Capital control

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Capital controls are residency-based measures such as transaction taxes, other limits, or outright prohibitions that a nation's government can use to regulate flows from capital markets into and out of the country's capital account. These measures may be economy-wide, sector-specific (usually the financial sector), or industry specific (for example, “strategic” industries). They may apply to all flows, or may differentiate by type or duration of the flow (debt, equity, direct investment; short-term vs. medium- and long-term).

Types of capital control include exchange controls that prevent or limit the buying and selling of a national currency at the market rate, caps on the allowed volume for the international sale or purchase of various financial assets, transaction taxes such as the proposed Tobin tax, minimum stay requirements, requirements for mandatory approval, or even limits on the amount of money a private citizen is allowed to remove from the country. There have been several shifts of opinion on whether capital controls are beneficial and in what circumstances they should be used.

Capital controls were an integral part of the Bretton Woods system which emerged after World War II and lasted until the early 1970s. This period was the first time capital controls had been endorsed by mainstream economics. In the 1970s free market economists became increasingly successful in persuading their colleagues that capital controls were in the main harmful. The US, other western governments, and the international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) began to take an increasingly critical view of capital controls and persuaded many countries to abandon them to facilitate financial globalization.[1]

The Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the Russian ruble crisis of 1998-99, and the global financial crisis of 2008, however, highlighted the risks associated with the volatility of capital flows, and led many countries—even those with relatively open capital accounts—to make use of capital controls alongside macroeconomic and prudential policies as means to damp the effects of volatile flows on their economies.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as capital inflows surged to emerging market economies, a group of economists at the IMF outlined the elements of a policy toolkit to manage the macroeconomic and financial-stability risks associated with capital flow volatility, and the role of capital controls within that toolkit.[2] The study, as well as a successor study focusing on financial-stability concerns stemming from capital flow volatility,[3] while not representing an IMF official view, were nevertheless influential in generating debate among policy makers and the international community, and ultimately in bringing about a shift in the institutional position of the IMF.[4][5][6] With the increased use of capital controls in recent years, the IMF has moved to destigmatize the use of capital controls alongside macroeconomic and prudential policies to deal with capital flow volatility. More widespread use of the capital controls instrument, however, raises a host of multilateral coordination issues, as enunciated for example by the G-20, echoing the concerns voiced by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White more than six decades ago.[7]

History[edit]

Pre World War I[edit]

Prior to the 19th century there was generally little need for capital controls due to low levels of international trade and financial integration. In the first age of globalisation which is generally dated from 1870–1914, capital controls remained largely absent.[8] [9]

World War I to World War II: 1914 - 1945[edit]

Highly restrictive capital controls were introduced with the outbreak of World War I. In the 1920s they were generally relaxed, only to be strengthened again in the wake of the 1929 Great Crash. This was more an ad hoc response to potentially damaging flows rather than based on a change in normative economic theory. Economic historian Barry Eichengreen has implied that the use of capital controls peaked during World War II, but the more general view is that the most wide ranging implementation occurred after Bretton Woods.[8] [10] [11] [12] An example of capital control in the inter war period was the Reich Flight Tax, introduced in 1931 by Chancellor Brüning. The tax was needed to limit the removal of capital from the country by wealthy residents. At the time Germany was suffering economic hardship due to the Great Depression and the harsh war reparations imposed after World War I. Following the ascension of the Nazis to power in 1933, the tax was repurposed to confiscate money and property from Jews fleeing the state-sponsored anti-Semitism.[13] [14] [15]

The Bretton Woods Era: 1945–1971[edit]

A widespread system of capital controls were decided upon at the international 1944 conference at Bretton Woods

