Battle of the Philippine Sea

Battle of the Philippine Sea
Part of World War II, Pacific War
The carrier Zuikaku (center) and two destroyers under attack by U.S. Navy carrier aircraft, June 20, 1944
Date June 19–20, 1944 Location The Philippine Sea Result Decisive American victory
Belligerents
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Raymond A. Spruance Marc A. Mitscher	Jisaburō Ozawa Kakuji Kakuta
Strength
7 fleet carriers 8 light fleet carriers 7 battleships 79 other ships 28 submarines 956 aircraft	5 fleet carriers 4 light carriers 5 battleships 19 other ships 24 submarines 450 carrier-based aircraft 300 land-based aircraft
Casualties and losses
1 battleship damaged 123 aircraft destroyed	3 fleet carriers sunk 2 oilers sunk 550–645 aircraft destroyed 6 other ships damaged

The Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) was a decisive naval battle of World War II which effectively eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions. It took place during the United States' amphibious invasion of the Mariana Islands during the Pacific War. The battle was the fifth of five major "carrier-versus-carrier" engagements between American and Japanese naval forces, and involved elements of the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet as well as ships and land-based aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Navy's Mobile Fleet and nearby island garrisons.

The battle was nicknamed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" by American aviators for the severely disproportional loss ratio inflicted upon Japanese aircraft by American pilots and anti-aircraft gunners. During the battle a pilot from the USS Lexington reportedly remarked "This is like an old-time turkey shoot!" The lopsided outcome is generally attributed to American advantages in pilot and crew training and tactics, war technology, and ship and aircraft design, which the Japanese could not match over the course of the war. Though at the time the battle appeared to be a missed opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet, the reality was that the Imperial Japanese Navy had lost the bulk of their carrier air strength and would never recover.

Background

With the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto on 19 April 1943, Admiral Mineichi Koga succeeded as Commander in Chief of the Mobile Fleet. Under his direction the Imperial Japanese Navy had looked to engage the American fleet in a single decisive battle in early 1944.

From the start of the conflict the Japanese war plan had been to discourage America by inflicting such severe and painful losses on her military that the public would become war weary and the American government would be convinced to allow Japan to keep her conquests in east and southeast Asia. Though at a numerical disadvantage from the outset, and an industrial disadvantage that would add to that disparity over the course of time, the Japanese high command believed they could fight the U.S. Navy in a single, decisive engagement, the Kantai Kessen, which would allow them to defeat the Americans. However, their ability to fight and win such a battle was slipping away with time. Imperial Navy aircrew losses suffered over the course of the earlier carrier battles at Coral Sea, Midway, and in the long Solomons campaign of 1942-43 had decimated the Japanese Navy's ability to project force with their carriers. As the Guadalcanal campaign was largely fought by the Imperial Navy, losses suffered there drastically reducing the number of skilled carrier pilots available to fill the carrier air groups. Losses suffered in the Solomons could be absorbed, replaced and made good by the US Navy. They could not be replaced by the Japanese.

It took nearly a year for the Japanese to reconstitute their airgroups following the Solomons campaign. Their initial plan was to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet in early 1944, whenever it launched its next offensive, but the decisive battle necessarily had to be delayed. Meanwhile, American material production capacity, aircrew training and technological advances made a Japanese victory increasingly difficult to achieve. By the end of 1942 the Allied navies had overcome most of the technological edges Japan's ships and planes had held at the start of the war. Furthermore, by mid-1943 mass production of ships and improved aircraft began to tip the balance of forces in the favor of the Allies. Allied educational training practices similarly adapted to new developments, along the way totally revising the fleet operations with parallel developments in both the Combat Information Center and in their doctrine, training, and practices to get the most out of the new communications and sensor technologies.

