Bowsher v. Synar
| Bowsher v. Synar | ||||||
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 Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued April 23, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 |
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| Full case name | Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States v. Synar, Member of Congress, Et al. | |||||
| Citations | 478 U.S. 714 (more) 478 U.S. 714; 106 S. Ct. 3181;92 L. Ed. 2d 583; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 141 |
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| Holding | ||||||
| Congress cannot reserve removal power over executive officers to itself, except for impeachment. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the separation of powers doctrine. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Burger, C. J., joined by Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor | |||||
| Concurrence | Stevens, joined by Marshall | |||||
| Dissent | White and Blackmun | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| U.S. Const. art. I and U.S. Const. art. II | ||||||
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) struck down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress because the law empowered Congress to terminate the United States Comptroller General for certain specified reasons, including "inefficiency, 'neglect of duty,' or 'malfeasance.'" The named defendant in the original case was Comptroller General Charles Arthur Bowsher and the the constitutional challenge was brought forth by Oklahoman Mike Synar.
Contents |
[edit] Facts
Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, allowable deficit levels were calculated with an eye to eliminating the federal deficit. If the budget exceeded the allowable deficit, across-the-board cuts were required. Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General then evaluated these reports, made his own conclusion, and made a recommendation to the President, who was then required to issue an order effecting the reductions required by the Comptroller General unless Congress made the required cuts in other ways within a specified amount of time. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three people recommended by the presiding officers of the House and Senate. He is removable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress, which requires majority votes in both houses and is subject to a Presidential veto. Congress can give a number of reasons for this removal, including "inefficiency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance."
[edit] Holding
The Congress cannot control how its laws are executed. Since it doesn't possess this power, it can't delegate it to its agents. The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress because it can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The Comptroller General exercises executive power and therefore, the Act is unconstitutional.
[edit] Reasoning
- Definition of "executive power." The Comptroller General's function under the Act is the "very essence" of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the Comptroller General commands the President to carry out, without variation, his directive regarding the budget resolutions. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through impeachment.
- Impeachment. The Constitution only provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for "maladministration," with Madison arguing that "so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate." Thus, Congress can only remove a member of the executive branch through impeachment.
[edit] White's Dissent
Justice White's dissent argued that the act should have been upheld. Determining the level of spending by the federal government is a legislative function, not an executive one, he argued. Even if the power were executive, White did not see anything wrong with delegating that power to an agent as long as Congress can only influence him by a means that is subject to the Presentment and Bicameralism Clause requirements, which the act satisfied, since the Comptroller General can only be 'influenced' by Congress through a joint resolution.
[edit] See also
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 478
- List of United States Supreme Court cases
- Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume
- List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court
- Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