At the end of World War II, international capital was "caged" by the imposition of strong and wide ranging capital controls as part of the newly created Bretton Woods system—it was perceived that this would help protect the interests of ordinary people and the wider economy. These measures were popular as at this time the western public's view of international bankers was generally very low, blaming them for the Great Depression.[16] [17] Keynes, one of the principal architects of the Bretton Woods system, envisaged capital controls as a permanent feature of the international monetary system,[18] though he had agreed current account convertibility should be adopted once international conditions had stabilised sufficiently. This essentially meant that currencies were to be freely convertible for the purposes of international trade in goods and services, but not for capital account transactions. Most industrial economies relaxed their controls around 1958 to allow this to happen.[19] The other leading architect of Bretton Woods, the American Harry Dexter White, and his boss Henry Morgenthau, were somewhat less radical than Keynes, but still agreed on the need for permanent capital controls. In his closing address to the Bretton Woods conference, Morgenthau spoke of how the measures adopted would drive "...the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance".[16]

Following the Keynesian Revolution, the first two decades after World War II saw little argument against capital controls from economists, though an exception was Milton Friedman. However, from the late 1950s the effectiveness of capital controls began to break down, in part due to innovations such as the Eurodollar market. According to Dani Rodrik it is unclear to what extent this was due to an unwillingness on the part of governments to respond effectively, as compared with an inability to do so.[18] Eric Helleiner has argued that heavy lobbying from Wall Street bankers was a factor in persuading American authorities not to exempt the Eurodollar market from capital controls. From the late 1960s the prevailing opinion among economists began to switch to the view that capital controls are on the whole more harmful than beneficial.[20][21]

While many of the capital controls in this era were directed at international financiers and banks, some were directed at individual citizens. For example in the 1960s, British individuals were at one point restricted from taking more than £50 with them out of the country for their foreign holidays.[22] In their book This Time Is Different, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff suggest that the use of capital controls in this period, even more than its rapid economic growth, was responsible for the very low level of banking crises that occurred in the Bretton Woods era.[23]

Transition period and Washington consensus: 1971 - 2009[edit]

By the late 1970s, as part of the displacement of Keynesianism in favour of free market orientated policies and theories, countries began abolishing their capital controls, starting between 1973 - 1974 with the U.S., Canada, Germany and Switzerland and followed by Great Britain in 1979.[24] Most other advanced and emerging economies followed, chiefly in the 1980s and early 1990s.[8] During the period spanning from approximately 1980 - 2009, known as the Washington Consensus, the normative opinion was that capital controls were to be avoided except perhaps in a crisis. It was widely held that the absence of controls allowed capital to freely flow to where it is needed most, helping not only investors to enjoy good returns, but also helping ordinary people to benefit from economic growth.[25] During the 1980s many emerging economies decided or were coerced into following the advanced economies by abandoning their capital controls, though over 50 retained them at least partially.[8] [26] The orthodox view that capital controls are a bad thing was challenged following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Asian nations that had retained their capital controls such as India and China could credit them for allowing them to escape the crisis relatively unscathed.[23][27] Malaysia's prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad imposed capital controls as an emergency measure in September 1998, both strict exchange controls and limits on outflows from portfolio investments - these were found to be effective in containing the damage from the crisis. [8] [28] [29] In the early nineties even some pro-globalization economists like Jagdish Bhagwati [30] and some writers in publications like The Economist,[28] [31] spoke out in favor of a limited role for capital controls. But while many developing world economies lost faith in the free market consensus, it remained strong among western nations.[8]

Post Washington Consensus: 2009 and later[edit]

By 2009, the global financial crisis had caused a resurgence in Keynesian thought which reversed the previously prevailing orthodoxy.[32] During the 2008–2012 Icelandic financial crisis, the IMF proposed that capital controls on outflows should be imposed by Iceland, calling them "an essential feature of the monetary policy framework, given the scale of potential capital outflows."[33]

In the latter half of 2009, as the global economy started to recover from the Global Financial Crisis, capital inflows to emerging market economies—especially, in Asia and Latin America—surged, raising macroeconomic and financial-stability risks. Several emerging market economies responded to these concerns by adopting capital controls or macroprudential measures; for example, Brazil imposed a tax on the purchase of financial assets by foreigners and Taiwan restricted overseas investors from buying Time deposits. [34]

