Defense Intelligence Agency

This article is about the United States agency. For other countries' agencies, see Defence Intelligence Agency. "DIA" redirects here. For other uses, see Dia.

Defense Intelligence Agency
Seal of the DIA
Agency overview
Formed	1 October 1961
Headquarters	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling
Motto	Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation
Employees	Classified Approx. 16,500 (65% civilian and 35% military)
Annual budget	Classified
Agency executive	Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Director
Parent Agency	Department of Defense
Website
www.dia.mil

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the central producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the United States. As one of the principal members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the agency works to answer national-level defense objectives for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and senior U.S. military and civilian policymakers. Its work encompasses all aspects of military intelligence requirements, including defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic, and medical and health intelligence. Further, DIA leads the Intelligence Community in collection and production of measurement and signature intelligence.

Although the DIA is designated a Department of Defense combat support agency, the majority of its 16,500 employees (65%) are civilian and its intelligence operations in support of U.S. national strategic planning extend far beyond the zones of combat. The agency has its own Clandestine Service, which conducts espionage activities around the world, particularly in countries where the Pentagon has better access or more specialized military experts than the overextended Central Intelligence Agency.

The agency was established in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency - who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate - chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the entire defense intelligence community.

Overview

The newly built 450,000 sf south wing of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling

DIA's Director is a three-star general or admiral who serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence. As a member of the U.S. intelligence community, he reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The Director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community. The exact numbers and specific budget information are not publicly released due to security considerations.

The DIA differs from the CIA in that the latter is more focused on providing non-military, national security intelligence to the President and his Cabinet, among others. Due to the interconnected nature of intelligence requirements, particularly in times of war, there has been a significant overlap in the work of the two agencies. This trend is, however, gradually changing as the overextended CIA transfers parts of its military intelligence requirements to the Defense Clandestine Service and other elements of the intelligence community.

DIA is headquartered at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) on Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington, D.C., with major operational activities at the Pentagon, at each Unified Combatant Command, United States Defense Attache Offices worldwide, the Joint-Use Intelligence Analysis Facility at Rivanna Station in Charlottesville, Virginia, the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Defense Intelligence Support Center (DISC) in Reston, Virginia. DIA is also in the process of building a new campus in Bethesda, Maryland which will serve as the new location of the National Intelligence University as well as a facility for DIA and other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Organization

DIA is organized into these primary operational directorates:

Defense Clandestine Service (DCS): DIA operates the Department of Defense's clandestine and espionage service as well as human source intelligence collection, including the Defense Attache System. DCS conducts worldwide strategic HUMINT collection operations in support of DoD, national intelligence requirements, and military operations. It deploys teams of linguists, field analysts, case officers, interrogation experts, technical specialists, and special forces. DCS also absorbed the personnel and capabilities of the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2008.

Directorate for Analysis (DI): Analyzes and disseminates finalized intelligence products for the DIA from all sources as well as from partner Intelligence Community agencies. Analysts focus on the military issues that may arise from political or economic events in foreign countries and also analyze foreign military capabilities, transportation systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), terrorism, and missile systems and contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to the President's Daily Brief. The Directorate of Analysis also manages the National Center for Medical Intelligence, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Underground Facilities Analysis Center, National Media Exploitation Center, and the Defense Combating Terrorism Center. Analysts serve DIA in all of the agency's facilities as well as in the field.

Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection (DT): Collects Measurement and Signature Intelligence which is technical intelligence that – when collected, processed, and analyzed by dedicated MASINT systems – results in intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. This often includes radar intelligence, acoustic intelligence, nuclear intelligence, and chemical and biological intelligence. DIA is the central agency for MASINT collection within the United States Intelligence Community.

Directorate for Information Management and Chief Information Officer (DS): This directorate provides the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System: a secure, standardized and integrated global Information Technology enterprise that is continuously improved and maintained in response to intelligence customer needs and enables collaborative discovery, synthesis, and delivery of critical intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, national-security policy makers, and international partners.

Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2): Advises and supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence for defense policy and war planning.

