Economics of nuclear power plants
The economics of new nuclear power plants is a controversial subject, since there are diverging views on this topic, and multi-billion dollar investments ride on the choice of an energy source. Nuclear power plants typically have high capital costs for building the plant, but low fuel costs and low external costs, namely greenhouse gases.
In recent years there has been a slowdown of electricity demand growth and financing has become more difficult, which has an impact on large projects such as nuclear reactors, with very large upfront costs and long project cycles which carry a large variety of risks. In Eastern Europe, a number of long-established projects are struggling to find finance, notably Belene in Bulgaria and the additional reactors at Cernavoda in Romania, and some potential backers have pulled out. Where cheap gas is available and its future supply relatively secure, this also poses a major problem for nuclear projects.
Analysis of the economics of nuclear power must take into account who bears the risks of future uncertainties. To date all operating nuclear power plants were developed by state-owned or regulated utility monopolies where many of the risks associated with construction costs, operating performance, fuel price, and other factors were borne by consumers rather than suppliers. Many countries have now liberalized the electricity market where these risks, and the risk of cheaper competitors emerging before capital costs are recovered, are borne by plant suppliers and operators rather than consumers, which leads to a significantly different evaluation of the economics of new nuclear power plants.
Two of the four EPRs under construction (in Finland and France) are significantly behind schedule and substantially over cost. Following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, costs are likely to go up for currently operating and new nuclear power plants, due to increased requirements for on-site spent fuel management and elevated design basis threats.
- 1 Overview
- 2 Capital costs
- 3 Operating costs
- 4 Cost per kW·h
- 5 Other economic issues
- 6 Recent developments
- 7 See also
- 8 References
- 9 External links
In 2013, investment advisers Morningstar, Inc. concluded that, in developed countries, “reactors are not a viable source of new power”. Even in developed nations where they make economic sense, they are not feasible because of nuclear’s “enormous costs, political and popular opposition, and regulatory uncertainty”. This view echoes the statement of former Exelon CEO John Rowe, who said in 2012 that new nuclear plants in the US “don’t make any sense right now” and won’t be economically viable in the foreseeable future, because of low natural gas prices in the American market. John Quiggin, an economics professor, says that the main problem with the nuclear option is that it is not economically viable. Former NRC member Peter Bradford and Professor Ian Lowe have recently made similar statements. However, nuclear supporters continue to champion reactors, often with proposed new but largely untested designs, as a source of new power.
Despite the perceived economics of nuclear power, many countries such as Russia, South Korea, India, and China have continued to pursue new builds. Globally, 72 nuclear power plants are under construction, and 92 are planned, as of December 31, 2013, according to the IAEA. China has 25 reactors under construction, with plans to build more, However, according to a government research unit, China must not build "too many nuclear power reactors too quickly", in order to avoid a shortfall of fuel, equipment and qualified plant workers.
"The usual rule of thumb for nuclear power is that about two thirds of the generation cost is accounted for by fixed costs, the main ones being the cost of paying interest on the loans and repaying the capital..." 
Areva, the French nuclear plant operator, for example, offers that 70% of the cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity is accounted for by the fixed costs from the construction process. Some analysts argue (for example Steve Thomas, Professor of Energy Studies at the University of Greenwich in the UK, quoted in the book The Doomsday Machine by Martin Cohen and Andrew McKillop) that what is often not appreciated in debates about the economics of nuclear power is that the cost of equity, that is companies using their own money to pay for new plants, is generally higher than the cost of debt. Another advantage of borrowing may be that "once large loans have been arranged at low interest rates - perhaps with government support - the money can then be lent out at higher rates of return".
"One of the big problems with nuclear power is the enormous upfront cost. These reactors are extremely expensive to build. While the returns may be very great, they're also very slow. It can sometimes take decades to recoup initial costs. Since many investors have a short attention span, they don't like to wait that long for their investment to pay off."
