Soviet deep operations
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Deep operations was a military doctrine developed by the Soviet Union for its armed forces during the 1920s and 1930s. It was fully developed with the 1936 Field Regulations.
The concept had two phases, deep battle and deep operations. The deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy forward defences, or tactical zones, for fresh mobile reserves to exploit.
Soviet deep operations reflected the Soviet strategy of exploiting the operational and strategic depth of an enemy front after the breakthrough achieved by the tactical deep battle - in order to inflict a strategic defeat on the enemy and render the defence of his front more difficult or impossible.
Contrary to popular belief, Soviet deep operations did not copy, nor were they the same as the nebulous, so-called "Blitzkrieg" methodology.
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[edit] History
During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle. [1] It was a direct consequence from the experience with wide, sweeping movements of cavalry formations during the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War.
[edit] Content
[edit] Scope
Deep Operations encompassed maneuver by multiple corps- or army sized formations simultaneously. It was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation, but rather multiple operations conducted in parallel or successively were meant to guarantee victory. In this, Deep Operations differed from the usual interpretation of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.
[edit] Aim
The objective of Deep Operations was to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force to induce a catastrophic failure in his defensive system. Highly mobile formations would then exploit this failure by breaking into the deep rear of the enemy and destroying his ability to rebuild his defenses.
The first-echelon, acted the first layer of forces in deep operations. These forces would be arrayed along the front immediately opposite the enemy. In the outbreak of conflict, first-echelon forces would come into immediate contact with opposing forces. Second-echelon forces provide a supporting role.
[edit] The role of technology
Soviet deep-battle theory was driven by technological advances and the hope that maneuver warfare offered opportunities for quick, efficient, and decisive victory. The concurrent development of aviation and armor provided a physical impetus for this doctrinal evolution within the Red Army.
Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky stated that airpower should be "employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance."
[edit] Deep Operations in theory and practice
[edit] Field Regulations
Deep Operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army's "Field Regulations" of 1929, and more fully developed in the 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936.
[edit] The impact of the purges
The Great Purges of 1937–1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Tukhachevsky. An early example of the potential effectiveness of deep operations can be found in the Soviet victory over Japan at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan), where a Soviet corps under the command of Tukhachevsky's disciple G. K. Zhukov defeated a substantial Japanese force in August–September, 1939.
Owing to the purges, the Red Army was caught unprepared for war during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa. The Soviets struggled to relearn the deep operations concept, intiating unsuccessful deep operations during Operation Mars, the Second Battle of Kharkov.
Not until Operation Uranus, and the Battle of Stalingrad in the winter, 1942-43, was deep operations a success. However, the Soviet pushed for a greater success by destroying Army Group South entirely.
Initiating Operation Jupiter led to their defeat in the Third Battle of Kharkov. After Kharkov, the Soviet implemented deep operations with huge success, at the Battle of Kursk, during Operation Bagration and Vistula–Oder Offensive.
[edit] Deep Operations during World War II
The development of Soviet operational doctrine during World War II owes a lot to the sound doctrinal base that was present in the 1936 Field Regulations, and the ideas of Deep Operations. The rapid growth of a competent mechanised force, as well as its adept handling, were remarked on by German officers such as F.W. von Mellenthin.
The two military operations that came closest to the ideal of Deep Operations were probably the Vistula-Oder Offensive against the Wehrmacht in January/February 1945, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945. Both were rapid and crushing victories for the Red Army.
[edit] Major proponents
[edit] See also
[edit] References
[edit] Notes
- ^ Habeck, Mary, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939, Cornell University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-8014-4074-2. Relevant pages available from Google Book Search: [1].
[edit] Sources
- United States War Department. Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces, War Department Technical Manual TM30-430. November 1945.
- Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Doctrine. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corp., 1953.
- Simpkin, Richard. Deep battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii. London; Washington: Brassey’s Defence, 1987. ISBN 0080311938.
- Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) Soviet military operational art: in pursuit of deep battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991 ISBN 0-7146-4077-8
- Harrison, Richard W. The Russian Way of War: Operational Art 1904–1940. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001. ISBN 070061074X.
