Desinicization

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Desinicization (simplified Chinese: 去中国化; traditional Chinese: 去中國化; pinyin: qùzhōngguóhuà, de + sinicization) is the elimination of Chinese influence.

Historical[edit]

There were people of mixed ancestry or desinicized Han Chinese who adopted steppe people's culture and way of life existed in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D., and some even served in the Sui and Tang dynasties' military.[1]

Qing Dynasty[edit]

Some Han Chinese during the Ming dynasty also joined the Manchu Eight banners and became "Manchufied". The Manchu people founded the Qing dynasty.

The Chinese banners were known as the "Nikan" Banners, made out of a massive amount of Chinese POWs and defectors. Jurchen women married those Chinese who had no family with them.[2] There were so many Chinese entering the Banners that there were more of them than the Jurchen.[3]

Attempts by Hung Taiji were made to separate Chinese and Jurchen banners. In Chinese and Jurchen of Liaodong were mix in culture. Many bannermen forged genealogies of their origin since they did not have any, and then these decided whether or not they were in a Chinese or a Jurchen banner.[4]

The Eight Banners were then created from the old black Chinese banners and Jurchen banners and made equal to each other. The Mongol Eight banners were also created at this time, and anyone who was not classified into a Chinese or a Mongol banner became a Manchu, an ethnic group which Hung Taiji created.[5]

After defeats inflicted by the Chinese General Yuan Chonghuan upon the Manchus,[6][7] the Manchu then decided to absorb Chinese prisoners who knew how to use guns into their army to supplement their forces.[8]

The Manchus also lured Chinese Generals into defecting and joining the Banners by giving marrying them to women from the Imperial Aisin Gioro family.[9] One Chinese General, Li Yongfang (Li Yung-fang) was bribed by the Manchus into defecting by being married to an Aisin Gioro wife, and being given a position in the banners. Many more Chinese abandoned their posts and joined the Manchus.[10] A mass marriage of Chinese to Manchu women numbering 1,000 took place in 1632 after Prince Yoto came up with the idea. They were either generals or officials.[11] It was said by the Manchu leader that "since the Chinese generals and Manchu women lived together and ate together, it would help these surrendered generals to forget their motherland."[12] Women from the Imperial family were also married to other Chinese who joined the Qing after their conquest of China.[13]

The Manchus also created an artillery unit out of Chinese, which they used against the Ming army.[14] Chinese were also lured by the Manchus into defecting and entering their employ in civil service by granting them privileges such as calling themselves "ministers", while Manchus in the same position were regarded as "slaves".[15]

Some Han Chinese also joined Manchu banners directly, instead of joining the separate Chinese banners. The Manchu White Banner were joined by some Zhejiang Han Chinese with the last name Tao who defected to the Qing towards the end of the Ming Dynasty. Their last name was changed to the Manchu sounding "Tohoro". One of their descendants was the Manchu Duanfang, an official in late Qing dynasty China.[16] Han Chinese bannermen manchufied their last names with adding "giya" at the end.[17]

However, while Han Chinese bannermen like Zhao Erfeng, Zhao Erxun and Cao Xueqin did not use Manchu names,[18] other Han Chinese bannermen used Manchufied names, one Han bannermen with a Manchu name of Deming also had a separate Chinese name, Zhand Deyi.[19]

The Manchu bannermen typically used their first/personal name to address themselves and not their last name, while Han bannermen used their last name and first in normal Chinese style.[20][21]

One Chinese bannerman named Cui Zhilu who knew Manchu had changed his name to the Manchu Arsai, and the emperor asked him how he came about his name.[22] Some Chinese bannermen also adopted Manchu personal naming practices like giving numbers as personal names.[23]

Desinicization elsewhere[edit]

Taiwan[edit]

In 2001, proponents of Taiwanization began characterizing desinicization 2001 as a part of the movement to emphasize a local Taiwan-based identity in opposition to the political leadership that had historically identified with China and Chinese culture.[24]