Because of the large capital costs for nuclear power, and the relatively long construction period before revenue is returned, servicing the capital costs of a nuclear power plant is the most important factor determining the economic competitiveness of nuclear energy. The investment can contribute about 70% to 80% of the costs of electricity. The discount rate chosen to cost a nuclear power plant's capital over its lifetime is arguably the most sensitive parameter to overall costs.
The recent liberalization of the electricity market in many countries has made the economics of nuclear power generation less attractive. Previously a monopolistic provider could guarantee output requirements decades into the future. Private generating companies now have to accept shorter output contracts and the risks of future lower-cost competition, so they desire a shorter return on investment period. This favours generation plant types with lower capital costs even if associated fuel costs are higher. A further difficulty is that due to the large sunk costs but unpredictable future income from the liberalized electricity market, private capital is unlikely to be available on favourable terms, which is particularly significant for nuclear as it is capital-intensive. Industry consensus is that a 5% discount rate is appropriate for plants operating in a regulated utility environment where revenues are guaranteed by captive markets, and 10% discount rate is appropriate for a competitive deregulated or merchant plant environment; however the independent MIT study (2003) which used a more sophisticated finance model distinguishing equity and debt capital had a higher 11.5% average discount rate.
As states are declining to finance nuclear power plants, the sector is now much more reliant on the commercial banking sector. According to research done by Dutch banking research group Profundo, commissioned by BankTrack, in 2008 private banks almost invested €176 billion in the nuclear sector. Champions were BNP Paribas, with more than €13,5 billion in nuclear investments and Citigroup and Barclays on par with both over €11,4 billion in investments. Profundo added up investments in eighty companies in over 800 financial relationships with 124 banks in the following sectors: construction, electricity, mining, the nuclear fuel cycle and "other".
Construction delays can add significantly to the cost of a plant. Because a power plant does not earn income and currencies can inflate during construction, longer construction times translate directly into higher finance charges. Modern nuclear power plants are planned for construction in four years or less (42 months for CANDU ACR-1000, 60 months from order to operation for an AP1000, 48 months from first concrete to operation for an EPR and 45 months for an ESBWR) as opposed to over a decade for some previous plants. However, despite Japanese success with ABWRs, two of the four EPRs under construction (in Finland and France) are significantly behind schedule.
In the U.S. many new regulations were put in place in the years before and again immediately after the Three Mile Island accident's partial meltdown, resulting in plant startup delays of many years. The NRC has new regulations in place now (see Combined Construction and Operating License), and the next plants will have NRC Final Design Approval before the customer buys them, and a Combined Construction and Operating License will be issued before construction starts, guaranteeing that if the plant is built as designed then it will be allowed to operate—thus avoiding lengthy hearings after completion.
In Japan and France, construction costs and delays are significantly diminished because of streamlined government licensing and certification procedures. In France, one model of reactor was type-certified, using a safety engineering process similar to the process used to certify aircraft models for safety. That is, rather than licensing individual reactors, the regulatory agency certified a particular design and its construction process to produce safe reactors. U.S. law permits type-licensing of reactors, a process which is being used on the AP1000 and the ESBWR.
In Canada, cost overruns for the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, largely due to delays and policy changes, are often cited by opponents of new reactors. Construction started in 1981 at an estimated cost of $7.4 Billion 1993-adjusted CAD, and finished in 1993 at a cost of $14.5 billion. 70% of the price increase was due to interest charges incurred due to delays imposed to postpone units 3 and 4, 46% inflation over a 4-year period and other changes in financial policy. No new nuclear reactor has since been built in Canada, although a few have been and are undergoing refurbishment and environment assessment is complete for 4 new generation stations at Darlington with the government committed in keeping a nuclear base load of 50% or around 10GW.
