Battle of Verdun
|Battle of Verdun|
|Part of the Western Front of the First World War|
Map: Battle of Verdun 1916
|Commanders and leaders|
| Joseph Joffre
Noël de Castelnau
Fernand de Langle de Cary
| Erich von Falkenhayn
Crown Prince Wilhelm
Schmidt von Knobelsdorf
Ewald von Lochow
Max von Gallwitz
Georg von der Marwitz
|1,140,000 soldiers in c. 75–85 divisions||1,250,000 soldiers in c. 50 divisions|
|Casualties and losses|
|315,000–542,000; c. 156,000 killed February–December 1916||281,000–434,000; c. 143,000 killed February–December 1916|
The Battle of Verdun (Bataille de Verdun, IPA: [bataj də vɛʁdœ̃], Schlacht um Verdun, IPA: [ʃlaxt ˀʊm vɛɐdœŋ]) was fought from 21 February – 18 December 1916 during the First World War on the Western Front between the German and French armies, on hills north of Verdun-sur-Meuse in north-eastern France. The German Fifth Army attacked the defences of the Région Fortifiée de Verdun (RFV) and those of the Second Army garrisons on the right bank of the Meuse, intending to rapidly capture the Côtes de Meuse (Meuse Heights), from which Verdun could be overlooked and bombarded with observed artillery-fire. The German strategy intended to provoke the French into counter-attacks and counter-offensives to drive the Germans off the heights. French attacks would be relatively easy to repel with massed artillery-fire from the large number of medium, heavy and super-heavy guns, supplied with large amounts of ammunition on excellent pre-war railways, within 24 kilometres (15 mi) of the front line.
The German strategy assumed that the French would attempt to hold on to the east bank of the Meuse, then commit the French strategic reserve to recapture it and suffer catastrophic losses from German artillery-fire, while the German infantry held positions easy to defend and suffered few losses. The German plan was based on the experience of the September – October 1915 battles in Champagne (Herbstschlacht) when, after early success, the French offensive was defeated with far more French than German casualties. Poor weather delayed the beginning of the German offensive (Unternehmen Gericht/Operation Judgement) until 21 February; French construction of defensive lines and the arrival of reinforcements before the opening attack were able to delay the German advance despite many losses. By 6 March, 20½ French divisions were in the RFV and defence in depth had been established. Pétain ordered that no withdrawals were to be made and that counter-attacks were to be conducted, despite exposing French infantry to fire from the German artillery massed in the area. By 29 March French artillery on the west bank had begun a constant bombardment of German positions on the east bank, which caused many German infantry casualties.
In March the German offensive was extended to the left (west) bank, to gain observation of the ground from which French artillery had been firing over the river into the flank of German infantry attacks on the east bank. The German troops were able to make substantial advances but French reinforcements contained the attacks before the artillery positions were brought under observation. In early May the Germans changed tactics and made local attacks and counter-attacks, which gave the French an opportunity to begin an attack against Fort Douaumont, which was partially occupied, until a German counter-attack reoccupied the fort and took numerous prisoners. The Germans changed tactics again, alternating attacks between both banks of the Meuse, and in June captured Fort Vaux. The Germans continued the offensive beyond Fort Vaux, towards the last geographical objectives of the original plan at Fleury and Fort Souville, drove a salient into the French defences, took Fleury, and brought the front line within 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) of the Verdun citadel.
The German offensive was reduced to provide artillery and infantry reinforcements for the Somme front, where the Anglo-French relief offensive began on 1 July; during the fighting Fleury changed hands sixteen times from 23 June – 17 August. A final German attempt to capture Fort Souville in early July reached the fort but was then repulsed by French counter-attacks. The German offensive was reduced further, although an attempt was made to deceive the French into expecting more attacks, to keep French troops away from the Somme front. In August and December French counter-offensives recaptured much of the ground lost on the east bank and recovered forts Douaumont and Vaux. An estimate in 2000 found a total of 714,231 casualties, 377,231 French and 337,000 German, an average of 70,000 casualties for each month of the battle. It was the longest and one of the most costly battles in human history; other recent estimates increase the number of casualties to 976,000.
- 1 Background
- 2 Prelude
- 3 Battle
- 3.1 First phase, 21 February – 1 March
- 3.2 Second phase, 6 March – 15 April
- 3.3 Third phase, 16 April – 1 July
- 3.4 Fourth phase 1 July – 17 December
- 3.5 Subsequent operations
- 4 Aftermath
- 5 Commemoration
- 6 See also
- 7 Notes
- 8 Footnotes
- 9 References
- 10 Further reading
- 11 External links
After the German invasion of France had been halted at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, the war of movement ended at the Battle of the Yser and the First Battle of Ypres. The Germans built field fortifications to hold the ground captured in 1914 and the French began siege warfare to break through the German defences and recover the lost territory. In late 1914 and in 1915 offensives on the Western front had failed to gain much ground and been extremely costly in casualties.[Note 1] According to his memoirs written after the war, the Chief of the German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn believed that although victory might no longer be achieved by a decisive battle, the French army could still be defeated, if it suffered a sufficient number of casualties. Falkenhayn offered five corps from the strategic reserve, for an offensive at Verdun at the beginning of February 1916 but only for an attack on the east bank of the Meuse. Falkenhayn considered it unlikely the French would be complacent about Verdun; he thought that they might send all their reserves there, begin a counter-offensive elsewhere or fight to hold Verdun while the British launched a relief offensive. After the war, the Kaiser and Colonel Tappen, the Operations Officer at Oberste Heeresleitung ("OHL", German Supreme Command), wrote that Falkenhayn believed the last possibility was most likely.
By seizing or threatening to capture Verdun, the Germans anticipated that the French would send all their reserves to defend the city, which would be destroyed as they attacked secure German defensive positions, supported by a powerful artillery reserve. In the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive (1 May – 19 September 1915) the German and Austro-Hungarian armies attacked Russian defences frontally, after pulverising them with large amounts of heavy artillery. During the Second Battle of Champagne (Herbstschlacht "autumn battle") of 25 September – 6 November 1915, the French suffered "extraordinary casualties" from the German heavy artillery, which Falkenhayn considered to be a way out of the dilemma of material inferiority and the growing strength of the Allies. In the north, a British relief offensive would wear down British reserves to no decisive effect and create the conditions for a German counter-offensive near Arras.
Hints about Falkenhayn's thinking were picked up by Dutch military intelligence and passed on to the British in December. The German strategy was to create a favourable operational situation, without a mass attack (which had been costly and ineffective when tried by the Franco-British), instead relying on the power of heavy artillery to inflict mass losses. A limited offensive at Verdun, would lead to the destruction of the French strategic reserve, in fruitless counter-attacks and the defeat of British reserves in a futile relief offensive, leading to the French accepting a separate peace. If the French refused to negotiate, the second phase of the strategy would begin, in which the German armies would attack terminally weakened Franco-British armies, mop up the remains of the French armies and expel the British from Europe. To fulfil this strategy, Falkenhayn needed to hold back enough of his strategic reserve, to deal with Anglo-French relief offensives and then conduct a counter-offensive, which limited the number of divisions which could be sent to the Fifth Army at Verdun for Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement).
The Fortified Region of Verdun lay in a salient which had formed during the German invasion of 1914. The Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Joseph Joffre, had concluded from the swift capture of the Belgian fortresses at the Battle of Liège and at the Siege of Namur in 1914, that fixed defences had been made obsolete by German siege guns. In a directive of the General Staff of 5 August 1915, the RFV was to be stripped of 54 artillery batteries and 128,000 rounds of ammunition. Plans to demolish forts Douaumont and Vaux, to deny them to the Germans were made and 5,000 kilograms (11,000 lb) of explosives had been laid by the time of the German offensive on 21 February. The 18 large forts and other batteries around Verdun were left with fewer than 300 guns and a small reserve of ammunition, while their garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews. The railway line from the south into Verdun had been cut during the Battle of Flirey in 1914, with the loss of Saint-Mihiel; the line west from Verdun to Paris was cut at Aubréville in mid-July 1915, by the German Third Army, which had attacked southwards through the Argonne Forest for most of the year.
Région Fortifiée de Verdun
For centuries, Verdun had played an important role in the defence of the hinterland, due to the city's strategic location on the Meuse River. Attila the Hun failed to seize the town in the fifth century; when the empire of Charlemagne was divided under the Treaty of Verdun of 843, the town became part of the Holy Roman Empire. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 awarded Verdun to France. The heart of the city of Verdun was a citadel built by Vauban in the 17th century. A double ring of 28 forts and smaller works (ouvrages) had been built around Verdun on commanding ground at least 150 metres (490 ft) above the river valley, from 2.5–8 kilometres (1.6–5.0 mi) from the citadel at Verdun. The programme had been devised by Séré de Rivières in the 1870s, to build two lines of fortresses from Belfort to Épinal and from Verdun to Toul as defensive screens and to enclose towns intended to be the bases for counter-attacks.[Note 2] Many of the Verdun forts had been modernized and made more resistant to artillery, with a reconstruction programme begun at Douaumont in the 1880s. A sand cushion and thick, steel-reinforced concrete tops up to 2.5 metres (8.2 ft) thick, buried under 1–4 metres (3.3–13.1 ft) of earth were added. The forts and ouvrages had been sited to overlook each other for mutual support and the outer ring had a circumference of 45 kilometres (28 mi). The outer forts had 79 guns in shell-proof turrets and more than 200 light guns and machine-guns, to protect the ditches around the forts. Six forts had 155mm guns in retractable turrets and fourteen had retractable twin 75mm turrets.