The partial return to favor of capital controls is linked to a wider emerging consensus among policy makers for the greater use of macroprudential policy. According to economics journalist Paul Mason, international agreement for the global adoption of Macro prudential policy was reached at the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh summit - an agreement which Mason said had seemed impossible at the London summit which took place only a few months before.[35]

Pro capital control statements by various prominent economists, together with an influential staff position note prepared by IMF economists in February 2010 (Jonathan D. Ostry et al., 2010), and a follow-up note prepared in April 2011,[3] have been hailed as an "end of an era" that eventually led to a change in the IMF's long held position that capital controls should be used only in extremis, as a last resort, and on a temporary basis.[2][4][5][6] [36] [37] [38][39]

In June 2010 The Financial Times published several articles on the growing trend towards using capital controls. They noted influential voices from the Asian Development Bank and World Bank had joined the IMF in advising there is a role for capital controls. The FT reported on the recent tightening of controls in Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Russia. In Indonesia recently implemented controls include a one-month minimum holding period for certain securities. In South Korea limits have been placed on currency forward positions. In Taiwan the access that foreigner investors have to certain bank deposits has been restricted. The FT cautioned that imposing controls has a downside including the creation of possible future problems in attracting funds. [40] [41] [42]

By September 2010, emerging economies had experienced huge capital inflows resulting from carry trades made attractive to market participants by the expansionary monetary policies several large economies had undertook over the previous two years as a response to the crisis.[clarification needed] This has led to countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Russia and Poland further reviewing the possibility of increasing their capital controls as a response. [43] [44] In October, with reference to increased concern about capital flows and widespread talk of an imminent Currency war, financier George Soros has suggested that capital controls are going to become much more widely used over the next few years.[45] But several analysts have questioned whether controls will be effective for most countries, with Chile's finance minister saying his country had no plans to use them.[46] [47] [48]

In February 2011, citing evidence from new IMF research (Jonathan D. Ostry et al., 2010) that restricting short-term capital inflows could lower financial-stability risks,[2] over 250 economists headed by Joseph Stiglitz wrote a letter to the Obama administration asking them to remove clauses from various bilateral trade agreements that allow the use of capital controls to be penalized. There was strong counter lobbying by business and so far the US administration has not acted on the call, although some figures such as Treasury secretary Tim Geithner have spoken out in support of capital controls at least in certain circumstances.[21][49]

Econometric analyses undertaken by the IMF,[50] and other academic economists found that in general countries which deployed capital controls weathered the 2008 crisis better than comparable countries which did not.[2][3][21] In April 2011 the IMF published its first ever set of guidelines for the use of capital controls.[51][52] At November's 2011 G-20 Cannes summit, the G20 agreed that developing countries should have even greater freedom to use capital controls than the IMF guidelines allow.[53] A few weeks later the Bank of England published a paper where they broadly welcomed the G20's decision in favor of even greater use of capital controls, though they caution that compared to developing countries, advanced economies may find it harder to implement efficient controls.[54] Not all momentum has been in favor of increased use of capital controls however. For example, in December 2011 China partially loosened its controls on inbound capital flows, which the Financial Times described as reflecting an ongoing desire by Chinese authorities for further liberalization. [55] India also lifted some of its controls on inbound capital in early January 2012, drawing criticism from economist Arvind Subramanian who considers relaxing capital controls a good policy for China but not for India considering her different economic circumstances.[56]

In September 2012, Michael W. Klein of Tufts University challenged the emergent consensus that short term capital controls can be beneficial, publishing a preliminary study that found the measures used by countries like Brazil had been ineffective (at least up to 2010). Klein argues it was only countries with long term capital controls, such as China and India, that have enjoyed measurable protection from adverse capital flows.[57] In the same month, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah of NIPFP published an article about the permanent and comprehensive capital controls in India, which seem to have been ineffective in achieving the goals of macroeconomic policy.[58] However, other studies have found that capital controls may lower financial stability risks,[3][50] while the controls Brazilian authorities adopted after the 2008 financial crisis did have some beneficial effect on Brazil itself.[59]

