Battle of Zahleh

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Battle of Zahle
معركة زحلة
Part of the Lebanese Civil War
Date December 22, 1980 – June 30, 1981[2]
Location Zahle, Lebanon
Result Lebanese Forces strategic victory
Belligerents
Lebanese Forces Syria Syrian Armed Forces aka Arab Deterrent Force

Flag of Palestine.svg Palestine Liberation Organization


The Hanache Group[1]
Commanders and leaders
Bachir Gemayel Hafez Al Assad
Units involved
Lebanese Forces:
  • Al Wahdat el-Markaziya (Special LF Central Units)[3]
  • ISF (Internal Security Forces)[4]
  • Zahlawi Local Resistance groups[5]
Syrian Army Forces:[6]
  • 35th Brigade (Special Forces)
  • 41st Brigade (Special Forces)
  • 47th Brigade (Mechanized Infantry)
  • 51st Brigade (Ind. Armored)
  • 62nd Brigade (Mechanized Infantry)
  • 67th Brigade
  • 85th Brigade
  • 78th Brigade

Palestine Liberation Organization:[7]

  • al-Yarmouk Faction
  • al-Kostol Faction
Casualties and losses
est. 200 killed
200 wounded
Total: 400 casualties[8]
est. 300 killed
400 wounded
32 tanks and Armored Personal Carrier
Total: 700 casualties[9]

The Battle of Zahle (Arabic: معركة زحلة) took place during the Lebanese Civil War, between December 1980 and June 1981. During the seven-month period, the city of Zahle (Arabic: زحلة) endured a handful of political and military setbacks. The opposing key players were on the one side, the LF (Lebanese Forces) (Arabic: القوات اللبنانية) aided by Zahlawi townspeople, and on the other side, the Syrian Army Forces also known as ADF Arab Deterrent Force (Arabic: قوات الردع العربية), aided by some PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) factions.[10] Demographically, Zahleh is one of the largest predominantly Christian towns in Lebanon.[11] Adjacent to the town's outskirts, the Bekaa valley (Arabic: وادي البقاع), spanning the length of the Syrian borders. Given Zahle's close proximity to the Bekaa Valley, the Syrian Army Forces feared a potential alliance between Israel and the LF in Zahle. This potential alliance would not only threaten the Syrian military presence in the Bekaa valley, but was regarded as a national security threat from the Syrians' point of view, given the close proximity between Zahle and the Damascus highway.[12] Consequently, as a clamp down strategy, the Syrian forces controlled major roads leading in and out of the city and fortified the entire Valley. Around December 1980, tension increased between Zahlawi Lebanese Forces and Syrian backed Leftist militants. From April to June 1981, throughout the four-month period, a handful of LF members, aided by Zahlawi Local Resistance, confronted the Syrian war machine and defended the city from Syrian intrusion and potential invasion.

Zahle's Strategic Location[edit]

From the start of the Civil War, the city of Zahle's key strategic location served as a main artery for the fighting groups involved in the conflict, particularly for the Syrian Army Forces who occupied the adjacent Bekaa Valley from May 1976.[13] Throughout history, the city of Zahleh served as a trade hub for commerce; located between Damascus on the East side, including the fertile Bekaa valley that borders Syria, and Beirut City on the opposite west side. Although Zahlawi's readily took advantage of their location for trade and commerce, their geo-strategic location was a deterrent on the socio-political level between 1980 and 1981. From the west side, the city lies at the base of the 8,622 feet high Mount Sannine (Arabic: جبل صنين). The peak of Mount Sannine, not only overlooked the entire Bekaa Valley, but the Israeli occupied Golan heights and even further. With that said, the Syrian's securing at least the base of Mount Sannine prevented any potential Israeli or LF attempt to scrutinize the occupied Golan Heights and further deep into Syrian territories.