In 1903 Douaumont was equipped with a new concrete bunker (Casemate de Bourges) containing two 75mm field guns to cover the south-western approach and the defensive works along the ridge to Ouvrage de Froidterre. More guns were added from 1903–1913 in four retractable steel turrets. The guns could rotate for all-round defence and two smaller versions, at the north-east and north-west corners of the fort housed twin Hotchkiss machine-guns. On the east side of the fort an armoured turret with a 155mm short-barrelled gun faced north and north-east and another housed twin 75mm guns at the north end, to cover the intervals between forts. The fort at Douaumont formed part of a complex of the village, fort, six ouvrages, five shelters, six concrete batteries, an underground infantry shelter, two ammunition depots and several concrete infantry trenches. The Verdun forts had a network of concrete infantry shelters, armoured observation posts, batteries, concrete trenches, command posts and underground shelters between the forts. The artillery comprised c. 1,000 guns, with 250 in reserve and the forts and ouvrages were linked by telephone and telegraph, a narrow-gauge railway system and a road network; on mobilisation the RFV had a garrison of 66,000 men and rations for six months.[Note 3]
German offensive preparations
Verdun was isolated on three sides and railway communications to the French rear had been cut except for a light railway; German controlled railways lay only 24 km (15 mi) to the north of the front line. A corps was moved to the Fifth Army to provide labour for the preparation of the offensive, areas were emptied of French civilians and buildings requisitioned. Thousands of kilometres of telephone cable were laid, thousands of tons of ammunition and rations stored under cover and hundreds of guns installed and camouflaged. Ten new rail lines with twenty stations were built and vast underground shelters (Stollen) were dug 4.5–14 metres (15–46 ft) deep, each to accommodate up to 1,200 German infantry. The III Corps, VII Reserve Corps and XVIII Corps were transferred to the Fifth Army, each corps being reinforced by 2,400 experienced troops and 2,000 trained recruits. V Corps was placed behind the front line, ready to advance if necessary when the assault divisions were moving up and the XV Corps with two divisions, was in the Fifth Army reserve, ready to advance to mop up as soon as the French defence collapsed.
Special arrangements were made to maintain a high rate of artillery-fire during the offensive. 33½ munitions trains per day were to deliver ammunition sufficient for 2,000,000 rounds to be fired in the first six days of the offensive. Another 2,000,000 shells were to be available for the next twelve days. Five repair shops were built close to the front, to keep guns in action with minimal delays for maintenance and factories in Germany were made ready rapidly to refurbish artillery needing more extensive repairs. A redeployment plan for the artillery once the offensive had begun was arranged, so that field guns and mobile heavy artillery, could be moved forward under the covering fire of mortars and the super-heavy artillery. A total of 1,201 guns were massed on the Verdun front, two-thirds of which were heavy and super-heavy artillery which had been obtained by stripping the modern German artillery from the rest of the Western front and substituting older types and captured Russian guns. The German artillery could fire into the Verdun salient from three directions yet remain dispersed.
German plan of attack
The Fifth Army divided the attack front into areas, "A" occupied by the VII Reserve Corps, "B" by the XVIII Corps, "C" by the III Corps, and "D" on the Woëvre plain by the XV Corps. The preliminary artillery bombardment was to begin in the morning of 12 February, at 5:00 p.m. The infantry in areas A–C would advance in open order, supported by grenade and flame-thrower detachments. Where possible, the French advanced trenches were to be occupied and the second position reconnoitred, to prepare the artillery support for the second day. Great emphasis was placed on limiting German infantry casualties, by following-up destructive bombardments by the artillery, which was to carry the burden of the offensive. The initial objectives were the Meuse Heights, on a line from Froide Terre to Fort Souville and Fort Tavannes, which would provide a secure defensive position, from which to repel French counter-attacks.
Control of the artillery was centralised by an "Order for the Activities of the Artillery and Mortars", which stipulated that the corps Generals of Foot Artillery were responsible for local target selection, while co-ordination of flanking fire by neighbouring corps and the fire of certain batteries was determined by the Fifth Army headquarters. French fortifications were to be engaged by the heaviest howitzers and enfilade fire. The heavy artillery was to maintain long-range bombardments of French supply routes and assembly areas and counter-battery fire was reserved for specialist batteries firing gas shells. Co-operation between the artillery and infantry was stressed, with accuracy of the artillery being given priority over rate of fire. The opening bombardment was to build up slowly and trommelfeuer (a rate of fire so great that the sound of individual shell-explosions merged into a rumble) would not begin until the last hour. As the infantry advanced, the artillery would increase the range of the bombardment to destroy the French second position. Artillery observers were to advance with the infantry and communicate with the guns by field telephones, flares and coloured balloons. When the offensive began, the French were to be bombarded continuously, with harassing fire being maintained at night.
French defensive preparations
In 1915, 237 guns and 647 long tons (657,000 kg) of ammunition in the forts of the RFV had been removed, leaving only heavy guns in the retractable gun turrets. The conversion of the RFV to a conventional linear defence, with trenches and barbed-wire began but proceeded slowly, after resources were sent west from Verdun for the Second Battle of Champagne (25 September – 6 November 1915). In October 1915, building began on trench lines known as the first, second and third positions and in January 1916, an inspection by General N. E. Castelnau, Chief of Staff at French General Headquarters (GQG), reported that the new defences were satisfactory, except for small deficiencies in three areas. The fortress garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews and some of the forts had been readied for demolition. The maintenance garrisons were responsible to the central military bureaucracy in Paris and when the XXX Corps commander General Chrétien, attempted to inspect Fort Douaumont in January 1916, he was refused entry.
Douaumont was the largest fort in the RFV and by February 1916, the only artillery left in the fort were the 75mm, 155 mm turret guns and the light cannon covering the ditch. The fort was used as a barracks by 68 technicians under the command of Gardien de Batterie Warrant-Officer Chenot. One of the rotating 155 mm (6.1 in) turrets was partially manned and the other was left empty. The Hotchkiss machine-guns were stored in boxes and the four 75mm guns in the casemates had been removed in 1915. The drawbridge had been jammed in the down position by a German shell and had not been repaired, the coffres (wall bunkers) with Hotchkiss revolver-cannons protecting the moats were unmanned and over 5,000 kilograms (11,000 lb) of explosive charges had been placed in the fort to demolish it.
In late January 1916, French intelligence had obtained an accurate assessment of German military capacity and intentions but Joffre considered such an attack to be a diversion, given the lack of an obvious strategic objective. By the time of the German offensive, Joffre expected a bigger attack elsewhere but ordered the VII Corps to Verdun on 23 January, to hold the north face of the west bank. XXX Corps held the salient east of the Meuse to the north and north-east and II Corps held the eastern face of the Meuse heights; Herr had 8½ divisions in the front line with 2½ divisions in close reserve and Le groupe d'armées du centre (GAC) had a reserve of the I and XX corps with two divisions each, plus most of the 19th Division; Joffre had 25 divisions in strategic reserve. French artillery reinforcements had brought the total at Verdun to 388 field guns and 244 heavy guns, against 1,201 German guns, ⅔ of which were heavy and super heavy, including 14 in (360 mm) and 202 mortars, some being 16 in (410 mm). Eight specialist flame-thrower companies were also sent to the 5th Army.
Castelnau met General De Langle de Cary, the commander of GAC, on 25 February, who doubted that the east bank could be held. Castelnau disagreed and ordered Herr to hold the right (east) bank of the Meuse at all costs. Herr sent a division from the west bank and ordered XXX Corps to hold a line from Bras to Douaumont, Vaux and Eix. Pétain took over command of the defence of the RFV at 11:00 p.m., with Colonel Maurice de Barescut as Chief of Staff and Colonel Bernard Serrigny as head of operations, only to hear that Fort Douaumont had fallen; Pétain ordered that the remaining Verdun forts were to be re-garrisoned. Four groups were established under the command of Guillaumat, Balfourier and Duchêne on the right bank and Bazelaire on the left bank. A "line of resistance" was established on the east bank from Souville to Thiaumont, around Fort Douaumont to Fort Vaux, Moulainville and along the ridge of the Woëvre. On the west bank the line ran from Cumières to Mort Homme, Côte 304 and Avocourt. A "line of panic" was planned in secret, as a final line of defence north of Verdun, through forts Belleville, St. Michel and Moulainville. The I and XX corps arrived from 24–26 February, which increased the number of divisions in the RFV to 14½. By 6 March, the arrival of the XIII, XXI, XIV and XXXIII corps, increased the total to 20½ divisions.
