Demographic dividend

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Demographic dividend refers to a period – usually 20 to 30 years – when fertility rates fall due to significant reductions in child and infant mortality rates. This fall is often accompanied by an extension in average life expectancy that increases the portion of the population that is in the working age-group. This cuts spending on dependents and spurs economic growth. As women and families realize that fewer children will die during infancy or childhood, they will begin to have fewer children to reach their desired number of offspring,further reducing the proportion of non-productive dependents.

However, this drop in fertility rates is not immediate. The lag between produces a generational population bulge that surges through society. For a period of time this “bulge” is a burden on society and increases the dependency ratio. Eventually this group begins to enter the productive labor force. With fertility rates continuing to fall and older generations having shorter life expectancies, the dependency ratio declines dramatically. This demographic shift initiates the demographic dividend. With fewer younger dependents, due to declining fertility and child mortality rates, and fewer older dependents, due to the older generations having shorter life expectancies, and the largest segment of the population of productive working age, the dependency ratio declines dramatically leading to the demographic dividend. Combined with effective public policies this time period of the demographic dividend can help facilitate more rapid economic growth and puts less strain on families. This is also a time period when many women enter the labor force for the first time.[1] In many countries this time period has led to increasingly smaller families, rising income, and rising life expectancy rates.[2] However, dramatic social changes can also occur during this time, such as increasing divorce rates, postponement of marriage, and single-person households.[3]

Examples[edit]

East Asia[edit]

East Asia provides some of the most compelling evidence to date of the demographic dividend. The demographic transition in East Asia occurred over 50–15 years, a shorter time period than anywhere previously. East Asia was able to benefit from knowledge, experience, and technology of other countries that had already passed through the demographic transition.[4] It has been argued that the demographic dividend played a role in the "economic miracles" of the East Asian Tigers and accounts for between one fourth and two fifths of the “miracle”.[5][6]

Ireland[edit]

Ireland also provides a recent example of the demographic dividend and transition. Faced with a high birth rate, the Irish government legalized contraception in 1979. This policy led to a decline in the fertility rate and a decrease in the dependency ratio. It has been linked as a contributing factor to the economic boom of the 1990s that was called the Celtic Tiger.[7] During this time the dependency ratio also improved as a result of increased female labor market participation and a reversal from outward migration of working age population to a net inflow.

Africa[edit]

Africa, on the other hand has been unique demographically because fertility rates have remained relatively high, even as significant progress has been made decreasing the mortality rates. This has led to a continuing population explosion rather than a population boom and has contributed to the economic stagnation in much of Sub-Saharan Africa.[8] The magnitude of the demographic dividend appears to be dependent on the ability of the economy to absorb and productively employ the extra workers,[9] rather than be a pure demographic gift.

India[edit]

In the near future India will be the largest individual contributor to the global demographic transition. A 2011 International Monetary Fund Working Paper found that substantial portion of the growth experienced by India since the 1980s is attributable to the country’s age structure and changing demographics.[10] The U.S. Census Bureau predicts that India will surpass China as the world’s largest country by 2025, with a large proportion of those in the working age category.[11] Over the next two decades the continuing demographic dividend in India could add about two percentage points per annum to India’s per capita GDP growth.[12] Extreme actions are needed to take care of future basic minimum living standards including food, water and energy.[13] As per Population Reference Bureau India's population in 2050 is projected to be 1.692 billion people.[14]

Four mechanisms for growth in the demographic dividend[edit]

During the course of the demographic dividend there are four mechanisms through which the benefits are delivered. The first is the increased labor supply. However, the magnitude of this benefit appears to be dependent on the ability of the economy to absorb and productively employ the extra workers rather than be a pure demographic gift. The second mechanism is the increase in savings. As the number of dependents decreases individuals can save more. This increase in national savings rates increases the stock of capital in developing countries already facing shortages of capital and leads to higher productivity as the accumulated capital is invested. The third mechanism is human capital. Decreases in fertility rates result in healthier women and fewer economic pressures at home. This also allows parents to invest more resources per child, leading to better health and educational outcomes. The fourth mechanism for growth is the increasing domestic demand brought about by the increasing GDP per capita and the decreasing dependency ratio.[15]

Inverse Dependency Ratio - World Regions - 1950–2050.png

Low fertility initially leads to low youth dependency and a high ratio of working age to total population. However as the relatively large working age cohort grows older, population aging sets in. The graph shows the ratio of working age to dependent population (those 15 to 64 years old, divided by those above or below this age range - the inverse of the dependency ratio) based on data and projections from the United Nations.

