Thus, considered in themselves, in their own nature, in their normal state, and apart from all abuses, public services are, like private services, purely and simply acts of exchange. - Frédéric Bastiat
The benefit principle takes a market-oriented approach to taxation. The objective is to accurately determine the optimal amount of revenue that should be spent on public goods.
More equitable/fair because taxpayers, like consumers, would "pay for what they get"
Taxes are more akin to prices that people would pay for government services
Until people are made to bear the full costs of their decisions, those decisions are unlikely to be socially sound, in this as in other areas of public policy. - Bird, Richard M. (1976). Charging for Public Services: A New Look at an Old Idea
The doctrine of consumer sovereignty is applied to the provision of social goods in so far as the consumer buys national defence, police service, fire protection and electricity or water supply from the public sector of his own choice and according to the benefits received just as he buys food, clothes, fuel, tooth brushes and automobiles from the private producers. - P.C. Jain (1989), The Economics of Public Finance, 2nd ed., v. 1, p. 63.
The free-rider problem is the primary criticism given for limiting the scope of the benefit principle. When information about marginal benefits is available only from the individuals themselves, they tend to under report their valuation for a particular good, this gives rise to the preference revelation problem. Each individual can lower his tax cost by under reporting his benefits derived from the public good or service. One solution would be to implement tax choice. If taxpayers had to pay taxes anyway, but could choose where their taxes went (without the possibility of secret rebates or similar), then they would have no incentive to hide their true preferences.
^Fritz Neumark and Charles E. McLure, Jr., 2013. "Taxation," The Benefit Principle, Encyclopædia Britannica, preview.
^• Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, 1973. Public Finance in Theory and Practice, ch. 3, "The Theory of Social Goods," C. Efficient Provision of Social Goods, p.68.
• Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, ed.,  1994. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pp. 72-119 for discussion and the relevant publications. Description and contents.
^ abBernd Hansjürgens, 2000. "The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan", Public Choice", 103(1/2), pp. 95-116.
^Richard A. Musgrave, 1959. The Theory of Public Finance, ch. 4, "The Benefit Approach," pp. 71-89.
^Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, 1973. Public Finance in Theory and Practice (under "Subject Index," Benefit Principle).