Low intensity conflict

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Low intensity conflict (LIC) is the use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with the policies or objectives of the political body controlling the military force. The term can be used to describe conflicts where at least one or both of the opposing parties operate along such lines.

Low intensity operations[edit]

Low-intensity operations consist of the deployment and use of soldiers in situations other than war. For states, these operations are usually conducted against non-state actors and are given terms like counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and peacekeeping.[1] Violent non-state actors often conduct low-intensity operations against states, often in insurgencies.

Official definitions[edit]

United States[edit]

Low-intensity conflict is defined by the US Army as:

... a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[2]

The manual also says:

... successful LIC operations, consistent with US interests and laws, can advance US international goals such as the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies. ... US policy recognizes that indirect, rather than direct, applications of US military power are the most appropriate and cost-effective ways to achieve national goals in a LIC environment. The principal US military instrument in LIC is security assistance in the form of training, equipment, services and combat support. When LIC threatens friends and allies, the aim of security assistance is to ensure that their military institutions can provide security for their citizens and government. ... The United States will also employ combat operations in exceptional circumstances when it cannot protect its national interests by other means. When a US response is called for, it must be in accordance with the principles of international and domestic law. These principles affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.[2]

Implementation[edit]

Weapons[edit]

As the name suggests, in comparison with conventional operations the armed forces involved operate at a greatly reduced tempo, with fewer soldiers, a reduced range of tactical equipment and limited scope to operate in a military manner. For example the use of air power, pivotal in modern warfare, is often relegated to transport and surveillance. Artillery is often not used when LIC occurs in populated areas. The role of the armed forces is dependent on the stage of the insurrection, whether it has progressed to armed struggle or is in an early stage of propaganda and protests.

Intelligence[edit]

Intelligence gathering is essential to an efficient basis of LIC operation instructions. Electronic and signal gathering intelligence, ELINT and SIGINT, proves largely ineffective against low intensity opponents. LIC generally requires more hands-on HUMINT methods of information retrieval.

Stages[edit]

In the first stages of insurrection, much of an army's work is "soft" - working in conjunction with civil authorities in psychological operations, propaganda, counter-organizing, so-called "hearts and minds." If the conflict progresses, possibly into armed clashes, the role develops with the addition of the identification and removal of the armed groups - but again, at a low level, in communities rather than throughout entire cities. This is roughly the definition of terrorism.

Examples[edit]

Burma[edit]

The Union of Myanmar (the official name of Burma) has regularly conducted limited low-intensity military campaigns against the independence movement of the Karen people in an area of southeast Burma (roughly corresponding to a Burmese administrative region called the Kayin State), which has actively pursued independence since January 1949. While allegedly limited and low-intensity in that the territories occupied in force by central government forces are returned (as they cannot be held permanently as yet) at the end of the offensives (with the stated, but sometimes unstated, purpose of weakening the opposition and independence movements), human rights organizations and national governments outside of Burma question the veracity of, and sometimes outright refute (based on clear evidence[citation needed]) these claims.

Sudan[edit]

The governments of Sudan have also engaged in limited military offensives (analogous to Burma's "annual dry season offensives") against various armed opposition and independence movements, which have often escalated into full-scale warfare, particularly in the south and Darfur, but also until recently in the east. These military actions (First Sudanese Civil War and Second Sudanese Civil War) have, over time, continued to ravage the areas in dispute and contribute greatly to the poor conditions in those regions as well as the various human rights violations that have occurred (and in some cases are still occurring) there.

German occupation of France[edit]

German occupation of Western Europe during World War II, notably the occupation of France, shared many aspects with more recent cases of LIC, such as the "Hearts and minds" stage early on, establishment of puppet governments, strong propaganda aimed at isolating resistance movements, and support to domestic friendly forces (such as the Milice in France).

