Committee of Union and Progress

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Committee of Union and Progress
إتحاد و ترقى
İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti
Leaders after 1913 "Three Pashas" (Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Djemal Pasha)
Slogan Hürriyet, Müsavaat, Adalet[1] (Liberty, Equality, Justice)
Founded 1889 (1889)
Dissolved 1918 (1918)
Headquarters Istanbul (formerly in Salonica)
Ideology Ottoman nationalism
Pan-Turkism
Conservatism
Secularism
Political position Right-wing
Religion Islam
International affiliation None
Politics of Turkey
Political parties
Elections

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Turkish: İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) began as a secret society established as the "Committee of Ottoman Union" (Turkish: İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti) in Istanbul in February 6, 1889 by medical students Ibrahim Temo, Çerkez Mehmed Reşid, Abdullah Cevdet, İshak Sükuti, Ali Hüseyinzade, Kerim Sebatî, Mekkeli Sabri Bey, Selanikli Nazım Bey, Şerafettin Mağmumi, Cevdet Osman and Giritli Şefik.[2][3][4] It was transformed into a political organization (and later an official political party) by Bahaeddin Sakir, aligning itself with the Young Turks in 1906, during the period of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In the West, members of the CUP were usually called "Young Turks" while in the Ottoman Empire, its members were known as Unionists. However, at the beginning of the Armenian Genocide, the Young Turks disaffiliated themselves from the CUP.[citation needed]

Begun as a liberal reform movement in the Ottoman Empire, the party was persecuted by the Ottoman imperial government for its calls for democratization and reform in the Empire. A major influence on the committee was Meji-era Japan, a backward state that successfully modernized itself without sacrificing its identity.[5] The CUP's intentions were to copy the Japanese example, and modernize the Ottoman Empire to end its status as the perpetual "sick man of Europe". The ultimate aim of the CUP was to return the Ottoman Empire to its former status as one of the world's great powers. Once the party gained power in the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and consolidated its power in the 1912 "Election of Clubs" and the 1913 Raid on the Sublime Porte, it grew increasingly more splintered and volatile (and after attacks on the Empire's Turkish citizens during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, nationalist) as its three leaders, Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Djemal Pasha, formed the triumvirate known as the Three Pashas and gained de facto rule over the Ottoman Empire and the party itself. During World War I, this leadership was responsible for the Armenian Genocide, among other acts.

At the end of World War I, most of its members were court-martialled by the sultan Mehmed VI and imprisoned. A few members of the organization were executed in Turkey after trial for the attempted assassination of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1926. Members who survived continued their political careers in Turkey as members of the Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and other political parties in Turkey.

Revolutionary Era: 1906–1908[edit]

The Committee of Union and Progress was an umbrella name for different underground factions, some of which were generally referred to as the "Young Turks". The name was officially sanctioned to a specific group in 1906 by Behaeddin Shakir. The organization was based upon the revolutionary Italian Carbonari.[6] The CUP, which always greatly admired Japan for modernizing itself after the so-called Meiji Restoration of 1867-68, were much impressed by Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, and after the Russian-Japanese war, the CUP was obsessed with the idea of copying the Japanese.[7] The Young Turks were especially expressed with the way the Japanese had been able to embrace Western science and technology without losing their "Eastern spiritual essence", an example that was especially inspiring to them because many in the Ottoman empire believed that the embrace of Western science and technology were diametrically opposed to Islam.[8] To the CUP, for whom science was something of a religion, the Japanese example seemed to show how the Ottoman empire could embrace the science of the West without losing its Islamic identity.[9] The CUP had an obsession with science, above all the natural sciences (CUP journals devoted much text to chemistry lessons), and the Unionists often described themselves as "societal doctors" who would apply modern scientific ideas and methods to solve all social problems.[10] Alongside the unbounded faith in science, the CUP embraced social Darwinism and the völkisch, scientific racism that was so popular at German universities in the first half of the 20th century.[11] In the words of the sociologist Ziya Gökalp, the CUP's chief thinker, the German racial approach to defining a nation was the "one that happened to more closely match the condition of 'Turkishness', which was struggling to constitute its own historical and national identity".[12] The Turkish historian Taner Akçam wrote that the CUP were quite flexible about mixing pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic and Ottomanist ideas as it suited their purposes, and the Unionists at various times would emphasize one at the expense of the others depending upon the exergies of the situation.[13] All that mattered in the end to the CUP was that the Ottoman empire become great again, and that the Turks be the dominant group within the empire.[14] Through the Central Committee of the CUP was made up of intense Turkish nationalists, until the defeat in the First Balkan war in 1912-13, the CUP did not stress its Turkish nationalism in public as it would offend the non-Turkish population of the empire.[15] A further problem for the CUP was that the majority of the ethnic Turks of the empire did not see themselves as Turks at all, but rather simply as Sunni Muslims who happened to speak Turkish.[16] Through the CUP was dedicated to a revolutionary transformation of Ottoman society by its "science-conscious cadres" , the CUP were conservative revolutionaries who wished to retain the monarchy and the leading status of Islam as the Young Turks believed that the sultanate and Islam were an essential part of the glue holding the Ottoman empire together.[17]