DIA also currently runs the National Intelligence University (NIU) on behalf of the Intelligence Community and houses the John T. Hughes Library in the DIAC. DIA will be relinquishing management of the NIU to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2014 and the university will be moving from the DIAC to its own campus in Bethesda, Maryland.

History

Robert McNamara, founder of DIA

After World War II, until the creation of DIA, the three Military Departments collected, produced and distributed their intelligence for individual use. This turned out to be duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each department provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense or to other governmental agencies.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 wanted to correct these deficiencies by assigning responsibility for Unified and Specified Command intelligence support. However, the intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, the coordination was poor and the first results were short of national reliability and focus. As a result of this poor organization, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the Joint Study Group in 1960 to find better ways for organizing the nation's military intelligence activities.

Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of his decision to establish the DIA in February 1961. He ordered them to develop a concept plan that would integrate all the military intelligence of the DoD. During the spring and summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (soon to become DIA's first director) took the lead in planning and organizing this new agency. The JCS published Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, and DIA began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space on 1 October 1961.

DIA reported to the Secretary through the JCS. The new Agency's mission was the continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Other objectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

Following DIA's establishment, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of defense intelligence. A year after its formation, in October 1962, the Agency faced its first major intelligence test during the superpower confrontation that developed after Soviet missiles were discovered at bases in Cuba by Air Force spy planes.

The U2 reconnaissance plane discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba based on a flight path selected by DIA analysts

In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School (now the National Intelligence University), and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" Buildings at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963. Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attaché System - the last function the Services transferred to DIA.

During these early years of DIA's existence, Agency attempts to establish itself as DoD's central military intelligence organization met with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the war increased defense intelligence's involvement in efforts to account for American service members missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

During the 1960s, DIA analysts focused on: China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its Cultural Revolution; increasing unrest among African and South Asian nations; fighting in Cyprus and Kashmir; and the missile gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s, crises that tested intelligence responsiveness included: the Tet Offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria; North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo; and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Years of transition

DIA sets the intelligence requirements for numerous military installations, such as T-AGM-23, which operates worldwide to check compliance with strategic arms treaties.

The early 1970s were transitional years as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating its functions and establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. Challenges facing DIA at this time included: the rise of Ostpolitik in Germany; the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Middle East; and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970s, as decision makers increasingly recognized the value of its products. Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Richard Nixon's visit to China, the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, the formation of Sri Lanka, and the prisoners of war being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved: détente; the development of arms control agreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; and global energy concerns.

Intense Congressional review during 1975-76 created turbulence within the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many Intelligence Community functions. At the same time, with American involvement in Vietnam ending, defense intelligence faced a significant decline in resources. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Unified & Specified Commands, and also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). Faced with similar resource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. Despite these and other Community-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the loss of resources during the 1970s limited the Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

In the 1970s, DIA and CIA engaged in heated debate on whether the new Soviet Strategic Bomber would strike the continental U.S.

As resources declined, intelligence requirements expanded. By the late 1970s, Agency analysts were focused on Lebanon, China, South Africa, terrorism, and Southeast Asia POW issues. In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA's relationship with the JCS and the Defense Secretary. Specifically, the Secretary assigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resource area to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisory responsibility regarding policy matters. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the time centered on the death of Mao Zedong, aircraft hijacking, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Middle East tensions.

Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. Also, of serious concern were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, border clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA's national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support.

Coming of age

DIA came of age in the 1980s by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both field commanders and national-level decision makers. DIA's publication in 1981 of the first in a series of whitepapers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled Soviet Military Power met with wide acclaim. Ten such booklets were published subsequently over roughly the next decade. World crises continued to flare and included the downing of two Libyan Su-22s by American F-14 Tomcats over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian air raids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

In 1980s, the DIA moved its headquarters to the DIAC (seen here in 1988), which now represents only one wing of the sprawling complex.

Other analysis at this time was focused on the war over the Falkland Islands, Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada. Other DIA analytical efforts during the mid-1980s centered on the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency's first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the previous year during a series of crises—the hijackings of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro, unrest in the Philippines, and counter-terrorism operations against Libya.