Yet capital controls may have externalities: some empirical studies find that capital flows were diverted to other countries as capital controls were tightened in Brazil.[60][61] An IMF staff discussion (Jonathan D. Ostry et al., 2012) note explores the multilateral consequences of capital controls, and the desirability of international cooperation to achieve globally efficient outcomes.[7] It flags three issues of potential concern. First is the possibility that capital controls may be used as a substitute for warranted external adjustment (for example, when inflow controls are used to sustain an undervalued currency). Second, the imposition of capital controls by one country may deflect some capital towards other recipient countries, exacerbating their inflow problem. Third, policies in source countries (including monetary policy) may exacerbate problems faced by capital-receiving countries if they increase the volume or riskiness of capital flows. The paper argues however that if capital controls are justified from a national standpoint (in terms of reducing domestic distortions), then under a range of circumstances they should be pursued even if they give rise to cross-border spillovers. But if policies in one country exacerbate existing distortions in other countries, and it is costly for other countries to respond, then multilateral coordination of unilateral policies is likely to be beneficial. Coordination may require borrowers to reduce inflow controls or an agreement with lenders to partially internalize the risks from excessively large or risky outflows.

On December 3, the IMF published a staff paper which further expanded on their recent support for the limited use of capital controls.[39]

The impossible trinity trilemma[edit]

The history of capital controls is sometimes discussed in relation to the Impossible trinity – the finding that its impossible for a nation's economic policy to simultaneously deliver more than two of the following three desirable macroeconomic goals: 1) A fixed exchange rate, 2) an independent monetary policy, 3) free movement for capital (absence of capital controls). [12] In the first age of globalization, governments largely chose to pursue a stable exchange rate while allowing freedom of movement for capital- the sacrifice was that their monetary policy was largely dictated by international conditions, not by the needs of the domestic economy. In the Bretton woods period governments were free to have both generally stable exchange rates and independent monetary policies at the price of capital controls. The impossible trinity concept was especially influential during this era, as a justification for capital controls. In the Washington consensus period, advanced economies generally chose to allow freedom of capital and to continue maintaining an independent monetary policy while accepting a floating or semi floating exchange rate.[8][21]

Adoption of Prudential Measures[edit]

The Prudential Capital Controls measure distinguishes itself from the general capital controls as summarized above as it is one of the prudential regulations that aims to mitigate the systemic risk, reduce the business cycle volatility, increase the macroeconomic stability, and enhance the social welfare. It generally regulates inflows only and take ex-ante policy interventions. The "prudence" requirement says that such regulation should curb and manage the excessive risk accumulation process with cautious forethought to prevent an emerging financial crisis and economic collapse. The "ex-ante" timing means that such regulation should be taken effectively before the realization of any unfettered crisis as opposed to taking policy interventions after a severe crisis already hits the economy.

Free movement of capital and payments[edit]

Finance workers such as those in the International Finance Centre may find ways to profitably exploit any loop holes in capital controls, often only weeks or days after they are implemented.

Full freedom of movement for capital and payments has so far only been approached between individual pairings of states which have free trade agreements and relative freedom from capital controls, such as Canada and the U.S., or the complete freedom within regions such as the European Union, with its "Four Freedoms" and the Eurozone. During the first age of globalization that was brought to an end by World War I, there were very few restrictions on the movement of capital, but all major economies except for Great Britain and the Netherlands heavily restricted payments for goods by the use of current account controls such as tariffs and duties.[8]

Arguments in favour of free capital movement[edit]

Pro free market economists claim the following advantages for free movement of capital:

  • It enhances overall economic growth by allowing savings to be channelled to their most productive use.[28]
  • By encouraging foreign direct investment it helps developing economies to benefit from foreign expertise.[28]
  • Allows states to raise funds from external markets to help them mitigate a temporary recession.[28]
  • Enables both savers and borrowers to secure the best available market rate.[12]
  • When controls include taxes, funds raised are sometimes siphoned off by corrupt government officials for their personal use.[12]
  • Hawala-type traders across Asia have always been able to evade currency movement controls
  • Computer and communications technologies have made unimpeded electronic funds transfer a convenience for increasing numbers of bank customers.