In the UK and the US cost overruns on nuclear plants contributed to the bankruptcies of several utility companies. In the US these losses helped usher in energy deregulation in the mid-1990s that saw rising electricity rates and power blackouts in California. When the UK began privatizing utilities, its nuclear reactors "were so unprofitable they could not be sold." Eventually in 1996, the government gave them away. But the company that took them over, British Energy, had to be bailed out in 2004 to the extent of 3.4 billion pounds.
In general, coal and nuclear plants have the same types of operating costs (operations and maintenance plus fuel costs). However, nuclear has lower fuel costs but higher operating and maintenance costs.
Nuclear plants require fissionable fuel. Generally, the fuel used is uranium, although other materials may be used (See MOX fuel or Thorium). In 2005, prices on the world market for uranium averaged US$20/lb (US$44.09/kg). On 2007-04-19, prices reached US$113/lb (US$249.12/kg). On 2008-07-02, the price had dropped to $59/lb.
Fuel costs account for about 28% of a nuclear plant's operating expenses. As of 2013, half the cost of reactor fuel was taken up by enrichment and fabrication, so that the cost of the uranium concentrate raw material was 14 percent of operating costs. Doubling the price of uranium would add about 10% to the cost of electricity produced in existing nuclear plants, and about half that much to the cost of electricity in future power plants.
Mining activity is growing rapidly, especially from smaller companies, but developing a uranium mine takes a long time, 10 years or more. The world's present measured resources of uranium, economically recoverable at a price of 130 USD/kg according to the industry groups Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are enough to last for "at least a century" at current consumption rates.
In 2011, Benjamin K. Sovacool said that even on optimistic assumptions of fuel availability, global reserves of uranium will only support a 2% growth in nuclear power and will only be available for 70 years. He said that uranium prices, like those of oil and natural gas, are highly volatile:
This means that uncertain uranium prices can have a grave impact on plant operating costs. Such price movement is hard to anticipate when, some of the countries now responsible for more than 30% of the world's uranium production: Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, and Uzbekistan, are politically unstable.
Waste disposal costs
All nuclear plants produce radioactive waste. To pay for the cost of storing, transporting and disposing these wastes in a permanent location, in the United States a surcharge of a tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour is added to electricity bills. Roughly one percent of electrical utility bills in provinces using nuclear power are diverted to fund nuclear waste disposal in Canada.
In 2009, the Obama administration announced that the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository would no longer be considered the answer for U.S. civilian nuclear waste. Currently, there is no plan for disposing of the waste and plants will be required to keep the waste on the plant premises indefinitely.
The disposal of low level waste reportedly costs around £2,000/m³ in the UK. High level waste costs somewhere between £67,000/m³ and £201,000/m³. General division is 80%/20% of low level/high level waste, and one reactor produces roughly 12 m³ of high level waste annually.
In Canada, the NWMO was created in 2002 to oversee long term disposal of nuclear waste, and in 2007 adopted the Adapted Phased Management procedure. Long term management is subject to change based on technology and public opinion, but currently largely follows the recommendations for a centralized repository as first extensively outlined in by AECL in 1988. It was determined after extensive review that following these recommendations would safely isolate the waste from the biosphere. The location has not yet been determined, as is expected to cost between $9 and $13 billion CAD for construction and operation for 60–90 years, employing roughly a thousand people for the duration. Funding is available and has been collected since 1978 under the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program. Very long term monitoring requires less staff since high-level waste is less toxic than naturally occurring uranium ore deposits within a few centuries.
At the end of a nuclear plant's lifetime, the plant must be decommissioned. This entails either dismantling, safe storage or entombment. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires plants to finish the process within 60 years of closing. Since it may cost $500 million or more to shut down and decommission a plant, the NRC requires plant owners to set aside money when the plant is still operating to pay for the future shutdown costs.
Decommissioning a reactor that has undergone a meltdown is inevitably more difficult and expensive. Three Mile Island was decommissioned 14 years after its incident for $837 million. The cost of the Fukushima disaster cleanup is not yet known, but has been estimated to cost around $100 billion. Chernobyl is not yet decommissioned, different estimates put the end date between 2013 and 2020.