First phase, 21 February – 1 March
Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement) was due to begin on 12 February but fog, heavy rain and high winds delayed the offensive until 7:15 a.m. on 21 February, when a 10-hour artillery bombardment by 808 guns began. The German artillery fired c. 1,000,000 shells along a front about 30 km (19 mi) long by 5 km (3.1 mi) wide. The main concentration of fire was on the right (east) bank of the Meuse river. Twenty-six super-heavy, long-range guns, up to 420 mm (16.5 in), fired on the forts and the city of Verdun; a rumble could be heard 160 km (99 mi) away. The bombardment was paused at midday, as a ruse to prompt French survivors to reveal themselves and German artillery-observation aircraft were able to fly over the battlefield unmolested by French aircraft. The 3rd, 7th and 18th corps attacked at 4:00 p.m.; the Germans used flamethrowers for the first time and storm troops followed closely with rifles slung, to use hand grenades to kill the remaining defenders. This tactic had been developed by Captain Willy Rohr and Sturm-Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), which battalion conducted the attack. French survivors engaged the attackers, yet the Germans suffered only c. 600 casualties.
By 22 February, German troops had advanced 5 km (3.1 mi) and captured Bois des Caures, at the edge of the village of Flabas. Two French battalions led by Colonel Émile Driant had held the bois (wood) for two days, but were forced back to Samogneux, Beaumont and Ornes. Driant was killed, fighting with the 56th and 59th Bataillons de chasseurs à pied and only 118 of the Chasseurs managed to escape. Poor communications meant that only then did the French High Command realise the seriousness of the attack. The Germans managed to take the village of Haumont but French forces repulsed a German attack on the village of Bois de l'Herbebois. On 23 February, a French counter-attack at Bois des Caures was repulsed. Fighting for Bois de l'Herbebois continued until the Germans outflanked the French defenders from Bois de Wavrille. The German attackers had many casualties during their attack on Bois de Fosses and the French held on Samogneux. German attacks continued on 24 February and the French XXX Corps was forced out of the second line of defence; XX Corps under General Balfourier arrived at the last minute and was rushed forward. That evening Castelnau advised Joffre that the French Second Army, under General Philippe Pétain should be sent to the RFV. The Germans had captured Beaumont, Bois des Fosses, Bois des Caurières and were moving up ravin Hassoule which led to Fort Douaumont.
At 3:00 p.m. on 25 February, infantry of Brandenburg Regiment 24 advanced with the II and III battalions side-by-side, each formed into two waves composed of two companies each. A delay in the arrival of orders to the regiments on the flanks, led to the III Battalion advancing without support on that flank. The Germans rushed French positions in the woods and on Côte 347, with the support of machine-gun fire from the edge of Bois Hermitage and took many prisoners, as the French on Côte 347 were outflanked on the right and withdrew to Douaumont village. The German infantry had reached their objectives in fewer than twenty minutes and pursued the French, until fired on by a machine-gun in Douaumont church. Some German troops took cover in woods and a ravine which led to the fort, when German artillery began to bombard the area, the gunners having refused to believe claims sent by field telephone, that the German infantry were within a few hundred metres of the fort. Several German parties were forced to advance to find cover from the German shelling and two parties independently made for the fort.[Note 4]
The German party of c. 100 soldiers tried to signal to the artillery with flares but twilight and falling snow obscured them from view. Some of the party began to cut through the wire around the fort and French machine-gun fire from Douaumont village ceased. The French had seen the German flares and took the Germans on the fort to be Zouaves retreating from Côte 378. The Germans reached the north end of the fort, before the French resumed firing. The German party found a way through the railings in front of the ditch as the German bombardment continued and found a way in at the Rue de Rempart. After quietly moving inside, the Germans heard voices and persuaded a French prisoner captured in an observation post, to lead them to the lower floor, where they met Warrant Officer Chenot and about 25 French troops and took them prisoner. On 26 February, the Germans had advanced 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) on a 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) front, French losses were 24,000 men and German losses were c. 25,000 men. A French counter-attack on Fort Douaumont failed and Pétain ordered that no more attempts would be made; existing lines were to be consolidated, other forts were to be occupied, rearmed and supplied to withstand a siege if surrounded.
The German advance gained little ground on 27 February, after a thaw turned the ground into a swamp and the arrival of French reinforcements increased the effectiveness of the defence. Some German artillery became unserviceable and other batteries became stranded in the mud. German infantry began to suffer from exhaustion and unexpectedly high losses, 500 casualties being suffered in the fighting around Douaumont village. On 29 February, the German advance was contained at Douaumont by a heavy snowfall and the defence of French 33rd Infantry Regiment.[Note 5] Delays gave the French time to bring up 90,000 men and 23,000 short tons (21,000 t) of ammunition from the railhead at Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. The swift German advance had gone beyond the range of artillery covering fire and the muddy conditions made it very difficult to move the artillery forward as planned. The German advance southwards, brought it into range of French artillery west of the Meuse, whose fire caused more German infantry casualties than in the earlier fighting, when French infantry on the east bank had fewer guns in support.
Second phase, 6 March – 15 April
Before the offensive, Falkenhayn had expected that French artillery on the west bank would be suppressed by counter-battery fire but this had failed. The Germans set up an artillery task-force, to counter French artillery-fire from the west bank but this also failed to reduce German infantry casualties. The Fifth Army asked for more troops in late February but Falkenhayn refused, due to the rapid advance already achieved on the east bank and because he needed the rest of the OHL reserve for an offensive elsewhere, once the attack at Verdun had attracted and consumed French reserves. The pause in the German advance on 27 February, led Falkenhayn to have second thoughts to decide between terminating the offensive or reinforcing it. On 29 February, Knobelsdorf, the Fifth Army Chief of Staff, prised two divisions from the OHL reserve, with the assurance that once the heights on the west bank had been occupied, the offensive on the east bank could be completed. The VI Reserve Corps was reinforced with the X Reserve Corps, to capture a line from the south of Avocourt to Côte 304 north of Esnes, Mort-Homme, Bois des Cumières and Côte 205, from which the French artillery on the west bank could be destroyed.
The artillery of the two-corps assault group on the west bank, was reinforced by 25 heavy artillery batteries, artillery command was centralised under one officer and arrangements were made for the artillery on the east bank to fire in support. The attack was planned by General Heinrich von Gossler in two parts, on Mort-Homme and Côte 265 on 6 March, followed by attacks on Avocourt and Côte 304 on 9 March. The German bombardment reduced the top of Côte 304 from a height of 304 metres (997 ft) to 300 metres (980 ft); Mort-Homme sheltered batteries of French field guns, which hindered German progress towards Verdun on the right bank; the hills also provided commanding views of the left bank. After storming the Bois des Corbeaux and then losing it to a French counter-attack, the Germans launched another assault on Mort-Homme on 9 March, from the direction of Béthincourt to the north-west. Bois des Corbeaux was captured again at great cost in casualties, before the Germans took parts of Mort-Homme, Côte 304, Cumières and Chattancourt on 14 March.
11 March – 9 April
After a week, the German attack had reached the first-day objectives and then found that French guns behind Côte de Marre and Bois Borrous were still operational and continued to inflict many casualties on the east bank. German artillery moved to Côte 265, was subjected to systematic artillery-fire by the French, which left the Germans needing to implement the second part of the west bank offensive, to protect the gains of the first phase. German attacks changed from large operations on broad fronts, to narrow-front attacks with limited objectives. On 14 March a German attack captured Côte 265 at west end of Mort-Homme but the French 75th Infantry Brigade managed to hold Côte 295 at the east end. On 20 March, after a bombardment by 13,000 trench mortar rounds, the 11th Bavarian and 11th Reserve divisions attacked Bois d'Avocourt and Bois de Malancourt and reached their initial objectives easily. Gossler then paused the attack, to consolidate the captured ground and to prepare another big bombardment for the next day. On 22 March, two divisions attacked "Termite Hill" near Côte 304 but were met by a mass of artillery-fire, which also fell on assembly points and the German lines of communication, which ended the German advance.
The limited German success had been costly and French artillery inflicted more casualties as the German infantry tried to dig in. By 30 March, Gossler had captured Bois de Malancourt but had lost 20,000 casualties and the Germans were still short of Côte 304. On 30 March, the XXII Reserve Corps arrived as reinforcements and General Max von Gallwitz took command of a new Angriffsgruppe West. Malancourt village was captured on 31 March, Haucourt fell on 5 April and Bethincourt on 8 April. On the east bank, German attacks near Vaux reached Bois Caillette and the Vaux–Fleury railway but were then driven back by the French 5th Division. An attack was made on a wider front along both banks by the Germans at noon on 9 April, with five divisions on the left bank but this was repulsed except at Mort-Homme, where the French 42nd Division was forced back from the north-east face. On the right bank an attack on Côte-du-Poivre failed.
In March the German attacks had no advantage of surprise and faced a determined and well-supplied adversary in superior defensive positions. German artillery could still devastate French defensive positions but could not prevent French artillery-fire from inflicting many casualties on German infantry and isolating them from their supplies. Massed artillery fire could enable German infantry to make small advances but massed French artillery-fire could do the same for French infantry when they counter-attacked, which often repulsed the German infantry and subjected them to constant losses, even when captured ground was held. The German effort on the west bank also showed that capturing a vital point was not sufficient, because it would be found to be overlooked by another terrain feature, which had to be captured to ensure the defence of the original point, which made it impossible for the Germans to terminate their attacks, unless they were willing to retire to the original front line of February 1916.
