Dereliction of Duty (1997 book)
|Author||H. R. McMaster|
|September 2, 1997|
Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam is a book written by then Major, currently Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, that explores the military's role in the policies of the Vietnam War. The book was written as part of McMaster's Ph.D. thesis at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The book examines Robert McNamara and U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's staff, alongside the military and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, failure to provide a successful plan of action to pacify either a Viet Cong insurgency or decisively defeat the North Vietnamese Army.
McMaster details why military actions intended to indicate "resolve" or to "communicate" ultimately failed when trying to accomplish sparsely detailed, confusing, and conflicting military objectives. In his opinion, the military is to be used appropriately in order to meet objective military targets and goals.
Pace said he and the other joint chiefs were debriefing commanders just back from the front lines, including one colonel recognized as a rising star and creative thinker -- Major General H.R. McMaster, the author of 1997 book "Dereliction of Duty," considered the seminal work on military's responsibility during Vietnam to confront their civilian bosses when strategy was not working.
- Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, searchable at Google Books
- Ronald H. Spector (20 July 1997). "Cooking Up a Quagmire". New York Times. Retrieved 20 November 2014.
- Wirtz, James J. (1999). "A Review Essay of H. R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty". Political Science Quarterly 114 (1): 131–136. Retrieved 19 November 2014.
|This article about a book on United States military history is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.|
|This article on a nonfiction book about the Vietnam War is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.|