Battle of Yarmouk

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Battle of Yarmouk Part of the Muslim conquest of Syria and Byzantine-Arab Wars Date August, 636 Location Near the Yarmouk River Result Decisive Rashidun victory Territorial changes Levant annexed by Rashidun Caliphate Belligerents Byzantine Empire, Ghassanid Kingdom, Rashidun Caliphate (Rashidun army) Commanders Heraclius Constantine III[1] Theodorus Trithurius[2] Jabalah ibn al-Aiham Dairjan[3] Vahan[2] (Mahan[3]) Buccinator (Qanateer)[3] Gregory[3] Khalid ibn al-Walid Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah Amr ibn al-A'as Shurahbil bin Hassana Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan Strength 20,000 - 150,000 (modern estimates)[4] 100,000 - 400,000 (primary sources)[5][6] 7,500 - 40,000 (modern estimates)[7] 24,000 - 40,000 (primary sources)[8] Casualties and losses 50,000 killed (modern estimate)[9] 45% killed (modern estimate)[3] 70,000 - 120,000 killed (primary sources)[10] 4,000 killed[3]

v • d • e Byzantine-Arab Wars Early Conflicts Mutah – Tabouk – Dathin – Firaz Arab Conquest of Roman Syria Qarteen – Bosra – Ajnadayn – Marj-al-Rahit – Fahl – Damascus - Maraj-al-Debaj - Emesa - Yarmouk – Jerusalem - Hazir – Aleppo Arab Conquest of Roman Egypt Heliopolis – Nikiou Umayyad Conquest of North Africa Carthage Arab Invasions of Anatolia and Constantinople Iron Bridge - Kahramanmaraş – Masts – 1st Constantinople – Syllaeum – 2nd Constantinople – Akroinon Arab Campaigns in Southern Italy Later Byzantine Campaigns

v • d • e Campaigns of Khalid ibn al-Walid Conquest of Arabia Uhud – Mu'tah – Mecca – Hunayn – Ta'if Ridda Wars Yamama – Zafar – Daumat-ul-Jandal – Buzakha – Ghamra – Naqra Conquest of the Persian Empire Chains – River – Walaja – Ullais – Hira – Al-Anbar – Ein-ul-tamr – Daumat-ul-Jandal – Muzayyah – Saniyy – Zumail – Firaz Conquest of Roman Syria Firaz – Qarteen – Bosra – Ajnadayn – Marj-al-Rahit – Fahl – Damascus - Maraj-al-Debaj - Emesa - Yarmouk - Jerusalem – Hazir - Aleppo Campaigns in Anatolia Iron Bridge - Kahramanmaraş

The Battle of Yarmouk (Arabic: معركة اليرموك‎, (also spelled Yarmuk, Yarmuq or Hieromyax) is a series of engagements that took place between the Rashidun Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire over six days in August 636. It is considered by some historians^{[citation needed]} to have been one of the most significant battles in the world history, marking the first great wave of Islamic conquests. It heralded the rapid advance of Islam into a then Christian Levant. The battle is also considered to be one of Khalid ibn al-Walid's most decisive victories, and cemented his reputation as one of the greatest military strategists and cavalry commanders of the Islamic conquest in the Middle Ages.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 Preparations for battle 2 Armies 2.1 Byzantine 2.2 Rashidun 3 Battlefield 4 Battle 4.1 Day 1 4.2 Day 2 4.3 Day 3 4.4 Day 4 4.5 Day 5 4.6 Day 6 5 Aftermath 6 References 7 Bibliography 7.1 Primary sources 7.2 Modern sources 8 External links

[edit] Background

Damascus had been a stronghold of the Byzantine Empire. In 634, the Rashidun army invaded Syria, and after decisively defeating the Byzantine armies at the Battle of Ajnadayn, captured Damascus in 634. From there, the Muslims continued their conquest across the Levant. Soon after the capture of Damascus, the Muslims defeated a Byzantine garrison at the Battle of Fahl and conquered most of Palestine.