The Syrian Reaction to Zahle's Location[edit]

Strategically, the prime concern of the Syrians was to curb the Christian controlled city's geo-strategic attributes. Consequently, the Syrian Forces blocked the main roads leading in and out of the city. The Syrian forces, however, remained stationed outside the city, in particular, along the outskirts. The Syrian army chief of staff at the time, General Hikmat Chehabi (Arabic: حكمت شهابي) expressed concerns over a free and uncontrolled Zahleh falling into the hands of the Israeli Forces. The Israelis were providing military aid to the LF, whose presence was apparent inside Zahleh. Chehabi's concern was, that the LF might hand over the base of mount Sannine to the Israelis, given the mount peek outlooks the Golan heights and deep inside Syrian territories. To that end, Chehabi foresaw a problematic scenario on more than one level. One, if the Israeli Forces cut through Zahle city and position their forces along its outskirts, they would be stationed only four miles West of the Syrian fifth division in the town of Chtaura (Arabic: شتورة), located by the Beirut Damascus highway.[14] Two, such a scenario, if actualized, would not only threaten Syrian military presence in the Valley, but even the Syrian capital itself –– the Israeli army would be 8.6 miles West of the Syrian borders and 31 miles from the Syrian capital, Damascus. For that reason, the Syrian 85th and 78th brigades along with the 7th division regrouped across the valley.[15] In addition, Chehabi armed PLO's (Palestinian Liberation Organization) factions such as, al-Yarmouk, al-Kostol and Ain jallout positioned between the Litani River (Arabic: نهر الليطاني) and Zahrani River[16] (Arabic: نهر الزهراني).

Background[edit]

The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975 between the Christian Defenders and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. This first phase lasted 2 years until the Syrian Army invaded Lebanon under the pretext of "stopping the war and protecting the Christians". However, it was later revealed that the Syrian Army had entered the Lebanese territories at the beginning of the war under the cover of "Palestine Liberation Army" in order to put the resisting Christians in a vulnerable position in the war so that they will demand a Syrian intervention for their protection. The Christians, who were represented in the war mainly by the Phalangists, demanded in 1978 a Syrian withdrawal because they had turned into occupiers and their intentions became clear. In addition, Syria switched sides and stood with the PLO after the Camp David Accords in order the lead the Arabs in the conflict against Israel. Tensions started to form between the Phalangists and the Syrian Army. This led to the Hundred Days War that resulted in the expulsion of the Syrian Army from East Beirut and most of Mount Lebanon. These areas were called the "Free Areas".

Initial Syrian Setbacks[edit]

Prior to the December setbacks, the Moukhabarat (Arabic:المخابرات السورية), the Syrian Secret Service, assassinated several members of the Kataeb and Ahrar in order to cause an internal struggle between them, but the local leaders of these parties were aware of the Syrian plan. Then, the Syrian Secret Service was congregating surreptitiously in and around the city, aiding the left-wing armed group, Hanache.[17] Tensions between the local right-wing LF and left-wing Hanache continued to increase.[18] The catalyst to the initial setbacks ensued when Hanache Group attempted to control the offices of the National Liberal Party (NLP).[19] On December 22, 1980, shootings broke out between LF local members and the Hanache group which was resulted in the expulsion of the Hanache group from Zahle.[20] After the failure of previous attempts, the Syrians tried to enter the city, but the LF replied directly. During the confrontations, a total of five Syrian soldiers were killed.[21] As a result, the Syrian Forces shelled the overpopulated city for six consecutive hours, to pressure Zahlawis to hand over the militants responsible for the killing.[22] To even further increase the psychological pressure on the City, the Syrian checkpoints dispersed around the outskirts of the city blocked foodstuff and supply materials going in and out the Zahle, and Syrian MIGs flew over the city for a long period of time.[23] On the international level, the disproportionate Syrian reaction triggered a unified international criticism. France for example, described the shelling as a barbaric act; Washington described the shelling as a deplorable Syrian act.[24] Consequently, the shelling stopped due to the international pressure; the turmoil cooled off between January and March due to heavy snow storms the city endured during the winter of 1980 - 1981.[25] The two sides, however, remained alert while preparing for the upcoming conclusive battle.

