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Bersiap is the name given by the Dutch to a violent and chaotic phase of the Indonesian National Revolution following the end of World War II. The Indonesian word bersiap means 'get ready' or 'be prepared'. The Bersiap period lasted from August 1945 to December 1946.
The period starting with revolutionary violence occurring during the increasing power vacuum left by the retreating Japanese occupational forces and the gradual buildup of a British military presence, but before the official handover to a Dutch military presence. The term refers to that period when, after being kidnapped by Republican youths (‘Pemuda’), Sukarno declared independence on 17 August 1945. The period ended with the departure of the British military in 1946, by which time the Dutch had rebuilt their military capacity. Meanwhile the Indonesian revolutionary fighters were well into the process of forming a formal military. The last Japanese troops had been evacuated by July 1946.
- 1 Term
- 2 Indonesian independence declared
- 3 The start of revolutionary fervour
- 4 Formation of the Republican government
- 5 Allied occupation
- 6 Return of the Dutch
- 7 Phases
- 8 Post Bersiap period
- 9 Propaganda
- 10 Guerrilla warfare
- 11 Atrocities
- 12 Casualties
- 13 Research
- 14 Commemoration
- 15 See also
- 16 References
- 17 External links
This particular phase of the Indonesian revolution is termed Bersiap by Dutch Indo (Eurasian) survivors of the period and is used in both Dutch and English language academic works. The term is derived from the Indonesian battle cry and perpetual call to arms: “Siap!” – “Get Ready!” heard when potential enemies of the revolution were entering pro-republican areas.
Indonesian independence declared
On 15 August 1945 the Japanese surrendered to the Allies. As there was for the most part no Allied reconquest of Indonesia, the Japanese were still in charge and had received specific orders to maintain the status quo until Allied forces arrived. Sukarno, Hatta, and the older leadership were hesitant to act and did not want to provoke conflict with the Japanese. Vice Admiral Maeda Tadashi, fearing volatile youth groups and the demoralised Japanese troops, wanted a quick transfer of power to the older generation of Indonesian leaders.
While the older nationalist leadership group, including Sukarno and Hatta, were reluctant, younger members of the new elite, the 'youth' (Indonesian: pemuda), believed they had a duty to push for revolution. A group associated with Menteng 31 kidnapped both Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to agree to declaring Indonesian independence. On 17 August 1945, two days after the surrender, Sukarno and Hatta declared independence at Sukarno's house in Jakarta. Indonesian staff briefly seized Jakarta radio from their Japanese supervisor and broadcast the news of the declaration across Java.
The start of revolutionary fervour
It was mid-September before news of the declaration of independence spread to the outer islands, and many Indonesians far from the capital Jakarta did not believe it. As the news spread, most Indonesians came to regard themselves as pro-Republican, and a mood of revolution swept across the country. External power had shifted; it would be weeks before Allied Forces entered Indonesia, and the Dutch were too weakened by World War II. The Japanese, on the other hand, were required by the terms of the surrender to both lay down their arms and maintain order; a contradiction that some resolved by handing weapons to Japanese-trained Indonesians. At the time of the surrender, there were 70,000 Japanese troops in Java and Sukarno and Hatta were concerned that celebratory independence rallies would result in the guns of Japanese troops being turned on Indonesian crowds. While the older leadership set about constructing a government on paper, they could do little to kerb younger mobs who attacked sultans and other members of the Indonesian elite, retaliated violently against those village heads who had assisted Japanese oppression of Indonesian peasants, attacked other alleged "traitors", and fought for turf and weapons.
The resulting power vacuums in the weeks following the Japanese surrender, created an atmosphere of uncertainty, but also one of opportunity for the Republicans. Many pemuda joined pro-Republic struggle groups (badan perjuangan). The most disciplined were soldiers from the Japanese-formed but disbanded Giyugun (PETA) and Heiho groups. Many groups were undisciplined, due to both the circumstances of their formation and what they perceived as revolutionary spirit. In the first weeks, Japanese troops often withdrew from urban areas to avoid confrontations. However, as Republican youths fought to secure the cities and take arms, attacks on the Japanese did occur usually following Allied orders for the Japanese to disarm Indonesian troops. Many of the Indonesian militia and some Japanese troops had no intention of allowing Indonesian disarmament, and in places like Bandung open conflict broke out.
By September 1945, control of major infrastructure installations, including railway stations and trams in Java's largest cities, had been taken over by Republican pemuda. To spread the revolutionary message, pemuda set up their own radio stations and newspapers, and graffiti proclaimed the nationalist sentiment. On most islands, struggle committees and militia were set up. Republican newspapers and journals were common in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta, which fostered a generation of writers known as angkatan 45 ('generation of 45') many of whom believed their work could be part of the revolution. In southern Kalimantan, Australian Communist soldiers spread the word of Indonesian independence declaration.