Also at this time, the Agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union, counter-narcotics, war fighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. DoD moved decisively to improve its automated data bases and apply additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

In 1983, in order to research the flow of technology to the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration created Project Socrates within the Agency. Over the following years Project Socrates's scope broadened to include monitoring of foreign advanced technology as a whole. Project Socrates ended in 1990 with Michael Sekora, the project's director, leaving in protest when the Bush Administration reduced funding.

In 1984, the Clandestine Services organization, designated STAR WATCHER, was created under DIA with the mission of conducting intelligence collection on perceived areas of conflict and against potential adversaries in developing countries. A critical objective was to create a Joint Services career path for case officers to flag rank since the individual Services were inconsistent in their support of clandestine operations; and, case officers were routinely sacrificed during reductions in force—or when the Intelligence Chiefs of the individual Services decided that espionage was immoral and military officers should not engage in "sinful activities." Ultimately, the organization was created to balance CIA's espionage operations which primarily targeted Soviet KGB/GRU officers, but ignored and were dismissive of Third World targets in areas of potential military conflict. Although there were previous attempts to establish such a DoD level espionage organization, there was no authorization document by which it could be established. This changed when Gregory Davis, a military intelligence officer, defined and established a clandestine services program under the U.S Southern Command's "Plan Green". The program was then authorized by JCS Chairman John Vessey, and sanctioned by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), with the sponsorship of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act was crafted partly to force military officers to serve in a Joint Services assignment in order to qualify for flag rank—ensuring the future of case officers from each Service. Assistant Secretary of the Army, William Clark (son of General Mark Clark), interfaced with the Service Chiefs to gain their support. Davis transferred to DIA in 1984 where he coordinated the authorizing documents and budget for the new organization, and directed the operations of the program for the next six years. The organization grew and flourished, and was cited by the SSCI for its intelligence achievements. Personnel selection and training were rigorous, and the case officers were notable for their advanced educations, area knowledge, and multilingual capabilities. The program was partially gutted under President Bill Clinton as he foresaw no conflict which would justify its existence, but, it was resurrected under President George W. Bush.

Designated a combat support agency under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DIA moved to increase cooperation with the Unified & Specified Commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine. Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran–Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation Earnest Will while closely monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS Stark, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The "Toyota War" between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA's heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Subsequently, the Agency provided threat data on "hot spots" throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing the impact of changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decision makers with intelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, events surrounding the downing of several Libyan jets, the civil war in Liberia, and the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which an agent was killed. Weapons acquisition issues, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism, likewise, remained high priority issues.

Post Cold War transformation

LTG Michael T. Flynn, Director of DIA

With the end of the Cold War, defense intelligence began a period of reevaluation following the fall of Communism in many Eastern European countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoing economic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production, DoD-wide, as resource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agency objectives and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the concept of functional management to better address unified & specified command intelligence issues.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation Desert Storm began, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligence support effort. Most of them associated in some way with the national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in The Pentagon to integrate the intelligence being produced throughout the Community. DIA sent more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations to provide intelligence support. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern times.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the Army for over 20 and 50 years respectively, became part of DIA in January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, DIA has been active in nuclear proliferation intelligence collection and analysis with particular interests in North Korea and Iran as well as counter-terrorism. DIA was also involved with the intelligence build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was a subject in the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq. After the invasion, DIA led the Iraq Survey Group to find the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Agency has conflicted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collection and analysis on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and has often represented the Pentagon in the CIA-DoD intelligence rivalry due to DIA's alleged clandestine HUMINT collection and often overlapping analysis products. Operational military intelligence has also been a focus, particularly in Iraq with insurgency threats and asymmetric warfare. The DIA is responsible for assessing the current and projected national security threats to the U.S. as well as presenting these assessments to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The DIA still actively maintains its responsibility for conventional strategic and operational military intelligence.

