Battle of the Sabis
| Battle of the Sabis | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Gallic Wars | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Roman Republic | Nervii, Viromandui, Atrebates Aduatuci |
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Julius Caesar | Boduognatus | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| about 42,000 men (8 legions with cavalry and auxiliaries) | 25,000 skilled warriors | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 5,000-6,000 killed or wounded | c.15,000 killed or wounded | ||||||
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The Battle of the Sabis, also (erroneously) known as the Battle of the Sambre[1] or the Battle against the Nervians (or Nervii), was fought in 57 BC in the area known today as Wallonia, between the legions of the Roman Republic and an association of Belgic tribes, principally the Nervii (a Belgian tribe). Julius Caesar, commanding the Roman forces, was surprised and nearly defeated. According to Caesar's report, a combination of determined defense, skilled generalship, and the timely arrival of reinforcements allowed the Romans to turn a strategic defeat into a tactical victory.
Contents |
[edit] Prelude
During the winter of 58/57 BC rumours that the Belgian tribes wanted to combat the Romans came to Caesar's ears.[2] These reports provided him with a good pretext for conquering more than Gaul "itself", and for this Caesar raised two more legions (the XIII and XIV)[3] and convinced the Remi tribe to side with him.[4]
Julius Caesar considered the Belgii to be the most warlike of the Gallic tribes. He wrote that their culture was a Spartan one and that they not only would not partake of alcoholic beverages or any other such imported Roman luxuries, but also that they were preventing the trade of any Roman goods since Caesar's war with the Helvetii.
In retaliation for Caesar's attack on Ariovistus and the Boii during Carnea, the other Belgic and Celtic tribes had attacked Bibrax (the oppidum of the Remi, situated near the Aisne River) and burned Roman trading posts.[5] The union included the Bellovaci, Suessiones, Nervii, Atrebates, Ambiani, Morini, Menapii, Caleti, Veliocasses, Viromandui, Aduatuci, Condrusi, Eburones, Caeroesi, and Paemani tribes, and was under the sponsorship of Galba, a king of the Suessiones with loyalties to the Helvetii.
Caesar quickly responded by garrisoning the oppidum (main settlement) and seizing any available interests of the Nervii and allied tribes.
In the face of this aggressive response by the Romans and the resulting impoverishment of the Belgic tribes' efforts, the union collapsed. Its tribal armies soon withdrew to their native lands for want of victuals and protection of their individual realms which had come under encroachment by piratical Germanic raids from the East.
[6] This presented four tribes, the Nervii, the Atrebates, the Aduatuci, and the Viromandui as isolated to confront the legions on their own and at a numerical disadvantage to the Caesar's legions and hired auxiliaries.
[edit] Forces
Estimates of the forces available to each side vary, but the eight Roman legions had a strength of 42,000 professional soldiers of infantry, with associated archers and auxiliary cavalry. An estimate of the Belgic forces, recruited from an approximate total population of some 300,000, gives the Belgii an estimated 25,000 genuinely skilled men at arms.
Although Caesar's figures are much higher (up to 150,000), those described as infantry (militia) and hidden in the woods were actually the native population at large. Caesar typically accounted every man, woman and child of the Gallic tribes as enemy combatants,[citation needed] and when tallying enemy casualties he made little distinctions between enemy refugees and actual men at arms.
This proclivity for massacring resisting populations accounts for the gigantic numbers (Triumphs) in his recorded summaries of the Gallic campaigns. Although the populace at large did arm themselves as best they could, it was with a rudimentary assortment of weapons when compared to genuine Gallic men at arms or their Roman antagonists.
[edit] Order of battle
Caesar's legions:
[edit] Battle
Caesar's legions had been marching through Belgae territory for three days, following an ancient road.[7] He then received reports of the natives' dispositions.[8] As the Roman columns made their way through the enemy landscape, Caesar used his usual tactic of leading his forces, with six legions in light marching order with auxiliaries, cavalry and scouts out in front and on the wings. Riders were sent towards anything that attracted interest or could supplement the march. Behind Caesar's lead elements were the baggage columns, supply trains and entourage for the entire army, escorted by two newly-recruited legions. These were replacements for losses incurred during the war against the Helvetii and Suebii.