Republican leaders struggled to come to terms with popular sentiment; some wanted passionate armed struggle; others a more reasoned approach. Some leaders, such as the leftist Tan Malaka, spread the idea that this was a revolutionary struggle to be led and won by the Indonesian pemuda. Sukarno and Hatta, in contrast, were more interested in planning out a government and institutions to achieve independence through diplomacy. Pro-revolution demonstrations took place in large cities, including one led by Tan Malaka in Jakarta with over 200,000 people, which Sukarno and Hatta, fearing violence, successfully quelled.
By September 1945, many of the self-proclaimed pemuda, who were ready to die for '100% freedom', were getting impatient. It was common for ethnic 'out-groups' – Dutch internees, Eurasians, Ambonese and Chinese – and anyone considered to be a spy, to be subjected to intimidation, kidnap, robbery, and sometimes murder, even organised massacres. Such attacks would continue to some extent for the course of the revolution. As the level of violence increased across the country, the Sukarno- and Hatta-led Republican government in Jakarta urged calm. However, pemuda in favour of armed struggle saw the older leadership as dithering and betraying the revolution, which often led to conflict amongst Indonesians.
Formation of the Republican government
By the end of August, a central Republican government had been established in Jakarta. It adopted a constitution drafted during the Japanese occupation by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence. Following Japanese navy advice that Christian Indonesians in its area would disapprove, provisions for a special role for Islam, such as the Jakarta Charter and a mandatory Muslim head of state, were not enacted. With general elections yet to be held, a Central Indonesian National Committee (KINP) was appointed to assist the President, however, elections were not held until 10 years. Similar committees were established at provincial and regency levels. Indonesian administrative advisors (sanyo), who had been appointed by the Japanese, and Vice Regents were appointed as Republican officials. This allowed for an efficient and discreet hand over of power from the Japanese that minimised violation of the terms of the Japanese surrender.
Questions of allegiance immediately arose amongst indigenous rulers. Central Javanese principalities, for example, immediately declared themselves Republican, while many raja ('rulers') of the outer islands, who had been enriched from their support of the Dutch, were less enthusiastic. Such reluctance among many outer islands was sharpened by the radical, non-aristocratic, and sometimes Islamic nature of the Java-centric Republican leadership. Support did, however, come from South Sulawesi (including the King of Bone, who still recalled battles against the Dutch from early in the century), and from Makassarese and Bugis raja, who supported the Republican Governor of Jakarta, a Menadonese Christian. Many Balinese raja accepted Republican authority.
Fearing the Dutch would attempt to re-establish their authority over Indonesia, the new Republican Government and its leaders moved quickly to strengthen the fledgling administration. Within Indonesia, the newly formed government, although enthusiastic, was fragile and focused in Java (where focused at all). It was rarely and loosely in contact with the outer islands, which had more Japanese troops (particularly in Japanese naval areas), less sympathetic Japanese commanders, and fewer Republican leaders and activists. In November 1945, a parliamentary form of government was established and Sjahrir was appointed Prime Minister.
In the week following the Japanese surrender, the Giyugun (PETA) and Heiho groups were disbanded by the Japanese. Command structures and membership vital for a national army were consequently dismantled. Thus, rather than being formed from a trained, armed, and organised army, the Republican armed forces began to grow in September from usually younger, less trained groups built around charismatic leaders. Creating a rational military structure that was obedient to central authority from such disorganisation, was one of the major problems of the revolution, a problem that remains through to contemporary times. In the self-created Indonesian army, Japanese-trained Indonesian officers prevailed over those trained by the Dutch. A thirty year-old former school teacher, Sudirman, was elected 'commander-in-chief' at the first meeting of Division Commanders in Yogyakarta on 12 November 1945.
The Dutch accused Sukarno and Hatta of collaborating with the Japanese, and denounced the Republic as a creation of Japanese fascism. The Dutch East Indies administration had just received a ten million dollar loan from the United States to finance its return to Indonesia.
The Netherlands, however, was critically weakened from World War II in Europe and did not return as a significant military force until early 1946. The Japanese and members of the Allied forces reluctantly agreed to act as caretakers. As US forces were focusing on the Japanese home islands, the archipelago was put under the jurisdiction of British Admiral Earl Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command. Allied enclaves already existed in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Morotai (Maluku) and parts of Irian Jaya; Dutch administrators had already returned to these areas. In the Japanese navy areas, the arrival of Allied troops quickly prevented revolutionary activities where Australian troops, followed by Dutch troops and administrators, took the Japanese surrender (except for Bali and Lombok). Due to the lack of strong resistance, two Australian Army divisions succeeded in occupying eastern Indonesia.