When the Republic of China took over Taiwan from Japan after World War II, and especially after Kuomintang lost control of China to the communists and retreated to Taiwan, the ROC promoted Chinese cultures on local residents who were mostly descendents of Hokkien and Cantonese who had been immigrating to Taiwan since the Dutch period. Those who attended school during the Japanese colonial period had to learn Japanese. The government launched policies to promote Chinese calligraphy, traditional Chinese painting, folk art, and Chinese opera. Over times steps were also taken such as limiting the use of Taiwan's languages in schools and media in favour of Mandarin, putting educational focus on China rather than Taiwan, naming entities in Taiwan with "China" or "Chinese" to reflect the government's ideology that it is the sole legitimate government of China, and replacing Japanese place names with Chinese names, an example being the renaming of Taipei streets to reflect the geography of China and the ideals promoted by the Kuomintang. The culture of Taiwan is now dominated by Han Chinese culture with a hybrid blend of other Chinese minorities, Japanese, European, American, global, local and indigenous influences which are both interlocked and divided between perceptions of tradition and modernity.

Desinicization occurred most rapidly between 1992 and 2005, according to a survey by the National Chengchi University about national identity in Taiwan. Identification as "Chinese" during this time dropped from 26.2% to 7.3%, "Taiwanese" identity increased from 17.3% to 46.5%, and identification as both Taiwanese and Chinese dropped from 45.4% to 42.0%.[25] The autocratic administrations of Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo claimed legitimacy as pan-Chinese leaders because the Republic of China's National Assembly was elected from all over China (in 1947), rather than just from Taiwan. However, the Lee Tenghui administration (1988–2000) began to desinicize the polity by abolishing this Assembly in 1991, to form a parliamentary body with a Taiwan-only electorate.[25] In academia, desinicization in the late 1980s and 1990s resulted in the replacement of the word "China" in the names of institutions to "Taiwan", creating the "Taiwan Legal Association", "Taiwan Political Science Association", "Taiwan Sociological Association", and "Taiwan History Association". As part of this movement, some Taiwanese historians downplayed the abuses of Japan's colonial administration, referring to it as "rule" rather than "occupation"; and the Taiwan History Association claimed that Taiwan's history was a part of Japanese, rather than Chinese, history.[25]

Desinicization accelerated under the Chen Shuibian administration (2000–2008), with the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party in control of the Executive Yuan. Chen's Minister of Education, Tu Chengsheng, directed the rewriting of high school history textbooks to abolish the "remnants of greater Chinese consciousness" (大中國意識的沈痾). This textbook desinicization included the separation of Taiwanese history and Chinese history into separate volumes, a ban on the term mainland China, and the portrayal of Chinese immigration to Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty as "colonization". Concurrently, Chen introduced the One Country on Each Side concept in 2002, which posited that China and Taiwan are separate countries, while ordering the addition of the words "Issued in Taiwan" on Republic of China passports.[25] That same year, Tu's department chose to invent its own romanization system for Mandarin Chinese, Tongyong Pinyin, designed by a Taiwanese scholar rather than adopting the internationally well-known Hanyu Pinyin system developed by the People's Republic of China and used in other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. In 2003, the government abolished the longstanding policy of using Mandarin as the sole language of government, which in practice promoted the second-largest dialect on the island, Hokkien, to fulfill many of the functions of a national language.[25] From 2004, the map of the "Republic of China" no longer includes mainland China.