The CUP had built an extensive organization, having a presence in towns, in the capital, and throughout Europe. Under this umbrella name, one could find ethnic Albanians, Bulgarians, Arabs, Serbians, Jews, Greeks, Turks, Kurds, and Armenians united by the common goal of changing the Ottoman absolute monarchical regime.

Sultan Abdulhamid II persecuted the members of the CUP in an attempt to hold on to absolute power, but was forced to reinstitute the Ottoman constitution of 1876, which he had originally suspended in 1878, after threats to overthrow him by the CUP in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The revolution had been sparked by a summit in July 1908 in Reval, Russia (modern Tallinn, Estonia) between King Edward VII of Great Britain and the Emperor Nicholas II of Russia. Popular rumor within the Ottoman empire had it that during the summit a secret Anglo-Russian deal was signed to partition the Ottoman empire. Through this story was not true, the rumor led to the CUP (which had many army officers as its members) to act, and led to the Ottoman troops in Salonica to march on Constantinople. However, after the meeting of the goal to change the regime of Abdulhamid, in the absence of this uniting factor, the CUP and the revolution began to fracture and different allegiances began to emerge.

The Young Turk Revolution played a significant role in the evolution of Committee of Union and Progress from a revolutionary organization to a political party.

Change through revolution[edit]

The revolution and CUP's work had a great impact on Muslims in other countries. The Persian community in Istanbul founded the Iranian Union and Progress Committee. Indian Muslims imitated the CUP oath administered to recruits of the organization. The leaders of the Young Bukhara movement were deeply influenced by the Young Turk Revolution, and saw it as an example to emulate. Reflecting their intense Japanophilia, the new regime proclaimed its intention to remake the Ottoman empire into the "Japan of the Near East".[18] In their own minds, the Central Committee of the CUP saw themselves as playing a role analogous to that of the oligarchy of Meiji Japan, and the revolution of 1908 as an event comparable to the brief civil war that had toppled the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867-68.[19] One Unionist Colonel Pertev Bey wrote after the revolution of 1908: "We will rise shortly...with the same brilliance as the Rising Sun of the Far East did a few years ago! In any case, let us not forget that a nation always rises from its own strength!".[20] An additional attraction for Japan as a role model for the Unionists were that the Japanese had modernized while keeping their women in an extremely subservient position within their society; the all-male Young Turks did not wish for Ottoman women to become anything like the women of the West, and instead wanted to preserve the traditional roles for women.[21] In an inversion of Western paranoia about the "Yellow Peril", the Young Turks often fantasised about creating an alliance with Japan that would unite all the peoples of "the East" to wage war against and wipe out the much hated Western nations that dominated the world, a "Yellow wave" that would wash away European civilization for good.[22] For the Young Turks, the term yellow (which was in fact a derogatory Western term for East Asians, based upon their perceived skin color) stood for the "Eastern gold", the innate moral superiority of Eastern peoples over the corrupt West.[23] In the eyes of the Unionists, it was the civilizations of the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the Far East that were the superior civilizations to Western civilization, and it was merely an unfortunate accident of history that the West had happened to become more economically and technologically advanced then the Asian civilizations, something that they were determined to correct.[24]