The British-led South East Asia Command was charged with restoring order and civilian government in Java. The Dutch took this to mean pre-war colonial administration and continued to claim sovereignty over Indonesia. Because the Dutch London-based government-in-exile were allied to the British, they expected the return of their colony, and the Japanese and members of the Allied Forces reluctantly fulfilled this promise. British Commonwealth troops did not, however, land on Java to accept the Japanese surrender until late September 1945. Lord Mountbatten’s immediate tasks included the repatriation of some 300,000 Japanese, and freeing prisoners of war. He did not want, nor did he have the resources, to commit his troops to a long struggle to regain Indonesia for the Dutch. The first British troops reached Jakarta in late September 1945, and arrived in the cities of Medan (North Sumatra), Padang (West Sumatra), Palembang (South Sumatra), Semarang (Central Java) and Surabaya (East Java) in October. In an attempt to avoid clashes with Indonesians, the British commander Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, diverted soldiers of the former Dutch colonial army to eastern Indonesia, where Dutch reoccupation was proceeding smoothly. Tensions mounted as Allied troops entered Java and Sumatra; clashes broke out between Republicans and their perceived enemies, namely Dutch prisoners, Dutch colonial troops (KNIL), Chinese, Eurasians and Japanese.
The first stages of warfare were initiated in October 1945 when, in accordance with the terms of their surrender, the Japanese tried to re-establish the authority they relinquished to Indonesians in the towns and cities. Japanese military police killed Republican pemuda in Pekalongan (Central Java) on 3 October, and Japanese troops drove Republican pemuda out of Bandung in West Java and handed the city to the British, but the fiercest fighting involving the Japanese was in Semarang. On 14 October, British forces began to occupy the city. Retreating Republican forces retaliated by killing between 130 and 300 Japanese prisoners they were holding. Five hundred Japanese and 2,000 Indonesians had been killed and the Japanese had almost captured the city six days later when British forces arrived. The Allies repatriated the remaining Japanese troops and civilians to Japan, although about 1,000 elected to remain behind and later assisted Republican forces in fighting for independence.
The British subsequently decided to evacuate the 10,000 Indo-Europeans and European internees in the volatile Central Java interior. British detachments sent to the towns of Ambarawa and Magelang encountered strong Republican resistance and used air attacks against the Indonesians. Sukarno arranged a ceasefire on 2 November, but by late November fighting had resumed and the British withdrew to the coast. Republican attacks against Allied and alleged pro-Dutch civilians reached a peak in November and December, with 1,200 killed in Bandung as the pemuda returned to the offensive. In March 1946, departing Republicans responded to a British ultimatum for them to leave the city of Bandung by deliberately burning down much of the southern half of the city in what is popularly known in Indonesia as the "Bandung Sea of Fire". The last British troops left Indonesia in November 1946, but by this time 55,000 Dutch troops had landed in Java.
Return of the Dutch
With British assistance, the Dutch landed their Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) forces in Jakarta and other key centres. Republican sources reported 8,000 deaths up to January 1946 in the defence of Jakarta, but they could not hold the city. The Republican leadership thus established themselves in the city of Yogyakarta with the crucial support of the new sultan, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. Yogyakarta went on to play a leading role in the revolution, which would result in the city being granted its own Special Territory status. In Bogor, near Jakarta, and in Balikpapan in Kalimantan, Republican officials were imprisoned. In preparation for Dutch occupation of Sumatra, its largest cities, Palembang and Medan, were bombed. In December 1946, Special Forces Depot (DST), led by commando and counter-insurgency expert Captain Raymond 'Turk' Westerling, were accused of pacifying the southern Sulawesi region using arbitrary terror techniques, which were copied by other anti-Republicans. As many as 3,000 Republican militia and their supporters were killed in a few weeks.
On Java and Sumatra, the Dutch found military success in cities and major towns, but they were unable to subdue the villages and countryside. On the outer islands (including Bali), Republican sentiment was not as strong, at least among the elite. They were consequently occupied by the Dutch with comparative ease, and autonomous states were set up by the Dutch. The largest, the State of East Indonesia (NIT), encompassed most of eastern Indonesia, and was established in December 1946, with its administrative capital in Makassar.
Several phases are distinguished during the Bersiap period, each with different levels of violence and chaos. October–November 1945 is considered the most aggressive one with the Battle of Surabaya as its heaviest single battle.
The Bersiap was mostly situated on the island of Java. British troops landed on Sumatra in October 1945. Former civilian internees on Sumatra were put into large camps in the sparsely populated interior. They were taken to the coast to the cities of Padang, Medan, and Palembang. By the end of November all Japanese internment camps on Sumatra had been cleared. On Sumatra the Japanese cooperated with the British, and the Indonesian republicans were less militant than on Java. The situation there, despite rioting in Medan and Padang, was relatively peaceful by the end of 1945. The chaotic Bersiap violence did not occur on any other island in Indonesia.
