Chinese historiography

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Chinese historiography refers to the study of methods and assumptions made in studying Chinese history.

History of Chinese historians[edit]

Recording of Chinese history dates back to the Shang Dynasty, although the oldest surviving histories—those compiled in the Classic of History—seem to date back only to the rise of Zhou at the earliest. The Spring and Autumn Annals, the official chronicle of the State of Lu covering the period from 722 to 481 BC, is among the earliest surviving Chinese historical texts to be arranged as an annal. The compilation of both is traditionally ascribed to Confucius. The Zuo Zhuan, attributed to Zuo Qiuming in the 5th century BC, is the earliest Chinese work of narrative history and covers the period from 722 to 468 BC. The anonymous Zhan Guo Ce was a renowned ancient Chinese historical work compiling sporadic materials on the Warring States between the 3rd and 1st centuries BC.

The first systematic Chinese historical text, the Records of the Grand Historian, was written by Sima Qian and his father. The book covers the period from the time of the Yellow Emperor until the author's own life in a naturalistic and comprehensive manner. Due to this highly praised and highly copied work, Sima Qian is often regarded as the father of Chinese historiography. The Twenty-Four Histories it spawned, the official compilations of the histories of those dynasties considered legitimate by the imperial Chinese historians, all copied his format. Typically, the rulers initiating a new dynasty would employ scholars to compile a final history from the annals and records of the previous one.

The Shitong was the first Chinese work about historiography. It was compiled by Liu Zhiji between AD 708 and 710. The book describes the general pattern of the official dynastic histories with regard to structure, method, arrangement, sequence, caption, and commentary back to the Warring States era.

The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government was a pioneering reference work in Chinese historiography. Emperor Yingzong of Song ordered Sima Guang and other scholars to begin compiling this universal history of China in 1065, and they presented it to his successor Shenzong in 1084. It contains 294 volumes and about 3 million characters and narrates the history of China from 403 BC to the beginning of the Song in AD 959 chronologically. This broke a nearly-thousand-year tradition dating back to Sima Qian of employing annals for imperial reigns but biographies or treatises for other topics. The more consistent style of the Comprehensive Mirror was not followed by later official histories. In the mid 13th century, Ouyang Xiu was heavily influenced by the work of Xue Juzheng. This led to the creation of the New History of the Five Dynasties, which covered five dynasties in over 70 chapters.[1]

Toward the end of the Qing dynasty, scholars looked to Japan and the West for models. Although deeply learned in the traditions he now saw as "traditional," Liang Qichao began in the late 1890s to publish extensive and influential studies and polemics which converted his young readers to a new history which he saw as scientific in its methods. This next generation became professional historians, trained and teaching in universities. They included Hu Shi, Gu Jiegang, and Tsiang Tingfu, who were PhDs from Columbia University, the center of the American "New History," and Chen Yinke, who prepared his investigations into medieval Chinese history both in Europe and the United States. Other historians, such as Qian Mu, who was trained largely through independent study, were more conservative but still innovative in their response to world trends.[2] In the 1920s, wide ranging scholars such as Guo Moruo adopted and adapted Marxism in order to portray China as a nation among nations rather than an exotic and isolated history. Following years saw historians such as Wu Han master both Western theories, including Marxism, and Chinese learning.[3]

Key organizing concepts[edit]

Dynastic cycle[edit]

Like the three ages of the Greek poet Hesiod, the oldest Chinese historiography viewed mankind as living in a fallen age of depravity, cut off from the virtues of the past. The example of the sage kings Yao and Shun was particularly revered by Confucius and his disciples in their political theory.

Unlike Hesiod's system, however, the Duke of Zhou's development of the "Mandate of Heaven" as a rationale for dethroning the supposedly divine Zi clan led subsequent historians to see man's fall as a cyclical pattern. On this view, a new dynasty is founded by a morally upright founder. On a long enough time scale, his successors cannot keep themselves from becoming morally corrupt and dissolute. This immorality removes the dynasty's divine favor and is reflected in natural disasters (particularly floods), rebellions, and foreign invasions. Eventually, the dynasty becomes so weak as to allow its replacement by a new one, whose founder is able to rectify many of society's problems and begin the cycle anew. Over time, many felt a full correction was not possible and thus the golden age of Yao and Shun could not be reattained.