In 1944 the Fast Carrier Task Force, under Admiral Marc Mitscher (known as Task Force 58 when part of Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet and Task Force 38 when led by Admiral William F. Halsey as part of the Third Fleet) began a series of softening-up missions aimed at weakening Japanese land based airpower to limit Japan's ability to interfere with future amphibious invasions. With the possible exception of Admiral Mitscher, few commanders realized how powerful the Task Force 58 had become. Though initially undertaken with trepidation, the raids proved to be successful beyond anything US planners had imagined, and changed the manner in which the war would be pursued.

The Japanese commanders saw the Marianas island group in the Central Pacific, including Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, as the inner circle of defense. Land-based fighter and bomber aircraft on these islands controlled the sea lanes to Japan and protected their home islands. In late 1943 Japan's 'outer' defensive ring was punctured at the costly Battle of Tarawa, and in early 1944 the U.S. fleet continued on through the Marshalls in a steady progression across the Central Pacific islands. The Imperial Staff calculated the Marianas would be next to come under similar attack. American control of the Marianas would put the Japanese home islands within effective range of American bombers. If the Marianas came under attack, the Japanese navy could wait no longer. This would be their time to bring the US Navy into the long awaited decisive battle.

Though US planners, particularly Admiral Spruance, were wary that the Japanese would try to attack U.S. transports and newly-landed forces, the Japanese were looking to engage and defeat Task Force 58, the major fighting unit of the US Navy. The Japanese had a number of advantages they hoped would turn the battle in their favor. The Japanese planned to bring as much power as they could to bear. Though outnumbered in ships and aircraft, they planned to supplement their carrier airpower with land-based aircraft. In addition, the Japanese aircraft had superior range, which could allow them to engage the American carriers beyond the range of the American aircraft. Furthermore, with island bases in the area, the Japanese hoped to launch at distance, have their aircraft attack the US fleet and then land on island airfields. They then could shuttle back and attack again on the return flight. Thus the U.S. fleet would be in the position of receiving punishment without being able to deliver it. Lastly, the area was dominated by the easterly trade winds. Aircraft in those days needed a head wind blowing across the flight deck to enable the aircraft to launch. The easterly trade winds that dominated the Central Pacific seas meant that aircraft carriers would necessarily have to be steaming eastward to launch and recover aircraft. This meant that a fleet located to the west of the Marianas would necessarily be in position to initiate and break off the battle, placing the initiative in the hands of the Japanese.

In March 1944 the commander of the Japanese navy was killed when his aircraft flew into a typhoon and crashed. A new Commander in Chief of the Mobile Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, was appointed. He continued the current work, finalizing the Japanese plans known as "Plan A-Go", or "Operation A-Go" The plan was adopted in early June 1944, then within weeks, quickly put into place to engage the American fleet now detected heading for Saipan.

Initial stages

On June 12, 1944 U.S. carriers started a series of air strikes on the Marianas, convincing Admiral Toyoda that the U.S. was preparing to invade. This move came as a surprise; the Japanese had expected the next U.S. target to be farther to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus, and had protected the Marianas with only 50 land-based aircraft. On June 13, U.S. forces began bombardment operations for invading Saipan; in response, Toyoda ordered a fleet-based counterattack. The main portions of the fleet, consisting of six carriers and several battleships, rendezvoused on June 16 in the western part of the Philippine Sea and completed refueling on June 17.

The Japanese fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, consisted of five large carriers (Taihō, Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Junyō, and Hiyō), four light carriers (Ryuho, Chitose, Chiyoda, and Zuihō), five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Kongō, Haruna and Nagato) along with supporting cruisers, destroyers, and oilers. This force was sighted on June 15 by American submarines and by the next day Admiral Spruance, commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet, was convinced that a major battle was at hand. By the afternoon of June 18, Task Force 58 commander Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, aboard his flagship (the carrier USS Lexington) had the Fast Carrier Task Force formed up near Saipan to meet the Japanese attack.