The first phase started immediately after the unilateral declaration of Indonesian independence and before the arrival of the British armed forces. Even though the declaration was made under strong arm pressure of the so-called 'Pemuda', this short phase was the least violent one of the Bersiap. The Japanese were either supportive or indifferent to the Indonesian independence movement, but were under clear orders to remain neutral and protect the former European inmates in their concentration camps. Indonesian independence leaders were taking over key positions from the Japanese. The trains were still riding and some of the former Dutch and Eurasian prisoners were out looking for their families and property.
In the second phase of the Bersiap (15 Sep – 14 Oct 1945) de-centralised local Pemuda groups started to organise and obtain weapons. The first Japanese soldiers were molested and the attitude against Dutch and Eurasian civilians became hostile. Indonesian propaganda also became aggressive. Atrocities committed by revolutionary forces against Indo-Europeans began. Fights between Pemuda and young Eurasians broke out, resulting in a food boycot of Indos (October 5), which in turn resulted into more violent fights. In October razzias commenced and Eurasian males were arrested and killed. On 12 October, the Revolutionary government ordered the arrest of all Eurasian men and boys. In Surabaya, 42 Eurasians were killed in the basement of the 'Simpang Club' and several hundred were tortured in the 'Kalisosok Prison' in the Werfstraat. After an Ambonese prison guard informed the British about plans to poison the prisoners (9 November) they were rescued (10 November) by a Eurasian commander and a Gurkha unit. By the end of September the first British (Indian) troops started to arrive. The British tried to remain neutral and seek cooperation with the Republican leadership. Also the Japanese military tried not to get involved and only reacted when provoked.
The third phase (middle of October to the end of November 1945) is considered the most violent one. In Surabaya and Malang Indonesian forces are able to disarm the Japanese military. European and Indo-European men and boys are locked up, soon followed by the women and girls. (The British military subsequently decided to evacuate the 10,000 Indo-Europeans and European internees from the volatile Central Java interior). Travel for the perceived anti-revolutionary population (Christian Indonesian, Chinese Indonesian, European and Indo-European people) becomes impossible. The British armed forces try to obtain control, but encounter heavy resistance particularly in the middle of Java. Surabaya is the scene of bitter fighting.(see Battle of Surabaya)
The fourth phase (December 1945 to December 1946) is considered the aftermath of the heaviest Bersiap fighting. In Jakarta, where hundreds of autonomous ‘'Pemuda'’ groups existed, the last months of 1945 were according to Cribb a "terrifying time of regular looting, robbery, kidnapping and random murders were Europeans and Indo-Europeans disappeared even from the heart of the city, to be found floating in the ‘kali’ (canals) days later". In Bandung, Republican attacks against alleged pro-Dutch civilians reached a peak in November and December, with 1,200 killed in Bandung. The alleged pro-Dutch civilians mostly included native born Indo-European, Indo-Chinese, Christian indigenous people (e.g. Menadonese and Ambonese) and indigenous aristocracy, which made the Bersiap period a chaotic mix of civil war, religious conflict and social revolution, and throughout Java regular violence continued through to March 1946. In March 1946, departing Republican forces responded to a British ultimatum for them to leave Bandung by deliberately burning down much of the southern half of the city, in what is known as the "Bandung Sea of Fire. Indonesian commanders put much effort into organising irregular fighting units and consolidate their forces on Java. Nasution in West-Java, Sudirman in Central Java had a hard time controlling the many different armed forces and excluding criminal forces from their ranks, but in the end they succeed. Pressure from the British compelled Dutch politicians to commence negotiations with the Republican leadership, leading to the Linggadjati Agreement, which eventually failed.
Indonesian forces started evacuating the Japanese military forces and European and Eurasian civilian prisoners. In March 1946, regular Dutch troops started to enter the country. In July 1946, the last of the Japanese army was evacuated and all British troops were withdrawn by the end of the year, leaving the Dutch military in charge and de facto ending the Bersiap period. The country was now divided into Republican and Dutch controlled areas. The violence and warfare continued, but now between two clear parties: the Dutch army and the Indonesian army.
Post Bersiap period
Because the Indonesian military leadership is able to control and organise the militant revolutionary forces, the Indonesian political leadership retain overall authority and political leverage in the international arena. The civilian evacuation of Europeans and Indo-Europeans continues until the middle of the next year (May 1947) and renewed hostility and warfare during the continued struggle for Indonesian independence lasts until under heavy political pressure of the US and UN the Dutch formally recognise the young state three years after the Bersiap (December 1949).
