadi hospital, July 5, 2006

The Fourth Geneva Convention says that civilian hospitals "may in no circumstances be the object of attack" (Part II, Section 18). Despite this ban, the Ramadi General Hospital was attacked by US forces. At the beginning of July the American forces managed to push deep enough in to the city to reach the Ramadi General Hospital, which was captured by the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment on July 5. The Marines reported that members of al-Qaida in Iraq had been using the seven-story building, which was equipped with some 250 beds, to treat their wounded and fire on U.S. troops in the area. They said wounded Iraqi police officers who had been taken to the hospital were later found beheaded. Though there was no resistance during the operation, the Marines found about a dozen triggering devices for roadside bombs hidden above the tiled ceiling of one office. They knocked down dozens of locked doors and searched medicine chests and storage closets for additional weapons. Hospitals are considered off-limits in traditional warfare. In western Ramadi, however, insurgents have fired on Marines from the rooftop of a women and children's hospital so often that patients were moved to a wing with fewer exposed windows.[16]

Formation of the Anbar Awakening Council[edit]

Sheikh Abdul Sittar speaks with Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq at Camp Ramadi, April 2, 2007. Sheikh Sittar helped spark the Anbar Awakening Movement

On August 21, insurgents killed Abu Ali Jassim, a Sunni sheik who had encouraged many of his tribesmen to join the Iraqi Police. The insurgents hid the body in a field rather than returning it for a proper burial, violating Islamic law and angering Jassim's tribesmen. Following this, 40 sheiks from 20 tribes from across Al Anbar organised a movement called the Sahwa Al Anbar (Anbar Awakening). On September 9, Sheik Sittar organised a tribal council attended by over fifty sheiks and Col. Sean MacFarland. During this council, Sittar officially declared the Anbar Awakening underway.[17]

Shortly after the council, the tribes began attacking al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents in the suburbs of Ramadi. By October, nearly every tribe in northern and western Ramadi had joined the awakening.[18] By December, attacks had dropped 50% according to the U.S. military.[15][19][20]

September–October[edit]

In mid-September 2006, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1-6) relieved the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines in western Ramadi.[21] The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Jurney, deployed his companies throughout the city. Alpha Company was deployed to OP VA, a combat outpost close to a large seven-story building. [22] Bravo Company took up position in the Ramadi Government Center and Charlie Company was deployed to OP Hawk, the main combat outpost around Ramadi General Hospital.[23][24]

In late September, Pentagon officials announced that the troops of the 1st brigade, 1st Armored Division would have their tour extended by 46 days.[25] This extension was ordered to give the relieving brigade, the 1st brigade, 3rd Infantry Division time to prepare for their deployment at the start of 2007.[26]

In mid-October, 1-6 conducted its first major offensive, taking the large building on 17th Street in the Jumaiyah neighborhood where they established the 17th Street Security Station. This was the first joint Marine-Iraqi outpost in the city.[24][27]

November incident[edit]

During heavy fighting between November 13 and November 15, U.S. forces were alleged to have killed at least 30 people, including women and children, in an airstrike in central Ramadi. Interviews by an unnamed Los Angeles Times correspondent in Ramadi supported eyewitness statements that there were civilian deaths during the fighting. Residents said the houses in an old Iraqi army officers quarters had been destroyed, including one being used as an Internet cafe. News photos showed bodies of civilians allegedly killed by coalition forces.[28]

A Marine spokesman disputed the account, saying that an airstrike on November 14 targeted a bridge east of Ramadi and there were many insurgent casualties in the attack. He said that on the 13th and 14th, Coalition forces killed 16 suspected insurgents, who had been placing IEDs and firing mortars and RPGs, in fighting in three separate incidents in Ramadi[29] . At least one U.S. soldier was also killed in the fighting.[28] The spokesman did not respond to inquiries about the number of civilian dead, but admitted that it was often difficult for coalition forces to distinguish between insurgents and civilians and did not confirm or deny that some collateral damage may have occurred. He neither responded to inquiries made by The Times regarding the number of homes destroyed or tank rounds fired in the fighting.[28][30]

Aftermath[edit]

By mid-November at least 75 American soldiers and Marines were killed along with an unknown number of Iraqi soldiers and police. The U.S. commander, Col. MacFarland, claimed 750 insurgents had been killed in fighting in Ramadi and that his forces had secured 70% of the city.[8]