By the end of March the offensive had cost the Germans 81,607 casualties and Falkenhayn began to think of ending the offensive, lest it become another costly and indecisive First Battle of Ypres. The Fifth Army staff requested more reinforcements from Falkenhayn on 31 March with an optimistic report claiming that the French were close to exhaustion and incapable of a big offensive. The Fifth Army command wanted to continue the east bank offensive until a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes had been reached, while on the west bank the French would be destroyed by their own counter-attacks. On 4 April, Falkenhayn replied that the French had retained a considerable reserve and that German resources were limited and not sufficient to replace continuously, men and munitions. If the resumed offensive on the east bank failed to reach the Meuse Heights, Falkenhayn was willing to end the offensive and accept that it had failed.
Third phase, 16 April – 1 July
The failure of German attacks in early April by Angriffsgruppe Ost, led Knobelsdorf to obtain reports from the Fifth Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue the offensive. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery-fire, from the flanks and behind, communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover from French artillery. The XV Corps commander, General Berthold von Deimling also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry and that it was necessary to keep going, to reach safer defensive positions. Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April and added that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.
Knobelsdorf rejected the policy of limited piecemeal attacks tried by Mudra, while in command of Angriffsgruppe Ost and advocated a return to wide-front attacks with unlimited objectives, intended swiftly to reach the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes. Falkenhayn was persuaded to agree to the change and by the end of April, 21 divisions, most of the OHL reserve, had been sent to Verdun and troops were also transferred from the Eastern Front. The resort to large, unlimited attacks was costly for both sides but the German advance proceeded only slowly. Rather than causing devastating French casualties with heavy artillery in secure positions, which the French were compelled to attack, the Germans inflicted casualties by attacks which provoked French counter-attacks and assumed that the process inflicted five French casualties for two German losses.
In mid-March Falkenhayn had reminded the Fifth Army to use tactics intended to conserve infantry, after the corps commanders had been allowed discretion to choose between the cautious step-by-step tactics desired by Falkenhayn and maximum efforts, intended to obtain quick results. On the third day of the offensive, the 6th Division of the III Corps of General Ewald von Lochow, had ordered that Herbebois be taken regardless of loss and the 5th Division had attacked Wavrille to the accompaniment of its band. Falkenhayn urged the Fifth Army to use Stoßtruppe (storm units) of two infantry squads and one of engineers, armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers, to advance in front of the main infantry body, which would conceal their advance by shrewd use of terrain and capture any strong-points which remained after the artillery preparation. Strong-points which could not be taken were to be by-passed and captured by follow-up troops. Falkenhayn ordered that the command of field and heavy artillery units was to be unified, with a commander at each corps headquarters. Common observers and communication systems, would ensure that batteries in different places could bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions.
In mid-April Falkenhayn ordered that infantry advance close to the barrage to exploit the neutralising effect of the shell-fire on surviving defenders, because fresh troops at Verdun had not been experienced in these methods. Knobelsdorf persisted with attempts to maintain momentum, which was incompatible with the methods of casualty conservation, which could be implemented only with limited attacks with pauses to consolidate and prepare. Mudra and other commanders who disagreed were sacked. Falkenhayn also intervened to change German defensive tactics and advocated a dispersed defence with the second line to be held as a main line of resistance and jumping-off point for counter-attacks. Machine-guns were to be set up with overlapping fields of fire and infantry given specific areas to defend. When French infantry attacked, they were to be isolated by Sperrfeuer (barrage-fire) on their former front line, to increase French infantry casualties. The changes desired by Falkenhayn had little effect, because the main cause of German casualties was artillery-fire, just as it was for the French.
From 10 May German operations were limited to local attacks, either in reply to French counter-attacks on 11 April between Douaumont and Vaux and on 17 April between the Meuse and Douaumont, or local attempts to take points of tactical value. At the beginning of May, General Pétain was promoted to the command of Le groupe d'armées du centre (GAC) and General Nivelle took over the Second Army at Verdun. From 4–24 May German attacks were made on the west bank around Mort-Homme and on 4 May the north slope of Côte 304 was captured; French counter-attacks from 5–6 May were repulsed. The French defenders on the crest of Côte 304 were forced back on 7 May but German infantry were unable to occupy the ridge because of the intensity of French artillery-fire. Cumieres and Caurettes fell on 24 May as a French counter-attack began at Fort Douaumont.
In May General Robert Nivelle who had taken over the Second Army, ordered General Charles Mangin, commander of the 5th Division to plan a counter-attack on Fort Douaumont. The initial plan was for an attack on a 3-kilometre (1.9 mi) front but several minor German attacks captured Fausse-Côte and Couleuvre ravines on the south-eastern and western sides of the fort. A further attack took the ridge south of the ravin de Couleuvre, which gave the Germans better routes for counter-attacks and observation over the French lines to the south and south-west. Mangin proposed a preliminary attack to retake the area of the ravines, to obstruct the routes by which a German counter-attack on the fort could be made. More divisions were necessary but these were refused, to preserve the troops needed for the forthcoming offensive on the Somme; Mangin was limited to one division for the attack with one in reserve. Nivelle reduced the attack to an assault on Morchée Trench, Bonnet-d'Evèque, Fontaine Trench, Fort Douaumont, a machine-gun turret and Hongrois Trench, which would be an advance of 500 metres (550 yd) on a 1,150 metres (1,260 yd) front.
III Corps was to command the attack by the 5th Division and the 71st Brigade, with support from three balloon companies for artillery-observation and a fighter group. The main effort was to be conducted by two battalions of the 129th Infantry Regiment, each with a pioneer company and a machine-gun company attached. The 2nd Battalion was to attack from the south and the 1st Battalion was to move along the west side of the fort to the north end, taking Fontaine Trench and linking with the 6th Company. Two battalions of the 74th Infantry Regiment were to advance along the east and south-east sides of the fort and take a machine-gun turret on a ridge to the east. Flank support was arranged with neighbouring regiments and diversions were planned near Fort Vaux and the raviin de Dame. Preparations for the attack included the digging of 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) of trenches and the building of large numbers of depots and stores but little progress was made due to a shortage of pioneers. French troops captured on 13 May disclosed the plan to the Germans, who responded by subjecting the area to more harassing fire by artillery, which also slowed French preparations.
The French preliminary bombardment by four 370 mm mortars and 300 heavy guns, began on 17 May and by 21 May the French artillery commander claimed that the fort had been severely damaged. During the bombardment the German garrison of the fort experienced great strain, as French heavy shells smashed holes in the walls and concrete dust, exhaust fumes from an electricity generator and disinterred corpses polluted the air. Water ran short but until 20 May, the fort remained operational, observation reports being passed back and reinforcements moving forward until the afternoon, when the Bourges Casemate was isolated and the wireless station in the north-western machine-gun turret was burnt down. Conditions for the German infantry in the vicinity of the fort were far worse and by 18 May, the French destructive bombardment had obliterated many defensive positions, the survivors taking post in shell-holes and dips on the ground. Communication with the rear was severed and food and water ran out by the time of the French attack on 22 May. The troops of Infantry Regiment 52 in front of Fort Douaumont had been reduced to 37 men near Thiaumont Farm and German counter-barrages inflicted similar losses on French troops; French aircraft attacked eight observation balloons and the Fifth Army headquarters at Stenay on 22 May. Six balloons were shot down but the German artillery fire increased and twenty minutes before zero hour, a German bombardment began which reduced the 129th Infantry Regiment companies to about 45 men each.
The assault began at 11:50 a. m. on the 22 May on a 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) front. On the left flank the 36th Infantry Regiment quickly captured Morchée Trench and Bonnet-d'Evèque but lost many casualties and advanced no further. The flank guard on the right was pinned down, except for one company which disappeared and in Bois Caillette a battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment was unable to leave its trenches; the other battalion managed to reach its objectives at an ammunition depot and shelter called DV1 at the edge of Bois Caillette and the machine-gun turret east of the fort, where the battalion found its flanks unsupported. Despite German small-arms fire, the 129th Infantry Regiment reached the fort in a few minutes and managed to get inside, through the west and south sides. By nightfall about half of the fort had been recaptured and next day the 34th Division was sent to reinforce the fort. The reinforcements were repulsed and German reserves managed to cut off the French troops in the fort and force them to surrender, 1000 French prisoners being taken. After three days the French had lost 5,640 casualties from the 12,000 men in the attack and German casualties in Infantry Regiment 52, Grenadier Regiment 12 and Leib-Grenadier Regiment 8 were 4,500 men.
30 May – 7 June
Later in May 1916, the German attacks shifted from the left bank (Mort-Homme and Côte 304) and returned to the right bank, south of Fort Douaumont. A German offensive began to reach Fleury ridge, the last French defensive line and take Ouvrage de Thiaumont, Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort Vaux at the north-east extremity of the French line, which had been bombarded by c. 8,000 shells a day, since the beginning of the Verdun offensive. After a final assault on 1 June by c. 10,000 German troops, the top of the fort was occupied on 2 June and fighting went on underground until the garrison ran out of water and surrendered on 7 June. In five days the German attack had advanced 65 metres (71 yd) for a loss of 2,700 killed against 20 French casualties. When news of the loss of Fort Vaux reached Verdun, the Line of Panic was occupied and trenches were dug on the edge of the city. On the left bank the German advanced from the line Côte 304, Mort-Homme and Cumières and threatened Chattancourt and Avocourt. Heavy rains slowed the German advance towards Fort Souville, where attacks followed counter-attacks for the next two months.