One of the catalysts driving the atrocities committed by Indonesian Pemuda against the native Eurasian civilian population was the inciteful Republican propaganda. Republican propaganda during the revolution was used as a form of political warfare, by communicating loaded messages to produce emotional responses and influence the attitude of the masses, with the objective to further its political and military agenda. Effective means of mass communication were the broadcasts of republican radio stations such as 'Radio Pemberontak' and speeches during mass demonstrations. The supreme republican leader Sukarno had mastered these forms of communication. However during the Bersiap period the republican strategic agenda had not yet fully found a common ground and unitary message how to achieve its single mission of independence. Due to this paradox republican communication often fluctuated between moderate (political) and radical (military) messages. The Republican military declaration of total war (14 October 1945) states: "When the sun sets, we the Indonesian people are in war with the Dutch." The declaration then continues with clearly targeting civilian groups: "With this declaration we order all Indonesians to find their own enemy – Dutch, Indo or Ambonese." 
In his speeches the revolutionary leader, Sutomo, specifically aims at the Eurasian population, verbally reducing them to bloodhounds. In Surabaya, Sutomo had a radio studio and transmitting equipment at his disposal. The first transmission was on 13 October 1945, but could only be received in Surabaya and parts of East-Java. From 16 October 1945 the radio broadcasts could be heard all over Indonesia. The next Sutomo speech was broadcast on 14 October and another on the evening of 15 October. This was the evening of "black monday", the day Dutch & Eurasian citizens were rounded up and killed at the Kalisosok and Bubutan prisons in Surabaya.
"Torture them to death, destroy those bloodhounds of colonialism to the root. […] The immortal spirits of your ancestors demand of you: revenge, bloody revenge!" , Sutomo, Jogjakarta, 24 November 1945.
Soon in the streets of the capital Batavia graffiti on the walls showed explicit slogans: "Death to the Ambonese and Indos!" The only pro-Dutch armed forces that existed on Java were small re-grouped South Maluku KNIL units. These so-called 'Ambonese' or 'Belanda Hitam' (English: Black Dutch) as they were called by other Indonesians consequently retaliated any provocation or attack by 'Pemuda'. Among the millions population of Java their numbers of approximately a few thousand were small, but in Jakarta their autonomous contra-terror operations escalated to the point that the British military leadership wanted to de-mobilise them from the city. Young Eurasians seeking revenge for atrocities committed by the Pemuda sometimes joined them (for instance in Bandung were they established an autonomous fighting unit called 'Andjing Nica', along the lines of a KNIL battalion), giving this part of the Bersiap the nature of a civil war. Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno and Sjahrir attempted to call for calm, and even groomed the Eurasian population to join the revolution, but were unable to prevent the atrocities. The small town of Depok, pre-dominantly occupied by native Christians, was one of the first places to be destroyed. Many of its inhabitants were tortured and killed by the Pemuda.
The ferocious mix of social revolution, xenophobia, opportunistic crime and feral populism that resulted in the Bersiap atrocities surprised and horrified not only the British commanders, but also moderate Indonesian leaders. In reflection the Islamicist leader Abu Hanifah who later became minister of education and ambassador admitted: “The Indonesian revolution was not totally pure.” But while western-educated Indonesian leaders were deeply shaken by what they witnessed, many Indonesian accounts of the time considered the violence inevitable, and even morally neutral.
October 1945 in an early reaction to the Bersiap atrocities Indonesian independence leader Soetan Sjahrir issued his famous revolutionary pamphlet "Our Struggle". In it Sjahrir strongly opposed and condemned the violence committed against fellow citizens.
- "Perhaps the high point of his career was the publication of his pamphlet 'Our Struggle'. Whoever reads that pamphlet today can scarcely comprehend what it demanded in insight and courage. For it appeared at a moment when the Indonesian masses, brought to the boiling point by the Japanese occupation and civil war, sought release in racist and other hysterical outbursts. Sjahrir's pamphlet went directly against this, and many must have felt his call for chivalry, for the understanding of other ethnic groups, as a personal attack.", Sol Tas.
"Recent developments show our peoples disarray [...] particularly the murder and cruelty aimed at Indos, Ambonese, and Menadonese who in any case still are our fellow countrymen. [...] This hatred towards Indos, Ambonese, Menadonese can only be explained as a lack of national consciousness among the masses of our people. [...] Hatred against minorities and foreigners are a hidden factor in any nationalist struggle..., but a nationalist movement that lets itself be carried away by xenophobia will in the end find the whole world against itself. [...] Our strength must exist in cultivating feelings of justice and humanity. Only a nationalism that is founded in these feelings will take us further in world history." Sjahrir, Jakarta, October 1945.