The Unionists believed that the secret behind the success of the West was science, and that the more scientifically advanced a nation was, the more powerful it was.[25] For the Young Turks, the basic problem of the Ottoman empire were its backward, impoverished status (today, the Ottoman empire would be considered a third world country) and the fact that most of its Muslim population were illiterate; thus, most Ottoman Muslims could not learn about modern science even if they had wanted to.[26] Furthermore, the Young Turks had embraced Social Darwinism and pseudo-scientific biological racism as the basis of their philosophy with history being seen as a merciless racial struggle with only the strongest "races" surviving.[27] For the CUP, the Japanese government had ensured that the "Japanese race" were strongest in East Asia, and it was their duty was to ensure that the "Turkish race" become the strongest in the Near East.[28] For the CUP, just as it was right and natural for the superior "Japanese race" to dominate "inferior races" like the Koreans and the Chinese, likewise it would be natural for the superior "Turkish race" to dominate "inferior races" like Greeks and the Armenians. This Social Darwinist perspective explains how the Unionists were so ferocious in their criticism of Western imperialism (especially if directed against the Ottoman empire) while being so supportive of Japanese imperialism in Korea and China. When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the Young Turks supported this move under the Social Darwinist grounds that the Koreans were a weak people who deserved to taken over by the stronger Japanese both for their own good and the good of the Japanese empire.[29] Along the same lines, the Social Darwinism of the Unionists led them to see the Armenians and the Greek minorities, who tended to be much better educated, literate and wealthier then the Turks and who dominated the business life of the empire as a threat to their plans for a glorious future for the "Turkish race".[30]

For purposes of enlisting public support from a Turkish public that was the most part devoutly Muslim (the Koran says all Muslims are equal in the eyes of Allah, so the theory of a superior "Turkish race" might seem blasphemous), and out of the fear of alienating those Ottoman Muslims who were not Turks like the Arabs, the Albanians and the Kurds, the CUP's pseudo-scientific theories about the "Turkish race" were usually not publicly proclaimed.[31] Already within the early years of the 20th century, the Japanese had started to champion the ideology of Pan-Asianism, under which all of the Asian peoples were to united under the leadership of Japan, the strongest of the Asian nations and as the "great Yamato race", the most racially superior of the Asian peoples as a justification for their imperialism. The CUP were greatly influenced by Japanese Pan-Asianism, which served as a template for their ideology of Pan-Islamism, where all of the world's Muslims were to united in the Ottoman empire, led of course by the "Turkish race".[32] The ultimate aim of the CUP was to modernize the Ottoman empire to recapture its former greatness, and just as the modernized Meiji Japan had defeated Russia in 1905, so too would the modernized Ottoman state defeat the Western nations.[33] To help with their plans for modernization, the CUP created a number of semi-official organisations such as the Ottoman Navy League, the Ottoman Red Crescent Society and the Committee for National Defense that were intended to engage the Ottoman public with the entire modernization project, and to promote their nationalist, militaristic ways of thinking amongst the public.[34] The CUP planned on taking back all of the territory that the Ottomans had lost during the course of the 19th century and under the banner of Pan-Turkic nationalism to acquire new territory in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[35] As part of its plans to make the Ottoman empire great again, the CUP leadership stated to engage in an "...increasingly radicalized demographic engineering program aimed at the ethnoreligious homogenization of Anatolia from 1913 till the end of World War I".[36]

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the Russian Revolution of 1917 diverted the attention of world revolutionaries from the Young Turk Revolution.

In 1909, there was a countercoup by Islamists against the CUP, which culminated in the 31 March Incident, when reactionaries rebelled against the restoration of the constitutional system and retook power in Istanbul in support of Sultan Abdulhamid II's absolute rule. However, the CUP easily defeated the reactionaries by organizing the "Army of Action" (Turkish: Hareket Ordusu) and taking back Istanbul within a few days.

