Battle of the Bagradas River (239 BC)
|Battle of Bagradas River|
|Part of Carthage's Mercenary War|
Rebelling Libyan towns and cities.
|Commanders and leaders|
8,000 infantry, 2,000 Cavalry, 70 elephants
|Unclear, an estimated 25,000. 15, 000 under Spendius at Utica, 10,000 near the bridge on Bagradas River.|
|Casualties and losses|
|Unknown||6000 killed, 2000 captured|
The Battle of Bagradas River or “Battle on the Macar” (c. 240 BC) was fought between Carthaginian forces and part of the combined forces of Carthage's former mercenary armies during the Mercenary War which it used to conduct the First Punic War and those of rebelling Libyan cities. After the forces of Hanno the Great were defeated at Utica, and failed to engage the mercenaries afterwards despite favorable conditions, Carthage raised a new army under Hamilcar Barca in Carthage. Hamilcar managed to leave Carthage despite the rebel blockade of the city and cross the Bagradas river. Rebel armies from besieging Utica and the camp guarded the bridge on the Bargradas river. Hamilcar Barca, by brilliant maneuvering, defeated the combined rebel army. This was the first major Carthaginian victory of the war.
- 1 Background
- 2 Opening Moves
- 3 Hamilcar Barca given a command
- 4 The Battle
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 Bibliography
- 7 Footnotes
- 8 External links
The First Punic War ended with the Roman victory in the Battle of Aegates Islands in March 241 BC and Carthage authorizing Hamilcar Barca to start peace negotiations with Rome. The eventual settlement between Rome and Carthage included evacuation of Sicily by Carthage and payment of 3,200 silver talents to Rome as war preparations, 1000 (21 tons of silver) immediately and 2,200 (56 ton of silver) in ten year installments. After paying Rome the indemnity which was part of the treaty, it could not easily pay the army of some 20,000 mercenaries it had employed to fight against Rome.
Miscalculation, mistrust and mutiny
Hamilcar Barca and Gisco, the commander of Lilybaeum who actually conducted the talks, had forced the Romans to agree not to disarm the Carthaginian army in Sicily. After the garrisons of Drepana and Eryx gathered at Lilybaeum, Hamilcar left Sicily for Carthage, leaving Gisco to manage the demobilization. The mercenaries resented Hamilcar abandoning them in this fashion.
This army had been commanded by Hamilcar Barca from 247 BC to 241 BC. Lacking numbers to fight set piece battles and resources from Carthage to build a larger one, Hamilcar relentlessly harassed the Roman forces, employing combined arms tactics, shrugged off failures, remained undefeated and kept the Romans occupied and financially bankrupted the Roman Republic. His charismatic leadership, combined with stern discipline (he executed mutineers) and promise of rich rewards kept his mercenary army intact and combat ready for seven years. This force was now fully armed, awaiting discharge and the promised rewards. On top of the 1,220 talents owed to the Romans as war reparations, the mercenary back pay, which may have amounted between a few hundred to several thousand silver talents, had to be disbursed.
Mishandling the discharge
Gisco, probably aware of the financial difficulties faced by Carthage, sensibly sent the troops to Carthage in small groups with intervals in between  so the government could pay them off without having a large force gather in Carthage. This sensible approach was totally foiled by the Punic authorities They withheld pay and allowed the mercenaries to gather in Carthage with their families and possessions. The government planned to negotiate with the mercenaries in accepting lesser pay than that was due to them. As their presence disrupted civil life in Carthage, they were sent to Sicca with their families and a gold coin each. The authorities refused to let the mercenaries keep their baggage in the city and rewarded the Punic officers who managed to get the mercenaries moving to Sicca. Carthage lost an opportunity to keep the families hostage to ensure future good behavior.
Sicca to Tunis
Delays in dealing with the mercenaries eventually led to the gathering of the entire army and their families in Sicca Veneria (modern El Kef), where they demanded payment from the Carthaginian negotiator Hanno the Great. The exact amount owned the mercenaries can only be guessed, but given the back pay, ration money and any other rewards promised, it probably was a substantial amount, which the mercenaries inflated after the reached Sicca. When Hanno refused their demands, as Carthage actually hoped to reduce the payment amount, and mercenaries were unsympathetic about the financial difficulties of Carthage, the negotiations broke down, the mercenaries seized Tunis. Carthage now sent provisions to Tunes and agreed to all the demands of the mercenaries, and sent Gisco to payoff the demanded amount.
Gisco began to pay off the mercenaries nationality by nationality, and events may have ended there, but two mercenary leaders, Spendius and Mathos, fomented revolt among the Libyan troops, for their own personal reasons, and were able eventually to persuade the entire mercenary army to revolt. The mercenaries seized the Carthaginian negotiators and the money. Matho used the funds to pay off the amount due to the mercenaries and fund the war effort. After settling the payments of the mercenaries, the rebels called upon the Libyan towns and cities under Carthaginian control to join the revolt. Several Libyan cities joined the revolt, providing men and funds (Libyan women donated personal possessions and jewels)  to gather a force of 70,000. These events probably took place in the autumn/winter of 241 BC.
Matho divided the rebel army into several detachments. Matho took two armies to cut off the cities of Utica and Hippacritae, while an army took up position along the only bridge over the River Macar linking Carthage and Utica. Spendius cut off Carthage from the mainland while rebels made Tunes their main base. The rebels had no siege weapons and decided not to assault the besieged towns, but they would from time to tome advance on Carthage to terrorize the city.
The Carthaginian Response
With their navy shattered in the First Punic War and their mercenaries in revolt, Carthage could do little but man the walls as an immediate response to the revolt. Carthage raised an army from citizens and mercenaries, trained their cavalry and refitted her navy, which probably took until the spring of 240 BC. Hanno the Great was put in command of the army, which included 110 elephants but the exact number of troops is unknown. Hanno chose to relieve Utica, since rebels had cut off Carthage from the mainland, Hanno and his army was probably ferried to Utica by the Punic fleet, which was also under siege by the rebel army under Spendius. The exact size of the rebel force is not known. Hanno initially defeated the rebels encamped near Utica and captured the rebel camp, but his negligence and the lax discipline of the Carthaginian army enabled the rebels to regroup, launch a surprise attack, capture the Carthaginian camp and drive the Carthaginian survivors in Utica. Hanno’s army later left Utica but failed to engage the rebels under favorable conditions several times. Carthage decided to raise a new army and recalled Hamilcar Barca to command. Rebels continued their blockade of Carthage, Utica and Hippo Acra.
Hamilcar Barca given a command
While Hanno the Great was campaigning against the rebels, Carthage had cobbled together another army raised from citizens, rebel deserters and newly hired mercenaries, numbering 8,000 foot, 2,000 horse and 70 elephants. Hamilcar Barca was given command of this force, and he spent some time training his soldiers. Carthage made no fresh move against the rebels. Hanno and his army continued watching the two rebel camps at Hippo Acra. Rebel army under Spenius, numbering 15,000, was blockading Utica. Another 10,000 strong rebel army was encamped near the only bridge across the River Bagradas, the exact location is not known.
Hamilcar's army breaks out
Hamilcar did not attack the rebel’s blockading Carthage head on after his army was properly trained. He sought to gain the freedom to maneuver and fight the rebels on his own terms. The rebel base at Tunes and rebel dispositions, which probably barricaded the passes on the hills between Djebdl Ammar and Djebel Nahli, cut off Carthage from the mainland. Hamilcar had observed that when the wind blew from a certain direction, a sandbar was uncovered on the river mouth which made the Bagradas river fordable.
Hamilcar marched his army out of Carthage at night, and marched along the north shore of the isthmus towards the mouth of the Bagradas river. His movement was not detected by the rebels and at the first opportunity he crossed the Bagradas river along the sandbar. Hamilcar’s army was free to maneuver in the African countryside.
Composition of Forces
Carthaginian citizens normally wore armor, leg greaves, Greek style helmets, carried a round shield, long spear and sword and fought in Phalanx formation. Carthaginian citizens and the Libyo-Phoenicians provided disciplined, well trained cavalry equipped with thrusting spears and round shields. Any mercenaries in Hanno the Great’s army may have resembled the rebels they were facing. Carthage also used Elephants, probably African Forest and Indian Elephants as shock troops. The elephants were ridden by specially trained riders, some may have come from ancient India or Syria.