At first republican propaganda such as radio speeches and mass rallys were the main tools to influence and mobilise the revolutionary masses. Indonesian military leadership was yet to establish a military agenda and had little control over the many autonomous revolutionary forces. During the Bersiap Indonesian leaders such as generals Sudirman and Nasution began to hastily build a formal military structure and develop an Indonesian military strategy. In his book about the founding doctrines of Indonesia's Army general Nasution, who became Indonesia's foremost military intellectual, reflects on this strategy and highlights the long term negative psychological and social impact on Indonesian fighters involved in the Bersiap.
“Guerrilla war is indeed destructive in nature, not only materially because it uses sabotage and scorched earth, but also what is more, it causes psychological, political and social damage. A guerrilla fighter is bred on a spirit of destruction and is not easily repatriated into the community as an ordinary citizen. The spirit of revolution, of guerrilla warfare and of scorched earth is aimed at destroying the whole existing religious, legal, socio-economic order which forms the organisation of the dominating power. How can the guerrilla accept again a legal, political and socio-economic situation since to him it has the taint of the old system? Many nations and countries continue to be chaotic years and decades after a guerrilla war overturns and rubs out the ethical, legal standards which are normally found in a society. Burning, sabotage, killing and kidnapping at the expense of the enemy have a heroic value. To have participated in guerrilla activities makes it difficult for one to adapt oneself to an ordered society, a society based on law.” Abdul Haris Nasution in 'Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare', 1953.
After the Bersiap in 1947 Dutch authorities attempted to retrieve the bodies of the victims and several survivors of the period provided legal testimony to the Attorney General office. Due to continued revolutionary warfare few bodies were found and few cases came to court. Around 3,500 graves of Bersiap victims can be found in the Kembang Kuning war cemetery in Surabaya and elsewhere.
The Simpang Society Club Surabaya was appropriated by the Pemudas of the Partai Rakyat Indonesia (P.R.I.) and made into the headquarters of P.R.I. commander Sutomo, who personally supervised the summary executions of hundreds of civilians. An archived eye witness testimony of the events of 22 October 1945 states:
"Before each execution Sutomo mockingly asked the crowd what should be done with this "Musuh (enemy) of the people". The crowd yelled "Bunuh!" (kill!) after which the executioner named Rustam decapitated the victim with one stroke of his sword. The victim was then left to the bloodthirst of boys 10, 11 and 12 years old. ...[who] further mutilated the body." "Women were tied to the tree in the back yard and pierced through the genitals with "bambu runcing" (bamboo spears) until they died."
On Sutomos orders the de-capitated bodies were disposed off in the sea, the women were thrown in the river.
The death toll of the Bersiap period runs into the tens of thousands. The bodies of 3,600 Indo-Europeans have been identified as killed. However more than 20,000 registered Indo-European civilians were abducted and never returned. The Indonesian revolutionaries lost at least 20,000, often young, fighting men. Estimates of the number of Indonesian fighters killed in the lead up and during the Battle of Surabaya range from 6,300 to 15,000. The Japanese forces lost around 1,000 soldiers and the British forces registered 660 soldiers, mostly British Indians, as killed (with a similar number missing in action). The actual Dutch military were hardly involved, as they only started to return to Indonesia in March and April 1946.
Few Dutch or Indonesian historians have undertaken holistic studies about this period of the Indonesian revolution. Dutch historians have focussed on particular locations and incidents and Indonesian historians mostly focus on the heroic aspects of the revolution. Witness reports from Eurasians focusses on the atrocities experienced. Japanese historians show very little interest all together in this part of the World War II aftermath. The most holistic studies encompassing all these elements have in fact been performed by American and English historians.
In 1988 a national 'Indies Monument' (Dutch: Indisch Monument) was erected in The Hague, Netherlands, to commemorate the victims of both the Japanese occupation and Indonesian National Revolution. Originally there were 22 dedicated cemeteries in Indonesia, laid out between 1946 and 1952. Earth from these 22 war cemeteries was collected in an urn and was integrated into the Dutch National Monument (Amsterdam) on the Dam Square. At the request of the Indonesian government, the number of war cemeteries was reduced to 7. These cemeteries, Menteng Pulo and Ancol (Jakarta), Pandu (Bandung), Leuwigaja (Cimahi), Candi and Kalibanteng (Semarang), Kembang Kuning (Surabaya), are all located on Java and managed and maintained by the Dutch War Graves Foundation. The bodies of European and Indo-European victims of the Bersiap atrocities that were retrieved from individual- and mass graves elsewhere on Java are mostly buried in these war cemeteries.