Proliferation and terrorism
A 2011 report for the Union of Concerned Scientists stated that "the costs of preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism should be recognized as negative externalities of civilian nuclear power, thoroughly evaluated, and integrated into economic assessments—just as global warming emissions are increasingly identified as a cost in the economics of coal-fired electricity".
However the commercial exploitation of high grade uranium ore bodies, by the civil nuclear power sector, has reduced the uranium ore quality worldwide over time, and therefore this has increased the difficulty and effort that potential terrorists, or rogue states, must go through in order to sufficiently concentrate uranium from ore.
Safety, security and accidents
Nuclear safety and security covers the actions taken to prevent nuclear and radiation accidents or to limit their consequences. With the ageing of reactors built in the 1960 and 1970s, there are increased risks of major accidents. This is partly due to design faults but also as a result of radiation causing embrittlement of pressure vessels. New reactor designs have been proposed but there is no guarantee that the reactors will be designed, built and operated correctly. Mistakes do occur and the designers of reactors at Fukushima in Japan did not anticipate that a tsunami generated by an earthquake would disable the backup systems that were supposed to stabilize the reactor after the earthquake. According to UBS AG, the Fukushima I nuclear accidents have cast doubt on whether even an advanced economy like Japan can master nuclear safety. Catastrophic scenarios involving terrorist attacks are also conceivable.
An interdisciplinary team from MIT have estimated that given the expected growth of nuclear power from 2005 to 2055, at least four serious nuclear accidents would be expected in that period. To date, there have been five serious accidents (core damage) in the world since 1970 (one at Three Mile Island in 1979; one at Chernobyl in 1986; and three at Fukushima-Daiichi in 2011), corresponding to the beginning of the operation of generation II reactors. This leads to on average one serious accident happening every eight years worldwide.
In terms of nuclear accidents, the Union of Concerned Scientists have stated that "reactor owners ... have never been economically responsible for the full costs and risks of their operations. Instead, the public faces the prospect of severe losses in the event of any number of potential adverse scenarios, while private investors reap the rewards if nuclear plants are economically successful. For all practical purposes, nuclear power's economic gains are privatized, while its risks are socialized".
Any effort to construct a new nuclear facility around the world, whether an existing design or an experimental future design, must deal with NIMBY or NIABY objections. Because of the high profiles of the Three Mile Island accident and Chernobyl disaster, relatively few municipalities welcome a new nuclear reactor, processing plant, transportation route, or nuclear burial ground within their borders, and some have issued local ordinances prohibiting the locating of such facilities there.
The proven dangers of nuclear power amplify the economic risks of expanding reliance on it. Indeed, the stronger regulation and improved safety features for nuclear reactors called for in the wake of the Japanese disaster will almost certainly require costly provisions that may price it out of the market.
The cascade of problems at Fukushima, from one reactor to another, and from reactors to fuel storage pools, will affect the design, layout and ultimately the cost of future nuclear plants.
Insurance available to the operators of nuclear power plants varies by nation. The worst case nuclear accident costs are so large that it would be difficult for the private insurance industry to carry the size of the risk, and the premium cost of full insurance would make nuclear energy uneconomic.
However, the problem of insurance costs for worst-case scenarios is not unique to nuclear power: hydroelectric power plants are similarly not fully insured against a catastrophic event such as the Banqiao Dam disaster, where 11 million people lost their homes and from 30,000 to 200,000 people died, or large dam failures in general. Private insurers base dam insurance premiums on worst-case scenarios, so insurance for major disasters in this sector is likewise provided by the state.
In Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Liability Act requires nuclear power plant operators to provide $75 million of liability insurance coverage. Claims beyond $75 million would be assessed by a government appointed but independent tribunal, and paid by the federal government.
