Defence Scheme No. 1

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Defence Scheme No. 1 was a plan created by Canadian Director of Military Operations and Intelligence Lieutenant Colonel James "Buster" Sutherland Brown, for a Canadian counterattack of the United States.

Targets[edit]

Defence Scheme No. 1 was created on April 12, 1921 and details a surprise invasion of the northern United States as soon as possible after evidence was received of an American invasion of Canada. It assumed that the Americans would first attempt to capture Montreal and Ottawa, then Hamilton, Toronto, the prairie provinces, and Vancouver and southwest British Columbia. Defence Scheme No. 1's American counterpart was War Plan Red, a plan to invade Canada as part of a war with Britain, created in 1930.[1]

The purpose of invading America was to allow time for Canada to prepare its war effort and to receive aid from Britain. According to the plan, Canadian flying columns stationed in Pacific Command in western Canada would immediately be sent to seize Seattle, Spokane, and Portland. Troops stationed in Prairie Command would be sent to attack Fargo and Great Falls, then move to Minneapolis. Troops from Quebec would be sent to seize Albany in a surprise counterattack while Maritime troops would attack Maine. When resistance to the Canadians grew they would retreat to their own borders, destroying bridges and railways to hinder American pursuit.[1][2]

Reconnaissance[edit]

Lt. Colonel Brown himself did reconnaissance for the plan,[2] along with other lieutenant-colonels, all in plainclothes. These missions took place from 1921 and 1926. As historian Pierre Berton noted in his book Marching as to War, the investigation had "a zany flavour about it, reminiscent of the silent comedies of the day." To illustrate this, Berton quoted from Brown's reports, in which Brown recorded, among other things, that in Burlington, Vermont, the people were "affable" and thus unusual for Americans; that Americans drink significantly less alcohol than Canadians (this was during Prohibition), and that upon pointing out that to Americans, one responded "My God! I'd go for a glass of beer. I'm going to 'Canady' to get some more"; that the people of Vermont would be serious soldiers only "if aroused"; and that many Americans might be sympathetic with the British cause.

Reaction[edit]

Despite Berton's description of the plan and its creator as "quixotic", Berton notes the plan had its supporters. These included General George Pearkes, who remarked that Defence Scheme No. 1 was a "fantastic desperate plan [which] just might have worked."

Christopher M. Bell, however, criticizes the plan as "suicidal". Brown did not coordinate with the British, so did not know that the Royal Navy thought that defending Canada was impossible and did not plan to send a large army there. His plan would thus have sacrificed the best Canadian troops for no reason. Brown also did not understand the importance of keeping Halifax, Nova Scotia—one of the main targets of an American invasion—and other Atlantic ports open. Bell states that Canada's best strategy would have been to—as the Americans expected—engage in a defensive war.[1]

In 1928 Defence Scheme No. 1 was terminated by Chief of the General Staff Andrew McNaughton, who sought peaceful US-British relations. Many of the documents relating to the scheme were accordingly destroyed. While never fully justified, when declassified information about the United States' War Plan Red was released Defence Scheme No. 1 demonstrated the foresight of such an operation, especially in that it was prepared before War Plan Red was researched.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Bell, Christopher M. (November 1997). "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-1931". The International History Review 19 (4): 789–808. doi:10.1080/07075332.1997.9640804. JSTOR 40108144. 
  2. ^ a b Peter Carlson (December 30, 2005). "Raiding the Icebox - Behind Its Warm Front, the United States Made Cold Calculations to Subdue Canada". Washington Post. Retrieved March 4, 2009. 

Books[edit]

  • Berton, Pierre. Marching as to War: Canada's Turbulent Years 1899-1953. Anchor Canada: 2002.
  • Harris, Steven, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. Includes a section on the interwar defence planning.
  • Preston, Richard A. The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977.

External links[edit]