[edit] Preparations for battle

After previous incursions by the Rashidun army, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius assembled a large army in Syria to halt the Arab invasion. Preparations started in late 635, and by May 636, a force was put under arms and was concentrated at Antioch and northern Syria. The size of these forces was stated as 200,000-250,000 in most Muslim accounts of the battle, but several modern estimates suggest that the real number of troops was lower than that range,^[11] claiming the count was 100,000,^[12][13] 80,000,^[2] or 50,000.^[14] The assembled army consisted of contingents of Byzantines, Slavs, Franks, Georgians, Armenians and Christian Arabs,^[15] contributing to internal conflicts.

This force was organized into five armies, whose commanders were: Mahan,^[16] the king of Armenia — who commanded a purely Armenian army, Qanateer, a Slavic prince commanded the Slavs and Jabla bin al-Eiham, king of the Ghassanid Arabs, commanded an exclusively Christian Arab force. The remaining contingents (all European), were placed under Gregory and Dairjan.^[17] Mahan was appointed commander-in-chief of the entire imperial army.

At this time, the Rashidun army was split in four groups: one under Amr ibn al-Aas in Palestine, one under Shurahbil in Jordan, one under Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan at Caesarea and the last one under Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah along with Khalid ibn al-Walid at Emesa. Heraclius sought to exploit this situation and planned to attack and destroy each of these Muslim corps separately by putting a large concentration of troops against each of them in turn. Thus, reinforcements were sent to Caesarea under Heraclius’s son Constantine, probably to tie down Yazid's forces there so that it would not move to join other Muslim corps to help them. The rest of the Imperial Army was to operate on the following plan:

• Qanateer would move along the coastal route up to Beirut, then approach Damascus from the west and cut off Abu Ubaidah.
• Jabla would march from Aleppo on the direct route to Emessa via Hama, and hold the Muslims frontally in the Emessa region. The lighter-armed but faster moving Christian Arabs would thus be the first to contact the Muslim Arabs.
• Dairjan would move between the coast and the Aleppo road and approach Emessa from the west, thus striking the Muslims in their flank while they were held frontally by Jabla.
• Gregory would advance on Emessa from the north-east and attack the Muslims in their right flanks at the same time as they were struck by Dairjan.
• Mahan’s army would advance behind the Christian Arabs and act as a reserve.^[18]

The imperial army was launched from Antioch and northern Syria some time in the middle of June 636. It was at Shaizar, through Roman prisoners, that the Muslims first came to know of the preparations being made by Heraclius. Alert to the possibility of being caught with separated forces that could be destroyed in detail, as Heraclius indeed planned, Khalid ibn al-Walid, in a council of war, advised Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah to pull back from northern and central Syria, as well as from Palestine. Then, he concentrated the entire Rashidun army in the vast plain of Yarmouk — which was suitable for cavalry charge and from there it would be easier for the caliph to send reinforcements and thus a strong, united force could be fielded against the Byzantine armies. The position also was beneficiary, due to its close proximity to Najd (a Rashidun stronghold), in case of retreat.^[19] Ibn al-Jarrah, Muslim's commander in chef, thus ordered the commanders to surrender the territory under their control and withdraw the army to Jabiya. In addition, he ordered the commanders to return the jizya (tribute) to the people who had paid it.^[20]

The Rashidun army thus moved towards the Yarmuk plain, and established a line of camps in the eastern part of the plain of Yarmuk. No major conflict occurred except for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry Mobile guard and Byzantine Advance guard. A few days later, the Byzantine army — proceeded by the lightly armed Ghassanids of Jabla — moved forward and established their camps just north of the Wadi-ur-Raqqad. Mahan was instructed by Heraculis, not to start battle until all avenues of peaceful negotiation had been explored. Grogory and then Jabla were sent by Mahan to negotiate but their efforts failed. Before the battle, on Mahan’s invitation, Khalid came to talks but still with no result.^[21] Meanwhile Caliph Umar sent a reinforcement of 6,000 troops, mostly from Yemen as well as 1,000 Sahaba (companions of Muhammad), among them a 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle of Islamic conquest. The army also included citizens of the highest rank, such as Zubair,^[22] Abu Sufyan, and his wife Hind bint Utbah.^[23]

[edit] Armies

Modern estimates of the sizes of the respective armies vary: between 15,000 - 100,000 for the Byzantine army, and 7,500 - 25,000 for the Arab army, with exaggerations on both sides by older historians. These figures come from studying the logistical capabilities of the combatants, the sustainability of their respective bases of operations, and the overall manpower constraints affecting the Romans and Arabs. Most scholars, however, agree that the Byzantine army and their allies outnumbered the Muslim Arabs by a sizeable margin.