During the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, Pan-Islamism had become a hugely important part of the state ideology as Abdul Hamid had often stressed his claim to be the Caliph. The claim that Abdul Hamid was the Caliph, making him the political and spiritual leader of all Muslims not only caught on within the Ottoman empire, but throughout the entire Dar-al-Islam (the "House of Islam", i.e the Islamic world), especially in India. At this time, the term India described all of modern day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Despite deposing Abdul Hamid in 1909, the CUP continued his Pan-Islamic policies. For the CUP, keeping the Sultanate-Caliphate in being had the effect of not only reinforcing the loyalty of Ottoman Muslims to the empire, but was also an useful foreign policy tool. The fact that Indian Muslims seemed to have far more enthusiasm for the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph then they did for the British King-Emperor was a matter of considerable concern for British decision-makers. The fear that the Sultan-Caliph might declare jihad against the British, and thereby plunge India into a revolt by its Muslims was a constant factor in British policy towards the Ottoman empire. On the other side, starting in 1897 Germany had a policy of Weltpolitik (World Politics), in which the Reich sought to become the world's dominant power. As part of its program of Weltpolitik, Germany had courted the Ottoman empire through a policy of providing generous loans to the Ottoman state (which had gone bankrupt in 1881, and which had trouble getting loans as a result), weapons and German officers to train the Ottoman army. An official German-Ottoman alliance was not signed until 1914, but from 1898 onwards, there was an informal German-Ottoman alliance. A large part of the reason for the German interest in the Ottomans was the belief by decision-makers in Berlin that the Sultan-Caliph could mobilize all of the world's Muslims to Germany's cause. In 1914, the German Emperor Wilhelm II sent out a message to his ambassador in Constantinople, urging him to get the CUP triumvirate to have the Sultan-Caliph declare jihad against the Allies, and "incite a savage revolt" by Muslims against the British, French and Russian governments.[37]

Second Constitutional Era: 1908–1912[edit]

For more details on this topic, see Second Constitutional Era.

The first 1908 election to the Ottoman parliament, the General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire, after the Young Turk Revolution netted the Committee of Union and Progress only 60 of the 275 seats, despite its leading role in the revolution. Other parties represented in Parliament at this time included the Armenian nationalist Dashnak and Hunchak parties (four and two members respectively) and the main opposition, the Liberty and Entente party, sometimes referred to by Ottoman historians as the "Liberal Union".

As a result of the "Law of Associations", which shut down ethnically based organizations and clubs, by the time of the second general election in 1912, the smaller ethnic parties had coalesced with the Liberal Union. Now alarmed at the success of Liberal Union and increasingly radicalized, the CUP won 269 of the 275 seats through electoral fraud and violence, which led to the nickname "Election of Clubs" (Turkish: Sopalı Seçimler).[38] In most republics, this is the margin required for wholesale transformation of the constitution, but the Ottoman Empire was technically a constitutional monarchy, although it is unlikely Sultan Mehmed V could have prevented the revision of the constitution. This Parliamentary session was very short due to the outbreak of the First Balkan War; sensing the danger, the government won passage of a bill conscripting dhimmis into the army. This proved too little and too late to salvage the Ottoman toehold in southeast Europe; the Ottomans lost Albania, Macedonia, and western Thrace.

On 5 August 1912, the government shuttered Parliament. Just prior to that, it had succeeded in passing the "Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition", a measure ostensibly intended to prevent insurgency against the central government, which assigned that duty to newly created paramilitary formations. These later came under the control of the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa.

Coup and aftermath: 1913–1918[edit]

Enver Bey (center) talking to the British attaché in Istanbul immediately after seizing power in the 1913 Raid on the Sublime Porte, also known as the 1913 Ottoman coup d'état.