In the United States, the Price-Anderson Act has governed the insurance of the nuclear power industry since 1957. Owners of nuclear power plants pay a premium each year for $375 million in private insurance for offsite liability coverage for each reactor unit. This primary or "first tier" insurance is supplemented by a second tier. In the event a nuclear accident, damages in excess of $375 million, each licensee would be assessed a prorated share of the excess up to $111.9 million. With 104 reactors currently licensed to operate, this secondary tier of funds contains about $11.6 billion. This results in a maximum coverage amount of $11.975 billion. If 15 percent of these funds are expended, prioritization of the remaining amount would be left to a federal district court. If the second tier is depleted, Congress is committed to determine whether additional disaster relief is required. In July 2005, Congress extended the Price-Anderson Act to newer facilities.
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy put in place two similar international frameworks for nuclear liability. The limits for the conventions vary. The Vienna convention was adapted in 2004 to increase the operator liability to €700 million per incident, but this modification is not yet ratified.
Cost per kW·h
|This article's factual accuracy may be compromised due to out-of-date information. (August 2012)|
The cost per unit of electricity produced (kW·h) will vary according to country, depending on costs in the area, the regulatory regime and consequent financial and other risks, and the availability and cost of finance. Costs will also depend on geographic factors such as availability of cooling water, earthquake likelihood, and availability of suitable power grid connections. So it is not possible to accurately estimate costs on a global basis.
Commodity prices rose in 2008, and so all types of plants became more expensive than previously calculated. In June 2008 Moody's estimated that the cost of installing new nuclear capacity in the U.S. might possibly exceed $7,000/kWe in final cost. In comparison, the reactor units already under construction in China have been reported with substantially lower costs due to significantly lower labour rates.
A 2008 study based on historical outcomes in the U.S. said costs for nuclear power can be expected to run $0.25-.30 per kW·h.
A 2008 study concluded that if carbon capture and storage were required then nuclear power would be the cheapest source of electricity even at $4,038/kW in overnight capital cost.
In 2009, MIT updated its 2003 study, concluding that inflation and rising construction costs had increased the overnight cost of nuclear power plants to about $4,000/kWe, and thus increased the power cost to $0.084/kW·h. The 2003 study had estimated the cost as $0.067/kWh.
According to Benjamin K. Sovacool, the marginal levelized cost for "a 1,000-MWe facility built in 2009 would be 41.2 to 80.3 cents/kWh, presuming one actually takes into account construction, operation and fuel, reprocessing, waste storage, and decommissioning".
In 2013, the US Energy Information Administration estimated the levelized cost of electricity from new nuclear power plants to be $0.108/kWh. Analysts at the investment research firm Morningstar, Inc. concluded that nuclear power was not a viable source of new power in the West.
Comparisons with other power sources
Generally, a nuclear power plant is significantly more expensive to build than an equivalent coal-fueled or gas-fueled plant. Most forms of electricity generation produce some form of negative externality — costs imposed on third parties that are not directly paid by the producer — such as pollution which negatively affects the health of those near and downwind of the power plant, and generation costs often do not reflect these external costs.
A comparison of the "real" cost of various energy sources is complicated by several uncertainties:
- The cost of climate change through emissions of greenhouse gases is hard to estimate. Carbon taxes may be enacted, or carbon capture and storage may become mandatory.
- The cost of environmental damage caused by (fossil or renewable) energy sources, both through land use (whether for mining fuels or for power generation) and through air and water pollution and solid waste.
- The cost and political feasibility of disposal of the waste from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel is still not fully resolved. In the U.S., the ultimate disposal costs of spent nuclear fuel are assumed by the U.S. government after producers pay a fixed surcharge.
- Operating reserve requirements are different for different generation methods. When nuclear units shut down unexpectedly they tend to do so independently, so the "hot spinning reserve" must be at least the size of the largest unit (this partly makes nuclear power more suitable for large grids). On the other hand, many renewables are intermittent power sources and may shut down together if they depend on weather conditions, so the grid will require either back-up generation capability or large-scale storage if the portion of generation from these renewables is significant. (Some renewables such as hydroelectricity have a storage reservoir and can be used as reliable back-up power for other power sources.)