Task Force 58 was made up of five task groups. In the rear and closest to the Japanese was the battle group of Vice Admiral Willis Lee. Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7), consisted of seven fast battleships (Washington, North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota and Alabama). Just north of them was the weakest of the carrier groups, Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4 of three carriers (Essex, Langley and Cowpens). To the east, in a line running north to south, were three groups each containing four carriers: Rear Admiral Joseph Clark's Task Group 58.1 (Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood and Bataan); Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery's Task Group 58.2 (Bunker Hill, Wasp, Cabot and Monterey) and Rear Admiral John W. Reeves's Task Group 58.3 (Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto and Princeton). The capital ships were supported by eight heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 28 submarines.

Shortly before midnight on June 18, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz sent Spruance a message from Pacific Fleet Headquarters indicating that the Japanese flagship was approximately 350 miles (562 km) to the west-southwest of Task Force 58. This was determined based on a "fix" obtained by radio direction-finding when a Japanese vessel broke radio silence, but Mitscher wondered if the radio fix was part of another Japanese deception. It was considered the Japanese may have sent a single vessel there to break radio silence and mislead them into thinking they were farther off then they were.

Mitscher realized that if Task Force 58 were to advance westward, there was a strong chance of a night surface encounter with Ozawa's forces. He therefore conferred with Lee and inquired whether Lee favored such an encounter. Experienced in the confusion that was common place in the night actions off Guadalcanal, he was not enthusiastic about a night engagement with Japanese surface forces. He felt his crews were not adequately trained for such an action. Shortly after his discussion with Lee, Mitscher asked Spruance for permission to head west during the night to reach what would be an ideal launch position for an all-out aerial assault on the enemy force at dawn.

Spruance refused. Throughout the run-up to the battle he had been concerned that the Japanese would try to draw his main fleet away from the landing area using a diversionary force, and would then make an attack around the flank of the U.S. carrier force—an "end run"—hitting the invasion shipping off Saipan. He was therefore not prepared to let Task Force 58 be drawn westward, away from the amphibious forces, as he was aware that Japanese operational plans frequently relied on diversionary forces. On this occasion, however, there was no such aspect to the Japanese plan; there was no ruse and no diversionary force.

Battle

Map of Battle of the Philippine Sea

Early actions

At 05:30 on June 19, TF-58 turned northeast into the wind and started to launch their air patrols. The Japanese had already launched their morning search patrols using some of the 50 aircraft stationed on Guam, and at 05:50, one of these, a Mitsubishi Zero, found TF-58. After radioing his sighting of U.S. ships, he attacked one of the destroyers on picket duty and was shot down.

Thus alerted, the rest of the Guam forces began forming up for an attack, but were spotted on radar by U.S. ships, and a group of F6F Hellcats from the Belleau Wood were sent to investigate. The Hellcats arrived while aircraft were still launching from Orote Field. Minutes later, additional radar contacts were seen, which were later discovered to be the additional forces being sent north from the other islands. A huge battle broke out; 35 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down, and the battle was still going an hour later when the Hellcats were recalled to their carriers.

Japanese raids

Fighter aircraft contrails mark the sky over Task Force 58, June 19, 1944

The recall had been ordered after several ships in TF-58 picked up radar contacts 150 miles (240 km) to the west around 10:00. This was the first of the raids from the Japanese carrier forces, with 68 aircraft. TF-58 started launching every fighter it could, and by the time they were in the air, the Japanese had closed to 70 miles (110 km). However, the Japanese began circling to regroup their formations for the attack. This 10-minute delay proved critical, and the first group of Hellcats met the raid, still at 70 miles (110 km), at 10:36. They were quickly joined by additional groups. Within minutes, 25 Japanese aircraft had been shot down, against the loss of only one U.S. aircraft.

The Japanese aircraft that survived were met by other fighters, and 16 more were shot down. Of the remainder, some made attacks on the picket destroyers USS Yarnall and USS Stockham but caused no damage. Three or four bombers broke through to Lee's battleship group, and one made a direct hit on the USS South Dakota, which caused many casualties, but failed to disable her, being the only Japanese success throughout the battle. Not one aircraft of Ozawa’s first wave got through to the American carriers.