The Devlin report[edit]

Two years before the battle, in 2004, then commander of the Marine garrison, MajGen James Mattis, stated that, "if Ramadi fell the whole province (Al Anbar) goes to hell".[31] Two years later, a classified report written by Marine Col. Pete Devlin in August 2006 and leaked to the Washington Post in mid-September 2006, said Al Anbar had been lost and there was almost nothing that could be done. Devlin was the chief Intelligence Officer for the Marine units operating in the province. The report said that not only were military operations facing a stalemate, unable to extend and sustain security beyond the perimeters of their bases, but also local governments in the province had collapsed and the weak central government had almost no presence.[32][33]

On November 28, 2006 another part of the classified Marine Corps intelligence report was published by the Washington Post which said US forces could neither crush the insurgency in western Iraq nor counter the rising popularity of the al-Qaeda terrorist network in the area. According to the report, "the social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that US and Iraqi troops are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar." The report describes Al-Qaeda in Iraq as the "dominant organization of influence" in the province, more important than local authorities, the Iraqi government and US troops "in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni." [34]

Operation Squeeze Play[edit]

Insurgents still remained well entrenched in the city with coalition forces continuing combat operations throughout November and December. On November 28, 2006 six civilians, including five Iraqi girls, were killed when a U.S. tank fired into a building from which two insurgents were firing upon U.S. soldiers.[35]

On December 1, 2006, a 900-strong task force centered around the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1-37) launched a month-long operation known as Operation Squeeze Play targeting the "Second Officers District" in central Ramadi.[36] On December 6, six American soldiers were killed in heavy street fighting. Three of these, two soldiers and a Marine, were killed in an area of western Ramadi controlled by the Abu Alwan tribe, which was aligned with the Awakening movement. According to Col. MacFarland, the tribe saw the killings as a personal attack by the insurgents against their tribe and killed or captured all of the insurgents involved in the attack within ten days.[37] By the end of the operation on January 14, 2007, US forces had killed 44 insurgents and captured a further 172. Four additional Iraqi police stations were established during the operation, which brought the total to 14.[38][39]

Marine reserve force committed[edit]

In mid-November 2006, 2,200 Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU), a reserve force on ships in the Persian Gulf, deployed to Al Anbar as reinforcements. This force included members of Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment who were sent by General Abizaid to help in the fighting in Ramadi.[40][41] In January 2007, as part of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq, 4,000 Marines in Al Anbar had their tour extended by 45 days. The order included the 15th MEU and 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment fighting in Ramadi, as well as the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment fighting elsewhere in Al Anbar.[42]

1-9 Infantry Regiment (Manchu) : Operation Murfreesboro and East Ramadi[edit]

Captured Insurgents

This operation was one of the closing engagements of the Battle of Ramadi in 2006. In the beginning months of 2007, Task Force 1-9, comprising 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (1-9 IN, part of 2ID), with support from Abrams main battle tanks of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment (3-69 AR), Navy SEALS, Bradley IFVs and dismounted infantry from 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment (1-26 IN), Charlie Company of the 321st Engineer Battalion, Lima Company of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (3/6 Marines), and infantrymen from the veteran 1/1/1 Iraqi Army, launched an offensive in East Ramadi named Operation Murfreesboro.

The operation was intended to cut off the Ma'Laab district from the rest of Ramadi in order to drive out the Al Queda forces operating with near impunity there. The operation began February 20, 2007, when tanks and IFVs from 3-69th Armor and 1-26th Infantry set up a full cordon around the Ma'Laab district, preventing any movement in or out of the neighborhood. Once this was in place, the soldiers of the 9th Infantry Regiment began conducting clearing operations and targeted raids searching for weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), enemy fighters, and high level Al Queda leadership (HVTs) within the Ma'Laab and the neighboring Iskaan district, supported by the aforementioned armored vehicles, Apache helicopters, and long range rockets (GMLRS).

Throughout February 2007, there were more than 40 separate engagements with Al Queda forces, 8 large weapons caches found, more than 20 IEDs used against US and Iraqi Army forces, more than 50 IEDs located and safely disposed of, 69 enemy fighters killed in action, 9 known enemy wounded, and 32 enemy fighters captured. Together with the Iraqi Army, the local police force began to conduct patrols with gradually lessened support from coalition forces. This led to the peaceful summer months of 2007, during which no attacks of any type took place.