On 22 June, German artillery fired over 116,000 Diphosgene (Green Cross) gas shells at French artillery positions, which caused over 1,600 casualties and silenced much of the French artillery. Next day the German attack on a 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) front at 5:00 a.m., drove a 3-by-2-kilometre (1.9 mi × 1.2 mi) salient into the French defences unopposed until 9:00 a.m., when some French troops were able to fight a rearguard action. The Ouvrage de Thiaumont and the Ouvrage de Froidterre at the south end of the plateau were captured and the village of Fleury and Chapelle Sainte-Fine were overrun. The attack came close to Fort Souville, which since April had been hit by c. 38,000 shells, and brought the Germans to within 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) of the Verdun citadel. Chapelle Sainte-Fine was quickly recaptured by a French counter-attack and the German advance was halted. The supply of water to the German infantry broke down, the salient was vulnerable to fire from three sides and the attack could not go on without Diphosgene ammunition. Chapelle Sainte-Fine became the furthest point reached by the German Verdun offensive and on 24 June, the Anglo-French preliminary bombardment began on the Somme. Fleury changed hands sixteen times from 23 June – 17 August. Four French divisions were diverted to Verdun from the Somme and the French artillery recovered sufficiently on 24 June, to cut off the German front line from the rear. By 25 June both sides were exhausted and Knobelsdorf suspended the attack.
Fourth phase 1 July – 17 December
By the end of May French casualties at Verdun had risen to c. 185,000 and in June German losses had reached c. 200,000 men. The opening of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July, forced the Germans to withdraw some of their artillery from Verdun, which was the first strategic success of the Anglo-French offensive. On 29 August Falkenhayn was replaced as Chief of the General Staff by Paul von Hindenburg and First Quartermaster-General Erich Ludendorff.
Fort Souville dominated a crest 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) south-east of Fleury and its capture would give the Germans control of the heights overlooking Verdun. The German preparatory bombardment began on 9 July, with an attempt to incapacitate French artillery with over 60,000 gas shells which had little effect, since the French had been equipped with an improved M2 gas mask. Fort Souville and its approaches were bombarded with more than 300,000 shells, including some five hundred 14 in (360 mm) shells on the fort. An attack by three German divisions began on 11 July, in which German infantry bunched on the path leading to Fort Souville and came under heavy fire from French artillery. The surviving troops were fired on by sixty French machine gunners who emerged from the fort and took post on the superstructure. Thirty soldiers of Infantry Regiment 140 managed to reach the top of the fort on 12 July, from where the Germans could see the roofs of Verdun and the spire of the cathedral but after a small French counter-attack, the survivors retreated to their start lines or surrendered. On the evening of 11 July Crown Prince Wilhelm was ordered by Falkenhayn to go onto the defensive and on 15 July, the French conducted a larger counter-attack which gained no ground; for the rest of the month the French made only small attacks.
1 August – 17 September
On 1 August a German surprise-attack advanced 800–900 metres (870–980 yd) towards Fort Souville, which prompted French counter-attacks for two weeks, which retook only a small amount of the captured ground. On 18 August Fleury was recaptured and by September French counter-attacks had recovered much of the ground lost in July and August. On 3 September an attack on both flanks at Fleury advanced the French line several hundred metres, against which German counter-attacks from 4–5 September failed. The French attacked again on 9, 13 and 15–17 September. Losses were light except at the Tavannes railway tunnel where 474 French troops died in a fire which began on 4 September.
20 October – 2 November
In October 1916 the French began the 1ère Bataille Offensive de Verdun (First Offensive Battle of Verdun), to recapture Fort Douaumont, an advance of more than 2 kilometres (1.2 mi). Seven of the 22 divisions at Verdun were replaced by mid-October and French infantry platoons were reorganised to contain riflemen, grenadiers and machine-gunners. In a six-day preliminary bombardment, the French artillery fired 855,264 shells, including 532,926 x 75mm field-gun shells, 100,000 x 155mm medium shells and 373 x 370mm and 400mm super-heavy shells, from more than 700 guns and howitzers. Two French Saint-Chamond railway guns, 13 km (8.1 mi) to the south-west at Baleycourt, fired 400 mm (16 in) shells, each weighing 1 short ton (0.91 t). At least 20 super-heavy shells hit Fort Douaumont, the sixth penetrating the lowest level and exploding in a pioneer depot, starting a fire next to 7,000 hand-grenades.
The 38th, 133rd and 74th divisions attacked at 11:40 a.m., 50 metres (55 yd) behind a creeping field-artillery barrage, moving at a rate of 50 metres (55 yd) in two minutes, beyond which a heavy artillery barrage moved in 500–1,000 metres (550–1,090 yd) lifts, as the field artillery barrage came within 150 metres (160 yd), to force the German infantry and machine-gunners to stay under cover. The Germans had partly evacuated Douaumont, which was recaptured on 24 October, by French marines and colonial infantry; more than 6,000 prisoners and fifteen guns were captured by 25 October but an attempt on Fort Vaux failed. The Haudromont quarries, Ouvrage de Thiaumont and Thiaumont Farm, Douaumont village, the northern end of Caillette Wood, Vaux pond, the eastern fringe of Bois Fumin and the Damloup battery were captured. The heaviest French artillery bombarded Fort Vaux for the next week and on 2 November, the Germans evacuated the fort, after a huge explosion was caused by a 220mm shell. French eavesdroppers overheard a German wireless message announcing the departure and a French infantry company entered the fort without firing a shot; on 5 November, the French reached the front line of 24 February; operations ceased until December.
15–17 December 1916
An offensive by four divisions and four in reserve, planned by General Nivelle and executed by General Mangin, began at 10:00 a.m. on 15 December, after a six-day bombardment by 1,169,000 shells fired from 827 guns. The final French bombardment was directed by observation aircraft crews and fell on trenches, dug-out entrances and observation posts. Five German divisions supported by 533 guns held the defensive position, which was 2,300 m (2,500 yd) deep, with 2⁄3 of the infantry in the battle zone and the remaining 1⁄3 in reserve 10–16 km (6.2–9.9 mi) back; two of the German divisions were understrength with only c. 3,000 infantry, instead of their normal establishment of c. 7,000. The attack was preceded by a double creeping barrage, shrapnel-fire from field artillery 64 m (70 yd) in front of the infantry and a high-explosive barrage 140 m (150 yd) ahead, which moved towards a shrapnel bombardment along the German second line, laid to cut off the German retreat and block the advance of reinforcements. The German defence collapsed and 13,500 troops of the 21,000 in the five front divisions were lost, most having been caught under cover and taken prisoner when the French infantry arrived.
The French reached their objectives at Vacherauville and Louvemont which had been lost in February, along with Hardaumont and Pepper Hill, despite very bad weather. German reserve battalions did not reach the front until the evening and two Eingreif divisions, which had been ordered forward the previous evening, were still 23 km (14 mi) away at midday. By the night of 16/17 December, the French had consolidated a new line from Bezonvaux to Côte du Poivre, 2–3 kilometres (1.2–1.9 mi) beyond Douaumont and 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) north of Fort Vaux, before the German reserve and Eingreif units could counter-attack. The 155mm turret at Douaumont had been repaired and fired in support of the French attack. The closest German point to Verdun had been pushed 7.5 kilometres (4.7 mi) back from Verdun and all the dominating observation points had been recaptured. The French took 11,387 prisoners and 115 artillery pieces. Some German officers complained to Mangin about their lack of comfort in captivity, who replied, We do regret it, gentlemen, but then we did not expect so many of you.[Note 6] General von Lochow, the Fifth Army commander and General von Zwehl, commander of XIV Reserve Corps were sacked on 16 December.
20–26 August 1917
On 20 August 1917, the 2ème Bataille Offensive de Verdun (Second Offensive Battle of Verdun) was carried out by the XIII, XVI, XV and XXXII corps, to capture Côte 304 and Mort Homme on the west bank and Côte Talou and Beaumont on the east bank. The plan required an advance of 1–2 kilometres (0.62–1.24 mi) on a 10-kilometre (6.2 mi) front. On 11 August, an artillery preparation by c. 3,000 guns on a 4 by 0.5 kilometres (2.49 mi × 0.31 mi) area began and by 20 August, the French artillery had fired 3,000,000 rounds, including 1,000,000 heavy shells, along with a machine-gun barrage fired on tracks, crossroads, supply lines and German artillery batteries. In four days, French troops captured Bois d'Avocourt, Mort-Homme, Bois Corbeaux and the Bismarck, Kronprinz and Gallwitz tunnels, which had connected the German front lines to the rear, underneath Mort-Homme and Côte 304. On the right bank, Bois Talou, Champneuville, Côte 344, part of Bois Fosse, Bois Chaume, Mormont Farm were captured. Next day Côte 304, Samogneux and Régnieville fell and on 26 August, the French reached the southern outskirts of Beaumont. By 26 August the French had captured 9,500 prisoners, thirty guns, 100 trench mortars and 242 machine-guns.
