Collective action

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Collective action is traditionally defined as any action taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance their status and achieve a common objective.[1] It is enacted by a representative of the group.[2] It is a term that has formulations and theories in many areas of the social sciences including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science and economics.

The social identity model[edit]

Researchers Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears conducted a meta-analysis of over 180 studies of collective action, in an attempt to integrate three dominant socio-psychological perspectives explaining antecedent conditions to this phenomenon – injustice, efficacy, and identity.[3] In their resultant 2008 review article, an integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) was proposed which accounts for interrelationships among the three predictors as well as their predictive capacities for collective action.[3] An important assumption of this approach is that people tend to respond to subjective states of disadvantage, which may or may not flow from objective physical and social reality.

Perceived injustice[edit]

Examining collective action through perceived injustice was initially guided by relative deprivation theory (RDT). RDT focuses on a subjective state of unjust disadvantage, proposing that engaging in fraternal (group-based) social comparisons with others may result in feelings of relative deprivation that foster collective action. Group-based emotions resulting from perceived injustice, such as anger, are thought to motivate collective action in an attempt to rectify the state of unfair deprivation.[3] Meta-analysis results confirm that effects of injustice causally predict collective action, highlighting the theoretical importance of this variable.[3]

Perceived efficacy[edit]

Moving beyond RDT, scholars suggested that in addition to a sense of injustice, people must also have the objective, structural resources necessary to mobilize change through social protest. An important psychological development saw this research instead directed towards subjective expectations and beliefs that unified effort (collective action) is a viable option for achieving group-based goals – this is referred to as perceived collective efficacy. Empirically, collective efficacy is shown to causally affect collective action among a number of populations across varied contexts.[3]

Social identity[edit]

Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests that people strive to achieve and maintain positive social identities associated with their group memberships.[4] Where a group membership is disadvantaged (for example, low status), SIT implicates three variables in the evocation of collective action to improve conditions for the group – permeability of group boundaries,[2] legitimacy of the intergroup structures, and the stability of these relationships. For example, when disadvantaged groups perceive intergroup status relationships as illegitimate and unstable, collective action is predicted to occur, in an attempt to change status structures for the betterment of the disadvantaged group.

Meta-analysis results also confirm that social identity causally predicts collective action across a number of diverse contexts. Additionally, the integrated SIMCA affords another important role to social identity – that of a psychological bridge forming the collective base from which both collective efficacy and group injustice may be conceived.

Model refinement[edit]

While there is sound empirical support for the causal importance of SIMCA’s key theoretical variables on collective action,[3] more recent literature has addressed the issue of reverse causation, finding support for a related, yet distinct, encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA).[5] This model suggests that perceived group efficacy and perceived injustice provide the basis from which social identity emerges, highlighting an alternative causal pathway to collective action. Recent research has sought to integrate SIMCA with intergroup contact theory (see Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath[6]) and others have extended SIMCA through bridging morality research with the collective action literature (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears[7] for a review).

Public good[edit]

The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods (and other collective consumption) through the collaboration of two or more individuals, and the impact of externalities on group behavior. It is more commonly referred to as Public Choice. Mancur Olson's 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, is an important early analysis of the problems of public good cost.

Besides economics, the theory has found many applications in political science, sociology, communication, anthropology and environmentalism.

Collective action problem[edit]

The term "collective action problem" describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any one individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The rational choice is then to undertake this as a collective action the cost of which is shared. An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "belling the cat."[8]

Exploitation of the great by the small[edit]

Mancur Olson made the highly controversial claim that individual rational choice leads to situations where individuals with more resources will carry a higher burden in the provision of the public good than poorer ones.[9] Poorer individuals will usually have little choice but to opt for the free rider strategy, i.e. they will attempt to benefit from the public good without contributing to its provision. This may also encourage the under-production (inefficient production) of the public good.

Institutional design[edit]

While public goods are often provided by governments, this is not always the case. Various institutional designs have been studied with the aim of reducing the collaborative failure. The best design for a given situation depends on the production costs, the utility function, and the collaborative effects, amongst other things. Here are only some examples:

Joint products[edit]

A joint-product model analyzes the collaborative effect of joining a private good to a public good. For example, a tax deduction (private good) can be tied to a donation to a charity (public good).

It can be shown that the provision of the public good increases when tied to the private good, as long as the private good is provided by a monopoly (otherwise the private good would be provided by competitors without the link to the public good).

Clubs[edit]

Some institutional design, e.g. intellectual property rights, can introduce an exclusion mechanism and turn a pure public good into an impure public good artificially.

If the costs of the exclusion mechanism are not higher than the gain from the collaboration, clubs can emerge. James M. Buchanan showed in his seminal paper that clubs can be an efficient alternative to government interventions.[10]

A nation can be seen as a club whose members are its citizens. Government would then be the manager of this club.

Federated structure[edit]

In some cases, theory shows that collaboration emerges spontaneously in smaller groups rather than in large ones (see e.g. Dunbar's number). This explains why labor unions or charities often have a federated structure.