Eventually the leading elements of the Roman columns reached the River Sabis, its shores crowded with fleeing natives. Caesar's forces started to set up camp near the 'via Belgicas' favored river crossing. The ford was crowded with refugees heading for their strongholds situated somewhere beyond the Sabis river. As the bulk of the Roman infantry began staking out Caesar's encampment, the cavalry and auxiliaries attacked the mass of fugitives and killed many of them at the crowded river crossing. Pursuing the panicked natives across the river, the cavalry clashed with a lesser force of Belgic horsemen, but this retreated into the woods at the approach of the peltasts and archers who had crossed the river to join in the attack.
On the opposite side of the river, Boduognatus, warlord of the Nervii, had been preparing to confront Caesar before he reached the Sabis; however, Caesar appeared before the Belgic war plan could be brought to fruition. Through the use of hired informants Caesar was able to locate Boduognatus at his encampment and claim the initiative.
Boduognatus and the Nervii were supported by the Belgic tribes Viromandui and Atrebates. These tribes had desired, for safety's sake, to collect all their peoples on the far side of the river while organizing their men-at-arms among the trees not far from the river crossing. At word of the rapid Roman advance their men-at-arms had rushed together in silence and formed up in the forest ready for a bold counter-attack on the Roman columns that were gathering on the other side of the river.
The Aduatuci were also riding to join the Belgae, but the unexpected swiftness of the Roman march to the Sabis now pre-empted Boduognatus' plans for using them later or in the battle now beckoning.[9] In any case, the Aduatuci were miles away and unaware of Caesar's rapid advance to the Sabis.
The few Belgic horsemen available were skirmishing in the open, between the trees and the river bank, hard-pressed, outnumbered and exposed to enemy archers, peltasts and cavalry. On Caesar's side of the river, six full-strength Roman legions (the VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII) were occupied with constructing the camp, its fortifications and fixed weapons (ballistas). Two youthful and inexperienced legions, the XIII and XIV, were still on the march about two miles in the rear, bringing up the bulk of the baggage train.
Just as the leading element of huge Roman baggage caravan came into view, harsh trumpets (carnyx) signaled the native attack and the combined Belgic fighting force burst from the cover of the trees in dense formation. The Belgic avalanche overtook all of Caesar's forces that had crossed the river and many of his auxiliaries were killed while retreating back across the river. With the Nervii leading the charge, the Belgae surged down the embankment, crossed the river at full speed (barely a meter deep) and roared up the opposing bank, smashing into the Roman ranks. The attackers gave individuals no time to prepare themselves or get into proper battle formation before coming to blows. Caesar remarked that it seemed that the Nervii were at once pouring out of the trees, charging across the river and overrunning his legionaries.
Caesar's men hastily formed up for battle, but many did not have time to put on their helmets or grab their shields. The Roman footmen were given no chance to group in coherent formations but instead were forced to rally around the nearest standard that still stood. Soon each legion was isolated by the swarming Gauls and fighting desperately for its immediate survival. Having received word of the massive attack, legions XIII and XIV were marching from the rear of the baggage train as quickly as they could but were still at least a mile away.
The four legions on the Roman left and centre had become locked with the onrushing Belgae on the north bank of the river. The veteran legions X Equestris and IX Triumphalis, on the left, engaged the Atrebates, defeated them with pilum and gladius tactics and pushed them back across the river, killing many as they fled. The legions in the Roman center XI and VIII though hard-pressed and mauled, had begun to prevail against the Viromandui pushing them back down the hill to the river's edge. As these four legions succeeded in besting their opponents and pushing them back, a gap formed in the Roman line.
The battle-wise Nervii immediately exploited this breach and attacked with renewed fury. Boduagnatus, leader of the Nervii, and his warriors quickly turned the exposed Roman flank and charged through the gap. The Nervii succeeded in over-running the Roman right front and thereby out-flanked the encampment itself which was undefended, though filled with camp attendants and materials.
As the Viromandui fought furiously to hold their ground on the river bank against the hard-pressed Roman center (XI and VIII legions), the two legions of the Roman right, the XII Victrix and VII were overrun, with most of the officers falling by their standards. The survivors fled for higher ground to re-form, while the Gauls distracted themselves with ravaging Caesar's encampment, killing the wounded, capturing eagles and collecting trophies.
Caesar made his way to the center of the fray escorted by his personal retinue. As he struggled to sort out the situation, he sent dispatch runners to the various legions, the left wing and reserves. By giving orders to those around him, he eventually reined in the bloodied XII and VII Legions which had fled up the hill after being overrun by the Belgae and outflanked by the Nervii.
On the opposite shore, the veterans of the X and IX legions had together defeated the Atrebates above the riverbank and then pursued them across the river, also attacking the throng of native fugitives that had massed on the far side of the Sabis. Throughout the woods, the natives had bent over and interwoven many small trees, binding them and cutting the branches in a way that created sharp ends to form labyrinthine barricades - these were dense in the woods beyond the river.