F6F-3 landing aboard 'Lexington' (CV-16) — Task Force 58 flagship

At 11:07, radar detected another, much larger attack. This second wave consisted of 107 aircraft. They were met while still 60 miles (97 km) out, and at least 70 of these aircraft were shot down before reaching the ships. Six attacked Rear Admiral Montgomery’s group, nearly hitting two of the carriers and causing casualties on each. Four of the six were shot down. A small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Enterprise, one torpedo exploding in the wake of the ship. Three other torpedo-aircraft attacked the light carrier Princeton but were shot down. In all, 97 of the 107 attacking aircraft were destroyed.

The third raid, consisting of 47 aircraft, came in from the north. It was intercepted by 40 fighters at 13:00, while 50 miles (80 km) out from the task force. Seven Japanese aircraft were shot down. A few broke through and made an ineffective attack on the Enterprise group. Many others did not press home their attacks. This raid therefore suffered less than the others, and 40 of its aircraft managed to return to their carriers.

USS Bunker Hill is nearly hit by a Japanese bomb during the air attacks of June 19, 1944.

The fourth Japanese raid was launched between 11:00 and 11:30, but pilots had been given an incorrect position for the US fleet and could not locate it. They then broke into two loose groups and turned for Guam and Rota to refuel. One group flying toward Rota stumbled upon Montgomery’s task group. Eighteen aircraft joined battle with American fighters and lost half their number. A smaller group of nine Japanese dive bombers of this force evaded U.S. aircraft and made attacks on the USS Wasp and the USS Bunker Hill, but failed to make any hits. Eight of these aircraft were shot down in the process. The larger group of Japanese aircraft had flown to Guam and were intercepted over Orote Field by 27 Hellcats while landing. Thirty of the 49 Japanese aircraft were shot down, and the rest were damaged beyond repair. Aboard the Lexington afterward, a pilot was heard to remark "Hell, this is like an old-time turkey shoot!" Since then, this lopsided air battle has been known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”.

Including the continued aerial slaughter over Orote Field, Japanese losses exceeded 350 planes on the first day of battle. American losses were slight, about thirty planes were lost. American ship damage was minimal.

Most of those who successfully evaded the US fighter screens were aviators who were seasoned veterans of the six-month Japanese advance early in the Pacific war, the South Pacific campaign and survivors of the Battle of Midway.

Submarine attacks

At 08:16 the submarine USS Albacore had sighted Ozawa’s own carrier group and began an attack on the closest carrier, which was Taihō, the largest and newest carrier in the Japanese fleet and Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s flagship. As Albacore was about to fire, however, her fire-control computer failed, and the torpedoes had to be fired “by eye”.

Taihō had just launched 42 aircraft as a part of the second raid. Four of Albacore’s torpedoes were off-target. Sakio Komatsu, the pilot of one of the recently-launched aircraft, sighted one of the two which were heading for Taihō and crashed his aircraft on it, but the last torpedo struck the carrier on her starboard side, rupturing two aviation-fuel tanks. At first, the damage did not appear to be very serious.

Another submarine, USS Cavalla, was able to maneuver to an attack position on the 25,675-ton carrier Shōkaku by about noon. The submarine fired a spread of six torpedoes, three of which struck the Shōkaku. Badly damaged, the carrier came to a halt. One torpedo had hit the forward aviation fuel tanks near the main hangar, and aircraft that had just landed and were being refueled exploded into flames. Ammunition and exploding bombs added to the conflagration, as did burning fuel spewing from shattered fuel pipes. With her bows subsiding into the sea and fires out of control, the captain gave orders to abandon ship. Within minutes, total catastrophe struck the vessel. Volatile gas fumes had accumulated throughout the vessel, and when an aerial bomb exploded on the hangar deck, a series of terrific explosions simply blew the ship apart about 140 miles (230 km) north of the island of Yap. The carrier rolled over and slid beneath the waves taking 887 navy officers and men plus 376 men of Air Group 601, a total of 1,263 men in all, to the seabed. There were 570 survivors, including the carrier's commander, Captain Hiroshi Matsubara. Futile attempts were made by destroyer Urakaze to destroy the submarine, but Cavalla escaped with relatively minor damage due to depth charge near misses from Urakaze.