7 September 1917
After the success of the attack in August, Guillaumat was ordered to plan an operation to capture several trenches and a more ambitious offensive to take the last ground from which German artillery-observers could see Verdun. Pétain questioned Guillaumat and Fayolle, who argued that the French could not remain in their present positions and must either advance or retire, advocating a limited advance to make German counter-attacks harder, improve conditions in the front line and deceive the Germans about French intentions. The two corps on the east bank made small attacks, XV Corps on 7 September which failed and XXXII Corps the next day which was a costly success. The attack continued and the trenches necessary for a secure defensive position were taken but not the last German observation point. Further attempts to advance were met by massed artillery-fire and counter-attacks; the French commanders ended the operation.
The French Fourth Army and the American First Army attacked on a front from Moronvillers to the Meuse on 26 September 1918 at 5:30 p.m. after a three-hour bombardment. American troops quickly captured Malancourt, Bethincourt and Forges on the left bank of the Meuse and by midday the Americans had reached Gercourt, Cuisy, the southern part of Montfaucon and Cheppy. German troops were able to repulse American attacks on Montfaucon ridge, until it was outflanked to the south and Montfaucon surrounded. German counter-attacks from 27–28 September slowed the American advance but Ivoiry and Epinon-Tille were captured, after which Montfaucon ridge was taken along with 8,000 prisoners and 100 guns. On the right bank of the Meuse a combined Franco-American force under American command took Brabant, Haumont, Bois d'Haumont and Bois des Caures and then crossed the front line of February 1916. By November c. 20,000 prisoners, c. 150 guns, c. 1,000 trench-mortars and several thousand machine-guns had been captured. A German retreat began and continued until the Armistice.
Falkenhayn wrote in his memoir that he sent an appreciation of the strategic situation to the Kaiser in December 1915,
The string in France has reached breaking point. A mass breakthrough—which in any case is beyond our means—is unnecessary. Within our reach there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death.
that German strategy in 1916 was to inflict mass casualties on the French, a goal which had been achieved in Russia in 1914–1915, to weaken the French Army to the point of collapse. The French Army had to be drawn into a situation from which it could not escape, for reasons of strategy and prestige. The Germans planned to use a large number of heavy and super-heavy guns to inflict a greater number of casualties than French artillery, which relied mostly upon the 75mm field gun. Foley wrote that Falkenhayn intended an attrition battle from the beginning, contrary to the views of Krumeich, Foerster and others but that the lack of surviving documents had led to many interpretations of Falkenhayn's strategy. At the time Falkenhayn's critics claimed that the battle demonstrated that he was indecisive and unfit for command; in 1937 Foerster had proposed this view "forcefully". Afflerbach questioned the authenticity of the "Christmas memorandum" in his biography of Falkenhayn and after studying such evidence as had survived in the Kriegsgeschichtliches Forschungsanstalt des Heeres (Army Military History Research Institute) files, concluded that the memorandum had been written after the war but that it was an accurate reflection of much of Falkenhayn's thinking in 1916.
Krumeich wrote that the Christmas Memorandum had been fabricated to justify a failed strategy and that attrition had been substituted for the capture of Verdun, only after the city was not taken quickly. Foley wrote that after the failure of the Ypres Offensive of 1914, Falkenhayn had returned to the pre-war strategic thinking of Moltke the Elder and Hans Delbrück on Ermattungsstrategie (attrition), because the coalition fighting Germany was too powerful to be decisively defeated by military means alone. German strategy should aim to divide the Allies, by forcing at least one of the Entente powers into a negotiated peace. An attempt at attrition lay behind the offensive against Russia in 1915, although the Russians had refused to accept German peace feelers, despite the huge defeats inflicted by the Austro-Germans in the summer. With insufficient forces to break through the Western Front and to overcome the Entente reserves behind it, Falkenhayn attempted to force the French to attack instead, by threatening a sensitive point close to the front line. Eventually Falkenhayn chose Verdun as the place to force the French to begin a counter-offensive, which would be defeated with huge losses to the French, inflicted by German artillery on the dominating heights around the city. The Fifth Army would begin a big offensive with limited objectives, to seize the Meuse Heights on the right bank of the river, from which German artillery could dominate the battlefield. By being forced into a counter-offensive against such formidable positions, the French Army would "bleed itself white". As the French were weakened, the British would be forced to launch a hasty relief-offensive, which would also be defeated with many casualties. If such defeats were not enough to force negotiations on the French, a German offensive would mop up the last of the Franco-British armies and break the Entente "once and for all".
In a revised instruction to the French army of January 1916, the General Staff had stated that equipment could not be fought by men. Fire power could conserve infantry but a battle of material prolonged the war and consumed over time the casualties which were preserved in each instance. In 1915 and early 1916 German industry quintupled the output of heavy artillery and doubled the production of super-heavy artillery. French production had also recovered since 1914 and by February 1916 the army had 3,500 heavy guns. In May 1916 Joffre began a plan to each division two groups of 155mm guns and each corps four groups of long-range guns. Both sides at Verdun had the means to fire huge numbers of heavy shells at targets to suppress defences before risking infantry movements. At the end of May the Germans had 1,730 heavy guns at Verdun against 548 French, which were sufficient to contain the Germans but not enough for a counter-offensive.
German infantry found that the French endured preparatory bombardments, which was easier than for the Germans since French positions tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible and sparsely occupied. As soon as German infantry attacked the French positions "came to life" and the troops began machine-gun and rapid field artillery-fire. On 22 April the Germans lost 1,000 casualties and in mid-April the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells during an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. A few days after taking over at Verdun Pétain told the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose to sweep away the German air service and to provide observation for the French artillery. German air superiority was challenged and eventually reversed, using eight-aircraft Escadrilles for artillery-observation, counter-battery and tactical support.
The fighting at Verdun was less costly to both sides than the war of movement in 1914, which cost the French c. 850,000 and the Germans c. 670,000 men from August–December. The German Fifth Army had a lower rate of loss than armies on the Eastern Front in 1915 and the French had a lower average rate of loss at Verdun than the rate over three weeks during the Third Battle of Champagne from September–October 1915, which had not been fought as battles of attrition. During the battle, German loss rates increased relative to French rates, from 2.2:1 in early 1915 to close to 1:1 by the end of the battle and continued at that rate during the Nivelle Offensive in 1917. The main cost of attrition tactics was indecision, limited objective attacks under an umbrella of massed heavy artillery-fire could succeed but created unlimited duration.
Pétain used a "Noria" ("rotation") system, to relieve French troops at Verdun after a short period, which brought most troops of the French army to the Verdun front but for shorter periods than the German troops opposite. French will to resist did not collapse, the symbolic importance of Verdun proved a rallying-point, Falkenhayn was forced to conduct the offensive for much longer than planned and to commit far more infantry than intended. By the end of April most of the German strategic reserve was at Verdun, suffering similar casualties to the French army, although the Germans believed that they were inflicting losses at a rate of 5:2; German military intelligence thought that French casualties up to 11 March had been 100,000 men. Falkenhayn was confident that German artillery could easily inflict another 100,000 losses; in May Falkenhayn estimated that the French had lost 525,000 men against 250,000 German casualties and that the French strategic reserve had been reduced to 300,000 troops. Actual French losses were c. 130,000 by 1 May and the Noria system had enabled 42 divisions to be withdrawn and rested, when their casualties reached 50%. 259 of the 330 infantry battalions of the French metropolitan army (78%) went to Verdun, against 48 German divisions, 25% of the Westheer (western army). Afflerbach wrote that 85 French divisions fought at Verdun and that from February to August the ratio of German to French losses was 1:1.1, rather than the third of French losses assumed by Falkenhayn. By 31 August the Fifth Army's losses were 281,000 and French casualties numbered 315,000 men.
In June 1916, the amount of French artillery at Verdun had been increased to 2,708 guns, including 1,138 x 75mm field guns; the French and German armies fired c. 10,000,000 shells, with a weight of 1,350,000 long tons (1,370,000 t) from February–December. The German offensive had been contained by French reinforcements, difficulties of terrain and the weather by May, with the Fifth Army infantry stuck in tactically dangerous positions, overlooked by the French on the east bank as well as the west bank, instead of secure on the Meuse Heights. Attrition of the French forces was inflicted by constant infantry attacks, which were vastly more costly than waiting for French counter-attacks and defeating them primarily with artillery. Eventually the stalemate was broken by the Brusilov Offensive and the Anglo-French relief offensive on the Somme, the conduct of which had been expected to lead to the collapse of the Anglo-French armies. Falkenhayn had begun to remove divisions from the armies on the Western Front in June, to rebuild the strategic reserve but only twelve divisions could be spared. Four divisions were sent to the Second Army on the Somme, which had dug a layered defensive system based on the experience of the Herbstschlacht. The situation before the beginning of the battle on the Somme, was considered by Falkenhayn to be better than before previous offensives and a relatively easy defeat of the British offensive was anticipated. No divisions were moved from the Sixth Army, which had 17½ divisions and a large amount of heavy artillery, ready for a counter-offensive when the British offensive had been defeated.