From 2005, Chen's Executive Yuan also initiated the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign, which sought to remove the words "China" or "Chinese" from public and private organizations. This included the renaming of state bodies such as Overseas Chinese Affairs Council (which became the "Overseas Compatriot Affairs Council"), persuading private organizations like China Airlines to change their name, and also the purging of references to mainland China in nearly 100 administrative laws. In 2006, Chen abolished the National Unification Council and its Guidelines for National Unification.[25] In February 2007, Chen's government changed the name of Chunghwa Post (China Post) to Taiwan Post, Chinese Petroleum Company to "CPC Corporation, Taiwan, and China Shipbuilding Corporation to "CSBC Corporation, Taiwan".[26]

The name changing issue was a topic in the Republic of China presidential elections in Taiwan in March 2008. Former Taipei mayor Ma Ying-Jeou was elected as the President, whereupon he sought to reverse some of the desinicization policies of Chen.[27] On 1 August 2008, the postal service resolved to reverse the name change and restore the name "Chunghwa Post".[28] As of 1 January 2009, Tongyong Pinyin was abolished by the government in favour of Hanyu Pinyin. On September 28, 2009, Ma celebrated the 2559th birthday of Confucius at the Taiwan Confucian Temple, which was built in 1665. And on January 1, 2011, President Ma entitled his New Year's address "Building up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage", which stressed "Chinese culture and virtues, such as benevolence, righteousness, filial devotion, respect for teachers, kindness, and simplicity".[27]

Korea[edit]

Using Hanja, or Chinese characters, was banned in 1949 in North Korea by Kim Il-sung. Hangul was made the official script of the Korean language, replacing Hanja, and Hanja is not required to be learned until high school in South Korea. Some commentators also take the former Seoul city mayor Lee Myung-bak's move to change Seoul's official Chinese name from Hancheng (simplified Chinese: 汉城; traditional Chinese: 漢城; pinyin: Hànchéng) to Shou'er (simplified Chinese: 首尔; traditional Chinese: 首爾; pinyin: Shǒuěr) in 2005 as a model of desinicization.[29] The previous name, pronounced Hànchéng in Chinese and Hanseong in Korean, is an old name for Seoul, literally meaning Han Castle City, but can be misinterpreted as Han Chinese City. The new name Shou'er carried no such connotation, and was close in both sound and meaning to Seoul, which, uniquely among Korean place names, does not have a Sino-Korean name. See also Names of Seoul.

Kyrgyzstan[edit]