In spite of parliamentary elections, non-partisan figures from the pre-revolutionary period known as the "Old Turks" still dominated the Ottoman cabinet, known as the Sublime Porte. The Grand Vizier Mehmed Kamil Pasha and his minister of war, Nazım Pasha, became targets of the CUP, which overthrew them in a military coup d'état known as the Raid on the Sublime Porte on 23 January 1913.

The emerging government could hardly be called constitutional. Indeed, 1913 was a period of government by assassination as Nazım and then his successor Mahmud Sevket Pasha were both slain, Nazım at the very instant the CUP seized power. The following year, new legislation made the CUP the Empire's only legal political party; all provincial and local officials reported to "Responsible Secretaries" chosen by the party for each vilayet.

Absent the wartime atmosphere, the CUP did not purge minority religions from political life; at least 23 Christians joined it and were elected to the third Parliament. This is one possible motivation for the entry into the war, another being the "pan-Turkic" ideology of the party which emphasized the Empire's manifest destiny of ruling over the Turkic people of Central Asia once Russia was driven out of that region. Notably, two of the "Three Pashas", Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha, would in fact die in the Soviet Union leading Muslim anti-Communist movements years after the Russian Revolution and the Ottoman defeat in World War I.

Armenian Genocide[edit]

Although the CUP had worked with the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire to reinstall constitutional monarchy against Abdul Hamid II, factions in the CUP began to view the Armenians as a fifth column that would betray the Ottoman cause after World War I with nearby Russia broke out;[39] these factions gained more power after the 1913 Ottoman coup d'état. Indeed, the first major offensive the Turks undertook in World War I was an unsuccessful attempt to drive the Russians from the portion of partially classic Armenia, which they had retaken in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. After the failure of this expedition, the CUP's leaders (Enver, Djemal, and Talaat, known collectively as the "Three Pashas") were involved in ordering the deportations and massacres of between 1 and 1.5 million Armenians in 1915–1916. As explained in the key indictment at the trial (in absentia) of the Three Pashas, the Armenian Genocide massacres were spearheaded by the Special Organization (Ottoman Turkish: تشکیلات مخصوصه, Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa‎) under its leader, the Turkish physician Behaeddin Shakir.

Disbandment[edit]

The dissolution of the CUP was achieved through military trials.

As the military position of the Central Powers disintegrated in October 1918, the government resigned. A new Grand Vizier, Ahmed Izzet Pasha, negotiated the Armistice of Mudros at the end of the month. The position of the CUP was now untenable, and its top leaders fled three days later.

British forces occupied various points throughout the Empire, and through their High Commissioner Somerset Calthorpe, demanded that those members of the leadership who had not fled be put on trial, a policy also demanded by Part VII of the Treaty of Sèvres formally ending hostilities between the Allies and the Empire. The British carried off 60 Turks thought to be responsible for atrocities to Malta, where trials were planned. The new government obligingly arrested over 100 party and military officials by April 1919 and began a series of trials. These were initially promising, with one district governor, Mehmed Kemal, being hanged on April 10.

Any possibility of a general effort at truth, reconciliation, or democratization was, however, lost when Greece, which had sought to remain neutral through most of World War I, was invited by France, Britain, and the United States to occupy western Anatolia in May 1919. Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal rallied the Turkish people to resist. Two additional organizers of the genocide were hanged, but while a few others were convicted, none completed their prison terms. The CUP and other Turkish prisoners held on Malta were eventually traded for almost 30 British prisoners held by Nationalist forces, obliging the British to give up their plans for international trials.

Legacy[edit]

The CUP has at times been identified with the two opposition parties that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk attempted to introduce into Turkish politics against his own party in order to help jump-start multiparty democracy in Turkey, namely the Progressive Republican Party and the Liberal Republican Party. While neither of these parties was primarily made up of persons indicted for genocidal activities, they were eventually taken over (or at least exploited) by persons who wished to restore the Ottoman Caliphate. Consequently, both parties were required to be outlawed, although Kazim Karabekir, founder of the PRP, was eventually rehabilitated after the death of Atatürk and even served as speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

It was also Karabekir who crystallized the modern Turkish position on the controversial Armenian Genocide, telling Soviet peace commissioners that the return of any Armenians to territory controlled by Turks was out of the question, as the Armenians had perished in a rebellion of their own making.[citation needed] Historian Taner Akçam has identified four definitions of Turkey which have been handed down by the first Republican generation to modern Turks, of which the second is "Turkey is a society without ethnic minorities or cultures."[40] While the postwar reconstruction of Eastern Europe was generally dominated by Wilsonian ideas of national self-determination, Turkey probably came closer than most of the new countries to ethnic homogeneity due to the subsequent population exchanges with neighboring countries (e.g. population exchange between Greece and Turkey).