Preparation for the War[edit]

The dire socio-political situation of Zahle alarmed the LF command post in Beirut. A weighty LF presence, however, was scarce in and around the turmoiled city. In addition to the impeding Syrian siege, the initial setbacks coincided with a harsh snowy winter. The siege and the rugged snowy mountains encumbered the LF and hindered the ability of trained elite resistant fighters to come from Beirut to aid local Zahlawis and local LF Nonetheless, commander in chief of the LF, Bachir Gemayel, dispatched his chief of staff Dr. Fouad Abou Nader to assess the dire situation in Zahleh. Reaching the city was problematic for Abou Nader on two levels: in addition to the cold winter and the heavy snow descending on the highest city of Lebanon, the Syrians controlled most of the main roads leading in and out of the city. To reach the city safely without being compromised by the Syrians, Abou Nader had to take foot trails and walk down the mountain in the snow, cutting down through the el-Berdawni river (Arabic: نهر البردوني). Upon reaching town, Abou Nader noticed that, although the Syrians blocked the northern access leading in and out the city, the southern access, in particular the Chtaura road was nevertheless open to circulation.[26] To that end, arms were smuggled inside the city, hidden in trucks carrying loads of wheat.[27] 120 trained elite members from the LF Central Units marched from Beirut to Zahleh to aid and mobilize the 1500 Local resistance fighters and the citizens of Zahle, to prepare for the final battle.[28] They used bulldozers in order to move the snow from the roads and they provided a direct phone line from Zahle to the military headquarters in Karantina.[29] The Lebanese Forces prepared the people in Zahle for the war and they set up a temporary hospital and they formed social groups to see what the people needed. Plus, mines were put, trenches were dug, and barricades were set up.[30]

On the other hand, the Syrians surrounded Zahle from all positions and they solidified their positions on previously controlled hills. This made any movement by the Lebanese Forces in the city open to be seen by the Syrian Forces.[31] The Syrians started kidnapped several Zahliots and they tortured them. Tensions between the Zahliots and the Syrians intensified during the last two weeks of March 1981.[32]

The War[edit]

First Phase[edit]

On April 1, 1982, the Syrians moved in to control the two hills, Harkat and Hammar, that links Zahle to the mountains. They were seen by the Lebanese Forces and they fired back. This was the trigger that started the battle of Zahle.[33] The Lebanese Forces assumed their positions according to the plan that was put to defend Zahle.[34]

The bridge in Zahle witnessed a ruthless battle on April 2–3 where the massive Syrian attack lasted from night till dawn and they weren't able to control it. During the battle for the bridge, the Syrian artillery pounded the city continuously which led to the death of tens of Zahliots while the Syrian Army lost about 50 men. Plus, the bridge was the place of the "massacre of tanks" since the Lebanese Forces were able to destroy more than 20 Syrian tanks in 2 days. The tenacity and courageousness and effectiveness of the fighters of the Lebanese Forces made the Syrians assume that Israelis were fighting alongside them![35]

During this battle, the Zahliots moved from the areas of fighting to a huge building because it was able to sustain a lot of damage. The Syrians focused their bombardment on this building until it collapsed on those hiding inside it which led to the death of 30 Zahliots, mainly women and children, while the Lebanese Forces were able to rescue 7 Zahliots who were still alive under the rubble. One of the rescued children was an 8 year-old boy who was yelling "Phalange, help, save me!" The dangerously wounded were taken to France for treatment.[36]

On April 4, nun Marie-Sofie Zoghby was bringing bread and medicine to the hospitals in Zahle along with 2 nurses Khalil Saydah and Salim Hamoud. The car was shot heavily by the Syrians which led to it slamming into the wall. The Syrians continued shooting at the car even after it crashed. The Lebanese Forces engaged in battle with the Syrians in order to be able to pull the bodies out of the car. It is important to note that the 2 nurses with her were Muslims and that showed that the Christians were not alone.[37]