Defense Clandestine Service

In 2012 DIA announced a massive expansion of clandestine collection efforts. The newly established Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) would absorb the Defense HUMINT Service and the Defense Attache System and expand DIA's overseas espionage apparatus to rival the CIA's. DCS would focus on military intelligence concerns—issues that the CIA has been unable to manage through lack of personnel or expertise—and would initially deal with Islamist militia groups in Africa, weapons transfers between North Korea and Iran, and Chinese military modernization. The DCS would work closely with the CIA's National Clandestine Service and the Joint Special Operations Command in overseas operations.

Notable cases of espionage

The DIA is one of few U.S. federal organizations, such as the CIA and FBI, that rely on human espionage to collect information. For this reason, the agency has been involved in numerous espionage events over the course of decades.

Spying for the DIA

• Lawrence A. Corcoran - a DIA officer stationed in Santiago, Chile since 1972, who allegedly paid $50,000 dollars per piece for the 17 missiles used to bombard the La Moneda Palace as part of the U.S.-supported 1973 Chilean coup d'état.

Igor Sutyagin

• Charles Dennis McKee - a DIA officer who, along with CIA's Matthew Gannon, died as a result of the the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. The incident gave birth to numerous conspiracy theories that the flight was bombed because the officers were aware of illicit U.S. intelligence drug activities or that the case was related to them trying to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon.

• Victor Kaliadin (Rus:Виктор Калядин) - a CEO of a Russian company "Elers Electron", who in 2001 was sentenced to 14 years in prison for selling a ring run by a DIA agent technical information on Arena, the Russian active protection system for tanks. He died of his fourth heart attack in 2004.

• Igor Sutyagin - Russian arms control and nuclear weapons specialist convicted in 2004 of spying for the DIA. Released in 2010 in exchange for Russian spies arrested in the U.S. during the break-up of the Illegals Program. Denies any involvement in spying.

• Jerzy Strawa - a Polish engineer executed in 1968 for spying for the DIA in communist Poland.

Mugshot of Ana Montes

• Curveball - DIA's Iraqi informant whose claims of mobile biological weapons laboratories was part of the rationale for the Iraq War.

• Natan Sharansky - a former high ranking Israeli politician and Soviet dissident who, during his life in Russia, was sentenced to 13 years of prison with hard labor for spying for the DIA. The prosecution alleged that he gave a DIA agent in journalist's disguise - Robert Toth - a list of people who had access to military and other secrets. Sharansky was released in 1986 following a spy exchange that took place on the Glienicke Bridge between the USSR and the Western allies. In 2006, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Against the DIA

• Ana Belen Montes - a senior DIA analyst arrested in 2001 for spying for the Intelligence Directorate of Cuba and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Prosecutors alleged that she started spying in the mid-1980s, around the same time when CIA's Aldrich Ames started his interaction with the KGB.

• Ronald Montaperto - a senior DIA intelligence analyst providing classified information to Chinese intelligence officers. Montaperto, who claimed that he was tricked, served only 3-months in jail due to letters of support from other intelligence analysts that are soft on China. One of such supporters, Lonnie Henley, was initially reprimanded by the ODNI for his support of Montaperto but was later promoted to acting national intelligence officer for East Asia, highlighting the sway of China-friendly analysts within the U.S intelligence community.

See also

• National Center for Medical Intelligence
• Coast Guard Intelligence Center
• Defense Attaché System
• Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
• Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
• Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
• Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (US Strategic Command)
• Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
• Missile and Space Intelligence Center
• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
• National Intelligence University
• National Security Agency
• Non-commissioned officer
• Office of Naval Intelligence
• Strategic Support Branch
• United States Director of National Intelligence
• United States Intelligence Community
• US Intelligence Community A-Space

External links

• Official DIA Public Web Page
• Missile and Space Intelligence Center
• National Ground Intelligence Center
• National Air and Space Intelligence Center
• Office of Naval Intelligence
• Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
• DIA 50th Anniversary Video and Short history
• DIA's John Hughes and the Cuban Missile Crisis
• The Origins of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Cuban Missile Crisis
• The Vietnam Cauldron: Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia