Eingreif division was a type of German Army formation of World War I established in 1917, which was responsible for engaging in immediate counter-attacks against enemy troops who broke through a defensive position being held by a "front-holding" division (Stellungsdivision).
Eingreif generally translated as counter-attack, but this does not capture the entire sense of the term.[Note 1] In German military doctrine it includes a sense of intervening decisively and is better understood as meaning interlocking. The term was adopted during the Battle of Arras (1917) as a replacement of an earlier term Ablösungsdivision ("relief division") to end confusion over the purpose of divisions held in reserve.
During the First World War, the German army differentiated clearly between an organised counter-attack (Gegenangriff) and a hasty counter-attack (Gegenstoss). The difference was largely to do with timings. A Gegenangriff implied a formal, deliberate attack with full preparatory artillery fire. A Gegenstoss was a hasty or immediate counter-thrust made to prevent the enemy from consolidating captured positions. The principal task of an Eingreif division was to conduct the more immediate Gegenstoss engagements, if troops held in reserve by the Stellungsdivision were insufficient to restore the position. To counteract the effect of an enemy penetration, these divisions were placed in readiness behind the trench system. The formation would have launched necessary manoeuvres in addition to the defensive efforts by the formation in situ.
German defensive practices had been based on the publication "Drill Regulations for the Infantry, German Army, 1906" (Exerzier-Reglement für die infanterie). After the experience of the 1916 Battle of the Somme, General Erich Ludendorff had German defensive doctrine revised. On 1 December 1916, The Supreme Army Command published new tactical instructions in Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare (Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg) and issued it to all divisions.[Note 2] On 30 January 1917, Ludendorff also circulated Experience of the German First Army in the Somme Battles (Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht) by Colonel Fritz von Lossberg which contradicted the idea that troops in forward positions should be allowed to withdraw. The result was that German commanders had two examples to consider when arranging their defences.
During the course of the Third Battle of Ypres, Lossberg's combination of forward defence and counter-attack from behind the front line was replaced by an elastic defence on Ludendorff's orders in October 1917. The new thinking emphasised the defensive battle as a fight in defensive zones for the front line rather than in the front line, to defeat the attack or to gain time for a counter-thrust by forces held in local reserve. In a rear battle zone specially trained Eingreif divisions, would be held back, ready to intervene with countering manoeuvres in support of the front zone garrisons. New deeper defensive positions composed of three defensive zones ("outpost", "battle" and "rear") which had been built according to the new manual Allgemeines über Stellenbau (Principles of Field Construction) and held by garrison or "trench" divisions (Stellungsdivisionen) in a defensive battle (Abwehrschlacht).
As the German army in the west was forced to make greater efforts in defence against Allied attacks in 1915–1917, counter-attacks became more sophisticated. Gegenstoss in der Stellung became counter-thrusts by local trench garrisons, while larger efforts by local reserves became Gegenstoss aus der Tiefe (counter-thrust from behind the position). As these practices developed, the role of the Eingreif division was to execute an instant and immediate counter-thrust (den sofortigen Gegenstoss) by moving to the front in stages to participate in a series of counter-thrusts.
The leading regiment of an Eingreif division was to advance into the zone of the front division with its other two regiments moving forward in close support. The support and reserve assembly areas in the Flandern Stellung were termed Fredericus Rex Raum and Triarier Raum by analogy with the formation of a Roman legion (hastati, principes and triarii). Eingreif Divisions were accommodated 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front line and began their advance to their assembly areas in the rear zone (rückwärtige Kampffeld), ready to intervene in the main battle zone (Grosskampffeld).
- The British Official Historian called these divisions special reserve or super counter-attack divisions.
- Ludendorff credited Colonel Max Bauer and Captain Hermann Geyer with authorship. Lupfer (1995) argues it was a collective effort of the General Staff, headed by Colonel Fritz von Lossberg, Colonel Max Bauer, Major Georg Wetzell and Captain Hermann Geyer.
- Samuels 1995, p. 183.
- Edmonds 1948, p. 143.
- Wynne 1939, pp. 184–185.
- Condell & Zabecki 2001, p.129 note.
- Zabecki 2006, p. 67.
- Balck 1922, p. 160.
- Samuels 1995, p. 179.
- Ludendorff 1919, p. 458.
- Lupfer 1981, p. 45.
- Samuels 1995, p. 186.
- Wynne 1939, p. 309.
- Lupfer 1981, p. 13.
- Falls 1940, p. 553.
- Samuels 1995, pp. 193–194.
- Wynne 1939, p. 290.
- Balck, William (1922). Development of Tactics, World War. Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools Press. OCLC 612366908.
- Condell, Bruce; Zabecki, David T., eds. (2001). On the German Art of War: Truppenführung. Foreword by James S. Corum. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-55587-996-9. LCCN 2001019798. OCLC 46704038. Originally published in German as Heeresdienstvorschrift 300: Part 1 (1933) and Part 2 (1934).
- Edmonds, J, (1948). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Vol II 7 June – 10 November. Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele) (IWM & Battery Press 1991 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-166-0.
- Falls, C. (1940). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917: The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras (IWM & Battery Press 1992 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-180-6.
- Ludendorff, E (1919). My War Memories 1914–1918 (Naval & Military Press 2005 ed.). New York: Harper & Bros. ISBN 1845743032.
- Lupfer, Timothy (1981). The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Fort Leavenworth: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. OCLC 8189258.
- Samuels, Martin (1995). Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888–1918. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-4214-2.
- Zabecki, David (2006). The German 1918 Offensives: a Case Study in the Operational Level of War. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-35600-8.
- Wynne, G. C. (1939). If Germany Attacks : The Battle in Depth in the West (Greenwood Press 1976 ed.). London: Faber & Faber. ISBN 0-8371-5029-9.
- German defensive tactics
- Truppenfuhrung: Condell, B. & Zabecki, D. T.
- The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Lupfer, T.