The Dungans of Kyrgyzstan represent a less conscious process of desinicization, during which, over the course of a little more than a century (since the Hui Minorities' War), a Hui Chinese population became alienated from the literary tradition and local culture of Shaanxi and Gansu.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Jacques Gernet (1996). A history of Chinese civilization. Cambridge University Press. p. 248. ISBN 0-521-49781-7. 
  2. ^ Kimberly Kagan (2010). Kimberly Kagan, ed. The imperial moment (illustrated ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 95. ISBN 0-674-03587-9. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "This was primarily because of the influx of very large numbers of captured or deserting Ming soldiers and officers, some of whom brought families but more of whom married Jurchen women after arriving. They and their families went into the banner units, and soon there were separate banner units for these Chinese-speaking bannermen—called by Nurhaci's government the Nikan. Some knew how to maintain and fire cannons, and they had this special assignment. Others took on domestic or proto-bureaucratic duties, especially if they were literate enough in Chinese to handle correspondence with Ming officials." 
  3. ^ Kimberly Kagan (2010). Kimberly Kagan, ed. The imperial moment (illustrated ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 95. ISBN 0-674-03587-9. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "By the end of Nurhaci's life, the difference between the Nikan banner units—now far outnumbering the normal banners because of the successful conquest and occupation of most of Liaodong—and the Jurchen units were institutionalized and rationalized." 
  4. ^ Kimberly Kagan (2010). Kimberly Kagan, ed. The imperial moment (illustrated ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 95. ISBN 0-674-03587-9. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Hung Taiji sought, first, to make the differences between the banners more essential. Liaodong and Jilin were culturally complex, and making a final determination of whether one was "Jurchen" or "Nikan" could be not only difficult but pointless. Now Hung Taiji demanded that just this determination be made and that the populations of each banner be adjusted to conform to the findings. Genealogies became important documents. The majority who did not have them had to concoct them. They were used to determine who was in which banner. Within the banners, they were used to determine who was eligible for a hereditary captaincy and who was not." 
  5. ^ Kimberly Kagan (2010). Kimberly Kagan, ed. The imperial moment (illustrated ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 96. ISBN 0-674-03587-9. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "At the same time, it was clear that all banners held equal status. The old black banners of the Nikan units were abolished, and all the banners—whether Jurchen or Nikan—used the same set of eight color patterns to demarcate their internal divisions. A parallel process gathered momentum in 1634, when Mongols began joining in volume as they sought refuge from Lighdan or deserted from his forces. The influx, again, invoked the great ambiguity of identities among the Mongols. Jurchens had lived for centuries in proximity to the Mongols. Many had Mongolian names; many had Mongol ancestors or putative Mongol ancestors. The followers of the Khorchins and Kharachins who had capitulated to Nurhaci had been absorbed into his old banners with no special notation of their ancestry. Now they lived among the "Jurchens" without labels. Hung Taiji ordered the creation of Mongol banners, to parallel the eight color divisions already existing for the Nikans and the Jurchens.9 In the same stroke, he ordered that an obverse distillation of those without Mongol or Nikan affiliation be created: they would be the Manchus. Jurchen, as it happens, had not been translated into Manchus. On the contrary, Manchu, Mongol, and Nikan identities had all emerged from mutually contradictory identifiers such as genealogies, language preferences, and occupation, and all under the pressure of Hung Taiji's drive to complete and emperorship between 1634 and 1636." 
  6. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 78. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "In February, 1626, however, his troops were repulsed at Ningyuan, and eight months later Nurhaci died." 
  7. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 78. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Abahai also realized how important it was to use Chinese military experts against the Ming forces. The great victories of 1618 and 1621 had placed eastern Manchuria under the Latter Chin's rule. But further expansion down the Liao-hsi coast toward the Great Wall had been blocked by the Ming commander, Yuan Ch'ung-huan, whose Portuguese artillery had repulsed Nurhaci at Ningyuan in 1626." 
  8. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 78. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Although the Manchus had excellent cavalry and armored infantry, they were often forced to retreat from well defended castle walls. Unable to obtain a decisive advantage over Ming forces, Abahai recognized that the stalemate of 1626 would not be broken unless he trusted captured Chinese soldiers to wield firearms and artillery on his behalf." 