Atatürk was particularly eager that Islamism be marginalized, leading to the tradition of secularism in Turkey. This idea was culminated by the CUP in its more liberal heyday, as it was one of the first mass movements in Turkish history that abandoned political Islam.

Antisemitic conspiracy theories[edit]

Between 1910 and 1916, antisemitic Judeo-Masonic conspiracy theories regarding the party were fuelled within the British government through diplomatic correspondence from Gerard Lowther (British Ambassador to Istanbul) and Gilbert Clayton (Chief of British intelligence in Egypt).[41][42][43][44]

In popular culture[edit]

  • In the 2010 alternate history novel Behemoth by Scott Westerfeld, the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 fails, igniting a new revolution at the start of World War I.

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ پاره، دولت اعليه، قوسطنطنيه، رشاد، 1908 ۲۰
  2. ^ Vahit İpekçi, Dr. Nâzım Bey’in Siyasal Yaşamı, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2006
  3. ^ Ali Haydar Bayat, Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, 1998
  4. ^ http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1271/14637.pdf
  5. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 21-22.
  6. ^ Celil Layiktez, THE HYSTORY OF FREEMASONRY IN TURKEY
  7. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 53-54.
  8. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 pages 210-211
  9. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 pages 210-211 & 222
  10. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 page 57.
  11. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 pages 52-53.
  12. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 page 53.
  13. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 page 53.
  14. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 pages 53-54.
  15. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 pages 51-52.
  16. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 pages 51-52.
  17. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 pages 59 & 67-68.
  18. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 208.
  19. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 213.
  20. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 213.
  21. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 page 186.
  22. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 54-55.
  23. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 53-54.
  24. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 55-56.
  25. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 216.
  26. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 page 193.
  27. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 216.
  28. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 216.
  29. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 page 257.
  30. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 page 150.
  31. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 216.
  32. ^ Worringer, Renee Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, London: Palgrave, 2014 pages 41, 53, 69, 81-82, 188, 224-227,& 260-261.
  33. ^ Worringe, Renée ""Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras" pages 207-230 from International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 36, Issue # 2, May 2004 page 222.
  34. ^ Özbek, Nadi̇r "Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire: War, Mass Mobilization and the Young Turk Regime (1908-18)" pages 795-808 from Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 43, Issue # 5 September 2007 pages 796-797.
  35. ^ Karsh, Efraim Review of The Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military, and Ottoman Collapse by M. Naim Turfan pages 439-440 from The International History Review, Volume 23, Issue # 2 June 2001 page 440.
  36. ^ Schull, Kent Review of The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire by Taner Akçam pages 974-976 from The Journal of Modern History, Volume 86, Issue # 4 December 2014 page 975.
  37. ^ Akçam, Taner A Shameful Act, London: Macmillan, 2007 page 113.
  38. ^ Hasan Kayalı (1995) "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919" International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp 265–286
  39. ^ Uğur Ümit Üngör (2008) Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk ‘Social Engineering’, European Journal of Turkish Studies, 7 | 2008
  40. ^ Balakian, Peter (2004). The Burning Tigris. HarperCollins. p. 375. ISBN 978-0-06-055870-3. 
  41. ^ Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897-1918, Isaiah Friedman
  42. ^ The revolution of 1908 in Turkey By Aykut Kansu
  43. ^ British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey, By Francis Harry Hinsley
  44. ^ Arabic political memoirs and other studies, By Elie Kédourie

References[edit]

External links[edit]