Category of being
In metaphysics (in particular, ontology), the different kinds or ways of being are called categories of being or simply categories. To investigate the categories of being is to determine the most fundamental and the broadest classes of entities. A distinction between such categories, in making the categories or applying them, is called an ontological distinction.
- 1 Categorical distinctions
- 2 Categorization of existence
- 3 Categories of being
- 4 History
- 5 See also
- 6 References
- 7 Selected bibliography
- 8 External links
The common or dominant ways to view categories as of the end of the 20th century.
- via bundle theory as bundles of properties – categories reflect differences in these
- via peer-to-peer comparisons or dialectics – categories are formed by conflict/debate
- via value theory as leading to specific ends – categories are formed by choosing ends
- via conceptual metaphors as arising from characteristics of human cognition itself – categories are found via cognitive science and other study of that biological system
Any of these ways can be criticized for...
- for seeking to make distinctions that aren't as universal as claimed (greedy reductionism)
- for serious bias in point of view (subject-object problem or God's eye view)
- for relying on theological or spiritual claims a priori, for relying too much on surface conflict or current investigative priorities to point out differences
- for ignoring action
- for ignoring the perceived or biospheric context, or the cognitive mechanisms that perceive and invent categories
- or for relying on a complex empirical process of investigation that is poorly understood and only recently embarked upon.
In process philosophy, this last is the only possibility, but historically philosophers have been loath to conclude that nothing exists but process.
Categorization of existence
As bundles of properties
Bundle theory is an ontological theory about objecthood proposed by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, which states that objects only subsist as a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes. In an epistemological sense, bundle theory says that all that can be known about objects are the properties which they are composed of, and that these properties are all that can be truly said to exist.
For example, if we take the concept of a black square, bundle theory would suggest that all that can be said to exist are the properties of a black square.
The properties of a black square are: Black, Regular and Quadrilateral.
However, from these properties alone, we cannot deduce any kind of underlying essence of a "black square", or some object called a "black square", except as a bundle of properties which constitute the object that we then go on to label as a "black square", but the object itself is really nothing more than a system of relations (or bundle) of properties. To defend this, Hume asks us to imagine an object without properties, if we strip the black square of its properties (being black, regular and quadrilateral) we end up reducing the object to literal non-existence.
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As formed by debate
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Intuition as evasion
A seemingly simpler way to view categories is as arising only from intuition. Philosophers argue this evades the issue. What it means to take the category physical object seriously as a category of being is to assert that the concept of physical objecthood cannot be reduced to or explicated in any other terms – not, for example, in terms of bundles of properties but only in terms of other items in that category.
In this way, many ontological controversies can be understood as controversies about exactly which categories should be seen as fundamental, irreducible, or primitive. To refer to intuition as the source of distinctions and thus categories doesn't resolve this.
Ideology, dogma, theory
Modern theories give weight to intuition, perceptually observed properties, comparisons of categories among persons, and the direction of investigation towards known specified ends, to determine what humanity in its present state of being needs to consider irreducible. They seek to explain why certain beliefs about categories would appear in political science as ideology, in religion as dogma, or in science as theory.
A set of ontological distinctions related by a single conceptual metaphor was called an ontological metaphor by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who claimed that such metaphors arising from experience were more basic than any properties or symbol-based comparisons. Their cognitive science of mathematics was a study of the embodiment of basic symbols and properties including those studied in the philosophy of mathematics, via embodied philosophy, using cognitive science. This theory comes after several thousand years of inquiry into patterns and cognitive bias of humanity.
Categories of being
Philosophers have many differing views on what the fundamental categories of being are. In no particular order, here are at least some items that have been regarded as categories of being by someone or other:[who?]
Physical objects are beings; certainly they are said to be in the simple sense that they exist all around us. So a house is a being, a person's body is a being, a tree is a being, a cloud is a being, and so on. They are beings because, and in the sense that, they are physical objects. One might also call them bodies, or physical particulars, or concrete things, or matter, or maybe substances (but bear in mind the word 'substance' has some special philosophical meanings).