Elias Hrawi sent the message of the Zahliots to the Syrian President, Hafez Al Assad, telling him that the only way to stop the battle is to send the Lebanese Army to Zahle and they will keep resisting the Syrian attack until this solution is reached. Hafez Al Assad told him that his army will not lose to a militia.[38]

After the intense fighting in the first two days, Bachir Gemayel decided to send more troops from Beirut to help with the resistance. In addition, "Milan" missiles, anti-tank missiles, were also sent to help with stopping the Syrian tanks.[39]

Second Phase[edit]

After the failure of entering Zahle through military force, the Syrian Army moved the battle towards the surrounding hills to tighten its siege over Zahle.[40]

The Lebanese Forces knew that they cannot defeat the Syrians in the battle for the hills because of their large number and their air superiority. They decided to try and fight for a few strategic hills so that they can keep the mountainous roads available for use for the movement of ammo and food.

The Syrians were able to control all of the hills in about a week. Although the Lebanese Forces were able to cause many casualties in the Syrian Army, the armed helicopters used by the Syrians gave them a huge advantage.[41] By controlling the hills, the Syrians closed all the roads that lead to Zahle.

On the night of April 10–11, Bachir called the fighters in Zahle and told them "Because the road is still open for a few hours only ... if you leave, you will save your lives and the fall of the city will be certain and this will be the end of our resistance ... if you stay, you will find yourselves without ammunition, without medicine, without bread, and maybe without water; your task will be to coordinate the internal resistance and defend the identity of the Lebanese Bekaa and the identity of Lebanon, and by that you will give a meaning to our six year war. If you decide to stay, know one thing, that heroes die and they don't surrender." Joe Edde, the man in charge in Zahle, looked at the faces of the fighters and he directly knew the answer, he replied to Bachir "We will stay".[42]

The siege of Zahle became sealed, and it was impossible to even send a piece of bread to the city. Bachir sent to the Israelis a series of exaggerated messages about the condition of Zahle in order to receive any kind of help from them. The Israelis said that they are ready to assist the Lebanese Forces diplomatically and by sending them weapons.

The Syrians then moved to control the highly strategic Mount Sannine and the French Room (the highest point on the mountain). The Syrians air raids played an important part in the successful capture of the mountain.[43] This was a very dangerous move by the Syrians since it put the entire "Free Christian Areas" in a dangerous position.

Bachir was afraid that this was the beginning of a full-scale attack on all the Christian areas. He met with the head of the Syrian Air Force intelligence agency, Mohammad El Khaouly where he told him that they will only be able to enter Zahle by force.[44] On the other hand, the Israelis intervened on the side of the Lebanese Forces, by shooting down Syrian choppers over Mount Sannine.[45] The Syrians replied by putting SAM missiles in the Bekaa Valley.[46] East Beirut was living in fear because of a possible Syrian attack, but the successful resistance in Zahle made the Syrians rethink their plans. Plus, the Lebanese Forces started preparing the front lines in case of a Syrian attack.[47]

These events made the USA intervene quickly to calm things down between Syria and Israel because it was afraid that a Syrian-Israeli war might lead to a war between them and the Soviet Union. The intervention was successful.[48]

Third Phase[edit]

After the American intervention to calm things down between Israel and Syria was successful, the fierce battle continued between the Syrians and the Lebanese Forces.