This teleological theory implies that there can be only one rightful sovereign under heaven at a time; thus, despite the fact that Chinese history has had many contentious and long periods of disunity, great effort was made in official histories to find and establish "legitimate" precursors whose fall allowed the new dynasty to carry on its mandate. Similarly, regardless of the particular merits of individual emperors, founders would be portrayed in more laudatory terms and the last ruler of a dynasty would always be castigated as depraved and unworthy even when that was not the case. Such a narrative was employed even after the fall of the empire by those compiling the history of the Qing and by those who justified the attempted restorations of the imperial system by Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun.

Multi-ethnic history[edit]

Nationalist and Communist China have both upheld the view that Chinese history should include all the ethnic groups of the lands held by the Qing Empire (Zhonghua Minzu), not just the history of the Han Chinese in so-called "(China Proper)." This view moves away from earlier Han chauvinism of the Tongmenghui to include internal and external tributaries and Conquest dynasties as parts of the history of modern China, which is viewed as a coherent multi-ethnic nation from time immemorial, existing as a legal entity even in periods of political disunity. As early as the the 1930s, the American scholar Owen Lattimore argued that China was the product of the interaction of Inner Asian pastoral societies and settled regimes, not simply the expansion of Han Chinese peoples.[4]

The advantage of these perspectives is to show the contributions of non-Han to Chinese history. It includes once "foreign" dynasties like the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing as well as the Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin dynasties.

Treatment of peoples who are now counted as "ethnic minorities" often varies in relation to views on prsent day issues. For example, the 14th Dalai Lama, long insistent on Tibet's history being separate from that of China, conceded in 2005 that Tibet "is a part" of China's "5,000-year history" as part of a new proposal for Tibetan autonomy.[5] Korean nationalists, however, have virulently reacted against China's application to UNESCO for recognition of Goguryeo tombs in Chinese territory: the absolute independence of Goguryeo is a central aspect of Korean identity, because according to Korean legend, it was comparatively independent of China and Japan, in contrast to subordinate states like the Joseon Dynasty and the Korean Empire.[6] The legacy of Genghis Khan has been contested between China, Mongolia, and Russia, all three states having significant numbers of ethnic Mongols within their borders and holding territory that was conquered by the Khan.[7]

The Chinese tradition since the 3rd-century Jin Dynasty that emperors of an incoming dynasty sponsor the writing of an official history for the immediately-preceding one has been cited in favor of an ethnically-inclusive interpretation of history. The compilation of official histories usually involved monumental intellectual labor. The Yuan and Qing Dynasties, which might be thought "foreign", faithfully carried out this practice, writing the official Chinese-language histories of the Han-ruled Song and Ming Dynasties, respectively. Had the two "non-Han" imperial families not thought of themselves as continuing the "Mandate of Heaven" of the Middle Kingdom, it would be hard to explain why they retained the costly tradition. Thus, every non-Han dynasty saw itself as the legitimate holder of the "Mandate of Heaven", which legitimized the dynastic cycle regardless of social or ethnic background.[citation needed]

Recent Western scholars have reacted against the ethnic-inclusiveness narrative in PRC-sponsored history by writing revisionist histories of China that feature, according to James A. Millward, "a degree of 'partisanship' for the indigenous underdogs of frontier history". Scholarly interest in writing about Chinese minorities from non-Chinese perspectives is growing.[8]

Marxism[edit]

Most Chinese history that is published in the People's Republic of China is based on a Marxist interpretation of history. These theories were first applied in the 1920s by Chinese scholars such as Guo Moruo, and became orthodoxy in academic study after 1949. The Marxist view of history is that history is governed by universal laws and that according to these laws, a society moves through a series of stages, with the transition between stages being driven by class struggle.[9] These stages are:

  • Slave society
  • Feudal society
  • Capitalist society
  • Socialist society
  • World communist society

The official historical view within the People's Republic of China associates each of these stages with a particular era in Chinese history, as well as making some subdivisions.

