Democratic Union Party (Syria)
|Democratic Union Party|
|Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat|
|Arabic name||حزب الاتحاد الديمقراطي|
|Military wing||People's Protection Units|
|National affiliation||National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change
Kurdish Supreme Committee
|International affiliation||Koma Civakên Kurdistan|
|Colors||Green, red, yellow|
|Politics of Syria
|This article is part of a series on the
politics and government of
The Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD; Arabic: حزب الاتحاد الديمقراطي, Ḥizb Al-Ittiḥad Al-Dimuqraṭiy) is a Rojava political party established in 2003 by Kurdish activists in northern Syria. An affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and a founder member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, it is described by the Carnegie Middle East Center as "one of the most important Kurdish opposition parties in Syria". It is said to control a number of towns in northern Syria. Chemical engineer Saleh Muslim became its chairman in 2010, and Asiyah Abdullah its co-chairman in June 2012.
It is banned in Syria because the constitution states that political parties cannot be founded on ethnic, religious, regional or tribal basis.
On its website, the PYD describes itself as believing in "social equality, justice and the freedom of belief" as well as "pluralism and the freedom of political parties". It describes itself as "striving for a democratic solution that includes the recognition of cultural, national and political rights, and develops and enhances their peaceful struggle to be able to govern themselves in a multicultural, democratic society."
The party is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States, the European Union and NATO. The Democratic Union Party considers jailed PKK founder Öcalan as its ideological leader, and declares the People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel) as the supreme legislative authority of the Kurdish people. It incorporates into the United Kurdish Community in Western Kurdistan (KCK – Rojava) with its own organisational identity.
Relationship with Turkey
Despite its current apparent strength in Syria, the group's leader, Salih Muslim, claims that the group desires Kurdish autonomy within a new democratic Syria rather than Kurdish independence. Because of the party's links with the PKK, the PYD has poor relations with Turkey, which views the PYD as merely a Syrian branch of the PKK. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has threatened that he would not allow the creation of a "terrorist" structure in Syria. Erdogan also views the recent territorial gains by the PYD as being the result of a deliberate transfer from Assad to the PYD.
The PYD were apparently not invited to a meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Syrian National Council, and the Kurdish National Council to discuss the future of Syria. This has led some to suggest that the Turkish government is trying to encourage the marginalization of the PYD in the Kurdish opposition due to the group's links with the PKK. Muslim also held talks with Turkish officials in July 2013 in regards to seeking autonomy within Syria. However, Turkey's demands included that the PYD not seek autonomy through violence, not harm Turkish border security and be firmly opposed to the Syrian government.
Origins and foundation (2003 and prior)
While the Syrian Ba'ath government had always been oppressive towards its own Kurdish minority, former president Hafiz al-Assad supported Kurdish factions in neighboring Iraq and Turkey in order to exert pressure on regional rivals. In 1975, Assad offered the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani a safe haven in Damascus to found his new Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). From the 1980s, Assad also supported the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) against his regional rival Turkey, when he bowed to pressure from Ankara and sought improved political and economic relations.
This only changed in the late 1990s when Turkey became serious about threatening Syria with war. After 19 years in Syria, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had to flee on October 9, 1998, only to be captured by Turkish agents several months later. Subsequently a mutual security pact between Turkey and Syria was concluded on 20 October in the Turkish city of Adana. The Syrian government listed the PKK as a "terrorist organisation", withdrew all support for it, and agreed to strategically cooperate with Turkey against it. The PKK soon was forced to largely abandon its former bases in Syria in the face of this. Against this backdrop, the PYD was secretly founded in 2003 by Syrian PKK remnants, and would soon come to "[suffer] years of violent repression at the hands of the Syrian regime", according to the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Underground activism and state repression (2004–2010)
Though Syrian security forces had already for several years been targeting PKK members who stayed in Syria, the PYD came under intensified persecution in the aftermath of the March 2004 Kurdish uprising across northern Syria. According to Human Rights Watch, the Syrian government saw the party as a particular threat due to its "ability to mobilise large crowds", and suspected it of organising numerous demonstrations. As such, many PYD activists imprisoned in the aftermath of the uprising were not given the amnesty that Bashar al-Assad granted other Kurdish detainees as a later goodwill gesture.
On 2 November 2007, PYD activists organised large demonstrations in Qamishli and Ayn al-Arab (Kurdish: Kobanê), drawing hundreds of Kurds to protest against recent Turkish threats—supported by Assad—to invade Kurdish areas in northern Iraq where the PKK was based. Security forces—including a unit imported from Damascus—fired teargas in an effort to disperse the crowds. When some protesters reportedly began to resist by throwing stones, the police opened fire with live ammunition, killing one and injuring at least two more. Dozens of Kurds (among them women and children) were detained in the ensuing police crackdown. Most were soon released, but 15 activists—3 of them party officials—remained imprisoned and were sent before a military court on various charges.