Meanwhile, Taihō was falling victim to poor damage control. On the orders of an inexperienced damage-control officer, her ventilation system had been operating at full-blast in an attempt to clear explosive fumes from the ship. This instead had the effect of spreading the vapors throughout Taihō. At 17:32, she suffered a series of catastrophic explosions caused by the accumulated fumes igniting near an electric generator on the hangar deck. Of her complement of 1,751, a total of 1,650 crewmen were lost.

U.S. counterattack

Japanese Carrier Division Three under attack by United States Navy aircraft from Task Force 58, late afternoon, June 20, 1944. The heavy cruiser circling at right, nearest to the camera, is either Maya or Chōkai. Beyond that, is the small aircraft carrier Chiyoda.

TF-58 sailed west during the night to attack the Japanese at dawn. Search patrols were put up at first light.

Admiral Ozawa had transferred to the destroyer Wakatsuki after Taihō had been hit, but the radio gear onboard wasn't capable of sending the number of messages needed, so he transferred again, to the carrier Zuikaku, at 13:00. It was then he learned of the disastrous results of the previous day and that he had about 150 aircraft left. Nevertheless, he decided to continue the attacks, thinking there were still hundreds of aircraft on Guam and Rota, and started planning new raids for June 21.

The main problem for Task Force 58 was locating the enemy, who had been operating at a great distance. Early morning American searches on June 20 found nothing. An extra mid-day search flown by Hellcat fighter pilots also came back empty. Finally at 15:12 a garbled message from one of the Enterprise search planes indicated a sighting. At 15:40 the sighting was verified, along with distance, course and speed. The Japanese fleet was 275 miles out, moving due west at a speed of 20 knots. The Japanese were at the limit of the strike range of Task Force 58, and daylight was slipping away. Mitscher decided to launch an all out strike. With the first group up a third message came in, indicating the Japanese fleet were 60 miles farther out than previously indicated. The first launch would be at their limits of fuel, and would have to attempt landing at night. Mitscher canceled the second launch of aircraft, but chose not to recall the first launch. The Task Force 58 aviators arrived over the Japanese fleet just before sunset.

The fighter air cover Ozawa was able to put up would have been good by 1942 standards, but in 1944 the 35 or so fighters he had available to intercept the incoming U.S. attack were completely overwhelmed by the incoming 230 aircraft of Mitscher's attack. Though these few were skillfully handled and the Japanese antiaircraft fire was intense, the U.S. aviators were able to press in on the attack.

The first ships sighted by the U.S. strike were oilers, and two of these were damaged so severely that they were later scuttled. The carrier Hiyo was attacked and hit by bombs and aerial torpedoes from four Grumman Avengers from Belleau Wood.

Hiyō was set afire after a tremendous blast from leaking aviation fuel. Dead in the water, she slipped stern first under the waves, taking the lives of 250 officers and men. The rest of her crew, about one thousand, survived to be rescued by Japanese destroyers. The carriers Zuikaku, Junyō, and Chiyoda were damaged by bombs, as was the battleship Haruna. Twenty American aircraft were lost in this strike.

At 20:45, the first U.S. aircraft began to return to TF 58. Knowing his aviators would have difficulty finding their carriers, Mitscher decided to fully illuminate his carriers, shining searchlights directly up into the night, despite the risk of attack from submarines and night-flying aircraft. Picket destroyers fired starshells to help the aircraft find the task groups. Despite this, 80 of the returning aircraft were lost, some crashing on flight decks, the majority going into the sea. Many of the crews were rescued over the next few days.

Aftermath

That night, Admiral Ozawa received orders from Toyoda to withdraw from the Philippine Sea. U.S. forces gave chase, but the battle was over.

