Double-aspect theory

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For the Canadian constitutional theory, see Double aspect

In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements to determine whether the group is mental, physical, both, or neither, double-aspect theory requires the mental and the physical to be inseparable and mutually irreducible (though distinct).[1]

Dual-aspect theory is akin to neutral monism. This diagram contrasts it with physicalism and idealism, as well as Cartesian dualism.

Double-aspect theorists include:-

See also[edit]

External links[edit]


  1. ^ Leopold Stubenberg. "Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Schopenhauer
  3. ^ Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere, Chapter III p28