Muslim sources place the number of Muslim troops at between 24,000 and 40,000 and the number of Byzantine forces at between 100,000 and 200,000.

[edit] Byzantine

See also: Byzantine army

Mahan deployed the Imperial Army forward of Allan. He used his four regular armies to form the line of battle, extending from the Yarmuk to south of the Hill of Jabiya. The right wing was commanded by Gregory with the army of Qanateer on his left. The centre was formed by the army of Dairjan and the Armenian army of Mahan-both under the command of Dairjan. The Roman regular cavalry was distributed equally among the four armies, with each army deployed with its infantry holding the front and its cavalry held as a reserve in the rear. Ahead of the front line, across the entire 12-mile front, Mahan deployed the Christian Arab army of Jabla, which was all mounted on horses and camels. This army acted as a screen and skirmish line, until they would be joined by the main army. The army of Gregory, which formed the right wing, used chains to link its foot soldiers together.^[24] All these foot soldiers had taken the oath of death. These chains were in 10-men lengths, and were used as a proof of unshakeable courage on the part of the men, who thus displayed their willingness to die where they stood and not retreat.^{[citation needed]} The chains also acted as an insurance against a break-through by enemy cavalry.

[edit] Rashidun

See also: Rashidun army and Mobile guard

During a council of war, Khalid ibn Walid, the former commander in chief of the Rashidun army in the campaign of Syria,^[25] offered his services as a commander of the Muslim army until the battle was over and it was given to him that day; Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah's military credentials were not as high as Khalid's.^[26] After taking command, Khalid reorganized the army into infantry and cavalry regiments, with cavalry making up a quarter of the 40,000-man army. Khalid further divided the army into 36 infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments; he formed some of the cavalry into a mobile guard that was held in reserve. Over the course of the battle Khalid would repeatedly make critical, decisive use of this mounted reserve.

The army was lined up on a front of ten miles, with its left on the Yarmouk River a mile before the ravine began and its right on the Jabiya road. The center of the army was under the command of Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah (left half) and Shurhabil bin Hassana (right half). The left wing was under the command of Yazid and the right wing was under Amr ibn al-A'as. Both left and right wings were given cavalry regiments under command, to be used as a reserve for counter attack in case they were pushed back by the Byzantines. Behind the center stood a cavalry regiment reserve along with a mobile guard under the personal command of Khalid. When Khalid was occupied in the conduct of the battle, Zirrar ibn al-Azwar would command the mobile guard. Each of the four corps had nine infantry regiments, which were all formed on a tribal and clan basis, so that every man would fight next to well-known comrades, and the army pushed out a line of scouts to keep the Byzantines under observation.^[27]

In late July 636, Mahan sent Jabla with his Christian Arabs forces to check the strength of the Muslim front, but they were repulsed by the mobile guard under Khalid.^[28] After this initial operation, no military activities occurred for a month.

[edit] Battlefield

The battlefield lies about 65 km from the Golan heights, an upland region currently on the frontier between Israel and Syria, northeast of the Sea of Galilee.^[29]

It was Khalid ibn al-Walid who maneuvered to choose this field of battle, because he judged it most useful for cavalry operations, and because it allowed a clear line of retreat to Arabia. The battlefield which stretched between the two camps consisted of the Plain of Yarmouk which was enclosed on its western and southern sides by deep ravines, known as Wadi-ur-Raqqad with banks about 30 m deep. This ravine joins the Yarmouk River on its southern side. On the south of the battlefield lies the Yarmouk River, a tributary of the Jordan River, this stream has very steep banks from 10 to 30 m deep.^[3] On the northern side of the battlefield lies the Jabiya road and to the east lie the Azra hills, although these hills were outside the actual field of battle.