On the right flank, the XI and VIII legions had combined their efforts in containing the Viromandui and pushed them back to the river bank. However, they were unable to drive them across the river or defeat them. Close to their position, the XII and VII legions were being badly defeated by the Nervii and retreated uphill away from the encampment and river ford. At this point, both legions had lost almost all of their centurions and several standards had been captured. These two legions were mauled so severely that, according to Appian, all of their tribunes were killed and their eagles taken by the Nerviians. Even the 'primus pilus' (the senior centurion) of one of the legions had fallen to Boduagnatus' personal retinue.
The routed XII and VII Legions abandoned the encampment and fled uphill with Caesar and his auxiliaries. They stood in confusion and despair overlooking the murderously-contested river bank. At this critical moment, Caesar is reported to have commandeered a shield from a soldier in the rear and personally rallied both legions. It is reported that by shouting at them by name over the blaring horns of the Gauls and by demanding that they properly form up, Caesar avoided being taken by Boduognatus.
As the Nervii continued to drive them uphill, Caesar admonished the legionaries that they were crowded too closely together and thus not fighting effectively; he held them fast and, as he tells it, it was only his arrival with the XII and VII legions that saved the remainder of the day, if not the entire campaign. As the fighting was renewed above the camp, the panicked auxiliaries hurried back to the relative safety of the XII and VII legions' rear echelon where they discharged their missile volleys as best they were able. With the return of his badly-shaken archers and horsemen, Caesar then ordered the XII and VII legions to join up and adopt a large square formation so they could better protect the wounded and offer a more effective resistance. He sent dispatches to the rear element pleading for the hastened arrival of the novice XIII and XIV legions as well to his favored officers among the other legions, Labienus, Brutus, Cotta, Sabinus et al.
After defeating the Atrebates and pursuing them across the river, the veteran X legion assaulted the Belgic populace which was gathered there in great numbers and amid much carnage.
At a certain moment Legate Labienus ordered his men to regroup, seeing that Caesar's right wing was being routed and the camp ransacked. The veteran X legion wheeled about and hastily marched back across the river to attack the Nervii rear. The XI and VIII legions were then able to finally repel the Viromandui who abruptly fled back across the river and into the hills as soon as X Legion was seen to be crossing back toward them with XIII and XIV legions cresting the high ground to their front. With the retreating Viromandui escaped some of the Nervii laden with booty. The few remaining Gallic horsemen turned and galloped off toward the distant Aduatuci who were only then learning of the Roman encroachment on Boduognatus' encampment.
With haste the XIII and XIV legions marched down and cleared the rear of the XII and VII square before investing themselves with the envelopment of the Nerviians. The arrival of reinforcements renewed the spirits of all the Roman forces who were struggling mightily with their Belgic enemies. With Caesar's immediate front stabilized and the Viromandui in disarray and the furious Nerviians now being enveloped, he observed the spectacle of the X legion throwing itself against the encircled Nervii, and the fighting reached its zenith.
The swiftness of Boduognatus' sudden massed attack, the speed of his allied native footmen ( Atrebates and Virumandui) together with the ferocity and skill at arms of his heavily armed Nerviians had completely routed Caesar's skirmishers and cavalry, overwhelmed his front and very nearly succeeded in taking the Roman camp and capturing Caesar himself. Caesar admits to losing all of his standards and having most of his centurions killed or wounded. He himself was forced to take up a shield and personally rally his forces, which were threatened with destruction. The strong stand by the adjoining X legion and the prompt arrival of reinforcements enabled Caesar to regroup, redeploy and eventually envelop the Nervii once the Atrebates and Viromandui were put to flight.
Caesar remarked that the warlike Nervii refused to yield their ground even after the Atrebates and Virumandui had been put into disarray. When finally surrounded by Roman reinforcements the Nervii continued fighting as a pitiless hail of missiles rained down on them from the many archers and peltasts Caesar had brought from overseas. The peltasts, slingers and archers were recruited for the specific purpose of confounding the Gallic proclivity for shield wall tactics, mass attack and/or individual close combat.
The Nervii were especially renowned for skills at warfare. They ruled and subsisted by warfare and by taxing their dependent and client tribes while adhering to a heroic hoplitic tradition. These Gallic conventions were something Caesar exploited as often as he could.