Notes and citations
- Bayly, Christopher Harper, Tim ‘’Forgotten Wars, Freedom and revolution in Southeast Asia’’ (Publisher: Harvard University Press, 2006) ISBN 9780674021532 P.181 Googlebooks
- Ricklefs (1991), p. 210
- Ricklefs (1991), page 213; Taylor, Jean Gelman (2003). Indonesia: Peoples and History. Yale University Press. p. 325. ISBN 0-300-10518-5.; Reid (1973), page 30; Vickers (2005), p. 95
- Taylor (2003), p. 323
- Ricklefs (1991), pages 214 – 215
- Friend (2003), page 32; Robert Cribb, 'A revolution delayed: the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Indies, August–November 1945', Australian Journal of Politics and History 32 no. 1 (1986), pp. 72–85.
- Taylor (2003), p. 324
- Taylor (2003), p. 324, 326
- Friend (2003), page 32
- Ricklefs (1991), pages 215 – 216
- Vickers (2005), p. 97
- Vickers (2005), page 97
- VIckers (2005), p. 97
- Vickers (2005), p. 97; Ricklefs (1991).
- Vickers (2005), p. 98
- Reid (1974), page 49; Mochtar Lubis, Jalan Tak Ada (Jakarta: Yayasan Obot Indonesia, 2002) [originally published 1952], p.78; Anthony Reid, Indonesian National Revolution (Hawthorn, Vic.: Longman, 1974), chs. 2 and 3; Shirley Fenton-Huie, The Forgotten Ones: Women and Children Under Nippon (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1992); Anthony Reid, 'Indonesia: revolution without socialism', in Robin Jeffrey (ed.), Asia: the Winning of Independence (London: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 107–57.
- Ricklefs (1991), p. 213
- Ricklefs (1991), page 214
- Friend (2003), page 33
- Ricklefs (1991), page 215
- Most PETA and Heiho members did not yet know about the declaration of independence.
- Friend (2003), page 35
- Reid (1974), page 78
- "The National Revolution, 1945–50". Country Studies, Indonesia. U.S. Library of Congress.
- Charles Bidien (5 December 1945). "Independence the Issue". Far Eastern Survey 14 (24): 345–348. doi:10.1525/as.1945.14.24.01p17062. JSTOR 3023219.
- Ricklefs (1991), page 216
- Ashton and Hellema (2001), page 181
- Vickers (2005), page 99
- Tjandraningsih, Christine T., "Indonesians to get book on Japanese freedom fighter", Japan Times, 19 August 2011, p. 3.
- Ricklefs (1991), page 216; McMillan, Richard (2005). The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945–1946. Melbourne: Routledge. pp. 306–307. ISBN 0-415-35551-6.
- Reid (1973), page 54
- Indonesia Law No. 5/1974 Concerning Basic Principles on Administration in the Region (translated version). The President of Republic of Indonesia (1974). Chapter VII Transitional Provisions, Art. 91.
- Ricklefs (1991), page 224
- Frederick, Willam H. Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Publisher Ohio University Press, Athens Ohio, 1989.) P. 237-243 ISBN 0-8214-0906-9
- Bussemaker, H.Th. Bersiap! - Opstand in het paradijs. (Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2005) ISBN 90-5730-366-3 summarised in this educational paper: .
- Ricklefs (1991)
- British detachments sent to the towns of Ambarawa and Magelang encountered strong Republican resistance and used air strikes against the Indonesian forces. p. 216; See: McMillan, Richard. 'The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946' (Publisher Routledge, Melbourne, 2005) pp. 306–307 ISBN 0-415-35551-6
- Cribb, Robert. ‘Gangsters and revolutionaries, the Jakarta peoples militia and the Indonesian revolution 1945-1949.’ (Publisher: Equinox , Singapore, 2009) p.64 ISBN 978-979-3780-71-9
- Reid (1973), p. 54.
- Meijer, Hans. 'In Indie geworteld, de Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders, de twintigste eeuw.' (Publisher Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2004) p. 247 ISBN 90-351-2617-3
- Bussemaker, H.Th. Bersiap! - Opstand in het paradijs. (Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2005) P.214-218 ISBN 90-5730-366-3
- Meijer, Hans. 'In Indie geworteld, de Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders, de twintigste eeuw.' (Publisher Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2004) P.245 ISBN 90-351-2617-3. Note: Citing Dutch newspaper 'De Haagsche Post', article dated 4 December 1954.