As the battle continued in Zahle, the Syrians were able to enter into Kaa' El Rim, a town next to Zahle; however, the Lebanese Forces launched a counter-attack and they were able to retake control over the town.[49] The fall of this town would put Zahle in a vulnerable position and facilitate its capture by the Syrians, so the Lebanese Forces prepared the front lines in order to repel any future attack by the Syrian Army.[50]

After a month after the failure of the capture of Kaa' El Rim, the Syrians blew up the water tanks and this led to the cutting of the supply of water from the city for two days; however, one of the employees told the Lebanese Forces that there is a backup water tank from the old network. Water was restored to the town, and it was also routed to Zahle. The perimeter surrounding the water tank was planted with mines to prevent the Syrians from reaching the generator and the tank in case the Syrians came close to that area.[51]

After a month and a half since the start of the fighting in Kaa' El Rim, some fighters asked Hanna El Atik, the person in charge, the possibility of surrendering the town since it was completely destroyed and defending it has become really difficult. This generated an argument between them until Hanna yelled "You still have your dignity. You either keep it or surrender it." The fighters returned to their posts and they remained in the town till the end of the war.[52]

The importance of Kaa' El Rim is that it contained chocolate factories and farms which provided food for its inhabitants and for the Zahliots.[53] After the failure of invading Zahle, the Syrians offered a solution that contained the following conditions:

  • The Lebanese Army replaces the Lebanese Forces in Zahle on condition that the soldiers are from Eblej (known for their loyalty to Syria), they obey Syrian orders, they are chosen by the Syrians, and the Syrians can replace any soldier they want.
  • The Syrian Army keeps its control over the surrounding hills.
  • The Syrians control the border of Zahle with the Bekaa Valley.
  • The Syrians control the international road Beirut-Damascus.
  • The Lebanese Forces leave Zahle without storing any weapons there.

Plus, the Lebanese Forces had to release a statement saying that the Syrians are not an occupying army and to stop calling for a Syrian withdrawal, and to acknowledge that the Bekaa Valley line cannot be passed since it belongs to Syria.

Bachir strongly rejected these conditions since the Syrians were trying to achieve in peace what they couldn't achieve in war. The Lebanese Forces put a new defensive plan and they prepared for another wave of fighting.[54]

Fourth and Final Phase[edit]

The fighting resumed and the lower floors of the schools became shelters for the women and children. Food was passed on for free to the houses where the women would prepare the food for the fighters.[55]

The Syrians launched an attack on the "Hill of Jeha" in order to penetrate through the front lines. The Lebanese Forces quickly tried to form a secondary defense line after they were told that the Syrians were able to capture the hill. They realized that forming a secondary defense line is difficult due to the type of the land on the hill, so they launched an attack to retake the hill. They were supported by the "Baskinta" artillery that hit the hill with about 300 shells. The plan worked and many Syrian soldiers were found dead because of the bombing.[56]

The Syrians realized their losses and their failure in capturing the hill, so they replied by shelling Zahle for 16 continuous hours.[57]

End of the War[edit]

After a series of Arab interventions and tries, a solution was finally reached in late June 1981.[58]

It was decided that the Syrians would abandon their positions around Zahle, and the Lebanese Forces would be replaced by Lebanese Internal Security Forces.

This solution was considered a victory for the Lebanese Forces since they were able to resist the Syrian attack and keep the city free from foreign occupation.

After 3 months of destruction, death, blood, and tears, Zahle breathed a sigh of relief. The Zahliots welcomed the Lebanese ISF with rice and roses, and they cried during the departure of the Lebanese Forces. One of the Zahliots said "We don't want to leave the fighters who defended our town with their blood, but we also cannot reject the peace and the arrival of the government forces."[59]

Bachir was afraid that the Syrians would attack Zahle after the Lebanese Forces leave, so they kept a small team just in case.[60]

The Lebanese Forces were supposed to surrender the heavy weapons to the Syrians, but they rejected that. Instead, the Syrians produced some equipment that doesn't work so that the press has something to photograph. Of course, nobody believed that these were the only weapons that were used in resisting a 3 months full scale attack, but they couldn't do anything about it.[61]

During the return to Beirut, the people in all areas threw rice over the fighters in the buses until they reached the huge ceremony that was done on their behalf in Karantina. Bachir decorated them with medals for their tremendous resistance and in his speech he told them "You can now rest because Zahle remained Lebanese and free".[62]

After the Withdrawal[edit]

Bachir sent a team to assess the damages and start with the reconstructions since the city and the neighboring towns were completely destroyed.[63]

The Syrians tried to enter the city several times, but the Lebanese ISF stood in their way and that stopped the attacks.[64]

After a month, the team that stayed in Zahle returned to Beirut after things cooled down.[65]

Demonstrations During the Zahle campaign[edit]

-Demonstrations in Paris,New York, and Ottawa that demanded the withdrawal of the Syrians and the halting of the "massacre" in Zahle.