Together with Caesar's prudent and unabashed use of fixed projectile weapons like the 'scorpion' and light ballista, the archers and peltasts took a heavy toll on the densely packed Nervii, who themselves shunned all projectile weapons but the lance. It is recorded in Caesar's war commentaries that as the battle raged, the Nervii caught Roman javelins in flight and hurled them back at legionaries. As the grim fighting wore on, the Nervii refused to yield and mounds of the fallen formed ramparts. Boduognatus' fighters fought from atop these hills of dead, clashing with the pressing Roman ranks again and again. Although all were eventually slain, not one of the Nervii was seen to desert.
The skill with which the veteran Roman legions executed their well-practiced 'pilum' barrage and gladius-and-scutum counter-attacks together with the prudent use of missile weapons was instrumental in defeating their daring opponents.
[edit] Casualties
The Greek historian Appian of Alexandria (c.95-c.165) reported in [57 BCE] that following Caesar's victory over Ariovistus he encroached upon the Belgae and killed many of them at a river crossing and that Boduognatus had immediately thereafter routed Caesar's forces with a sudden massed attack with the warlike Nervii. Caesar described the Belgae as being the bravest of the Gauls with Nervii being especially accomplished in warfare.
Appian reports the Nervii as "making great mayhem among the Roman auxiliaries and legionaries, killing all of Caesar's tribunes and nearly all of his centurions during the course of the melee". Appian wrote that Caesar himself took refuge on a rise protected by his bodyguard and was in the act of being surrounded by Nervii when the latter was finally assailed from the rear by the rescuing tenth legion commanded by a heroic Labienus.
As the Nervii wheeled about to face the outflanking tenth legion more Roman reinforcements arrived and this rallied many of Caesar's forces which had earlier fled. The Nervii fought stubbornly but the shattered Atrebates and Virumandui could not rally and the Aduatuci were still riding in from the east. A dramatic melee ensued wherein the legions eventually prevailed.
Appian asserts that the Nervii were the descendants of the infamous and warlike Cimbri and Teutones from beyond the Rhine river. The Nervii controlled the flow of goods in and out of the region and this had conflicted with Roman interests; especially the flow of wine into the Belgic territories which had been banned by Nervii decree. The embargo was said to be in response to the Nerviian proclivity toward spartan values and austerity and other druidic meddlings.
With Caesar's victory, trades and goods came under Roman control, with the defeat of the Nervii Caesar is said to have subjugated the Allobroges also, other tribes fled east.
By the time the Nervii elders came to parley, Caesar writes, their formation of 60,000 men at arms had been reduced to some just several hundred and that only three of the 600 elders had survived by their absence.[10][11] Certainly a part of the defeated Nervii army later joined the Eburones and destroyed a complete legion.[12] The character whom Caesar mentions as 'Correus' who led a Nervii/Belovaccii coalition following the capture of Vercingetorix may have been none other than Boduognatus who like Ariovistus was never accounted for.
[edit] Aftermath
The Nervii were severely mauled and forced to flee; thereby all former client tribes surrendered to Caesar or likewise flee. Their absence gave Caesar control of most of what is now Belgium.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Pierre Turquin ("La Bataille de la Selle (du Sabis) en l' An 57 avant J.-C." in Les Études Classiques 23/2 (1955), 113-156) has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the battle was fought at the River Selle, west of modern Saulzoir.
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.1
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.2
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.3 - 2.5
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.6
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.6 - Bello Gallico 2.15
- ^ Essentially the road that was later paved by the Romans and connected Samarobriva (Amiens) with Cologne, and is now often referred to as "Via Belgica". The position of Bronze Age and Iron Age tombs proves that it already existed in pre-Roman times.
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.16—the battle as a whole occupies the majority of this book of the Commentaries, from 2.16 to 2.28
- ^ Bello Gallico 2.29
- ^ Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico s:Commentaries on the Gallic War, 2.28.
- ^ Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico s:Commentaries on the Gallic War, 7.75.
- ^ Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico s:Commentaries on the Gallic War, 6.29.
[edit] Source
- Caesar, C. Julius. The Gallic War. Trans. Carolyn Hammond. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
[edit] Literature
- Pierre Turquin, "La Bataille de la Selle (du Sabis) en l' An 57 avant J.-C." in Les Études Classiques 23/2 (1955), 113-156
[edit] External links
- The Battle of the Sabis (57 BCE) Photos of the battlefield
- Caesar and the Nervians Text of Caesar's account of the battle
- Battle of the Sambre[sic] from the Military History Encyclopedia on the Web
- Clash on the Sabis painting titled 'Fury of the Goths'