- See: Meijer, Hans. 'In Indie geworteld, de Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders, de twintigste eeuw.' (Publisher Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2004) P.249-250 ISBN 90-351-2617-3
- Bayly, Christopher Harper, Tim ‘’Forgotten Wars, Freedom and revolution in Southeast Asia’’ (Publisher: Harvard University Press, 2006) ISBN 9780674021532 P.181-182 Googlebooks
- Tas, Sol Souvenirs of Sjahrir P.150
- Sjahrir, Soetan Onze Strijd (Publisher: Vrij Nederland, Amsterdam, 1946) P15-16, 27 
- Nasution, Abdul Haris, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and The Indonesian Defence System Past and Future, (Information Service of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Jakarta, 1953) P.50-51
- Note: These legal testimonies formerly designated top secret have been made public and are available online. See: Van der Molen, Pia Bussemaker, Herman Archief van Tranen website (2012). Document: 125_A_B_C_D_E_F Online archive
- Bussemaker, H.Th. 'Bersiap! - Opstand in het paradijs.' (Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2005) ISBN 90-5730-366-3
- Former KNIL POWs were still recuperating in Allied military bases outside of Indonesia (e.g. Japan and the Philippines). The British in fact prohibited Dutch troops to enter the country during most of the Bersiap period.
- The Indisch Monument, official publication (15 August 1945 Commemoration Foundation, The Hague, 2008) Archived online: 
- Anderson, B.R.O.G. Java in a time of revolution. Occupation and resistance 1944-1946. (Publisher: Ithaca, 1972)
- (Dutch) Berg, J. van den, Bersiap, Nederlands-Indonesische Verhalen. (Publisher: KITLV, The Hague, 1993)
- (Dutch) Bussemaker, H.Th. Bersiap! - Opstand in het paradijs. (Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2005) ISBN 90-5730-366-3
- (Dutch) Beekhuis, H., Bussemaker, H.Th., Haas, P.M. de en Lutter, A.A. Geïllustreerde atlas van de Bersiapkampen in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1947.  (Publisher: Beekhuis, 2009) ISBN 978-90-5294-436-4
- (Dutch) Meijer, Hans. In Indie geworteld, de Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders, de twintigste eeuw., Chapter: 'De bersiaptijd.' (Publisher Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2004) P.236-266 ISBN 90-351-2617-3
- (Dutch) Willems, Wim, De uittocht uit Indie 1945-1995 (Publisher Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2001) ISBN 90-351-2361-1
- Cribb, Robert. ‘Gangsters and revolutionaries, the Jakarta peoples militia and the Indonesian revolution 1945-1949.’ (Publisher: Equinox, Singapore, 2009) ISBN 978-979-3780-71-9
- Frederick, Willam H. Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Publisher Ohio University Press, Athens Ohio, 1989) P.237-243 ISBN 0-8214-0906-9
- Hollander, Inez Silenced Voices: Uncovering a Family's Colonial History in Indonesia. (Ohio RIS Southeast Asia Series, Publisher: Ohio University Press; 1 edition, 2009) ISBN 0-89680-269-8 
- Jong, J.J.P. de, "Diplomatie of strijd. Het Nederlandse beleid tegenover de Indonesische Revolutie 1945-1947." Amsterdam 1988
- Jong, J.J.P. de, "Avondschot. Hoe Nederland zich terugtrok uit zijn Aziatisch imperium." Amsterdam 2011
- McMillan, Richard. The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946.(Publisher Routledge, Melbourne, 2005) P.306-307 ISBN 0-415-35551-6
- (Dutch) Meelhuijsen, W., Revolutie in Soerabaja: 17 augustus – 1 december 1945. (Publisher: NIMH, Zutphen, 2000)
- Reid, Anthony. The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950. (Publisher: Longman Pty Ltd., Melbourne, 1974) ISBN 0-582-71046-4.
- Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. (Second Edition. MacMillan, 1991) P.216
- Smail, J.R.W. Bandung in the early revolution 1945-1946. A study in the social history of the Indonesian revolution. (Publisher: Ithaca, 1964)
- (Indonesian) Trisnojuwono Dimedan perang: dan tjerita-tjerita lain. (Publisher: Nusantara, 1962)
- Vickers, Adrian. A History of Modern Indonesia. (Publisher: Cambridge University Press, New York 2005) P. 85–112. ISBN 0-521-54262-6
- Bersiap in Semarang.
- Official NIOD (Dutch Institute for War Documentation) website.
- (Dutch) Archief van tranen website. A large collection of official testimonies.
- Official SJV (Foundation for victims of the Japanese concentration camps) website. Includes accounts of the Bersiap period .
- (Dutch) Camp Children Website. Bersiap Chapter. Retrieved 06 aug 2011.
- (Dutch) Java Post Website. Bersiap related articles. Retrieved 06 aug 2011.
- van Leeuwen, Lizzy. "Postcolonial neglect in Holland, Colonial and anticolonial sentiments lead Dutch scholars to ignore and marginalise Indies postcolonial history.". 2011 article series called 'Being Indo' featured in Inside Indonesia. Inside Indonesia, the English-language media forum of the Indonesian Resources and Information Program. Retrieved 15 August 2012.
- research project by the Cornell-University Ithaca, New York State, USA.