Biodefense

Biodefense refers to short term, local, usually military measures to restore biosecurity to a given group of persons in a given area who are, or may be, subject to biological warfare— in the civilian terminology, it is a very robust biohazard response. It is technically possible to apply biodefense measures to protect animals or plants, but this is generally uneconomic. However, protection of water supplies and food supplies are often a critical part of biodefense. Various definitions of biosafety emerged in different professions to guarantee non-human health.

Biodefense is most often discussed in the context of biowar or bioterrorism, and is generally considered a military or emergency response term.

Biodefense applies to two distinct target populations: civilian non-combatant and military combatant (troops in the field).

Military

Biodefense of troops in the field

The United States Department of Defense (or "DoD") has focused since at least 1998 on the development and application of vaccine-based biodefenses. In a July 2001 report commissioned by the DoD, the "DoD-critical products" were stated as vaccines against anthrax (AVA and Next Generation), smallpox, plague, tularemia, botulinum, ricin, and equine encephalitis. Note that two of these targets are toxins (botulinum and ricin) while the remainder are infectious agents.

Civilian

Role of public health and disease surveillance

It is important to note that all of the classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans.

Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident known– the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 19 and still off limits to visitors today, see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak).

Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill.

For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24 – 36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease.

Identification of bioweapons

The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians.

The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive.

The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.

The U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) also participates in the identification and prevention of biowarfare and first released a strategy for biodefense in 2002, periodically releasing updates as new pathogens are becoming topics of discussion. Within this list of strategies, responses for specific infectious agents are provided, along with the classification of these agents. NIAID provides countermeasures after the U.S. Department of Homeland Security details which pathogens hold the most threat.

See also

• United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
• National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
• Sensing of phage-triggered ion cascades
• Fluctuation-enhanced sensing of biological and chemical agents

References

Other sources

• Department of Defense (2001). Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research & Development Programs. Retrieved 2005-02-25.
• Institute of Medicine and National Research Councel of the National Academies (2004). Giving Full Measure to Countermeasures: Addressing Problems in the DoD Program to Develop Medical Countermeasures Against Biological Warefare Agents. National Academy Press (Washington, D.C.). ISBN 0-309-09153-5 (paperback).

External links

• BiodefenseEducation.org - A biodefense digital library and learning collaboratory
• NIAID Biodefense Research