Operation Murfreesboro is widely credited with breaking the back of the insurgency in Anbar Province, as it fed the fire of the Anbar Awakening, which saw almost the entirety of Anbar province turn on the insurgency, in favor of the new Iraqi government in Baghdad. Coupled with further gains in recruiting the local leaders and militias in the surrounding areas, Anbar Province required very little assistance during the famous "surge" that took place later in 2007. The improvement was so great that it enabled Task Force 1-9 (now operating without the armored and mechanized support it had enjoyed in the early part of 2007) to send nearly 70% of its strength to assist other units in clearing the city of Taji, just north of Baghdad, in October 2007.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment received the Navy Unit Commendation for this battle, and has also been recommended for a Valorous Unit Award.

"Raider" Brigade takes over Ramadi[edit]

In January 2007, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, on its third tour to Iraq, arrived in Ramadi and assumed responsibility from Macfarland's brigade on February 18 at a transfer ceremony at Camp Ramadi. During the ceremony, which was attended by Sheikh Sattar, MacFarland said that his brigade had lost 86 soldiers, sailors and Marines during the 8 month campaign (though the Brigade had spent a total of nearly 17 months in Iraq).[43][44]

In January 2007, Ramadi averaged approximately 35 enemy attacks on US forces per day. Following heavy fighting over an 8-week campaign, which was led by a Task Force commanded by 1st Brigade, 3rd ID, also known as Task Force Raider, attacks in the brigade's area of operations dropped to one or two per day within the city of Ramadi. In the early months of 2007, 3-69 Armor Battalion, in conjunction with two Marine Battalions, was largely responsible for securing Southern and Central Ramadi. By August 2007, Ramadi had gone 80 consecutive days without a single attack on US forces and the 1st BDE, 3rd ID commander commander, Colonel John Charlton, stated, "...al-Qaida is defeated in Al Anbar". However, despite 1-3 ID's effectiveness, insurgents continued to launch attacks on Ramadi and the surrounding areas in the weeks and months to follow. On June 30, 2007, a group of between 50 and 60 insurgents attempting to infiltrate Ramadi were intercepted and destroyed, following a tip from Iraqi Police officers. The insurgents were intercepted by elements of the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor on 30 June 2007 and on 1 July 2007 they were destroyed by elements of Bravo company, 2nd Squad, 1st platoon, 1-18 Infantry Regiment. 1-18 operated out of the Ta'Meem district of Ramadi's western sector. North of Ramadi, elements of 3-69 Armor, whose headquarters had been moved north of Ramadi, engaged elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq who had taken refuge in rural areas north of the city. After several counter-insurgency operations, 3-69 AR Battalion effectively removed Al Qaeda in Iraq from the greater Anbar province. By March 2008, Ramadi, Iraq had become a vastly safer city than it had been only a year before and the number of enemy attacks in the city had fallen drastically. Years later, by mid 2012, Ramadi remained far safer than it had been since 2003.[45][46][47]

Iraqi Police Development Played a Key Role in Tribal Engagement Strategy[edit]

One major shortcoming in the efforts to wrest control of Ramadi from the insurgency was the failure of the Iraqi Police to effectively combat the insurgency. As part of the Tribal Engagement Strategy, Ready First developed and implemented a plan to quickly recruit, train, and employ Iraqi Policemen on the streets of Ramadi. COL MacFarland, and LTC James Lechner, Deputy Brigade Commander, successfully developed an Iraqi Police recruiting, training, and employment plan that was implemented by HHC, 2-152 Infantry (Mech), an Army National Guard unit that lived in Iraqi Police Stations and Combat Outposts conducting daily patrols and clearing operations with their counterparts. HHC, 2-152 Infantry, also known in Ramadi as "the 152nd", or the Police Transition Team (PTT) Company would provide the Iraqi Police in Ramadi with the leadership and oversight that proved crucial in re-establishing a police presence in Ramadi to ensure insurgent forces did not return to neighborhoods that had been secured. Consequently, the success of the Iraqi Police program in Ramadi convinced the Ramadi populace that their government could effectively provide for their security needs, a critical element of defeating the insurgency. The 152nd PTT Company's Iraqi Police efforts began in October 2006 and would continue through the departure of Ready First and into the tenure of 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division until the 152nd departed in October 2007. The 152nd was responsible for recruiting, training, and conducting patrols with hundreds of Iraqi Police, and opened several new Iraqi Police stations in the city of Ramadi.