Guerrilla warfare: the main challenge to low-intensity warfare[edit]

Low intensity warfare's main opponent is the guerrilla, or irregular fighter. This opponent may be state sponsired, or private non-state actors driien by religious or other ideology in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Modern guerrilla warfare at its fullest elaboration is an integrated process, complete with sophisticated doctrine, organization, specialist skills and propaganda capabilities. Guerrillas can operate as small, scattered bands of raiders, but they can also work side by side with regular forces, or combine for far ranging mobile operations in squad, platoon or battalion sizes, or even form conventional units. Based on their level of sophiscation and organization, they can shift between all these modes as the situation demands. guerrilla warfare is flexible, not static. guerrilla guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage, and espionage, undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as demonstrated by the Vietnam conflict. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrillas may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerillas . In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy for a long time, as in Russia's Second Chechen War and the Second Seminole War fought in the swamps of Florida (United States of America). guerrilla tactics and strategy are summarized below and are discussed extensively in standard reference works such as Mao's "On guerrilla Warfare." [3]

Three-phase Maoist model[edit]

Mao/Giap approach[edit]

Maoist theory of people's war divides warfare into three phases. In the first phase, the guerillas gain the support of the population through attacks on the machinery of government and the distribution of propaganda.In the second phase, escalating attacks are made on the government's military and vital institutions. In the third phase, conventional fighting is used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and take control of the country. Mao's seminal work. On guerrilla Warfare, [4] has been widely distributed and applied, nowhere more successfully than in Vietnam, under military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap's "Peoples War, Peoples Army" [5] closely follows the Maoist three-stage approach, but with greater emphasis on flexible shifting between mobile and guerrilla warfare, and opportunities for a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the masses in conjunction with guerrilla forces.


Organization[edit]

Simpleguorg.jpg

Guerrilla organization can range from small local rebel groups with a few dozen participants, to tens of thousands of fighters, deploying from tiny cells to formations of regimental strength. In most cases, there will be leadership aiming for a clear political objective. The organization will typically be structured into political and military wings, sometimes allowing the political leadership to claim "plausible denial" for military attacks.[6]The most fully elaborated guerrilla warfare structure is seen by the Chinese and Vietnamese communists during the revolutionary wars of East and Southeast Asia. [7] A simplified example of this more sophiscated organizational type- that used by revolutionary forces during the Vietnam War, is shown below.

Vcnvastructure2.jpg

Types of operations[edit]

Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police or military, installations and structures, economic enterprises, and targeted civilians. Attacking in small groups, using camouflage and often captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralize target populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerillas . Examples range from the chopping off of limbs in various internal African rebellions, to the suicide bombings of Palestine and Sri Lanka, to sophisticated maneuvers by Viet Cong and NVA forces against military bases and formations.

Surprise and intelligence[edit]

Ingenious tunnel complex in Vietnam, used by low intensity fighters for storage, shelter, withdrawal and defence

For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by guerillas . If the operation has been betrayed or compromised it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely important, and detailed knowledge of the target's dispositions, weaponry and morale is gathered before any attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several ways. Collaborators and sympathizers will usually provide a steady flow of useful information. If working clandestinely, the guerrilla operative may disguise his membership in the insurgent operation, and use deception to ferret out needed data. Employment or enrollment as a student may be undertaken near the target zone, community organizations may be infiltrated, and even romantic relationships struck up as part of intelligence gathering. [8] Public sources of information are also invaluable to the guerrilla, from the flight schedules of targeted airlines, to public announcements of visiting foreign dignitaries, to US Army Field Manuals. Modern computer access via the World Wide Web makes harvesting and collation of such data relatively easy. [9] The use of on the spot reconnaissance is integral to operational planning. Operatives will "case" or analyze a location or potential target in depth- cataloging routes of entry and exit, building structures, the location of phones and communication lines, presence of security personnel and a myriad of other factors. Finally intelligence is concerned with political factors- such as the occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.