There was only one prominence in the battlefield: a 100 m high elevation known as the hill of Jamu'a (gathering), because part of the Muslim troops were concentrated on it, as it gives a good view of the plain of Yarmouk. In 636 the ravine at the west of the battlefield was crossable at a few places but there was only one main crossing, at a ford, where the village of Kafir-ul-Ma stands today.^[3]

[edit] Battle

The battle begun in the third week of August 636. At dawn both armies lined up for battle and were a little less than a mile apart.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Day 1

At midday one-third of the infantry of each of the four corps of the Byzantine army advanced to battle. The Roman assault was not a determined one. Mahan attempted a limited offensive on a broad front to test the strength and strategy of the Muslim army, and if possible, achieve a breakthrough wherever the Muslim front was weak. Many of the soldiers of the Imperial army were unused to battle and were unable to press the attack as the Muslim veterans did. On some parts of the front the fighting was intense, but on the whole the action of this day could be described as steady and moderately hard.^[30] The Muslims held their own. The Romans did not reinforce their forward infantry, and at sunset the action ended with the two armies separating and returning to their respective camps.^[3]

[edit] Day 2

Mahan in a council of war decided to launch his attack at dawn, so that the Muslims would be caught unprepared. His plan being to engage the two of his central armies with the Muslim's central armies to tie them down while the main thrusts would be against the wings of the Muslim army, which would then be either driven away from the battlefield or pushed in to the center. To observe the battlefield Mahan had a large pavilion built behind his right wing with an Armenians bodyguard force. He ordered the army to prepare for the surprise dawn attack.^[3]

The Byzantines attacked soon after dawn and the Muslims probably were caught unprepared, but Khalid had already placed a strong outpost line in front during night, which gave the Muslims time to prepare for battle. The sun was not yet up on this second day of battle when the two armies clashed.^[3] At the center, the Byzantines did not press hard, as this was meant to be a limited attack to pin the Muslim central corps in their position.^[31] Thus the center remained stable. But on the left wing of the Byzantine army, the Qanateer, commanding a force of mainly Slavs, attacked and forced the Muslim infantry to retreat. Amr ibn al-A'as, commander of right wing, ordered his cavalry regiment to counter attack, which checked the Byzantine advance and stabilized the battle line for some time.

The situation on the Muslim left wing was only a little less serious. Here the Byzantines broke through the corps. This was the army of Gregory, with chains, more slow-moving than the others but also more solid. Yazid, commander of left wing, also used his cavalry regiment to counter attack but it was repulsed. After a period of stiff resistance the warriors of Yazid fell back to their camps, but afterwards managed to hold a stable line.

Mahan's plan appeared to be succeeding. The center of the Muslim army was pinned down and its flanks had been pushed back. But although they had been forced back, neither flank had broken. It was now about midday, and Khalid decided to use his mobile guard to assist the wings in counterattacks to reestablish their battle positions.

Khalid first turned to the right wing and, with his mobile guard and the reserve cavalry regiment of the right wing, struck at the flank of the army of Qanateer at the same time as right wing counter-attacked again from the front. Simultaneously attacked from two sides, the Slavs very soon retreat to their original position. Amr regained all the ground that he had lost and started to reorganize his corps for the next round.

As soon as the position on his right was restored, Khalid turned to the left wing. By now Yazid had begun a major counterattack from the front to push the Romans back. He was up against the formidable chained Byzantine infantry of Gregory. Khalid detached one regiment under Zirrar ibn al-Azwar and ordered him to attack the front of the army of Deirjan (left half of the center) in order to create a diversion and threaten the withdrawal of the Roman right wing from its advanced position. With the rest of the mobile guard Khalid then attacked the flank of Gregory. Here again, under simultaneous attacks from front and flank, the Romans fell back, but more slowly because with their chains the men could not move as fast.^[32] A critical blow to Byzantine morale arrived while the Roman right was falling back. Zirrar ibn al-Azwar broke through one of the European contingents and killed the commander Dairjan. At sunset the central armies broke contact and withdrew to their original positions and both fronts were restored along the lines occupied in the morning. The death of Dairjan and the failure of Mahan's battle plan left the Imperial army relatively demoralized, whereas Khalid's successful counterattacks emboldened his troops.^[3]