  • Slave society – Xia to Shang
  • Feudal society (decentralized) – Zhou to Sui
  • Feudal society (bureaucratic) – Tang to the First Opium War
  • Feudal society (semicolonial) – First Opium War to end of Qing dynasty
  • Capitalist society – Republican era
  • Socialist society – PRC 1949 to present
  • World communist society –

Because of the strength of the Communist Party of China and the importance of the Marxist interpretation of history in legitimizing its rule, it was for many years difficult for historians within the PRC to actively argue in favor of non-Marxist and anti-Marxist interpretations of history. However, this political restriction is less confining than it may first appear in that the Marxist historical framework is surprisingly flexible, and it is a rather simple matter to modify an alternative historical theory to use language that at least does not challenge the Marxist interpretation of history.[10]

Partly because of the interest of Mao Zedong, historians in the 1950s took a special interest in the role of peasant rebellions in Chinese history and compiled documentary histories to examine them.[11]

There are several problems associated with imposing Marx's European-based framework on Chinese history. First, slavery existed throughout China's history but was never the primary mode of production. While the Zhou and earlier dynasties may be labelled as feudal, later dynasties were much more centralized than Marx analyzed their European counterparts as being. To account for the discrepancy, Chinese Marxists invented the term "bureaucratic feudalism". The placement of the Tang as the beginning of the bureaucratic phase rests largely on the replacement of patronage networks with the imperial examination. Some world-systems analysts, such as Janet Abu-Lughod, claim analysis of Kondratiev waves shows that capitalism first arose in Song dynasty China; however, its widespread trade was subsequently disrupted and then curtailed.

The Japanese scholar Tanigawa Michio, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, set out to revise the generally Marxist views of China prevalent in post-war Japan. Tanigawa writes that historians in Japan fell into two schools. One held that China followed the set European pattern which Marxists thought to be universal, that is, from ancient slavery to medieval feudalism to modern capitalism, while another group argued that "Chinese society was extraordinarily saturated with stagnancy, as compared to the West" and assumed that China existed in a "qualitatively different historical world from Western society." That is, there an argument between those who see "unilinear, monistic world history" and those who conceive of a "two-tracked or multitracked world history." Tanigawa reviewed the applications of these theories in Japanese writings about Chinese history and then tested them by analyzing the Six Dynasties 220-589 CE period, which Marxist historians saw as "feudal." His conclusion is that China did not have "feudalism" in the sense that Marxists use, but that there was basic change in Chinese society when the military governments did not develop a military aristocracy of the sort that developed in Europe. The period established social and political patterns which shaped China's history from that point on.[12]

There was a gradual relaxation of Marxist interpretation after the death of Mao in 1976,[13] which was accelerated after the Tian'anmen Square protest and other revolutions in 1989, which damaged Marxism's ideological legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese academics.

Modernization[edit]

This view of Chinese history sees Chinese society as a "traditional" society needing to become "modern", usually with the implicit assumption that Western society is the definition of modern society.[14] Such a view was common among British and French scholars during the 19th and early 20th centuries but is now typically dismissed as eurocentrism or even racism, since such a view permits an implicit justification for breaking the society from its static past and bringing it into the modern world under European direction.[15]

There are a number of other criticisms of this view. One centers on the slippery definition of "traditional society", which can become simply a catch-all for any non-Western society and treats all such societies similarly. To use an analogy, animals might be classified into "fish" and "non-fish", but the latter category is not a particularly helpful one.

By the mid-20th century, it was increasingly clear to historians that the notion of "changeless China" was untenable. A new concept, popularized by John Fairbank, was the notion of "change within tradition", which argued that China did change in the pre-modern period but that this change existed within certain cultural traditions. This notion has also been subject to the criticism that to say "China has not changed fundamentally" is tautological, since it requires that one look for things that have not changed and then define those as fundamental. This is far too broad, leading to conclusions like "England has not changed in the past thousand years because it has maintained its fundamental traditions of fishing, sheep-rearing, and monarchy".

Nonetheless, studies seeing China's interaction with Europe as the driving force behind its recent history are still common. Such studies, e.g., may consider the First Opium War as the starting point for China's modern period. Examples include the works of H.B. Morse, who wrote chronicles of China's international relations such as Trade and Relations of the Chinese Empire.[16]

Several of Fairbank's students argued in the 1950s that Confucianism was incompatible with modernity. Joseph Levenson and Mary C. Wright, and Albert Feuerwerker argued in effect that traditional Chinese values were a barrier to modernity and would have to be dismantled before China could make progress.[17] Wright concluded, “The failure of the T’ung-chih [Tongzhi] Restoration demonstrated with a rare clarity that even in the most favorable circumstances there is no way in which an effective modern state can be grafted onto a Confucian society. Yet in the decades that followed, the political ideas that had been tested and, for all their grandeur, found wanting, were never given a decent burial.” [18]

In a different view of modernization, the Japanese historian Naito Torajiro argued that China reached "modernity" during its mid-Imperial period, centuries before Europe. He believed that the reform of the civil service into a meritocratic system and the disappearance of the ancient Chinese nobility from the bureaucracy constituted a modern society. The problem associated with this approach is the subjective use of "modernity". Chinese nobility had been in decline since the Qin dynasty and, while the exams were largely meritocratic, performance required time and resources that meant examinees were still typically from the gentry. Moreover, expertise in the Confucian classics did not guarantee competent meritocrats when it came to managing public works or preparing a budget. Confucian hostility to commerce maintained merchants at the bottom of the four occupations, itself an archaism maintained by devotion to classic texts. The social goal continued to be to invest in land and enter the gentry, ideas more similar to those of the physiocrats than those of Adam Smith.[19]

Hydraulic despotism[edit]

With ideas derived from Marx and Max Weber, Karl August Wittfogel argued that bureaucracy arose to manage irrigation systems. Despotism was needed to force the people into building canals, dikes, and waterways to increase agriculture. Yu the Great, one of China's legendary founders, is mostly known for his control of the floods of the Yellow River. The hydraulic empire produces wealth from its stability; while dynasties may change, the structure remains intact until destroyed by modern powers. Whereas in Europe agriculture always depended on rainfall and did not necessitate irrigation, in the Orient natural conditions were such that the bulk of the land could not be cultivated without large-scale irrigation works. As only a centralized administration could organize the building and maintenance of large-scale systems of irrigation, the need for such systems made bureaucratic despotism inevitable in Oriental lands.[20]

Critics of Wittfogel's theory point out that water management was given the high status China accorded to officials concerned with taxes, rituals, or fighting off bandits. The theory also has a strong orientalist bent, regarding all Asian states as generally the same while finding reasons for European polities to escape the pattern.[21]

Convergence[edit]

Convergence theory, including Hu Shih and Ray Huang's involution theory, holds that the past 150 years have been a period in which Chinese and Western civilization have been in the process of converging into a world civilization. Such a view is heavily influenced by modernization theory but, in China's case, it is also strongly influenced by indigenous sources such as the notion of Shijie Datong or "Great Unity". It has tended to be less popular among more recent historians, as postmodern Western historians discount overarching narratives and nationalist Chinese historians feel similarly about narratives failing to account for some special or unique characteristics of Chinese culture.

Anti-Imperialism[edit]

Closely related are colonial and anti-imperialist narratives. These often merge or are part of Marxist critiques from within China or the former Soviet Union or postmodern critiques such as Edward Said's Orientalism, which fault traditional scholarship for trying to fit West, South, and East Asia's histories into European categories unsuited to them. With regard to China particularly, T.F. Tsiang and John Fairbank used newly opened archives in the 1930s to write modern history from a Chinese point of view. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu then edited the influential China's Response to the West (1953), although this was attacked for ascribing change in China to outside forces. In the 1980s, Paul Cohen continued to call for a more "China-Centered history of China".[22]

Republican[edit]

The schools of thought on the 1911 Revolution have evolved and developed from the early years of the Republic. The Marxist view saw the events of 1911 as a "Bourgeois Revolution".[23] In the 1920s, the Nationalist Party issued a theory of three political stages based on Sun Yatsen's writings:

The most obvious criticism is the near-identical nature of "political tutelage" and of a "constitutional democracy" consisting only of one-party rule until the 1990s. Against this, Chen Shui-bian proposed his own four-stage theory.

Postmodernism[edit]

Postmodern interpretations of Chinese history tend to reject narrative history and instead focus on a small subset of Chinese history, particularly the daily lives of ordinary people in particular locations or settings.

Recent trends[edit]

The late 20th century and early 21st century have seen a large number of studies of Chinese history that seek to challenge traditional paradigms. The field is rapidly evolving, with much new scholarship. Much of this new scholarship is based on the realization that there is much about Chinese history that is unknown or controversial. To give one such controversy, it is an active topic of discussion whether the typical Chinese peasant in 1900 was seeing his life improve or decline. In addition to the realization that there are major gaps in our knowledge of Chinese history is the equal realization that there are tremendous quantities of primary source material that have not yet been analyzed.

Recent Western scholarship of China has been heavily influenced by postmodernism, seeking to question modernist narratives regarding China's backwardness and lack of development. The desire to challenge the preconception that 19th-century China was weak, for instance, has led to scholarly interest in Qing expansion into Central Asia, where they were much more successful for a time than elsewhere. In fact, postmodern scholarship largely rejects grand narratives altogether, preferring to publish empirical studies on the socioeconomics and political or cultural dynamics of smaller communities within China.

Current scholars also attempt to assess source material more critically. For example, for a long period it was assumed that Imperial China had no system of civil law because the law codes did not have explicit provisions for civil lawsuits. However, more recent studies which use the records of civil magistrates suggest that China did in fact have a well-developed system of civil law, in which provisions of the criminal code were interpreted to allow civil causes of action. Another example has been statements made by intellectuals of the mid-Qing dynasty which were hostile toward commerce. Recent studies using sources such as magistrates' diaries and genealogical records show that these statements should not be taken at face value, without also recognizing the powerful unwritten influence merchants exerted on government policies. The division between the world of the merchant and that of the official was far more porous than traditionally believed. In fact, the growing consensus is that the anti-merchant statements of the mid-Qing record a growth of merchants' power and influence rather than the opposite.

Finally, current scholars are assessing new and previously overlooked documentary and historical evidence. Examples include masses of governmental and family archives, economic records such as the census tax-rolls, price records, and land surveys. In addition, there are large numbers of cultural artifacts such as vernacular novels, how-to books, and children's books which are in the process of being analyzed for clues about day-to-day life.

In contrast, Chinese historical scholarship remains largely nationalist and modernist or even traditionalist.[citation needed] The legacies of the modernist school (such as Lo Hsiang-lin) and the traditionalist school (such as Chien Mu) remain strong in Chinese circles. The more modernist works focus on imperial systems in China and employ scientific method to analyze epochs of Chinese dynasties from geographical, genealogical, and cultural artifacts: for example, using Carbon-14 dating and geographical records to correlate climates with cycles of calm and calamity in Chinese history. The traditionalist school of scholarship resorts to official imperial records and colloquial historical works and analyzes the different dynasties' rises and falls using a Confucian philosophy,[citation needed] albeit modified by an institutional administration perspective.[clarification needed]

From the beginning of Communist rule in 1949 until the 1980s, the focus of Chinese historical scholarship was largely on peasant life interpreted via the officially-sanctioned Marxist theory of class struggle. From the time of Deng Xiaoping on, there has been a drift towards a Marxist-inspired nationalist perspective, and consideration of China's contemporary international status has became of paramount importance in historical studies. The current focus tends to be on specifics of civilization in ancient China, and the general paradigm of how China has responded to the dual challenges of interactions with the outside world and modernization in the post-1700 era. Long abandoned as a research focus among most Western scholars due to postmodernism's influence, this remains the primary interest for most historians inside China.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ "History of the Five Dynasties". World Digital Library. 1280–1368. Retrieved 2013-09-04. 
  2. ^ Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-Kang and China's New History; Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), passim
  3. ^ Mary Gale Mazur, Wu Han, Historian: Son of China's Times (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009)
  4. ^ Cotton (1989), p. passim.
  5. ^ McDonald, Hamish (2005-03-15). "Tibet part of China, Dalai Lama agrees". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 2010-11-05. 
  6. ^ Gries, Peter Hays (Winter 2005). "The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations Today". East Asia 22 (4): 3–17. doi:10.1007/s12140-005-0001-y. 
  7. ^ Kucera, Joshua (2009-08-10). "The Search for Genghis Khan: Genghis Khan's Lecay Being Reappraised in China, Russia". EurasiaNet. Retrieved 2010-11-05. 
  8. ^ Millward, James A. (1996). "New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier". In Hershatter, Gail. Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain. Stanford University Press. pp. 121–122. 
  9. ^ Arif Dirlik, "The Universalization of a Concept: From 'Feudalism' to Feudalism in Chinese Marxist Historiography," Journal of Peasant Studies 12.2-3 (January/April 1985): 197–227.
  10. ^ Albert Feuerwerker, "China's History in Marxian Dress," The American Historical Review 66.2 (1961): 323–353. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1844030
  11. ^ James P. Harrison. The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions; a Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
  12. ^ Tanigawa (1985), p. 3.
  13. ^ Kwang-Ching Liu, "World View and Peasant Rebellion: Reflections on Post-Mao Historiography," The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 40, No. 2 (Feb., 1981), pp. 295–326 [1]
  14. ^ A prominent example is Gilbert Rozman, ed., The Modernization of China (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1981), in which a series of essays analyzes "The Legacy of the Past" and "The Transformation."
  15. ^ Ch Two "Moving Beyond 'Tradition' and 'Modernity,'" Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1984; 2010)
  16. ^ Cohen, Discovering History in Chinap. 102
  17. ^ Cohen, Discovering History in China, pp. 79-80.
  18. ^ Mary Clabaugh Wright. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874. (Stanford,: Stanford University Press, 1957), 300-12.
  19. ^ See, for instance, Joshua A. Fogel, Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Kōnan (1866-1934) (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Council on East Asian Studies, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1984).
  20. ^ Stanislav Andreski (1985). The Use of Comparative Sociology. University of California Press. p. 165. GGKEY:Y0TY2LKP809. Retrieved 16 September 2013. 
  21. ^ Frederick W. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism: A Critique of Wittfogel's Theory of Oriental Despotism as Applied to China," Oriens Extremus 8.1 (1961): 1-41.
  22. ^ Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York, London:: Columbia University Press, 1984), Ch 1 "The Problem with 'China's Response to the West,'pp. 1-56, and Ch 4, "Toward a China-Centered History of China," pp. 149-198.
  23. ^ Winston Hsieh, Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 : A Critical Survey and a Selected Bibliography (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975)

References and Further Reading[edit]

  • W. G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank. Historians of China and Japan. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962. Essays on the historiographical traditions in pre-modern times.
  • Paul Cohen, "Reflections on a Watershed Date: The 1949 Divide in Chinese History," in Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ed., Twentieth Century China: New Approaches (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 29-36.
  • Paul A. Cohen, Rethinking China's History: Alternative Perspectives on the Chinese Past (New York London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Reprints of Cohen's influential reviews and essays.
  • Johanna Waley-Cohen, "The New Qing History," Radical History Review 88.1 (2004): 193-206.
  • Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Historiography of Modern China," in Michael Bentley, ed., Companion to Historiography (Taylor & Francis, 1997), 641-658.
  • Arif Dirlik. Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. ISBN 0-520-03541-0.
  • Prasenjit Duara. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
  • Albert Feuerwerker. History in Communist China. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968. Essays on post-1949 treatment of particular aspects of Chinese history.
  • Judith Farquhar James Hevia, "Culture and Postwar American Historiography of China," positions 1.2 (1993): 486-525. Critique of orthodox historiography.
  • Joshua A. Fogel. Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naito Konan (1866-1934). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1984. ISBN 0-674-68790-6. Naito Konan developed the influential thesis that China developed an early modern society from the 8th to the 12th century.
  • David S.G. Goodman, "Mao and the Da Vinci Code: Conspiracy, Narrative, and History," The Pacific Review 19.3 (September 2006): 359-384. Critiques the assumptions and methodology Chang Jung and John Halliday's Mao: The Unknown Story.
  • Norman Kutcher, "'The Benign Bachelor': Kenneth Scott Latourette between China and the United States," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2.4 (Winter 1993): 399-424. The life and historiographical place of Kenneth Scott Latourette.
  • William Rowe, “Approaches to Modern Chinese Social History,” in Olivier Zunz, ed., Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History (University of North Carolina Press 1985), pp. 236–296.
  • Gilbert Rozman. Soviet Studies of Premodern China: Assessments of Recent Scholarship. Ann Arbor: Center For Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1984. ISBN 0-89264-052-9.
  • David L. Shambaugh, American Studies of Contemporary China (Washington, Armonk, NY: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; M.E. Sharpe, 1993)
  • Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-Kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. ISBN 0-520-01804-4. The first generation of Chinese historians to use Western concepts to write the history of China.
  • Stefan Tanaka. Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. ISBN 0-520-07731-8.
  • Harriet Zurndorfer, "A Guide to the 'New' Chinese History: Recent Publications Concerning Chinese Social and Economic Development before 1800," International Review of Social History 33: 148-201.

External links[edit]