The four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 130 returned to the carriers, and many more were lost on board when the two carriers were sunk on the first day by submarine attacks. After the second day the losses totaled three carriers, more than 433 carrier aircraft, and around 200 land-based aircraft. Losses on the U.S. side on the first day were only 23. The second day's airstrike against the Japanese fleet saw most of the aircraft losses for the U.S. Of the 215 aircraft launched on the strike, only 115 made it back. Twenty were lost to enemy action in the attack, while 80 more were lost when one by one they expended their fuel and had to ditch into the sea.

The losses to the Japanese fleet air arm were irreplaceable. The Japanese had spent the better part of a year reconstituting their carrier air groups, and the Fast Carrier Task Force had destroyed 90% of it in two days. The Japanese only had enough pilots left to form the air group for one of their light carriers. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf to follow a few months later, their carriers were used solely as a decoy.

The Japanese military, which had shielded the Japanese public from the extent of their losses, continued this policy. Though the occurrence of the simultaneous Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Saipan were made known to the public, the extent of the disasters were withheld.

The F6F had proved to be a capable weapon in the battle. Its superior speed, firepower, and protection made it a formidable aircraft. Competent U.S. aviators flying against the increasingly undertrained Japanese airmen still flying the underpowered and fragile A6M Zero, led for a one sided contest. Losing fewer than two dozen Hellcats, the American pilots were dominant during the battle and garnered nearly 500 kills.

Spruance was heavily criticized by many officers after the battle (and continues to be to this day) for his decision to initiate battle cautiously rather than exploiting his superior forces and intelligence data with a more aggressive posture; by failing to press the attack earlier and more forcefully, his critics argue, he might well have squandered the opportunity to envelop and destroy the entire Japanese strike force. However, it is instructive to compare Spruance's caution (particularly his suspicion of a diversionary force) with Admiral Halsey's later impetuous pursuit of an actual diversionary force at the Battle of Leyte Gulf that left inferior U.S. forces open to an attack off Samar by a Japanese surface action group composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Furthermore, Spruance's conservative battle plan, while not destroying all of the Japanese aircraft carriers, did effectively drive the final nail into the coffin of the Japanese naval aviation forces by killing most of the remaining trained pilots and destroying their last operational reserves of naval aircraft. Without the time or resources to build sufficient aircraft and train experienced pilots, the surviving Japanese carriers were mere shadows of their former selves, a fact the Japanese recognized by using them as sacrificial decoys at Leyte Gulf. With the effective crippling of her best striking arm, Japan was increasingly forced to rely on land-based kamikaze suicide aircraft in a last-ditch effort to stave off total U.S. naval and air supremacy.

See also

• United States Navy in World War II
• Z Plan (Japan)

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

• Bryan III, Lt. Cmdr. J. Mission Beyond Darkness: The story of USS Lexington's Air Group 16 June 20, 1944 attack on the Japanese carrier fleet as told by the men who flew that day (1945)
• Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (1987).
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
• Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3.
• Morison, Samuel Eliot, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944, vol. 8 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (1950).
• Potter, E. B. (2005). Admiral Arliegh Burke. U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-692-6. 
• Shores, Christopher. Duel for the Sky: Ten Crucial Battles of World War II. Grub Street, London 1985. ISBN 978-0-7137-1601-6
• Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-794-8.
• Taylor, Theodore. The Magnificent Mitscher. New York: Norton, 1954; reprinted Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. ISBN 1-55750-800-3.
• Tillman, Barrett, (2006) Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II.
• Willmott, H.P. June 1944. New York, NY: Blandford Press, 1984. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8
• Y'Blood, William T. (1981). Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea. Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-994-0.

External links

• Order of battle
• WW2DB: The Marianas and the Great Turkey Shoot
• Animated History of The Battle of the Philippine Sea
• The Controversy over Spruance's Decision
• Air Group 31's participation in the Battle of the Philippine Sea
• A Brief Account of the Battle