[edit] Day 3

After the failure of the previous day's ambitious battle plan, and the loss of one of their senior commanders with the death of Deirjan, Mahan's Imperial Byzantine army decided on a less ambitious plan, aiming to break the Muslim army at a specific point: the junction between the centre of the Muslim army and its right flank. Qanateer's Slavs would lead the charge. Thus battle on this day began with a Byzantine attack on the right wing and on the right hand side of the centre of the Muslim army; the main point of attack being the junction between the two corps.

After holding the initial attacks, Muslim's right wing retreated toward their base camps followed by the retreat of the right half of the Muslim’s center.^[33] But this day the retreat was not as severe as that of the previous, and the corps managed to reorganize some distance from the Muslim camp for a counter attack.^[34]

Now, again, Khalid intervened decisively with his cavalry, launching his mobile guard against the left flank of Qanateer's corps (right half of Byzantine army's center). At the same time the right wing's cavalry regiment maneouvered from the right and struck at the left flank, while the infantry of right wing and right half of centre counter-attacked frontally. This time the combat was severe. Many on both sides fell in combat, but by dusk the Byzantines had been pushed back to their former positions and the situation restored to that existing at the beginning of the battle.^[35]

[edit] Day 4

The fourth day was to prove decisive, and both army commanders knew it. Mahan decided to persist with the previous day's war plan, judging that the right wing of the Muslim army had suffered a lot so far.

The two armies of Qanateer (right wing and right half of the central corps, Armenians and Slavs respectively) were set in motion against Muslims right wing and right half of center. Right wing was pushed back again, but not as far as on the previous day. Some distance behind its original position, Muslim's right wing held the Byzantine Slavs. In the sector of Muslim's right half of the center, however, the Armenians broke through and pushed the Muslims back towards their camp. The Armenians were strongly supported by the mounted Christian Arabs of Jabla, and this proved the most serious penetration of the Muslim front.

Once again, Khalid bin Walid decisively entered the fray with his mobile guard. Khalid feared a general attack on a broad front, which would make it impossible for him to repulse the Byzantine advance with his mobile guard; he therefore ordered Abu Ubaidah(left half of center) and Yazid(left wing) to attack the Byzantine corps on their respective fronts. The purpose of the attack was just to tie down the Byzantine right half of the center and right wing and preempt a general advance of the Imperial army.^[36].

Khalid then decided to strike against the advancing Armenians on the right half of the central corps. He divided his mobile guard into two equal groups of which one would attack at the southern flank of Armenians, while leading his own cavalry group, Khalid galloped round behind the right half of center and appeared against the northern flank of the Armenians. Now began a three-pronged counter attack against the Armenians and Christian Arabs: one cavalry regiment from the right, one from the left and right half of center, from the front. At last the Armenians(left half of center) fell back and retreated towards their own position. The operation against the Armenians lasted the whole afternoon.

As the Armenians pulled back, the Slavs of Qanateer, denied the support of the Armenians on their flank, also retired. The positions of Sharhabil and Amr were now restored. While the operation on the Muslims' right was taking place, a similarly intense fight was taking place on their left. With Khalid's reserve fully committed against the Armenians on the right sector, the left had to rely entirely on themselves. Khalid had ordered the corps of Abu Ubaidah and Yazid to attack the Byzantines from their respective fronts to tie them down and prevent a general assault by the entire Byzantine army, but soon they were pushed back by intense Byzantine archery, which caused heavy casualties. Many Muslim soldiers lost their sight to Byzantine arrows on that day, which thereafter became known as the "Day of lost eyes".^[37]