-The bishops in Zahle played an important role in the war where they stressed on the independence of Zahle and Lebanon, and they held a demonstration near the Presidential Palace in Baabda.

-Hunger strike by the nuns demonstrating near the Presidential Palace.

-Pope Jean Paul II called for the stop of the Syrian onslaught on Zahle.

-Many governments called for the stop of the battle, including Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, in addition to the United Nations.[66]

Formation of the Sadem[edit]

Hanna El Atik took advantage of the extra month he stayed in Zahle to write a report to Bachir where he studied the pros and cons of the defense strategy used and how it can be improved. He also suggested the formation of a special fighting unit called "Sadem" that consists of the elite fighters in the Lebanese Forces. Bachir agreed to the suggestion and they directly started planning the structure and the goals of this unit.[67]

References[edit]

  • Syria's Battles in Lebanon - Part 2 (Clovis Choueifaty)
  • From Israel to Damascus
  • Battle of Zahle - LBC Documentary

External links[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. 
  2. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban: du Coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. pp. 106–170. 
  3. ^ Abou Nade, Fouad. "On Battle of Zahleh". YouTube video. michel10452. Retrieved 5 November 2011. 
  4. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 10. 
  5. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 10. 
  6. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 11. 
  7. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban: du Coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. pp. 106–107. 
  8. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban: du Coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 171. 
  9. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 166. 
  10. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. pp. 106–107. 
  11. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. 
  12. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. pp. 106–107. 
  13. ^ "Syrian Occupation of Lebanon (1976-2005)". Lgic. Retrieved November 6, 2011. 
  14. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 107. 
  15. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 108. 
  16. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 108. 
  17. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 6. 
  18. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 6. 
  19. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 7. 
  20. ^ Mclaurin, R. D. (1986). The battle of Zahle (Technical memorandum 8-86). MD: U.S Army Human Engineering Laboratory. p. 7. 
  21. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 107. 
  22. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 107. 
  23. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 107. 
  24. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 107. 
  25. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gémayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 111. 
  26. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gemayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 108. 
  27. ^ Menargues, Alain (2004). Les secrets de la guerre au Liban : du coup d'Etat de Bachir Gemayel aux Massacres des Camps Palestiniens. Albin Michel. p. 108. 
  28. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 166. 
  29. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 44. 
  30. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 49. 
  31. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 53. 
  32. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 54. 
  33. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 53. 
  34. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 57. 
  35. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 58. 
  36. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 66. 
  37. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 70. 
  38. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 73. 
  39. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 78. 
  40. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 85. 
  41. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 96. 
  42. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 100. 
  43. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 106. 
  44. ^ Shoueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 111. 
  45. ^ Shoueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 112. 
  46. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 115. 
  47. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 113. 
  48. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 118. 
  49. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 119. 
  50. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 123. 
  51. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 125. 
  52. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 127. 
  53. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 129. 
  54. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 132. 
  55. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 133. 
  56. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 137. 
  57. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 140. 
  58. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 147. 
  59. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 149. 
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  61. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 151. 
  62. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. pp. 153–154. 
  63. ^ Shoueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 161. 
  64. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 162. 
  65. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 162. 
  66. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 186. 
  67. ^ Choueifaty, Clovis (2010). The Battles of Syria In Lebanon Vol 2. self-published. p. 163. 

See also[edit]