Relationships with the civil population[edit]

Relationships with civil populations are influenced by whether the guerillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrillas, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. The "base of the people" is thus the key lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled 'fortified hamlets' were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerillas , who 'often used them for supply and rest havens'." [10] Popular mass support in a confined local area or country however is not always strictly necessary. guerillas and revolutionary groups can still operate using the protection of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intellligence, local security and diplomatic cover. The Al Queda organization is an example of the latter type, drawing sympathizers and support primarily from the wide-ranging Muslim world, even after American attacks eliminated the umbrella of a friendly Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

An apathetic or hostile population makes life difficult for guerillas and strenuous attempts are usually made to gain their support. These may involve not only persuasion, but a calculated policy of intimidation. guerrilla forces may characterize a variety of operations as a liberation struggle, but this may or may not result in sufficient support from affected civilians. Other factors, including ethnic and religious hatreds, can make a simple national liberation claim untenable. Whatever the exact mix of persuasion or coercion used by guerillas, relationships with civil populations are one of the most important factors in their success or failure. [11]

Use of terror[edit]

The use of terror is one of the worst aspects of guerrilla warfare. Terror is used to focus international attention on the guerrilla cause, liquidate opposition leaders, extort cash from targets, intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. Widespread use of terror by guerillas and their opponents is a common feature of modern guerrilla conflicts, with civilians attempting to mollify both sides. At times a civil population may be the main targets of guerrilla attacks, as in Palestinian operations against Israeli civilians. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces against the guerillas . [12]


Withdrawal[edit]

Guerrillas must plan carefully for withdrawal once an operation has been completed, or if it is going badly. The withdrawal phase is sometimes regarded as the most important part of a planned action, and to get entangled in a lengthy struggle with superior forces is usually fatal to insurgent, terrorist or revolutionary operatives. Withdrawal is usually accomplished using a variety of different routes and methods and may include quickly scouring the area for loose weapons, evidence cleanup, and disguise as peaceful civilians. [13] In the case of suicide operations, withdrawal considerations by successful attackers are moot, nevertheless such activity as eliminating traces of evidence, or hiding materials and supplies must be done.

Logistics[edit]

Guerrillas typically operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional formations, nevertheless their logistical activities can be elaborately organized. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land, or draw support from the civil population in which he is embedded. In this sense, "the people" become the guerillas supply base.[14] Financing of terrorist or guerrilla activities ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or non-voluntary), to actual operation of business enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies and kidnappings, to the complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation used by modern Jihadist/Jihad organizations.

Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerrilla logistical structure, usually located in remote areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes.[15] These can be quite elaborate, as in the tough VC/NVA fortified base camps and tunnel complexes encountered by US forces during the Vietnam War. Their importance can be seen by the hard fighting sometimes engaged in by communist forces to protect these sites. However when it became clear that defence was untenable, communist units typically withdrew without sentiment.

Terrain[edit]

Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting, and this is indeed the case with the definitive operations of Mao and Giap, and the mujahadeen of Afghanistan. guerrillas however have successfully operated in urban settings as demonstrated in places like Argentina and Cyprus. In both cases, guerillas rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural guerillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerillas, rather than melting into the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people. Rooting guerillas out of both types of areas can be difficult.

Foreign support and sanctuaries[edit]

Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or statements of sympathy for the guerillas is not strictly necessary, but it can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory.[16] Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law, particularly if the sponsoring regime is successful in concealing its support and in claiming "plausible denial" for attacks by operatives based in its territory.

The VC and NVA made extensive use of such international sanctuaries during their conflict, and the complex of trails, way-stations and bases snaking through Laos and Cambodia, the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, was the logistical lifeline that sustained their forces in the South. Another case in point is the Mukti Bahini guerillas who fought alongside the Indian Army in the 14-day Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 against Pakistan that resulted in the creation of the state of Bangladesh. In the post-Vietnam era, the Al Queda organization also made effective use of remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and execute its operations. This foreign sanctuary eventually broke down with American attacks against the Taliban and Al Queda but not before operatives pulled off the spectacular September 11, 2001 attacks.

Guerrilla initiative and combat intensity[edit]

Low intensity operations often make use of helicopter assets to quickly surround opposing forces.