- Governmental instabilities in the next plant lifetime. New nuclear power plants are designed for a minimum of 60 years (50 for VVER-1200), and may be able to be refurbished. Likewise, the waste from reprocessed fuel remains dangerous for about this period, however reprocessing/reuse of spent nuclear fuel can add future value as well.
- Actual plant lifetime (to date, no plant has been shut down due to maximum licensed lifetime being reached, or been refurbished).
- Due to the dominant role of initial construction cost and the multi-year construction time and planned lifetime, the interest rate for the capital required is of particularly high importance for estimating the total cost.
Several recent comparisons of the costs of plants are available (see below); however, commodity prices have shot up since they were completed, and so all types of plants will be more expensive than shown
A UK Royal Academy of Engineering report in 2004 looked at electricity generation costs from new plants in the UK. In particular it aimed to develop "a robust approach to compare directly the costs of intermittent generation with more dependable sources of generation". This meant adding the cost of standby capacity for wind, as well as carbon values up to £30 (€45.44) per tonne CO2 for coal and gas. Wind power was calculated to be more than twice as expensive as nuclear power. Without a carbon tax, the cost of production through coal, nuclear and gas ranged £0.022–0.026/kW·h and coal gasification was £0.032/kW·h. When carbon tax was added (up to £0.025) coal came close to onshore wind (including back-up power) at £0.054/kW·h — offshore wind is £0.072/kW·h — nuclear power remained at £0.023/kW·h either way, as it produces negligible amounts of CO2. (Nuclear figures included estimated decommissioning costs.)
A May 2008 study by the Congressional Budget Office concludes that a carbon tax of $45 per tonne of carbon dioxide would probably make nuclear power cost competitive against conventional fossil fuel for electricity generation.
Estimates of total lifetime energy returned on energy invested vary greatly depending on the study. An overview can be found here (Table 2):
The effect of subsidies is difficult to gauge, as some are indirect (such as research and development). A May 12, 2008 editorial in the Wall Street Journal stated, "For electricity generation, the EIA(Energy Information Administration, an office of the Department of Energy) concludes that solar energy is subsidized to the tune of $24.34 per megawatt hour, wind $23.37 and 'clean coal' $29.81. By contrast, normal coal receives 44 cents, natural gas a mere quarter, hydroelectric about 67 cents and nuclear power $1.59."
However, the most important subsidies to the nuclear industry do not involve cash payments. Rather, they shift construction costs and operating risks from investors to taxpayers and ratepayers, burdening them with an array of risks including cost overruns, defaults to accidents, and nuclear waste management. This approach has remained remarkably consistent throughout the nuclear industry's history, and distorts market choices that would otherwise favor less risky energy investments.
In 2011, Benjamin K. Sovacool said that: "When the full nuclear fuel cycle is considered - not only reactors but also uranium mines and mills, enrichment facilities, spent fuel repositories, and decommissioning sites - nuclear power proves to be one of the costliest sources of energy".
An EU-funded research study known as ExternE, or Externalities of Energy, undertaken from 1995 to 2005, found that the cost of producing electricity from coal or oil would double, and the cost of electricity production from gas would increase by 30% if external costs such as damage to the environment and to human health, from the particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, chromium VI, river water alkalinity, mercury poisoning and arsenic emissions produced by these sources, were taken into account. It was estimated in the study that these external, downstream, fossil fuel costs amount up to 1-2% of the EU's Gross Domestic Product, and this was before the external cost of global warming from these sources was included. The study also found that the environmental and health costs of nuclear power, per unit of energy delivered, was lower than many renewable sources, including that caused by biomass and photovoltaic solar panels, but was higher than the external costs associated with wind power and alpine hydropower.