The armies of Abu Ubaidah and Yazid fell back, except the regiment of Ikramah bin Abu-Jahal, which was on the left of Abu Ubaidah's corps. Ikramah bin Abu-Jahal had called on his men to take an oath of death: to not retreat and to go down fighting. The four hundred men immediately responded and their attack impeded the Byzantine army. The self-sacrifice of Ikrimah’s regiment provided a cover for the retreating Muslims, who reorganized themselves and counter-attacked to regain their lost positions. All four hundred of the dedicated men who had taken the oath of death were either killed or seriously wounded, but in the process killed many more than four hundred Byzantines. Ikrimah and his son Amr were mortally wounded.^[38]

By dusk the day's action was over. Both armies stood once again on their original lines. Ikrimah and his son Amr, one of the childhood friends of Khalid ibn Walid, died that evening due to the wounds they got in their stand against the Byzantines. It had been a bloody day on which the Byzantines came very near to victory.

[edit] Day 5

Early on the fifth day of battle Mahan sent an emissary to the Muslim camp for a truce for the next few days so that fresh negotiations could be held. Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah nearly accepted the proposal but was restrained by Khalid ibn al-Walid. On Khalid's insistence he sent the envoy back with a negative reply, adding:^[39]

“

We are in a hurry to finish this business!

”

The rest of the day passed uneventfully. Khalid knew that the Byzantines were no longer eager for battle. Up till now the Muslim army had adopted a largely defensive strategy, but Khalid now decided to take the offensive and reorganized his troops accordingly. All the cavalry regiments were grouped together into one powerful mounted force with the mobile guard acting as its hard core. The total strength of this cavalry group was now about 8,000 mounted warriors, an effective corps for an offensive attack the next day.

Khalid formulated a simple but bold plan of attack. With his massed cavalry force he now intended to drive the Byzantine cavalry entirely off the battlefield so that the infantry, which formed the bulk of the Imperial army, would be left without cavalry support and thus be exposed and helpless when attacked from flank and rear. At the same time he planned to push a determined attack to turn the left flank of the Byzantine army and push them toward the ravine to the west.

[edit] Day 6

Now, Khalid put his battle plan into action. While the Muslim centre and left wing engaged the Byzantine armies on their fronts to pin them down,^[40] Khalid deployed his cavalry and charged the Byzantine left flank. At the same time he also dispatched a mounted regiment to engage and pin down the Byzantine cavalry of the left wing. Simultaneously, right wing launched a frontal attack on the left wing of the Imperial army. The left wing of the Byzantines, consisting mainly of Slavs under Qanateer, resisted this double sided attack but, getting no support from their own cavalry which was busy dealing with the cavalry charge against them, fell back into the left half of the center - onto the Armenians of Mahan. As the Byzantine left wing retreated, Muslim right wing, drove home its advantage and wheeled into an attack on the Byzantine left half of the center from their left flank, which was already in imbalance due to the retreating Slav corps. At the same time Muslim's right half of center now pressed their attack against them from the front.

The left wing of the Byzantine army had now been turned and the Muslim infantry were pressing their advantage. So Khalid now detached his cavalry from this fight and took them to join the dispatched regiment that was attacking the Byzantine cavalry of the left wing. The Byzantine cavalry was driven off the battlefield to the north. In response to this action on his left, Mahan tried to concentrate all his cavalry regiments behind the center to counterattack the advancing massed Muslim cavalry.

But he was not quick enough; before Mahan could organize his disparate heavy cavalry squadrons, Khalid had galloped his cavalry back to attack the concentrating Byzantine horses, falling upon them from the front and the flank while they were still maneuvering into formation. Muslim lightly armed horsemen were superb for these fluid situations, as they were able to attack, disengage, maneuver and strike again. Disorganized and disoriented, the Byzantine cavalry soon broke contact and dispersed to the north, leaving the infantry to its fate. This included the mounted corps of Jabla, who now scattered towards Damascus

As the Byzantine cavalry retreated in disorder, Khalid now turned his attentions to the main body of the Imperial army, the Armenian army of Mahan, attacking them from the rear. The Armenians were strong fighters who had come close to defeating the Muslim army when they broke through two days earlier, but under the three-pronged attack of Khalid's cavalry from the rear, Muslim's right wing from the left and right half of centre from the front, and with no support, and with their ranks already disturbed by the retreating Slavs of Qanateer, they had no chance. The Armenian line broke and fell back.

