District Attorney's Office v. Osborne
|District Attorney's Office v. Osborne|
|Argued March 2, 2009
Decided June 18, 2009
|Full case name||District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, et al. v. Osborne|
|Citations||557 U.S. 52 (more)|
|In pursuing a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the convicted does not have a constitutional right to postconviction access to State’s evidence for DNA testing.|
|Majority||Roberts, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito|
|Concurrence||Alito, joined by Kennedy; Thomas (in part)|
|Dissent||Stevens, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer; Souter (in part)|
|U.S. Const. amend. XIV|
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court decided that the Constitution's due process clause does not require states to turn over DNA evidence to a party seeking a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The case concerned the conviction of William G. Osborne on charges related to the rape and beating of a prostitute. The prostitute had been beaten with an axe handle, shot in the head, and left in an Alaskan snowbank.
On a combination of eye witness testimony and DNA evidence from a condom found at the scene, Osborne was convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault and sentenced to 26 years in prison. The testing method used on the condom, DQ Alpha, was a relatively inexact form of DNA testing that generally cannot narrow the perpetrator down to less than 5% of the population.
After his conviction, Osborne sought for the state's evidence to be put to Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) testing according to his rights under Alaska Statute §12.72.010(4) (2008) for postconviction relief, and according to his State and Federal Constitution rights. The Alaska Court of Appeals ruled Osborne had neither Federal constitutional right to postconviction testing, due to lack of precedent, nor a State constitutional right, on the basis that the other evidence of his guilt was too strong and RFLP testing was not likely to be conclusive. Alaska prosecutors do not dispute that advanced DNA testing could potentially prove Osborne's innocence beyond any doubt, but refused to allow him additional testing despite a decade-old request.
Following the refusal, Osborne filed a claim for due process under 42 U.S.C. §1983, challenging a State's "deprivation of any rights... secured by the Constitution" and requested the DNA evidence against him be tested at his personal expense by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, a method more discriminating than both RFLP and DQ Alpha, and unavailable at the time of his trial. The State instead insisted that Osborne’s claim must be brought under 28 U.S.C. §2254, which allows a prisoner to seek “a writ of habeas corpus... on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution.” Oswald argued that his claim did not sound in habeas, as access to evidence, or even vindication through said access, would not automatically invalidate his conviction. The case was ultimately brought before the Supreme Court, which overturned a Ninth District Court judgement in Oswald's favor and ruled that "assuming Osborne’s claims can be pursued using §1983, he has no constitutional right to obtain postconviction access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing."
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to Part II.
In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court found that Alaska provided for discovery in postconviction proceedings, and has through judicial decision, specified that such discovery is available to those seeking access to evidence for DNA testing. The Court decided these procedures are similar to those provided by federal law and the laws of other States, and they satisfy due process. Osbourne brought this case under §1983 without ever using procedures in filing a state or federal habeas claim relying on actual innocence. The Court found he had not tried to use the process provided to him by the State or attempted to vindicate the liberty interest that was disputed in this case. As such, the Court found no substantive due process rights infringed.
Justice Stevens found Osborne made full use of available state procedures in his efforts to secure access to evidence for DNA testing so that he might avail himself of the postconviction relief afforded by the State of Alaska, but that he was repeatedly rebuffed in a manner which left doubt about the adequacy of the procedural protections afforded to litigants under Alaska Stat. §12.72.010(4), and which proved contrary to the majority assertion that Osborne could gain access to the evidence were he simply to seek it through the State’s discovery procedures.
Justice Souter filed a separate dissenting opinion on procedural grounds, arguing that while Alaska had facially reasonable conditions guaranteeing access to DNA evidence, the way it went about applying those conditions added up to procedural unfairness that violated the Due Process Clause.
Former FBI Director William S. Sessions was among those who sought to have the evidence revealed, arguing the Justice Department should intervene and demand testing since the department’s very name implies "justice". He wrote "Why should our criminal justice system be afraid?" Some consider the decision to be a rebuke of the Innocence Project, which offered to fund Osborne's DNA testing and exonerated 240 prisoners as of the date of the decision.
- Sessions, William S. (2009-02-27). "Obama's Testing Test: Why is the Justice Department on the wrong side of a Supreme Court case about DNA evidence?". Slate.
- Lundin, Leigh (2009-06-28). "Dark Justice". Criminal Brief. Retrieved 2009-06-29.