Other economic issues
Prominent nuclear energy critic Kristin Shrader-Frechette analysed 30 papers on the economics of nuclear power for possible conflicts of interest. She found of the 30, 18 had been funded either by the nuclear industry or pro-nuclear governments and were pro-nuclear, 11 were funded by universities or non-profit non-government organisations and were anti-nuclear, the remaining 1 had unknown sponsors and took the pro-nuclear stance. The pro-nuclear studies were accused of using cost-trimming methods such as ignoring government subsides and using industry projections above empirical evidence where ever possible. The situation was compared to medical research where 98% of industry sponsored studies return positive results.
Nuclear Power plants tend to be very competitive in areas where other fuel resources are not readily available — France, most notably, has almost no native supplies of fossil fuels. France's nuclear power experience has also been one of paradoxically increasing rather than decreasing costs over time.
Making a massive investment of capital in a project with long-term recovery might impact a company's credit rating.
A Council on Foreign Relations report on nuclear energy argues that a rapid expansion of nuclear power may create shortages in building materials such as reactor-quality concrete and steel, skilled workers and engineers, and safety controls by skilled inspectors. This would drive up current prices. It may be easier to rapidly expand, for example, the number of coal power plants, without this having a large effect on current prices.
Some existing LWR type plants have limited ability to significantly vary their output to match changing demand (called load-following). Other PWRs, as well as CANDU, BWR have load-following capability, which will allow them to fill more than baseline generation needs. Some newer reactors also offer some form of enhanced load-following capability. For example, the Areva EPR can slew its electrical output power between 990 and 1,650 MW at 82.5 MW per minute. The number of companies that manufacture certain parts for nuclear reactors is limited, particularly the large forgings used for reactor vessels and steam systems. Only four companies (Japan Steel Works, China First Heavy Industries, Russia's OMZ Izhora and Korea's Doosan Heavy Industries) currently manufacture pressure vessels for reactors of 1100 MGe or larger. Some have suggested that this poses a bottleneck that could hamper expansion of nuclear power internationally, however, some Western reactor designs require no steel pressure vessel such as CANDU derived reactors which rely on individual pressurized fuel channels. The large forgings for steam generators — although still very heavy — can be produced by a far larger number of suppliers.
Nuclear plants require 20–83 percent more cooling water than other power stations.[better source needed] During times of abnormally high seasonal temperatures or drought it may be necessary for reactors drawing from small bodies of water to reduce power or shut down. Nuclear plants situated on large lakes, seas or oceans are not affected by seasonal temperature variations due to the thermal stability of large bodies of water. In some regions, such as the Gravelines Nuclear Station in France, the waste-heat water is used by local aqua-farmers to increase fish production.
The latest plant designs currently available for building are generally called generation III+ reactors. They include AREVA's European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), General Electric's ESBWR, Westinghouse's AP1000, and AECL's ACR-1000. Russia (see VVER), China (see CPR-1000), Japan, Korea and India all also have indigenous plant designs currently available for deployment.
In July 2008, Russia announced plans to allocate $40 billion from the state budget over the next 7 years for development of the nuclear energy sector and the nuclear industry. This will allow for construction of 26 major generating units in Russia by 2020 — about as many as were built in the entire Soviet period.
As of 2008, the UK has indicated that it will take steps to encourage private operators to build new nuclear power plants in the coming years to meet projected energy needs as fossil fuel prices climb, however there would be no subsidies from the UK government for nuclear power. An online calculator outlining UK means and limitations in meeting future energy needs illustrates the problem facing lawmakers and the public.
As of 2013[update], the People's Republic of China has 17 nuclear power reactors spread out over 4 separate sites (Daya Bay, Qinshan, Tianwan, and Ling Ao), and 28 under construction. China's National Development and Reform Commission has indicated the intention to raise the percentage of China's electricity produced by nuclear power from the current 1% to 6% by 2020 (compared to 20% in the USA as of 2008). This will require the current installed capacity of 10.2 GW to be increased to 70–80 GW (more than France at 63 GW). However, rapid nuclear expansion may lead to a shortfall of fuel, equipment, qualified plant workers and safety inspectors. China has since laid even more ambitious plans for 1,400MW reactors as part of the CAP1400 design with plans for a significant export industry.