Arguments in favour of capital controls[edit]

Pro capital control economists have made the following points.

  • Capital controls may represent an optimal macroprudential policy that reduces the risk of financial crises and prevents the associated externalities.[3][50][62][63]
  • Global economic growth was on average considerably higher in the Bretton Woods periods where capital controls were widely in use. Using regression analysis, economists such as Dani Rodrik have found no positive correlation between growth and free capital movement.[28]
  • Capital controls limiting a nation's residents from owning foreign assets can ensure that domestic credit is available more cheaply than would otherwise be the case. This sort of capital control is still in effect in both India and China. In India the controls encourage residents to provide cheap funds directly to the government, while in China it means that Chinese businesses have an inexpensive source of loans.[23]
  • Economic crises have been considerably more frequent since the Bretton Woods capital controls were relaxed. Even economic historians who class capital controls as repressive have concluded capital controls, more than the period's high growth, were responsible for the infrequency of crisis.[23] Studies have found that large uncontrolled capital inflows have frequently damaged a nation's economic development by causing its currency to appreciate, by contributing to inflation, and by causing unsustainable economic booms which often precede financial crises - caused when the inflows sharply reverse and both domestic and foreign capital flee the country. The risk of crisis is especially high in developing economies where the inbound flows become loans denominated in foreign currency, so that the repayments become considerably more expensive as the developing country's currency depreciates. This is known as original sin (economics).[8][64][65]

See also[edit]

Notes and references[edit]