  9. ^ Anne Walthall (2008). Anne Walthall, ed. Servants of the dynasty: palace women in world history. Volume 7 of The California world history library (illustrated ed.). University of California Press. p. 148. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Whereas the emperor and princes chose wives or concubines from the banner population through the drafts, imperial daughters were married to Mongol princes, Manchu aristocrats, or, on some occasions, Chinese high officials...To win the support and cooperation of Ming generals in Liaodong, Nurhaci gave them Aisin Gioro women as wives. In 1618, before he attacked Fushun city, he promised the Ming general defending the city a woman from the Aisin Gioro clan in marriage if he surrendered. After the general surrendered, Nurhaci gave him one of his granddaughters. Later the general joined the Chinese banner." 
  10. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 79. ISBN 0-02-933680-5. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Chinese elements had joined the Manchu armies as early as 1618 when the Ming commander Li Yung-fang surrendered at Fu-shun. Li was made a banner general, was given gifts of slaves and serfs, and was betrothed to a young woman of the Aisin Gioro clan. Although Li's surrender at the time was exceptional, his integration into the Manchu elite was only the first of many such defections by border generals and their subordinates, who shaved their heads and accepted Manchu customs. It was upon these prisoners, then, that Abahai relied to form new military units to fight their former master, the Ming Emperor." 
  11. ^ Anne Walthall (2008). Anne Walthall, ed. Servants of the dynasty: palace women in world history. Volume 7 of The California world history library (illustrated ed.). University of California Press. p. 148. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "In 1632, Hongtaiji accepted the suggestion of Prince Yoto, his nephew, and assigned one thousand Manchu women to surrendered Chinese officials and generals for them to marry. He also classified these Chinese into groups by rank and gave them wives accordingly. "First-rank officials were given Manchu princes' daughters as wives; second rank officials were given Manchu ministers' daughters as wives."" 
  12. ^ Anne Walthall (2008). Anne Walthall, ed. Servants of the dynasty: palace women in world history. Volume 7 of The California world history library (illustrated ed.). University of California Press. p. 148. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Hongtaiji believed that only through intermarrige between Chinese and Manchus would he be able to eliminate ethnic conflicts in the areas he conquered; and "since the Chinese generals and Manchu women lived together and ate together, it would help these surrendered generals to forget their motherland"" 
  13. ^ Anne Walthall (2008). Anne Walthall, ed. Servants of the dynasty: palace women in world history. Volume 7 of The California world history library (illustrated ed.). University of California Press. p. 148. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "During their first years in China, the Manchu rulers continued to give imperial daughters to Chinese high officials. These included the sons of the Three Feudatories—the Ming defectors rewarded with large and almost autonomous fiefs in the south." 
  14. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 79. ISBN 0-02-933680-5. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "While Abahai proceeded to organize these new units, he also opened diplomatic negotiations with Yuan Ch'ung-huan, thus freeing his own troops for campaigns in Korea and against Mongol enemies. . .The military stalemate was really only broken two years later, when Abahai sent his new Chinese artillery force against the walls of the Ming garrison at Ta-ling-ho." 
  15. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (1977). The fall of imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 80. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Chinese defectors to its cause. In 1631 he had become president of the Board of Civil Appointments in Abahai's facsimile of the Ming administration, and in that crucial captivity had managed to interview all prominent Chinese captives, diverting the better educated into bureaucratic positions. Civilians were wooed with Confucian deference. Whereas Manchu officials necessarily addressed themselves as "slaves" to the throne, Chinese mandarins were entitled to call themselves "ministers."" 
  16. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 55. ISBN 0-295-98040-0. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "The ancestors of the post-Boxer official Duanfang, for example, were Han Chinese from Zhejiang who, when they moved to southern Manchuria in the late Ming, became subjects of the Qing and were enrolled in the Manchu Plain White Banner; they then Manchufied their surname from Tao to Tohoro (Tuohuoluo in Chinese)." 
  17. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 55. ISBN 0-295-98040-0. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Members of the Hanjun often altered an originally monosyllabic Han family name by adding it to the two-syllable suffix giya (jia in Chinese) to make it sound Manchu; thus, the monosyllabic surname Li would become (in Chinese) the disyllabic Lijia." 
  18. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 55. ISBN 0-295-98040-0. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Despite such examples, the Qing rulers seemingly did not require all of their bannermen followers who were of Han origin to adopt Manchu-style names. Thus, the bond-servant family of Cao Xueqin (1715-63), author of Dream of the Red Chamber (Hongloumeng), evidently never changed their surname. Neither did the Hanjun family of the late-Qing officials Zhao Erxun and Zhao Erfeng." 