The 1.6 GWe EPR reactor is being built in Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant, Finland. A joint effort of French AREVA and German Siemens AG, it will be the largest pressurized water reactor (PWR) in the world. The Olkiluoto project has been claimed to have benefited from various forms of government support and subsidies, including liability limitations, preferential financing rates, and export credit agency subsidies, but the European Commission's investigation didn't find anything illegal in the proceedings. However, as of August 2009, the project is "more than three years behind schedule and at least 55% over budget, reaching a total cost estimate of €5 billion ($7 billion) or close to €3,100 ($4,400) per kilowatt". Finnish electricity consumers interest group ElFi OY evaluated in 2007 the impact of Olkiluoto-3 to be slightly over 6%, or €3/MWh, to the average market price of electricity within Nord Pool Spot. The delay is therefore costing the Nordic countries over 1.3 billion euros per year as the reactor would replace more expensive methods of production and lower the price of electricity.
Russia has begun building the world's first floating nuclear power plant. The £100 million vessel, the Akademik Lomonosov, is the first of seven plants (70 MWe per ship) that Moscow says will bring vital energy resources to remote Russian regions.
In December 2009 the United Arab Emirates declined both the American and French bids and awarded a contract for construction for four APR-1400s to a South Korean group including Korea Electric Power Corporation, Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Samsung and Doosan Heavy Industries.
Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, costs are likely to go up for currently operating and new nuclear power plants, due to increased requirements for on-site spent fuel management and elevated design basis threats. After Fukushima, the International Energy Agency halved its estimate of additional nuclear generating capacity built by 2035.
Many license applications filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for proposed new reactors have been suspended or cancelled. As of October 2011, plans for about 30 new reactors in the United States have been reduced to 14. There are currently five new nuclear plants under construction in the United States (Watts Bar 2, Summer 2, Summer 3, Vogtle 3, Vogtle 4). Matthew Wald from the New York Times has reported that "the nuclear renaissance is looking small and slow".
In 2013, four aging, uncompetitive reactors were permanently closed in the US: San Onofre 2 and 3 in California, Crystal River 3 in Florida, and Kewaunee in Wisconsin. The state of Vermont is trying to close Vermont Yankee, in Vernon. New York State is seeking to close Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, in Buchanan, 30 miles from New York City. The additional cancellation of five large reactor uprates (Prairie Island, 1 reactor, LaSalle, 2 reactors, and Limerick, 2 rectors), four by the largest nuclear company in the U.S., suggest that the nuclear industry faces "a broad range of operational and economic problems".
As of July 2013, economist Mark Cooper has identified some US nuclear power plants that face particularly significant challenges to their continued operation due to regulatory challenges by local politicians. These are Palisades, Fort Calhoun, Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick, Ginna, Oyster Creek, Vermont Yankee, Millstone, Clinton, Indian Point. Cooper said the lesson here for policy makers and economists is clear: "nuclear reactors are simply not competitive".
- Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
- Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program
- Decommissioning nuclear facilities
- Nuclear power debate
- Generation IV reactor
- Nuclear power in France
- Renewable energy commercialization
- World Nuclear Industry Status Report
- Cost of electricity by source
- List of books about nuclear issues
- John Quiggin (8 November 2013). "Reviving nuclear power debates is a distraction. We need to use less energy". The Guardian.
- Kidd, Steve (January 21, 2011). "New reactors—more or less?". Nuclear Engineering International.
- Ed Crooks (12 September 2010). "Nuclear: New dawn now seems limited to the east". Financial Times. Retrieved 12 September 2010.
- Edward Kee (16 March 2012). "Future of Nuclear Energy". NERA Economic Consulting. Retrieved 2 October 2013.
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