As the Armenians retreated, the entire Byzantine army was now in full retreat. Parts scattered in panic and parts fell back in good order west towards Wadi-ur-Riqqad.^[41]. Khalid now turned this retreat into a rout, taking his cavalry towards the northwest so that no troops could escape from there, though, before he could seal off all the gaps, a few thousand Byzantine troops escaped towards Damascus. The rest simply headed towards the ford which was the only safe crossing from the ravine of Waddi-ur-Riqqad.

But as the retreating Byzantine troops reached the ford they were met by the sight of a Muslim cavalry regiment under Zirrar ibn al-Azwar blocking their way at the ford. As part of his battle plan, Khalid had the night before sent 500 mounted troops towards that 500 meter wide ford to block the passage. In fact this was the route Khalid wanted the Byzantines to retreat along. Now the advancing Muslim infantry caught up from the east and the cavalry under Khalid’s command came from the north to link up with the regiment which was blocking the passage from the west. To the south lies the deep ravine of Yarmouk River, and there the Byzantine troops were corralled and surrounded.^[3]

The final phase of the battle began as the exhausted Byzantine corps were pushed back towards the ravine from the front, while from the flanking side they were pushed towards the center so that imbalance was created in the army. By this time the Imperial army had lost all formation and cohesion. In fact the Byzantine troops were pushed together so tightly that they were unable to use their weapons freely and soon they broke, unsuccessfully attempting to find a way through the ravine. Some of the Byzantines fell into the ravine, others fell fighting or surrendered, effectively ending the battle.

[edit] Aftermath

Immediately after this operation was over, Khalid ibn al-Walid and his mobile guard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers; he found them near Damascus and attacked. In the ensuing fight the commander-in-chief of the Imperial army, the Armenian king Mahan who had escaped the fate of most of his men at Yarmouk, was killed. Khalid then entered Damascus where he was welcomed by the local residents, thus recapturing the city.^[3] When news of the disaster reached the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius at Antioch, it is said that he bade a last farewell to Syria, saying:

“

Farewell Syria, my fair province. Thou art an enemy's now.

”

Heraclius then left Antioch for Constantinople. Abandoning Syria, the Emperor began to concentrate on his remaining forces for the defense of Egypt instead. The Byzantines again were defeated by the Muslims led by Amr ibn al-A'as — who had commanded the right flank of the Rashidun army at Yarmouk.

[edit] References

[edit] Bibliography

[edit] Primary sources

• Ibn Ishaq, Sirah Rasul Allah, 750.
• Al-Waqidi, Maghazi Rasulillah, 8th century.
• Theophanes the Confessor, Chronographia, 810-815.
• Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, 9th century.
• Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, History of the Prophets and Kings, 915.
• Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 1377.

[edit] Modern sources

• Akram, A. I. The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed, His Life and Campaigns, Nat. Publishing House. Rawalpindi, 1970. ISBN 0-71010-104-X. (See Eve of Yarmuk and Battle of Yarmuk.)
• Donner, Fred. The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton, 1981.
• Elton, Hugh. Review of Kaegi, W. E., Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. The Medieval Review. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, Scholarly Publishing Office, 1994.
• Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1776-1788.
• Gil, Moshe and Broido, Ethel. A History of Palestine, 634-1099, Cambridge University Press, 1997. ISBN 0521599849.
• Haldon, John. The Byzantine Wars, Tempus Publishing, 2001.
• Kaegi, Walter E. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests, Cambridge, 1992.
• Kaegi, Walter E. Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Cambridge, 2003.
• Kennedy, Hugh N. The Byzantine And Early Islamic Near East, Ashgate Publishing, 2006. ISBN 0754659097.
• Nicolle, David. Yarmuk 636 A.D.: The Muslim Conquest of Syria, Osprey Campaign Series #31, Osprey Publishing, 1994.
• Treadgold, Warren. Byzantium and Its Army: 284-1081, Stanford, 1995.
• Treadgold, Warren. A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford, 1997.
• Khalid ibn al-Walid, Encyclopædia Britannica (2007).

[edit] External links

• Battle of Yarmuk, 636