The rebel army had Libyans, Iberians, Gauls, Greeks, and probably Thracians and Scythians present, along with Campanians and Roman deserters. The Libyan heavy infantry fought in close formation, armed with long spears and round shields, wearing helmets and linen cuirasses. The light Libyan infantry carried javelins and a small shield, same as Iberian light infantry. The Iberian infantry wore purple bordered white tunics and leather headgear. The heavy Iberian infantry fought in a dense phalanx, armed with heavy throwing spears, long body shields and short thrusting swords. Campanian, Sardinian, Sicel and Gallic infantry fought in their native gear, but often were equipped by Carthage. Sicels, Sardinians and other Sicilians were equipped like Greek Hoplites, as were the Sicilian Greek mercenaries. Balearic Slingers fought in their native gear.
Numidians provided superb light cavalry armed with bundles of javelins and riding without bridle or saddle, and light infantry armed with javelins. Iberians and Gauls also provided cavalry, which relied on the all out charge.
Hamilcar’s army completed the river crossing unmolested and undetected by the rebels, and then moved towards the rebel camp near the bridge. Spendius led 15,000 troops from Utica to confront Hamilcar, while 10,000 rebels from the camp near the bridge also advanced towards Hamilcar’s position. Caught in a pincer movement, Hamilcar started to march north. The two rebels forces joined up and began to march north on a parallel course. The army of Spendius outnumbered Hamilcar’s army two to one, so he could afford to form his army in two lines, although the rebels had no elephants and nothing is known of their cavalry. Spendius extended his left flank to the north in an attempt to outflank the Carthaginians. His intention was to have his right flank stop the Carthaginian movement north while his main force attacked and pushed the Carthaginain army towards the river.
The plan of Spendius was foiled by Himalcar Barca’s brilliant counter maneuver, which enabled his outnumbered and seemingly outmaneuvered army to emerge victorious in the ensuing battle. Exactly what Hamilcar did is not clearly known and the issue has been much discussed. It is known that Hamilcar pretended to retreat, which caused the rebels to launched a disorderly attack, while Hamilcar got his soldiers in battle formation to crush the rebels.
The About Turn
According to one line of thought, the Carthaginian army order of march had the War Elephants leading the column, with the light troops and cavalry behind the elephants. Heavy infantry formed the rearguard, and the whole army marched in a single file in battle formation.
When Hamilcar observed Spendius extending his battle line to outflank the Carthaginian right flank and cut off the Carthaginian army’s line of advance, he ordered his elephants to turn right, away from the rebel army. The cavalry and light infantry did the same after the elephants, while the heavy infantry continued to move forward. The rebels mistook this for a withdrawal and rushed forward to engage. This wild charge disordered their battle line, some rebel units moving ahead of others.
The elephants then again turned right, followed by the Carthaginian light infantry and cavalry, so they were now moving south. Parallel to the heavy infantry in the opposite direction The Carthaginian infantry, moving northwards, stopped, turned left and formed a battle line, facing the onrushing rebels. The elephants, light infantry and cavalry are now positioned behind the Carthaginian heavy infantry battle line.
The Carthaginian elephants, light infantry and cavalry again turned right, divided into two divisions and took their position on both flanks of the Carthaginian heavy infantry. The rebel formations no longer outflanked the Carthaginian army, and a solid battle line now confronted a disorderly rebel army.
According to another line of thought, Hamilcar’s army marched in three separate columns, The War elephants were placed nearest the rebel army. The cavalry and light infantry was in the middle, while the heavy infantry was posted furthest from the rebel army.
As the three Carthaginian columns moved north, Spendius extended his left flank to overlap the Carthaginian formation and outflank and cutoff the Carthaginians. Hamilcar’s army halted its march seeing this development. The cavalry and light infantry, and the elephants turn right, then move through gaps in the heavy infantry formation. The rebels mistake this as Carthaginian withdrawal and rush forward to attack.
The Carthaginian heavy infantry next turns right, close gaps and form a battle line to face the rebels. The elephants, cavalry and light infantry split into two divisions, and moves into position on the flanks of the Carthaginian heavy infantry. The rebel formations no longer outflanked the Carthaginian army, and a solid battle line confronted a disorderly rebel formation.