From 2006 to 14 April 2009, at least two dozen PYD activists were formally tried before a special security court, some receiving sentences from five to seven years on charges of membership in a "secret organisation" and seeking "to cut off part of Syrian land to join it to another country". Many others were detained, often in severe conditions and without basic legal rights—some of those released reported being kept in extended solitary confinement and even being subjected to physical and mental torture. Syrian security forces also often continued to harass activists and their families even following their release. While similar methods were employed against many Kurdish prisoners and activists in Syria, Human Rights Watch has noted that security forces tended to reserve their harshest treatments for PYD members.
Conflict in Syria and Kurdish self-rule (2011–present)
- Stance in early stages of the conflict (March 2011–July 2012)
With the outbreak of antigovernment demonstrations across Syria in early 2011, the PYD joined the Kurdish Patriotic Movement in May, and was a founder member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change in July and of the KCK-aligned People's Council of Western Kurdistan in December. Unlike most other Kurdish Syrian parties, it did not join the Kurdish National Council (KNC) when it was formed in October 2011, because of tensions between pro-KNC Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government leader Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PKK. The PYD has been accused by opposition elements of responsibility for the October 2011 assassination of KNC leader Mashaal Tammo, while the PYD has maintained that Turkey was responsible. Although critical of the Syrian government, the PYD also criticised the Syrian opposition, including the Syrian National Council (SNC), which it accused of acting in Turkey's interests. The SNC's unwillingness to support Kurdish autonomy led all but one of its Kurdish parties to leave by February 2012. Over 640 prisoners related to PYD were released by the Syrian security apparatus in 2011, most of which returned to the North.
- Assertion of control in Rojava (July 2012–July 2013)
In mid-2012 the People's Council of Western Kurdistan signed an agreement with the Kurdish National Council, forming a joint Kurdish Supreme Council (Kurdish Supreme Committee) and agreeing to cooperate on security for Kurdish areas, forming People's Protection Units (YPG). This followed an "operational decision made by the Assad regime in mid-July 2012 to withdraw the majority of its forces from Syria’s Kurdish areas" (leaving a strong presence only in Qamishli and Al-Hasakah), prompted by a major opposition offensive against the capital Damascus. According to the Carnegie Middle East Center, "Despite these agreements, the Kurdish National Council has accused the PYD of attacking Kurdish demonstrators, kidnapping members of other Kurdish opposition parties, and setting up armed checkpoints along the border with Turkey." In mid-2012 Reuters cited unconfirmed reports that the towns of Amuda, Derik, Kobani and Afrin were under PYD control. Abdelbasset Seida, head of the opposition Syrian National Council claimed in July 2012 after a meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that the Syrian Army had handed over control of certain parts of northeastern Syria to the PYD. The PYD's alleged control over certain areas was said to have led to disputes and clashes between the PYD, the KNC, and the Syrian National Council.
The PYD soon became the dominant force in the Kurdish opposition, with its members running checkpoints on major roads and entrances to Kurdish cities. Under the agreement, cities that fall under the control of Syrian Kurdish forces will be ruled jointly by the PYD and the KNC until an election can be held. Despite the agreement before the groups, there remain allegations from the Kurdish Union Party that the PYD has forced people flying the Kurdish flag to replace it with the PKK flag. The PYD has apparently been able to do this through intimidation due to the fact that unlike most other Kurdish groups, the PYD is armed.
- Moves toward official autonomy (July 2013–present)
Syrian government forces have withdrawn from three Kurdish-inhabited areas and handed military control to Kurdish militias in 2012. In November 2013, the PYD announced an interim government, divided into three non-contiguous autonomous areas or cantons, Afrin, Jazira and Kobani.
"Kurdish rebels are establishing self-rule in war-torn Syria, resembling the Zapatista experience and providing a democratic alternative for the region."
- "Syria rebels, Kurdish militia discuss cease-fire". CNN. 30 October 2012. Retrieved 28 October 2013.
- pydrojava.net, About us: The Democratic Union Party (PYD)
- Carnegie Middle East Center, 1 March 2012, The Kurdish Democratic Union Party
- "Syrian Kurdish moves ring alarm bells in Turkey". Reuters. 23 July 2012. Retrieved 2012-07-25.
- "PYD Leader Salih Muslim: Syrian Government Has Lost Control in Kurdish Areas". Rudaw. 10 July 2012. Retrieved 2013-07-01.
- "Syrian Kurd party says Turkey should not fear its rise". Reuters. 7 August 2012. Retrieved 2012-08-11.
- "Crisis in Syria emboldens country's Kurds". BBC News. 28 July 2012. Retrieved 2012-08-11.
- "Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria". Human Rights Watch. November 2009. Retrieved 14 November 2013.
- John Caves, 6 December 2012, Institute for the Study of War, BACKGROUNDER: Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party (PYD)
- "Barzani Unites Syrian Kurds Against Assad". Al-Monitor. 16 July 2012. Retrieved 2012-07-25.
- "More Kurdish Cities Liberated As Syrian Army Withdraws from Area". Rudaw. 20 July 2012. Retrieved 2013-07-01.
- "Liberated Kurdish Cities in Syria Move into Next Phase". Rudaw. 25 July 2012. Retrieved 2013-07-01.
- PYD Announces Surprise Interim Government in Syria’s Kurdish Reg
- "Rojava revolution: building autonomy in the Middle East". ROARmag. 25 July 2014. Retrieved 2014-10-09.