Participating Units[edit]

1st Battalion, 6th Infantry
2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry
1st Battalion, 35th Armor
1st Battalion 36th Infantry
1st Battalion 37th Armor
2nd Battalion, 37th Armor
2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery
16th Engineer Battalion
Alpha Company, 40th Engineer Battalion
Charlie Company, 40th Engineer Battalion
54th ENBN(Task Force Dagger) Alpha, Bravo & Charlie Company(Route Clearance & Reconnaissance)
46th Engineer Battalion
321st Engineer Battalion (Task Force Pathfinder), Route Clearance and Horizontal construction
501st Forward Support Battalion
47th Forward Support Battalion
Asymmetric Warfare Group
HHC, 2nd Battalion, 152nd Infantry Regiment (Police Transition Team Company)
1st Battalion 9th Infantry Regiment Task Force 1-9
3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment Task Force 1-9
1st Battalion, 77th Armor
1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment Task Force 1-9

B Co, 486th Civil Affairs Battalion

Regimental Combat Team 5
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
2nd Battalion, 11th Marines
1st Battalion, 6th Marines
3rd Battalion, 8th Marines
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 15th MEU
2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
1st Radio Battalion
Combat Logistics Regiment 15
Department Of Defense Security Forces, Tactical Response Team
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment
SEAL Team 3
SEAL Team 5
9th Naval Construction Regiment
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74
  • Iraqi Army Iraq
    • 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division[48]
    • 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division[48]

415th Military Intelligence Battalion

15th MEU. 2nd Battalion 4th Marines. Rage Company

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker
  2. ^ Michael Fumento. "Return to Ramadi". The Weekly Standard. 
  3. ^ Dick Couch. The Sheriff of Ramadi: Navy Seals and the Winning of al-Anbar. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-147-1. 
  4. ^ Michaels, Jim (2007-05-01). "Behind success in Ramadi An Army colonel's gamble". USA Today. Retrieved 2010-04-26. 
  5. ^ Michaels, Jim (2006-08-28). "In Ramadi, the force isn't huge but the task is". USA Today. Retrieved 2008-07-27. 
  6. ^ http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq/Fatalities.aspx
  7. ^ http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq/IraqiDeaths.aspx
  8. ^ a b Fletcher, Martin (2006-11-20). "Fighting back: the city determined not to become al-Qaeda's capital". London: The Times Online. Retrieved 2008-07-25. 
  9. ^ Pitman, Todd (2007-03-25). "Iraq's Sunni sheiks join Americans to fight insurgency". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 18 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  10. ^ "Ramadi, Iraq claws back from ravages of war". MSNBC News. 2007-10-28. Retrieved 2008-07-25. 
  11. ^ Rubin, Andrew (April 2008). "Ramadi from the Caliphate to Capitalism". Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute). 134/4/1. Archived from the original on 12 October 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. Ramadi needed more than security...There were no basic services. Two years of constant IED blasts, 70-ton M1 Abrams tanks barreling through the streets, and Marine counterattacks had left the city devastated. Raw sewage ran down the streets from shattered pipes. There was little-to-no city-supplied electrical power. Shops and other businesses had long ceased to open, and the school system had collapsed. Those citizens who had not fled the city huddled in their homes as Marines and insurgents fought through the streets day and night.  p.262
  12. ^ Stack, Megan (2006-06-11). "Fear of Big Battle Panics Iraqi City". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2008-08-26. 
  13. ^ "Iraq Coalition Casualty Count - June 2006". icasualties.org. 2006-07-01. Archived from the original on 2008-07-08. Retrieved 2008-07-25. 
  14. ^ Filkins, Dexter (2006-07-05). "In Ramadi, Fetid Quarters and Unrelenting Battles". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  15. ^ a b Fumento, Michael (2006-11-27). "Return to Ramadi". The Weekly Standard. Archived from the original on 29 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  16. ^ Castaneda, Antonio (2006-07-05). "Marines gain control of Iraq hospital". Boston Globe. Retrieved 2008-07-26. [dead link]
  17. ^ Smith, Niel; Sean MacFarland (March–April 2008). "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point" (PDF). Military Review 72 (2): 622. doi:10.1353/jmh.2008.0120. Archived from the original on 10 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-24.  p.48
  18. ^ Smith, Niel; Sean MacFarland (March–April 2008). "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point" (PDF). Military Review 72 (2): 622. doi:10.1353/jmh.2008.0120. Archived from the original on 10 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-24.  p.49
  19. ^ Kagan, Kimberly (April 2007). "The Anbar Awakening:Displacing al Qaeda from its Stronghold in Western Iraq" (PDF). Archived from the original on 10 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  20. ^ Partlow, Joshua (2007-01-27). "Sheiks Help Curb Violence in Iraq's West, U.S. Says". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  21. ^ "PASSING THE TORCH IN RAMADI". marines.mil. September 16, 2006. Archived from the original on March 7, 2014. 
  22. ^ http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2007/winter/morris-jarhead-underground/
  23. ^ http://www.marines.mil/units/marforpac/imef/Pages/2007/The%20purpose%20and%20effect%20of%20Observation%20Post%20Hawk.aspx
  24. ^ a b "Ramadi from the Caliphate to Capitalism". United States Naval Institute. April 2008. 
  25. ^ Barnes, Julian E. (2006-09-26). "Soldiers In for Extended Tour of Duty". The Los Angeles Times. 
  26. ^ http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3738
  27. ^ http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/georgiansatwar/entries/2007/04/18/georgia_marines_bond_together.html
  28. ^ a b c Moore, Solomon (2006-12-29). "Marines Deny Airstrikes Used Against Insurgents In Ramadi". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 5 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-03. 
  29. ^ http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7241&Itemid=21
  30. ^ http://oneoarinthewater.blogspot.com/2006/11/why-most-americans-hate-msm-more-lies.html
  31. ^ Tyson, Ann (2007-08-18). "A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-08-31. In June 2004, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis visited the city and issued an order to a Marine battalion that was taking the heaviest casualties of the war: "Ramadi must hold," he said, or "the rest of the province goes to hell." 
  32. ^ "Al-Qaeda controls western Iraq: US intelligence report". AFP. 2006-11-28. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  33. ^ Ricks, Thomas (2006-09-10). "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  34. ^ Linzer, Dafna; Ricks, Thomas E. (2006-11-27). "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker". Washington Post. Retrieved 2010-04-26. 
  35. ^ Malterre, Thibauld (2006-12-05). "Ramadi Marines on the front line against Al-Qaeda in Iraq". AFP. Retrieved 2008-07-26. [dead link]
  36. ^ Weissert, Will (2006-11-08). "Extended Occupation Helps U.S. in Ramadi". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-08-24. 
  37. ^ Millham, Matt (2007-03-06). "Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team credits Iraqis for Ramadi turnaround". Stars and Stripes. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  38. ^ "Iraqi Coalition Casualty Count - December 2006". icasualties.org. 2007-01-01. Archived from the original on 2008-07-08. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  39. ^ "Operation Squeeze Play Makes Ramadi Safer". Multi-National Force Iraq PAO. 2007-01-14. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  40. ^ Weissert, Will (2006-12-02). "Many Marines Head to Dangerous Anbar". Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  41. ^ Burgess, Lisa (2006-11-18). "15th MEU in Kuwait, training for move into Anbar province". Stars and Stripes. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  42. ^ Giordono, Joseph (2007-03-29). "15th MEU hands off Anbar duty". Stars and Stripes. Retrieved 2008-07-26. 
  43. ^ Morin, Monte (2007-02-19). "'Raider Brigade' takes over Ramadi". Stars and Stripes. Archived from the original on 10 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  44. ^ "First Brigade Combat Team Transfers Authority". Multi-National Force Iraq. 2008-03-20. Archived from the original on 16 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  45. ^ "Iraq: COL John Charlton Commander 1st BCT, 3rd ID". QAndO.net. 2007-08-03. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  46. ^ Roggio, Bill (2007-07-03). "Coalition Forces Rout al Qaeda Elements South of Ramadi". Long War Journal. Archived from the original on 14 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  47. ^ "DoD News Briefing: Col. John Charlton, March 13". Multi-National Force Iraq. 2008-03-14. Archived from the original on 10 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-31. 
  48. ^ a b http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=38367&archive=true

References[edit]

  • Couch, Dick (2008). The Sheriff of Ramadi: Navy SEALs and the Winning of al-Anbar. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-138-9. 

External links[edit]