As the numerically superior but outgeneraled rebels closed and confronted the solid Carthaginian battle line pandemonium ensued. Instead of hitting the Carthaginians with an orderly formation of infantry en mass, some rebel units engaged the Carthaginians before other units could arrive in support, while others stopped to regroup. As a result, some rebel units were thrown back by the Carthaginians, or as some of the units stopped their charge, the units following them ploughed straight into their back. Battle cohesion was lost and before the rebels could reorder and regroup, Carthaginian cavalry and infantry charged the entangled rebel units. Scores of rebels were killed, and as the Carthaginian infantry followed up the cavalry and elephant charge, the rebel army broke and scattered, having lost 6,000 of their number. Carthaginian pursuit bagged 2000 prisoners.
The surviving rebels fled either to Utica or to their camp beside the bridge. Hamilcar, after mopping up the battle field, advanced on the rebel camp, forcing the rebels to flee to Tunes, where they were reunited with their commander Spendius. Hamilcar then moved towards Utica, forcing the rebels to flee to Hippo Acra. The rebel blockade of Utica was broken. Hamilcar had the choice to join up with Hanno and try to lift the rebel blockade of Hippo Acra as well. Instead he began to mop up the lands beside the Bagradas river, by force or diplomacy asserting Carthaginian authority over the rebel Libyan towns, thus cutting off the rebels from sources funds, recruits and provisions and ensuring Cartage can tap the same resources.
Note: The main source for information about The Mercenary War comes from Polybius, a Greek historian writing many years after the events portrayed here, because no Punic primary sources survived into modern times. It is likely that he based much of his account on now-lost works of prior Greek and Roman historians, who are unlikely to have had an unbiased view of Carthage.
- Polybius, The Histories.
- Appian, History of Rome: The Sicilian Wars.
- Bagnall, Nigel (1990). The Punic Wars. ISBN 0-312-34214-4.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel Military Paperbacks. ISBN 0-304-36642-0.
- Miles, Richard (2011). Carthage Must Be Destroyed. Penguin Group. ISBN 978-0-141-01809-6.
- Lazanby, Johm Francis (2003). The First Punic War. Routledge. ISBN 1-85728-136-5.
- Lancel, Serge (1999). Hannibal. Blackwell Publishers Limited. ISBN 0-631-21848-3.
- Dodge, Theodore A. (2004) . Hannibal. Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-81362-7.
- Bath, Tony (1999). Hannibal’s Campaigns. Barns & Noble Books. ISBN 0-88029-817-0.
- Polybius 1:73.1.
- Polybius 1:75.1-75.2.
- Polybius 1:76.1
- Polybius, 1:62.8-63.3.
- Polybius, 66.5, and 1:68.12
- Polybius 1.66.1, 68.12,
- Zonaras 8.16
- Hoyos Dexter, The Truceless War, pp27-31
- Polybius 1.66.12, Appian 5.2.2-3
- Polybius 1.66.2-4
- Polybius 1.66.6
- Polybius, 1:66.6-66.12.
- Po0lybius 1.66.1-1.6712
- Appian, 2.7; Polybius, 1:67.1-68.13.
- Polybius 1.68.1, 1.69.3
- Polybius 1.69.4, 1.70.6
- Polybius 1.72.5-6
- Polybius 1.70.8-9
- Polybius, 1:68.4-68.13.
- Polybius 1.73.7
- Polybius 1.73.1-2
- Polybius 1.73
- Polybius 1.74.3-4
- Polybius 1.74
- Lancel Serge, Hannibal, pp14, ISBN 0-631-20631-0
- Polybius 1.73.1, 1.75.2
- Polybius 1.75.5
- Lancel, Serge, Hannibal, pp17
- Polybius 1.67.7
- Goldsworthy, Adrian, The fall of Carthage, p 32 ISBN 0-253-33546-9
- Makroe, Glenn E., Phoenicians, p 84-86 ISBN 0-520-22614-3
- Polybius 1.76.1-5
- Hoyos Dexter, The Truceless War, pp115-124
- Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, pp116-117
- Polybius 1.76.5
- Dodge, T.A, Hannibal, pp135
|This section requires expansion. (January 2007)|