Minds – those "parts" of us that think and perceive—are considered beings by some philosophers. Each of us, according to common sense anyway, "has" a mind. Of course, philosophers rarely just assume that minds occupy a different category of beings from physical objects. Some, like René Descartes, have thought that this is so (this view is known as dualism, and functionalism also considers the mind as distinct from the body), while others have thought that concepts of the mental can be reduced to physical concepts (this is the view of physicalism or materialism). Still others maintain though "mind" is a noun, it is not necessarily the "name of a thing" distinct within the whole person. In this view the relationship between mental properties and physical properties is one of supervenience – similar to how "banks" supervene upon certain buildings.
We can talk about all human beings, and the planets, and all engines as belonging to classes. Within the class of human beings are all of the human beings, or the extension of the term 'human being'. In the class of planets would be Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and all the other planets that there might be in the universe. Classes, in addition to each of their members, are often taken to be beings. Surely we can say that in some sense, the class of planets is, or has being. Classes are usually taken to be abstract objects, like sets; 'class' is often regarded as equivalent, or nearly equivalent, in meaning to 'set'. Denying that classes and sets exist is the contemporary meaning of nominalism.
The redness of a red apple, or more to the point, the redness all red things share, is a property. One could also call it an attribute of the apple. Very roughly put, a property is just a quality that describes an object. This will not do as a definition of the word 'property' because, like 'attribute', 'quality' is a near-synonym of 'property'. But these synonyms can at least help us to get a fix on the concept we are talking about. Whenever one talks about the size, color, weight, composition, and so forth, of an object, one is talking about the properties of that object. Some—though this is a point of severe contention in the problem of universals – believe that properties are beings; the redness of all apples is something that is. To deny that universals exist is the scholastic variant of nominalism.
Note that the color red is an objective property of an object. The intrinsic property is that it reflects radiation (including light) in a certain way. A human perceives that as the color red in his or her brain. An object thus has two types of properties, intrinsic (physical) and objective (observer specific).
An apple sitting on a table is in a relation to the table it sits on. So we can say that there is a relation between the apple and the table: namely, the relation of sitting-on. So, some say, we can say that that relation has being. For another example, the Washington Monument is taller than the White House. Being-taller-than is a relation between the two structures. We can say that that relation has being as well. This, too, is a point of contention in the problem of universals.
Space and time
Space and time are what physical objects are extended into. There is debate as to whether time exists only in the present or whether far away times are just as real as far away spaces, and there is debate (among who?) as to whether space is curved. Many (nearly all?) contemporary thinkers actually suggest that time is the fourth dimension, thus reducing space and time to one distinct ontological entity, the space-time continuum.
Propositions are units of meaning. They should not be confused with declarative sentences, which are just sets of words in languages that refer to propositions. Declarative sentences, ontologically speaking, are thus ideas, a property of substances (minds), rather than a distinct ontological category. For instance, the English declarative sentence "snow is white" refers to the same proposition as the equivalent French declarative sentence "la neige est blanche"; two sentences, one proposition. Similarly, one declarative sentence can refer to many propositions; for instance, "I am hungry" changes meaning (i.e. refers to different propositions) depending on the person uttering it.
Events are that which can be said to occur. To illustrate, consider the claim "John went to a ballgame"; if true, then we must ontologically account for every entity in the sentence. "John" refers to a substance. But what does "went to a ballgame" refer to? It seems wrong to say that "went to a ballgame" is a property that instantiates John, because "went to a ballgame" does not seem to be the same ontological kind of thing as, for instance, redness. Thus, events arguably deserve their own ontological category.
Properties, relations, and classes are supposed to be abstract, rather than concrete. Many philosophers say that properties and relations have an abstract existence, and that physical objects have a concrete existence. That, perhaps, is the paradigm case of a difference in ways in which items can be said to be, or to have being.
Many philosophers have attempted to reduce the number of distinct ontological categories. For instance, David Hume famously regarded Space and Time as nothing more than psychological facts about human beings, which would effectively reduce Space and Time to ideas, which are properties of humans (substances). Nominalists and realists argue over the existence of properties and relations. Finally, events and propositions have been argued to be reducible to sets (classes) of substances and other such categories.