The strength of the Anglo-French offensive surprised Falkenhayn and the staff officers of OHL, despite the losses inflicted on the British; the loss of artillery to "overwhelming" counter-battery fire and the policy of instant counter-attack against any Anglo-French advance, led to far more German infantry casualties than at the height of the fighting at Verdun, where 25,989 casualties had been suffered in the first ten days, against 40,187 losses, in the first ten days on the Somme. The Brusilov Offensive had recommenced as soon as Russian supplies had been replenished, which inflicted more losses on Austro-Hungarian and German troops during June and July, when the offensive was extended to the north. Falkenhayn was called on to justify his strategy to the Kaiser on 8 July and again advocated sending minimal reinforcements to the east, to continue the "decisive" battle in France, where the Somme offensive was the "last throw of the dice" for the Entente. Falkenhayn had already given up the plan for a counter-offensive near Arras, to reinforce the Russian front and the Second Army with eighteen divisions moved from the reserve and the Sixth Army front. By the end of August only one division remained in reserve. The Fifth Army had been ordered to limit its attacks at Verdun in June but a final effort was made in July to capture Fort Souville. The effort failed and on 12 July Falkenhayn ordered a strict defensive policy, with only small local attacks allowed, to try to limit the number of troops the French took from the RFV to add to the Somme offensive.
Falkenhayn had underestimated the French, for whom victory at all costs was the only way to justify the sacrifices already made; the pressure imposed on the French army never came close to making the French collapse and trigger a premature British relief offensive. The ability of the German army to inflict disproportionate losses had also been exaggerated, in part because the Fifth Army commanders had tried to capture Verdun and attacked regardless of loss; even when reconciled to Falkenhayn's attrition strategy they continued to use the costly Vernichtungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation) and tactics of Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvre warfare). Failure to reach the Meuse Heights, forced the Fifth Army to try to advance from poor tactical positions and to impose attrition by infantry attacks and counter-attacks. The unanticipated duration of the offensive, made Verdun a matter of German prestige as much as it was for the French and Falkenhayn became dependent on a British relief offensive and a German counter-offensive to end the stalemate. When it came the collapse of the southern front in Russia and the power of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme, reduced the German armies to holding their positions as best they could. On 29 August Falkenhayn was sacked and replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who ended the German offensive at Verdun on 2 September.
In 1980 Terraine gave c. 750,000 Franco-German casualties in 299 days of battle; Dupuy and Dupuy gave 542,000 French casualties in 1993. Heer and Naumann calculated 377,231 French and 337,000 German casualties, a monthly average of 70,000 casualties in 2000. Mason wrote in 2000 that there had been 378,000 French and 337,000 German casualties. In 2003, Clayton quoted 330,000 German casualties, of whom 143,000 were killed or missing and 351,000 French losses, 56,000 killed, 100,000 missing or prisoners and 195,000 wounded. Writing in 2005, Doughty gave French casualties at Verdun, from 21 February – 20 December 1916 as 377,231 men of 579,798 losses at Verdun and the Somme; 16% of Verdun casualties were known to have been killed, 56% wounded and 28% missing, many of whom were eventually presumed dead. Doughty wrote that other historians had followed Churchill (1927) who gave a figure of 442,000 casualties, by mistakenly including all French losses on the Western Front.
In the second edition of The World Crisis (1938), Churchill wrote that the figure of 442,000 was for other ranks and the figure of "probably" 460,000 casualties included officers. Churchill gave a figure of 278,000 German casualties of whom 72,000 were killed and expressed dismay that French casualties had exceeded German by about 3:2. Churchill also stated that an eighth needed to be deducted from his figures for both sides, to account for casualties on other sectors, giving 403,000 French and 244,000 German total casualties. Grant gave a figure of 434,000 German casualties in 2005. In 2005, Foley used calculations made by Wendt in 1931 to give German casualties at Verdun from 21 February – 31 August 1916 as 281,000, against 315,000 French casualties. Afflerbach used the same source in 2000 to give 336,000 German and 365,000 French casualties for the fighting at Verdun, from February to December 1916.
In 2013, Jankowski wrote that since the beginning of the war, French army units had produced états numériques des pertes every five days, for the Bureau of Personnel at GQG. The health service at the Ministry of War, received daily counts of wounded taken in by hospitals and other services but casualty data was dispersed among regimental depots, the GQG, the État Civil which recorded deaths, the Service de Santé which counted injuries and illnesses and the Renseignements aux Familles, which communicated with next-of-kin. Regimental depots were ordered to keep fiches de position, to record losses continuously and the Première Bureau of GQG, began to compare the five-day field reports with the records of hospital admissions. The new system was used to calculate losses since August 1914, which took several months but the system had become established by February 1916. The états numériques des pertes were used to calculate casualty figures published in the Journal Officiel, the French Official History and other publications.
The German armies compiled Verlustlisten every ten days, which were published by the Reichsarchiv in the deutsches Jahrbuch of 1924–1925. German medical units kept detailed records of medical treatment at the front and in hospitals and in 1923 the Zentral Nachweiseamt published an amended edition of the lists produced during the war, incorporating medical service data not in the Verlustlisten. Monthly figures of wounded and ill servicemen treated, were published in 1934 in the Sanitätsbericht. Using such sources for comparisons of losses during a battle is difficult because the information recorded losses over time rather than place. Losses calculated for particular battles could be inconsistent, as in the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914–1920 (1922). In the early 1920s, Louis Marin reported to the Chamber of Deputies but could not give figures per battle, except for some by using numerical reports from the armies, which were unreliable unless reconciled with the system established in 1916.
Some French data excluded lightly wounded and some did not. In April 1917, GQG required that the états numériques des pertes discriminate between lightly wounded treated at the front over a period of 20–30 days and severely wounded evacuated to hospitals. Uncertainty over the criteria had not been resolved before the war ended. Verlustlisten excluded lightly wounded and the Zentral Nachweiseamt records included them. Churchill revised German statistics, by adding 2% for unrecorded wounded, in The World Crisis written in the 1920s and the British Official Historian added 30%. For the Battle of Verdun, the Sanitätsbericht contained incomplete data for the Verdun area and did not define "wounded" and the 5th Army field reports exclude them. The Marin Report and Service de Santé covered different periods but included lightly wounded. Churchill used a Reichsarchiv figure of 428,000 casualties and took a figure of 532,500 casualties from the Marin Report, for March–June and November–December 1916 for all the Western Front.
The états numériques des pertes give French losses in a range from 348,000–378,000 and in 1930, Wendt recorded for the French Second Army and the German Fifth Army, casualties of 362,000 and 336,831 respectively from 21 February – 20 December, which did not take account of the inclusion or exclusion of lightly wounded. In 2006, McRandle and Quirk used the Sanitätsbericht to adjust the Verlustlisten by an increase of c. 11%, which gave a total of 373,882 German casualties, compared to the French Official History record by 20 December 1916, of 373,231 French losses. A German record from the Sanitätsbericht which explicitly excluded lightly wounded, compared German losses at Verdun in 1916, which averaged 37.7 casualties for each 1,000 men, with the 9th Army in Poland 1914 average of 48.1 per 1,000, the 11th Army average in Galicia 1915 of 52.4 per 1,000 men, the 1st Army on the Somme 1916 average of 54.7 per 1,000 and the 2nd Army average on the Somme of 39.1 per 1,000 men. Jankowski estimated an equivalent figure for the French Second Army of 40.9 men per 1,000, including lightly wounded. With a c. 11% adjustment following McRandle and Quirk, to the German figure of 37.7 per 1,000 to include lightly wounded, the loss rate is analogous to the estimate for French casualties.
The concentration of so much fighting in such a small area devastated the land, resulting in miserable conditions for troops on both sides. Rain combined with the constant tearing up of the ground turned the clay of the area to a wasteland of mud full of human remains. Shell craters became filled with a liquid ooze, becoming so slippery that troops who fell into them or took cover in them could drown. Forests were reduced to tangled piles of wood by constant artillery-fire and eventually obliterated. The effect on soldiers in the battle was devastating, many broke down with shell-shock and some French troops attempted to desert to Spain, those who were caught being shot. On 20 March French deserters disclosed details of the French defences to the Germans, who were able to surround 2,000 men and force them to surrender. Many troops at the battle never saw an enemy soldier, experiencing nothing but artillery shells and many troops on both sides called Verdun "Hell".
A French lieutenant at Verdun who was later killed by a shell, wrote in his diary on 23 May 1916
Humanity is mad. It must be mad to do what it is doing. What a massacre! What scenes of horror and carnage! I cannot find words to translate my impressions. Hell cannot be so terrible. Men are mad!
and discontent began to spread among the French at Verdun during the summer of 1916. On the promotion of Pétain from his Verdun command on 1 June and his replacement by General Nivelle, five infantry regiments were affected by short-lived episodes of "collective indiscipline". Two French Lieutenants, Henri Herduin and Pierre Millant, were summarily shot on 11 June, at Fleury-devant-Douaumont; Nivelle then published an Order of the Day forbidding French troops to surrender. In 1926, after an inquiry and a cause célèbre, Herduin and Millant were exonerated and their official military records expunged. Period photographs show huge numbers of overlapping shell craters in an area of about 100 square kilometres (39 sq mi). Forests planted in the 1930s have grown up and hide most of the Zone rouge (Red Zone) but the battlefield is a vast graveyard, where the mortal remains of over 100,000 missing soldiers remain, unless discovered by the French Forestry Service and laid in the Douaumont ossuary.