  1. ^ Fischer, Stanley (1997). "Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 2 April 2014. 
  2. ^ a b c d Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Dennis B.S. Reinhardt (2010-02-19). "Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls." Staff Position Note 10/04. International Monetary Fund.
  3. ^ a b c d e Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Luc Laeven, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Annamaria Kokenyne (April 2011), “Managing Capital Inflows: What Tools to Use?, IMF Staff Discussion Notes No. 11/06.” International Monetary Fund.
  4. ^ a b The Economist (February 2010), "The IMF changes its mind on controls on capital inflows."
  5. ^ a b Financial Times (February 2010), "IMF reconsiders capital controls opposition."
  6. ^ a b The Economist (April 2011), "The Reformation: A disjointed attempt by the IMF to refine its thinking on capital controls."
  7. ^ a b Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, and Anton Korinek (2012b) “Multilateral Aspects of Managing the Capital Account,” SDN/12/10. International Monetary Fund.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h i Eirc Helleiner, Louis W Pauly, et al (2005). John Ravenhill, ed. Global Political Economy. Oxford University Press. pp. 7–15, 154, 177–204. ISBN 0-19-926584-4. 
  9. ^ Some of the few pre WWI capital controls had political rather than economic motivations, e.g. between Germany and France after the 1871 Franco Prussian war, but there were a few controls implemented with economic justifications, although not endorsed by mainstream economists.
  10. ^ Barry Eichengreen (2008). ""chp 1"". Globalizing capital: a history of the international monetary system. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-13937-7. 
  11. ^ Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2008-04-16). "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises" (pdf). Harvard. p. 8. Retrieved 2010-05-28. 
  12. ^ a b c d Michael C. Burda and Charles Wyplosz (2005). Macroeconomics: A European Text , 4th edition. Oxford University Press. pp. 246–248 , 515 , 516. ISBN 0-19-926496-1. 
  13. ^ Expropriation (Aryanization) of Jewish Property
  14. ^ "GERMANY: Profitable Tax". Time Magazine. 1938-09-26. Retrieved 2010-05-30. 
  15. ^ Liaquat Ahamed (2009). Lords of Finance. WindMill Books. ISBN 978-0-09-949308-2. 
  16. ^ a b Orlin, Crabbe (1996). International Financial Markets (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. pp. 2–20. ISBN 0-13-206988-1. 
  17. ^ Larry Elliott , Dan Atkinson (2008). The Gods That Failed: How Blind Faith in Markets Has Cost Us Our Future. The Bodley Head Ltd. pp. 6–15, 72–81. ISBN 1-84792-030-6. 
  18. ^ a b Dani Rodrik (2010-05-11). "Greek Lessons for the World Economy". Project Syndicate. Retrieved 2010-05-19. 
  19. ^ Laurence Copeland. Exchange Rates and International Finance (4th ed.). Prentice Hall. pp. 10–40. ISBN 0-273-68306-3. 
  20. ^ Helleiner,, Eric (1995). States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8333-6. 
  21. ^ a b c d Kevin Gallagher (2011-02-20). "Regaining Control? - Capital Controls and the Global Financial Crisis". University of Massachusetts Amherst. Retrieved 2011-06-24. 
  22. ^ Wolf, Martin (2009). "passim, esp. preface and chpt. 3". Fixing Global Finance. Yale University Press. 
  23. ^ a b c d Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2010). This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton University Press. pp. passim, esp. 66 , 92–94, 205 , 403. ISBN 0-19-926584-4. 
  24. ^ Roberts, Richard (1999). Inside International Finance. Orion. p. 25. ISBN 0-7528-2070-2. 
  25. ^ Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Julian di Giovanni, Andre Faria, Ayhan Kose, Paolo Mauro, Jonathan D. Ostry, Martin Schindler, and Marco Terrones, 2008, “Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 264 (International Monetary Fund).
  26. ^ James M. Boughton. "Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979–1989". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 2009-09-07. 
  27. ^ China and India still retain capital controls as late as 2010.
  28. ^ a b c d e f Kate Galbraith, ed. (2001). Globalisation. The economist. pp. 286–290. ISBN 1-86197-348-9. 
  29. ^ Masahiro Kawai and Shinji Takagi (2003-05-01). "RETHINKING CAPITAL CONTROLS:THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE". Ministry of Finance (Japan). Retrieved 2010-05-28. 
  30. ^ Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) In defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press; pp.199-207
  31. ^ The Economist (2003) A place for capital controls
  32. ^ Chris Giles, Ralph Atkins and Krishna Guha. "The undeniable shift to Keynes". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2009-01-23. 
  33. ^ IMF Completes First Review Under Stand-By Arrangement with Iceland, Extends Arrangement, and Approves US$167.5 Million Disbursement, Press Release No. 09/375, October 28, 2009