  19. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 55. ISBN 0-295-98040-0. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Nevertheless, many members of the Hanjun did go by Manchu names. For example, six of the seven Hanjun who were sent to study police matters in Japan in 1901 had Manchu-style two-syllable names, and so did two of the six students who were identified as Hanjun in the school directory of the Metropolitan University (Jingshi Daxuetang) for 1906. And the Hanjun graduate of the Beijing Translators College who was China's minister to the United Kingdom in 1902-5 had both a Han-style name (Zhang Deyi) and a Manchu name (Deming [1847-1918])." 
  20. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Manchu men had abandoned their original polysyllabic personal names in favor of Han-style disyllabic names; they had adopted the Han practice of choosing characters with auspicious meanings for the names; and they had assigned names on a generational basis. . . Except among some Hanjun such as the two Zhao brothers, bannermen still did not, by and large, use their" 
  21. ^ Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001). Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861-1928 (reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 57. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "family name but called themselves only by their personal name—for example, Yikuang, Ronglu, Gangyi, Duanfang, Xiliang, and Tieliang. In this respect, most Manchus remained conspicuously different from Han." 
  22. ^ Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "Sioi-yuwanmeng (better known as Xu Yuanmeng or Xu-yuan-meng, 1655-1741), or a Mongol or Chinese bannerman might have a Manchu-sounding name. A glance through the names of captains of Chinese banner companies shows a number of such names, such as Ke-sheng-e, Fo-bao, Chang-shou, Hai-ning, Qi-fu, Ba-shi-liu, and Tun-dai.50 In fact, where names were concerned, the blurring of ethnic boundaries seems more often to owe to the adoption of Manchu names by non-Manchu bannermen. Many non-Manchus who had infiltrated banner ranks were anxious to borrow some of the cachet and prestige associated with being a Manchu, and perhaps even hoped to pass themselves off as Manchus permanently, in which case having a Manchu name could help. At the upper levels of the banners, though, this was not so easy. This is seen in a curious incident of 1737 in which a Chinese banner officer named Arsai suddenly announced to the emperor that he wished to change his name back to his original name, the very Chinese-sound Cui Zhilu. In an audience with the emperor earlier that year, Cui, a garrison bannerman at Fuzhou, as asked why, since he was a Chinese bannerman, he had a Manchu name. He explained that he had adopted the name Arsai when he was young because of his long study of the Manchu language. When an edict arrived from the emperor a few weeks later, Cui was sure it was a reprimand for having wrongfully assumed a Manchu name. Though the edict was in fact on an entirely separate matter, he was so unnerved that he still appealed for permission to change his name back from Arsai to Cui Zhilu.51" 
  23. ^ Mark C. Elliott (2001). The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 243. ISBN 0-8047-4684-2. Retrieved March 2, 2012. "While Chinese names, too, sometimes ended in characters with the sounds "zhu," "bao," and "tai," more often than not, such names in the Qing belonged to Manchus and other bannermen (Chinese bannermen and Mongols sometimes took Manchu-sounding names), even if the attached meaning is not clear (it is not certain that all names in fact had a specific meaning). Giving "numeral names" was another unique Manchu habit. These were names that actually referred to numbers. Sometimes they were given using Manchu numbers—for example, Nadanju (seventy) or Susai (fifty). Other times number names used the Manchu transcriptions of Chinese numbers, as in the name Loišici (= Liushi qi, "sixty-seven"), Bašinu (= bashi wu, "eight-five").45 Such names, unheard of among the Han, were quite common among the Manchus, an appeared from time to time among Chinese bannermen. Popular curiosity about this odd custom in Qing was partly satisfied by the nineteenth-century bannerman-writer Fu-ge, who explained in his book of "jottings" that naming children for their grandparents' ages was a way of wishing longevity to the newly born.46" 
  24. ^ Makeham, John (2008). Lost Soul: "Confucianism" in contemporary Chinese academic discourse. Harvard University Asia Center. p. 85. "Many proponents of indigenization in Taiwan regard it quite specifically as a project of desinicization: an attempt to remove the yoke of "Chinese" colonial hegemony so that Taiwan's putative native (bentu) identity can be recognized and further nurtured." 
  25. ^ a b c d e f Hao, Zhidong (2010). "De-Sinicization under Lee and Chen and the Role of Intellectuals". Whither Taiwan and Mainland China? National Identity, the State, and Intellectuals. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 49–58. 
  26. ^ ":::::Welcome to Taiwan POST:::::". Archived from the original on May 10, 2007. Retrieved 5 January 2011. 
  27. ^ a b Hebert, David; Kertz-Welzel, Alexandra (2012). Patriotism and Nationalism in Music Education. Ashgate Publishing. 
  28. ^ ":::::Welcome to Chunghwa POST:::::". Archived from the original on Aug 21, 2008. Retrieved 5 January 2011. 
  29. ^ 杨谷 (August 16, 2005), 将汉城改为"首尔"是另一种形式的"去中国化" (in Simplified Chinese), retrieved 2008-06-15