There is a strategic urgency to put in place policies which take advantage of the demographic dividend for most countries.[16] This urgency stems from the relatively small window of opportunity countries have to plan for the demographic dividend when many in their population are still young, prior to entering the work force.[17] During this short opportunity, countries traditionally try to promote investments which will help these young people be more productive during their working years.[18] Failure to provide opportunities to the growing young population will result in rising unemployment and an increased risk of social upheaval.[19][20]

After the demographic dividend[edit]

The urgency to put in place appropriate policies is magnified by the reality that what follows the “demographic dividend” is a time when the dependency ratio begins to increase again. Inevitably the population bubble that made its way through the most productive working years creating the “demographic dividend” grows old and retires. With a disproportionate number of old people relying upon a smaller generation following behind them the “demographic dividend” becomes a liability. With each generation having fewer children population growth slows, stops, or even goes into reverse. This is currently seen most dramatically in Japan with younger generations essentially abandoning many parts of the country.[21] Other regions, notably Europe and North America, will face similar situations in the near future with East Asia to follow after that.

China’s current independence ratio of 38 is unprecedentedly low. This represents the number of dependents, children, and people over 65, per 100 working adults.[22] This implies that there are nearly twice as many working age people as the rest of the entire population combined. This historically low dependency ratio has been extremely beneficial for China’s unprecedented period of economic growth. This dramatic shift was brought about largely in part due to China’s one-child policy. As a result China is currently aging at an unprecedented rate.[23] China will be older than the United States by 2020 and by Europe by 2030.[24] Combined with the sex-selective abortions widely practiced as a result of the one-child policy – China will have 96.5 million men in their 20s in 2025 but only 80.3 million young women – China’s future demography holds many challenges for the Communist Party.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  2. ^ http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  3. ^ http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  4. ^ Bloom, David E., David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, 2003, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change, Population Matters Monograph MR-1274, RAND, Santa Monica.
  5. ^ Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1998, Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia, World Bank Economic Review, 12: 419 - 455.
  6. ^ Bloom, David E., David Canning and Pia Malaney, 2000, Demographic Change and Economic Growth in Asia, Population and Development Review, 26, supp. 257-290.
  7. ^ Bloom, David E. and David Canning, 2003, Contraception and the Celtic Tiger, Economic and Social Review, 34, pp 229-247.
  8. ^ Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 207-273.http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/malaria/docs/brookafr.pdf
  9. ^ Bloom, David E., David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, 2003, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change, Population Matters Monograph MR-1274, RAND, Santa Monica.
  10. ^ The Demographic Dividend: Evidence From the Indian States, by Shekhar Aiyar and Ashoka Mody, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1138.pdf
  11. ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/amid-population-boom-india-hopes-for-demographic-dividend-but-fears-disaster/2011/10/12/gIQA9I4nmL_story.html
  12. ^ The Demographic Dividend: Evidence From the Indian States, by Shekhar Aiyar and Ashoka Mody, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1138.pdf
  13. ^ India’s population in 2050: extreme projections demand extreme actions, by Ranjit Goswami, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/05/indias-population-in-2050-extreme-projections-demand-extreme-action/
  14. ^ Population Reference Bureau 2011 World Population Data Sheet, http://www.prb.org/pdf11/2011population-data-sheet_eng.pdf
  15. ^ Bloom, David E., David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, 2003, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change
  16. ^ http://live.worldbank.org/realizing-demographic-dividend-challenges-and-opportunities-ministers-finance-and-development
  17. ^ http://live.worldbank.org/realizing-demographic-dividend-challenges-and-opportunities-ministers-finance-and-development
  18. ^ http://live.worldbank.org/realizing-demographic-dividend-challenges-and-opportunities-ministers-finance-and-development
  19. ^ http://live.worldbank.org/realizing-demographic-dividend-challenges-and-opportunities-ministers-finance-and-development
  20. ^ Bloom, David E., David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, 2003, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change
  21. ^ ”A Tale of Three Islands”, The Economist October 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  22. ^ ”A Tale of Three Islands”, The Economist October 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  23. ^ ”A Tale of Three Islands”, The Economist October 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533364
  24. ^ ”A Tale of Three Islands”, The Economist October 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533364