  34. ^ A Beattie, K Brown, P Garnham, J Wheatley, S Jung-a & J Lau (2009-11-19). "Worried nations try to cool hot money". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2009-12-15. 
  35. ^ Paul Mason (journalist) (2010). Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed (2nd edition). Verso. pp. 196–199. ISBN 978-1-84467-653-8. 
  36. ^ Dani Rodrik (2010-03-11). "The End of an Era in Finance". Project Syndicate. Retrieved 2010-05-24. 
  37. ^ Kevin Gallagher (2010-03-01). "Capital controls back in IMF toolkit". The Guardian. Retrieved 2010-05-24. 
  38. ^ Arvind Subramanian (2009-11-18). "Time For Coordinated Capital Account Controls?". The Baseline Scenario. Retrieved 2009-12-15. 
  39. ^ a b "THE LIBERALIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CAPITAL FLOWS: AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW". International Monetary Fund. 2012-12-03. Retrieved 2012-12-04. 
  40. ^ Lex team (2010-06-10). "Capital controls". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
  41. ^ Song Jung- (2010-06-14). "Seoul curbs capital flows to rein in won fluctuations". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
  42. ^ Kevin Brown (2010-06-30). "Asia toys with introducing capital controls". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
  43. ^ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2010-09-29). "Capital controls eyed as global currency wars escalate". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 2010-09-29. 
  44. ^ West inflates EM 'super bubble'. The Financial Times. 2010-09-29. Retrieved 2010-09-29. 
  45. ^ George Soros (2010-10-07). China must fix the global currency crisis. The Financial Times. Retrieved 2010-10-14. 
  46. ^ "Chile Not Planning Capital Controls For Region-Beating Peso, Larrain Says". Bloomberg L.P. 2010-10-09. Retrieved 2010-10-14. 
  47. ^ Sebastian Mallaby (2011-04-14). "The IMF needs to find its voice again". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2011-12-15. 
  48. ^ Ragnar Arnason and Jon Danielsson (2011-11-14). "Capital controls are exactly wrong for Iceland". Vox EU. Retrieved 2011-12-15. 
  49. ^ "US business defends capital controls in trade pacts". Reuters. 2011-02-08. Retrieved 2011-06-24. 
  50. ^ a b c Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, 2012a, "Tools for Managing Financial-Stability Risks from Capital Inflows," Journal of International Economics, vol. 88(2), pp. 407-421.
  51. ^ Robin Harding (2011-04-05). "IMF gives ground on capital controls". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2011-04-16. 
  52. ^ IMF staffers (2011-04-05). "IMF Develops Framework to Manage Capital Inflows". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 2011-04-16. 
  53. ^ Kevin Gallagher (2010-11-29). "The IMF must heed G20 decisions". The Guardian. Retrieved 2011-12-15. 
  54. ^ Oliver Bush, Katie Farrant and Michelle Wright (2011-12-09). "Reform of the International Monetary and Financial System". Bank of England. Retrieved 2011-12-15. 
  55. ^ Simon Rabinovitch (2011-12-18). "China opens up to offshore renminbi investors". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2011-12-20. 
  56. ^ Arvind Subramanian (2012-01-09). "China and India: right policy, wrong place". The Financial Times. Retrieved 2012-01-17. 
  57. ^ Capital Controls: Gates and Walls by Michael W. Klein (Tufts), September 2012
  58. ^ Did the Indian capital controls work as a tool of macroeconomic policy?, IMF Economic Review, September 2012.
  59. ^ Navigating Capital Flows in Brazil and Chile by Brittany Baumann and Kevin Gallagher (BU), June 2012
  60. ^ Capital Controls and Spillover Effects: Evidence from Latin-American Countries by Frederic J. Lambert, Julio Ramos-Tallada and Cyril Rebillard (Banque de France), December 2011
  61. ^ Bubble Thy Neighbor: Portfolio Effects and Externalities from Capital Controls by Kristin J. Forbes (MIT), April 2012
  62. ^ Anton Korinek. "The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls". IMF Economic Review 59(3), pp. 523-561. 
  63. ^ Anton Korinek (2010-05-01). "Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View". University of Maryland. Retrieved 2011-07-12. 
  64. ^ Eswar S. Prasad , Raghuram G. Rajan , and Arvind Subramanian (2007-04-16). "Foreign Capital and Economic Growth". Peterson Institute. Retrieved 2009-12-15. 
  65. ^ Heakal, Reem. "Understanding Capital And Financial Accounts In The Balance Of Payments". Investopedia. Retrieved 2009-12-11. 

Further reading[edit]

  • States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (1994) by Eric Helleiner - Chapter 2 is excellent for the pre WWII history of capital controls and their stenghening with Bretton Woods. Remaining chapters cover their decline from the 60s through to early 90s. Helleiner offers extensive additional reading for those with a deep interest in the history of capital controls.

External links[edit]