- Substance, essence (ousia) — examples of primary substance: this man, this horse; secondary substance (species, genera): man, horse
- Quantity (poson, how much), discrete or continuous — examples: two cubits long, number, space, (length of) time.
- Quality (poion, of what kind or description) — examples: white, black, grammatical, hot, sweet, curved, straight.
- Relation (pros ti, toward something) — examples: double, half, large, master, knowledge.
- Place (pou, where) — examples: in a marketplace, in the Lyceum
- Time (pote, when) — examples: yesterday, last year
- Position, posture, attitude (keisthai, to lie) — examples: sitting, lying, standing
- State, condition (echein, to have or be) — examples: shod, armed
- Action (poiein, to make or do) — examples: to lance, to heat, to cool (something)
- Affection, passion (paschein, to suffer or undergo) — examples: to be lanced, to be heated, to be cooled
Peirce and Husserl
Charles Sanders Peirce, who had read Kant closely and who also had some knowledge of Aristotle, proposed a system of merely three phenomenological categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, which he repeatedly invoked in his subsequent writings.
Contemporary systems of categories have been proposed by John G. Bennett (The Dramatic Universe, 4 vols., 1956–65), Wilfrid Sellars (1974), Reinhardt Grossmann (1983, 1992), Johansson (1989), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994), Roderick Chisholm (1996), Barry Smith (ontologist) (2003), and Jonathan Lowe (2006).
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- Categories, translated by E. M. Edghill. For the Greek terms, see The Complete Works of Aristotle in Greek (requires DjVu), Book 1 (Organon), Categories Section 4 (DjVu file's page 6).
- Aristotle, 1953. Metaphysics. Ross, W. D., trans. Oxford Uni. Press.
- --------, 2004. Categories, Edghill, E. M., trans. Uni. of Adelaide library.
- John G. Bennett, 1956–1965. The Dramatic Universe. London, Hodder & Stoughton.
- Gustav Bergmann, 1992. New Foundations of Ontology. Madison: Uni. of Wisconsin Press.
- Browning, Douglas, 1990. Ontology and the Practical Arena. Pennsylvania State Uni.
- Butchvarov, Panayot, 1979. Being qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication. Indiana Uni. Press.
- Roderick Chisholm, 1996. A Realistic Theory of Categories. Cambridge Uni. Press.
- Feibleman, James Kern, 1951. Ontology. The Johns Hopkins Press (reprinted 1968, Greenwood Press, Publishers, New York).
- Grossmann, Reinhardt, 1983. The Categorial Structure of the World. Indiana Uni. Press.
- Grossmann, Reinhardt, 1992. The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. Routledge.
- Haaparanta, Leila and Koskinen, Heikki J., 2012. Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic. New York: Oxford Uni Press.
- Hoffman, J., and Rosenkrantz, G. S.,1994. Substance among other Categories. Cambridge Uni. Press.
- Edmund Husserl, 1962. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Boyce Gibson, W. R., trans. Collier.
- ------, 2000. Logical Investigations, 2nd ed. Findlay, J. N., trans. Routledge.
- Johansson, Ingvar, 1989. Ontological Investigations. Routledge, 2nd ed. Ontos Verlag 2004.
- Kahn, Charles H., 2009. Essays on Being, Oxford Uni. Press.
- Immanuel Kant, 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul, and Wood, A. W., trans. Cambridge Uni. Press.
- Charles Sanders Peirce, 1992, 1998. The Essential Peirce, vols. 1,2. Houser, Nathan et al., eds. Indiana Uni. Press.
- Gilbert Ryle, 1949. The Concept of Mind. Uni. of Chicago Press.
- Wilfrid Sellars, 1974, "Toward a Theory of the Categories" in Essays in Philosophy and Its History. Reidel.
- Barry Smith, 2003. "Ontology" in Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information. Blackwell.
- Aristotle's Categories at MIT.
- Categories entry by Amie Thomasson in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Ontological Categories and How to Use Them" – Amie Thomasson.
- "Recent Advances in Metaphysics" – E. J. Lowe.
- Theory and History of Ontology – Raul Corazzon.