In philosophy[edit]

Over the past twenty years or so analytic philosophers have been exploring the nature of collective action in the sense of acting together, as when people paint a house together, go for a walk together, or together execute a pass play. These particular examples have been central for three of the philosophers who have made well known contributions to this literature: Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and John Searle, respectively.

In (Gilbert 1989) and subsequent articles and book chapters including Gilbert (2006, chapter 7) Gilbert argues for an account of collective action according to which this rests on a special kind of interpersonal commitment, what Gilbert calls a "joint commitment". A joint commitment in Gilbert's sense is not a matter of a set of personal commitments independently created by each of the participants, as when each makes a personal decision to do something. Rather, it is a single commitment to whose creation each participant makes a contribution. Thus suppose that one person says "Shall we go for a walk?" and the other says "Yes, let's". Gilbert proposes that as a result of this exchange the parties are jointly committed to go for a walk, and thereby obligated to one another to act as if they were parts of a single person taking a walk. Joint commitments can be created less explicitly and through processes that are more extended in time. One merit of a joint commitment account of collective action, in Gilbert's view, is that it explains the fact that those who are out on a walk together, for instance, understand that each of them is in a position to demand corrective action of the other if he or she acts in ways that affect negatively the completion of their walk. In (Gilbert 2006a) she discusses the pertinence of joint commitment to collective actions in the sense of the theory of rational choice.

In Searle (1990) Searle argues that what lies at the heart of a collective action is the presence in the mind of each participant of a "we-intention". Searle does not give an account of we-intentions or, as he also puts it, "collective intentionality", but insists that they are distinct from the "I-intentions" that animate the actions of persons acting alone.

In Bratman (1993) Bratman proposed that, roughly, two people "share an intention" to paint a house together when each intends that the house is painted by virtue of the activity of each, and also intends that it is so painted by virtue of the intention of each that it is so painted. That these conditions obtain must also be "common knowledge" between the participants.

Discussion in this area continues to expand, and has influenced discussions in other disciplines including anthropology, developmental psychology, and economics. One general question is whether it is necessary to think in terms that go beyond the personal intentions of individual human beings properly to characterize what it is to act together. Bratman's account does not go beyond such personal intentions. Gilbert's account, with its invocation of joint commitment, does go beyond them. Searle's account does also, with its invocation of collective intentionality. The question of whether and how one must account for the existence of mutual obligations when there is a collective intention is another of the issues in this area of inquiry.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1917157/collective-action-problem.  Missing or empty |title= (help)
  2. ^ a b Wright, S.C.; Taylor, D.M.; Moghaddam, F.M. (1990). "Responding to membership in a disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 (6): 994–1003. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.994. 
  3. ^ a b c d e f van Zomeren, M.; Postmes, T.; Spears, R. (2008). "Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives". Psychological Bulletin 134 (4): 504–535. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504. PMID 18605818. 
  4. ^ Tajfel, H.; Turner, J.C. (1979). "An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.)". The social psychology of inter-group relations. (pp. 33-47): Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
  5. ^ Thomas, E.F.; Mavor, K.I.; McGarty, C. (2011). "Social identities facilitate and encapsulate action-relevant constructs: A test of the social identity model of collective action". Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 15 (1): 75–88. doi:10.1177/1368430211413619. 
  6. ^ Cakal, H.; Hewstone, M.; Schwär, G.; Heath, A. (2011). "An investigation of the social identity model of collective action and the 'sedative' effect of intergroup contact among Black and White students in South Africa". British Journal of Social Psychology 50 (4): 606–627. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02075.x. PMID 22122025. 
  7. ^ van Zomeren, M.; Postmes, T.; Spears, R. (2012). "On conviction's collective consequences: Integrating moral conviction with the social identity model of collective action". British Journal of Social Psychology 51 (1): 52–71. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.02000.x. PMID 22435846. 
  8. ^ Dowding, Keith (1996). Power. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 31 ff. ISBN 0-8166-2941-2 
  9. ^ Olson, Mancur (1965). "logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups". Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
  10. ^ Buchanan, James M. (1965). "An Economic Theory of Clubs". Economica 32 (125): 1–14. doi:10.2307/2552442. JSTOR 2552442. 
  • Bratman, Michael (1993). 'Shared Intention'. Ethics.
  • Gilbert, Margaret (1989). "On Social Facts". Princeton University Press 
  • Gilbert, Margaret (2006a). "Rationality in Collective Action". Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1): 3–17. doi:10.1177/0048393105284167 
  • Gilbert, Margaret (2006). "A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society". Oxford University Press 
  • Hardin, Russell (1982). Collective Action. Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. ISBN 0-8018-2818-X
  • Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-53751-3
  • Ostrom, Elinor. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0-521-40599-7
  • Sandler Todd (1992) Collective action: Theory and applications. University of Michigan Press.
  • Searle, John (1990). 'Collective Intentions and Actions'.
  • Meinzen-Dick, R. and M. di Gregorio, eds. (2004) Collective Action and Property Rights for Sustainable Development. 2020 Focus No. 11. International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC. http://www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focus11.asp