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrillas will usually possess the tactical initiative and the element of surprise. Planning for an operation may take weeks, months or even years, with a constant series of cancellations and restarts as the situation changes.[17] Careful rehearsals and "dry runs" are usually conducted to work out problems and details. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area, a pattern typical of VC/NVA and other "Peoples War" operations. Individual suicide bomb attacks offer another pattern, typically involving only the individual bomber and his support team, but these too are spread or metered out based on prevailing capabilities and political winds.

Whatever approach is used, the guerrilla holds the initiative, and can prolong his survival though varying the intensity of combat. This means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to years. During the interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply and plan. In the Vietnam War, most communist units (including mobile NVA regulars using guerrilla tactics) spent only a few days a month fighting. While they might be forced into an unwanted battle by an enemy sweep, most of the time was spent in training, intelligence gathering, political and civic infiltration, propaganda indoctrination, construction of fortifications, or foraging for supplies and food. [18]The large numbers of such groups striking at different times however, gave the war its "around the clock" quality.

Low intensity counter operations or counter-guerrilla warfare[edit]

Quick air support by helicopters and fixed wing assets in integral to countering low-intensity threats

Principles[edit]

The low intensity fighter or guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the 1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied.

Classic guidelines[edit]

The widely distributed and influential work of Sir. Robert Thompson, counter-insurgency expert in Malaysia, offers several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance. Numerous other regimes, however, give such considerations short shrift, and their counterguerrilla operations have involved mass murder, genocide, starvation and the massive spread of terror, torture and execution. The totalitarian regimes of Stalin and Hitler are classic examples, as are the lesser but comparable measures of dictatorships fighting "dirty wars" in South America. Elements of Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:[19]

  1. A viable competing vision that comprehensively mobilizes popular support. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures.
  2. Reasonable concessions where necessary. Action must be also be taken at a lower level to resolve legitimate grievances. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side to simply declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, or collecting taxes honestly can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
Propaganda leaflets are often used in low intensity operations to demoralize opponents. Above is a US propaganda leaflet dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam war.
  1. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. Clear steps must be taken to curb brutality and retaliation by the security or "freelance" forces.
  2. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop insurgents, military isweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-military action can control them.
  3. Mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, etc.
  4. Systematic intelligence effort. Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
  5. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
  6. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range recon and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups. Strict control must be kept over specialist units to prevent the emergence of violent vigilante style reprisal squads that undermine the government's program. Mass forces include village self-defence groups and citizen militias organized for local defence and security.
  7. Foreign assistance must be limited and carefully used. Such aid should be limited to material and technical support and small cadres of specialists. Unless this is done, the foreign helper may find itself "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam.[20]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ G.V. Brandolini (2002). Low intensity conflicts. CRF Press, Bergamo, 16 p.
  2. ^ a b United States Department of the Army (5 December 1990), Field Manual 100-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, GlobalSecurity.org 
  3. ^ Mao, op. cit.
  4. ^ Mao, op. cit.
  5. ^ Peoples War, Peoples Army, Vo Nguyen Giap
  6. ^ "Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Bard E. O'Neill
  7. ^ Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
  8. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
  9. ^ Terrorist use of web spreads
  10. ^ Encyclopedia Britannica, 14ed, "guerrilla Warfare" p. 460-464
  11. ^ "Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
  12. ^ "Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare", Bard E. O'Neill
  13. ^ Mao, op. cit.
  14. ^ Mao, op. cit.
  15. ^ Mao, op. cit., Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
  16. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit.
  17. ^ Lanning/Cragg, op. cit
  18. ^ Inside the VC and the NVA, Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg
  19. ^ "Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
  20. ^ "Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam", Robert Thompson
  • Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows, ISBN 0-595-22593-4
  • British Army (ed.). Land Operations, Volume III, Counter Revolutionary Operations, 1969.
  • Buffaloe, David. Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne at Firebase Shkin, Afghanistan [1], October 2004.
  • Hammes, Thomas X.. The Sling and the Stone, Zenith Press, 2004. ISBN 0-7603-2059-4
  • van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. The Free Press, 1991. ISBN 0-02-933155-2

External links[edit]