In April 1916, Pétain had issued an Order of the Day, "Courage! On les aura" ("Courage! We shall get them") and on 23 June 1916, Nivelle issued: "They shall not pass", a simplification of the actual French text: "Vous ne les laisserez pas passer, mes camarades" ("you will not let them pass, my comrades"). Nivelle had been concerned about diminished French morale at Verdun; after Nivelle's promotion to lead the Second Army in June 1916, manifestations of indiscipline occurred in five front line regiments.[Note 7] Défaillance reappeared in the French army mutinies that followed the Nivelle offensive of April–May 1917.
Marshal Pétain praised what he saw as the success of the fixed fortification system at Verdun in his war memoir: "La Bataille de Verdun" published in 1929 and in 1930, construction of the Maginot Line (Ligne Maginot) began along the border with Germany. At Verdun French field artillery in the open, outnumbered turreted guns in the Verdun forts by at least two hundred to one. It was the mass of French field artillery (over 2,000 guns after May 1916) which inflicted about 70% of German infantry casualties. In 1935 a number of mechanized and motorized units were deployed behind the Maginot line and plans laid to send detachments to fight a mobile defence in front of the fortifications. Verdun remained a symbol of French determination for many years. At the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1953–1954, General Christian de Castries remarked that the situation was "somewhat like Verdun.". French forces at Dien Bien Phu were supplied by transport aircraft using a landing strip in range of Viet Minh artillery; the French forces at Verdun were supplied by road and rail, beyond the reach of German artillery.
Verdun and its horrors have become for the French the representative memory of World War I. Antoine Prost wrote that "Like Auschwitz, Verdun marks a transgression of the limits of the human condition". From 1918–1939 the French expressed two memories of the battle, one a patriotic view, embodied in the memorials built on the battlefield and the other the memory of the survivors who recalled the death, suffering and sacrifice of comrades. In the 1960s Verdun became a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation, through remembrance of common suffering and in the 1980s Verdun took on a new identity as the capital of peace. Organizations were formed and old museums were dedicated to the ideals of peace and human rights. On 22 September 1984, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (whose father had fought near Verdun in World War I) and French President François Mitterrand (who had been taken prisoner nearby in World War II) stood at the Douaumont cemetery, holding hands for several minutes in the driving rain as a gesture of Franco-German reconciliation. In November 1998, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder did not attend a joint French and German memorial service with French president Jacques Chirac.
- List of French villages destroyed in World War I
- Reverse salient
- Rue Verdun, Beirut, Lebanon
- Voie Sacrée
- First Battle of Champagne (20 December 1914 – 17 March 1915), First Battle of Artois (December 1914 – January 1915), Second Battle of Ypres (21 April – 25 May), Neuve Chapelle (10–13 March), Second Battle of Artois (9 May – 18 June), Second Battle of Champagne (25 September – 6 November), Battle of Loos (25 September – 14 October) and Third Battle of Artois (25 September – 4 November).
- Forts in the outer ring were (clockwise) Douaumont, Vaux, Moulainville, Le Rozelier, Haudainville, Dugny, Regret and Marre. The inner ring included Souville, Tavannes, Belrupt and Belleville.
- In September and December 1914 the 155 mm gun at Fort Douaumont bombarded German positions north of Verdun and a German observation post at the Jumelles d'Ornes. In February 1915, Douaumont was bombarded by a 420 mm mortar known as Big Bertha and Long Max, a 380 mm naval gun.
- The first party to enter the fort was led by Leutnant Eugen Radtke, Hauptmann Hans Joachim Haupt and Oberleutnant Cordt von Brandis. Brandis and Haupt were awarded the highest German military decoration, Pour le Mérite but Radtke was overlooked. Attempts to remedy this led to Major Klüfer of Infantry Regiment 24 being transferred and to controversy after the war, when Radtke published a memoir and Klüfer published a detailed examination of the capture of the fort, naming Feldwebel Kunze as the first German soldier to enter Fort Douaumont, which was considered improbable since only one report mentioned him.
- Captain Charles de Gaulle, the future Free French leader and President of France, was a company commander in this regiment and was wounded and taken prisoner near Douaumont during the battle.
- Mangin was paraphrasing Frederick the Great after his victory at the battle of Rossbach (5 November 1757): "Mais, messieurs, je ne vous attendais pas sitôt, en si grand nombre." (But, gentlemen, I did not expect you so soon, in so great number.)
- Denizot published detailed statistical tables including all French troop movements, as well as monthly French artillery ammunition consumption by type of gun. German artillery ammunition consumption is reported as well but not in such detail. Original sources at the Service Historique de la Défense (Defence Historical Service) at Vincennes were extensively consulted. The volume is based on Denizot's PhD Thesis (1990) on the Battle of Verdun, published by the Université de Paris-Sorbonne.
- Falkenhayn 1919, pp. 217–218.
- Foley 2005, pp. 191–192.
- Foley 2005, p. 192.
- Foley 2005, p. 193.
- Holstein 2002, p. 35.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 275–276.
- Holstein 2002, p. 20.
- Le Hallé 1998, p. 15.
- Holstein 2002, p. 32.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 31–32.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 25–29.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 33–34.
- Mason 2000, pp. 21, 32.
- Foley 2005, pp. 214–216.
- Foley 2005, pp. 211–212.
- Foley 2005, pp. 213–214.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 265–266.
- Holstein 2002, p. 36.
- Foley 2005, p. 217.
- Doughty 2005, p. 267.
- Foley 2005, pp. 215, 217.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 272–273.
- Mason 2000, pp. 107–109.
- Doughty 2005, p. 274.
- Mason 2000, pp. 48–49.
- Mason 2000, pp. 49–51.
- Schwerin 1939, pp. 9–12, 24–29.
- Mason 2000, pp. 54–59.
- Mason 2000, pp. 60–64.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 43–44.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 54–55, 148.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 45–50.
- Foley 2005, p. 220.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 57–58.
- Mason 2000, pp. 114–115.
- Williams 1998, p. 45.
- Mason 2000, p. 115.
- Foley 2005, p. 223.
- Foley 2005, pp. 224–225.
- Foley 2005, pp. 225–226.
- Doughty 2005, p. 283.
- Michelin 1919, p. 29.
- Foley 2005, p. 226.
- Foley 2005, pp. 226–227.
- Foley 2005, p. 228.
- Foley 2005, pp. 228–229.
- Foley 2005, pp. 230–231.
- Foley 2005, pp. 232–233.
- Foley 2005, p. 234.
- Michelin 1919, pp. 17–18.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 76–78.
- Holstein 2002, p. 78.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 79–82.
- Holstein 2002, p. 91.
- Mason 2000, pp. 150–159.
- Ousby 2002, p. 229.
- Ousby 2002, pp. 229–231.
- Mason 2000, pp. 183–167.
- Samuels 1995, p. 126.
- Holstein 2002, p. 95.
- Doughty 2005, p. 288.
- Doughty 2005, p. 298.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 94–95.
- Doughty 2005, p. 299.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 305–306.
- Holstein 2002, p. 99.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 102–103.
- Doughty 2005, p. 306.
- Michelin 1919, pp. 19–20.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 306–308.
- Wynne 1939, pp. 166–167.
- Holstein 2002, pp. 112–114.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 308–309.
- Durant & Durant 1967, p. 50.
- Wynne 1939, p. 168.
- Doughty 2005, p. 380.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 381–382.
- Michelin 1919, pp. 23–24.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 382–282.
- Michelin 1919, pp. 24–25.
- Foerster 1937, pp. 304–330.
- Afflerbach 1994, pp. 543–545.
- Krumeich 1996, pp. 17–29.
- Foley 2005, pp. 206–207.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 109–112.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 112–114.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 114–120.
- Clayton 2003, pp. 120–121.
- Chickering and Förster 2000, pp. 130, 126.
- Foley 2005, p. 256.
- Mason 2000, p. 185.
- Foley 2005, pp. 235–236.
- Foley 2005, pp. 249–250.
- Foley 2005, pp. 251–254.
- Foley 2005, pp. 254–256.
- Foley 2005, p. 258.
- Terraine 1980, p. 59.
- Dupuy and Dupuy 1993, p. 1052.
- Heer and Naumann 2000, p. 26.
- Clayton 2003, p. 110.
- Doughty 2005, p. 309.
- Churchill 1938, pp. 1003–1004.
- Grant 2005, p. 276.
- Foley 2005, p. 259.
- Chickering and Förster 2000, p. 114.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 257–258.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 258–259.
- Jankowski 2013, pp. 259–260.
- Jankowski 2013, p. 261.
- Horne 1962, p. 236.
- Mason 2000, p. 160.
- Clayton 2003, p. 122.
- Holstein 2002, p. 124.
- Denizot 1996, p. 136.
- Pedroncini 1989, pp. 150–153.
- Denizot 1996.
- Doughty 2005, pp. 361–365.
- Wynne 1939, p. 329.
- Windrow 2004, p. 499.
- Jackson 2001, p. 28.
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- Murase 2002, p. 304.
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