Committee on Capital Markets Regulation

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Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
Abbreviation CCMR
Formation 2006
Type nonpartisan research
Purpose Improving regulation of U.S. Capital Markets
Headquarters 125 Mt. Auburn St., Third Floor
Location
Key people

Hal S. Scott, Director

Glenn Hubbard, Co-Chair

John L. Thornton, Co-Chair
Website http://capmktsreg.org

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets.

Background[edit]

Twenty-seven leaders from the investor community, business, finance, law, accounting and academia comprise the Committee’s membership. The Committee co-Chairs are Glenn Hubbard, Dean of Columbia Business School, and John L. Thornton, Chairman of the Brookings Institution. The Committee’s Director is Professor Hal S. Scott, Nomura Professor and Director of the Program on International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School. The Committee’s research regarding the regulation of U.S. capital markets provides policymakers with a nonpartisan, empirical foundation for public policy.[1]

Recommendations[edit]

The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan for Regulatory Reform[edit]

The Committee determined four critical objectives based upon a year of observation and research into the financial crisis that are further broken down into 57 specific recommendations.[2] These four objectives are:

  1. Reduced systemic risk through more sensible and effective regulation.
  2. Increased disclosure to protect investors and stabilize the market.
  3. A unified regulatory system where lines of accountability are clear and transparency in improved.
  4. International regulatory harmonization and cooperation.

A Blueprint for Financial Reform[edit]

In the 37-page letter to Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, Chairman Lincoln and Ranking Member Chambliss the CCMR evaluated all major elements in the financial reform proposals that have emerged from Senate committees, but focused especially on four as areas for compromise:

  1. Federal regulators must have the ability to use tax dollars (and recoup them later) to pay for the orderly resolution of failing institutions in cases where they judge the alternative would be national and/or international financial catastrophe.
  2. No banks or non-banks should be labeled “systemically important.”
  3. Clarity about jurisdiction over the clearing and settlement of derivatives is crucial to reducing systemic risk, as is increasing these activities.
  4. The proposed independent and transparently funded Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should be free of overriding authority except that of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (as provided in the Dodd Bill) and the Treasury Secretary (only when he or she is acting on matters of the “safety and soundness” of the financial system, as in matters of systemic risk).

Committee Members[3][edit]

External links[edit]

References[edit]