Intrinsic value (ethics)

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Intrinsic value is an ethical and philosophic property. It is the ethical or philosophic value that an object has "in itself" or "for its own sake", as an intrinsic property. An object with intrinsic value may be regarded as an end or (in Kantian terminology) end-in-itself.[1]

It is contrasted with instrumental value (or extrinsic value), the value of which depends on how much it generates intrinsic value.[2] For an eudaemonist, happiness has intrinsic value, while having a family may not have intrinsic value, yet be instrumental, since it generates happiness. Intrinsic value is a term employed in axiology, the study of quality or value.

Terminology[edit]

Other names[edit]

Other names for intrinsic value are terminal value, essential value, principle value or ultimate importance. See also Robert S. Hartman's use of the term in the article Science of Value.

Similar concepts[edit]

Intrinsic value is mainly used in ethics, but the concept is also used in philosophy, with terms that essentially may refer to the same concept.

  • As "ultimate importance" it is what is related to by a sentient being in order to constitute a life stance.
  • It is synonymous with the meaning of life, as this may be expressed as what is meaningful or valuable[3] in life. However, meaning of life is more vague, with other uses as well.

End[edit]

In philosophy and ethics, an end is the ultimate goal in a series of steps. For example, according to Aristotle the end of everything we do is happiness. It is contrasted to a means, which is something that helps you achieve that goal. For example, money or power may be said to be a means to the end of happiness. Nevertheless, some objects may be ends and means at the same time.

Similar concepts[edit]

End is roughly similar, and often used as a synonym, for the following concepts:

  • Purpose or aim: in its most general sense the anticipated result which guides action.
  • Goal or objective consists of a projected state of affairs which a person or a system plans or intends to achieve or bring about

Life stances and intrinsic value[edit]

This is a table which attempts to summarize the main intrinsic value of different life stances and other views, although there may be great diversity within them:

Life stance
and other views
Main intrinsic value
Moral nihilism None
Humanism human flourishing
Environmentalism non-human life flourishing
Feminism sexual equality
Multiculturalism flourishing of cultural values beyond one's own
Hedonism pleasure
Eudaemonism human flourishing
Utilitarianism utility (classically and usually, happiness or pleasure and absence of pain)
Rational deontologism virtue or duty
Rational eudaemonism, or tempered Deontologism both virtue and happiness combined[4]
Situational ethics love
Buddhism wisdom leading to Enlightenment

Quantity[edit]

There may be zero,[5] one, or several[5] things in the world with intrinsic value.

  • Intrinsic nihilism, or simply nihilism (from Latin nihil "nothing") holds that there are zero.
  • Intrinsic aliquidism, or simply aliquidism[6] (from Latin aliquid "something") holds that there is one or more. This may be of several quantities, ranging from one single to all possible.
    • Intrinsic monism (from Greek monos "single") holds that there is one thing with intrinsic value. This view may hold only lifestances that accept this object as intrinsically valuable.
    • Intrinsic multism (from Latin multus "many") holds that there are many things with intrinsic value. In other words, this view may hold the instrinsic values of several life stances as intrinsically valuable.
    • Intrinsic panism (from Greek pan "everything") is one step further. It is to everything in the world as having intrinsic value.

Equality[edit]

Among followers of aliquidistic lifestances regarding more than one thing as having intrinsic value, these may be regarded as equally intrinsically valuable or unequally so. However, in practice, they may in any case be unequally valued because of their instrumental values resulting in unequal whole values.

Intrinsic multism[edit]

This view may hold the instrinsic values of several life stances as intrinsically valuable. Note the difference between this and regarding several intrinsic values as more or less instrumentally valuable, since intrinsic monistic views also may hold other intrinsic values than their own chosen one as valuable, but then only to the degree other intrinsic values contribute indirectly to their own chosen intrinsic value.

The most simple form of intrinsic multism is intrinsic bi-ism (from Latin two), which holds two objects as having intrinsic value.

Humanism is an example of a life stance that accepts that several things have intrinsic value.[5][full citation needed]

Multism may not necessarily include the feature of intrinsic values to have a negative side, e.g. the feature of utilitarism to accept both pain as well as pleasure to be of intrinsic value, since they may be viewed as different sides of the same coin.

Total intrinsic value[edit]

The total intrinsic value of an object is the product of its average intrinsic value, average value intensity and value duration. It may be either an absolute or relative value.

The total intrinsic value and total instrumental value together make the total whole value of an object.

Unspecified aliquidism[edit]

Ietsism (Dutch ietsisme "somethingism") is a Dutch language term for a range of beliefs held by people who, on the one hand, inwardly suspect—or indeed believe—that there is “More between Heaven and Earth” than we know about, but on the other hand do not accept or subscribe to the established belief system, dogma or view of the nature of God offered by any particular religion.

In this sense, it may roughly be regarded as aliquidism, without further specification. For instance, most lifestances include the acceptance of "there is something, some meaning of life, something that is an end-in-itself or something more to existence, and it is...", assuming various objects or "truths", while ietsism, on the other hand simply accepts "there is something", without further assumption to it.

Concrete and abstract[edit]

The object with instrinsic value, the end, may be both a concrete object or an abstract object.

Concrete[edit]

In the case where concrete objects are accepted as ends, they may be either single particulars or generalized to all particulars of one or more universals. However, the majority of life stances choose all particulars of universals as ends. For instance, Humanism doesn't assume individual humans as ends but rather all humans of humanity.

Continuum[edit]

When generalizing multiple particulars of a single universal it may not be certain whether the end is actually the individual particulars or the rather abstract universal. In such cases, a life stance may rather be a continuum between having a concrete and abstract end.

This may render life stances of being both intrinsic multistic and intrinsic monistic at the same time. Such a quantity contradiction, however, may be of only minor practic significance, since splitting an end into many ends decreases the whole value but increases the value intensity.

Absolute and relative[edit]

There may be a distinction between absolute and relative ethic value regarding intrinsic value.

Relative intrinsic value is subjective, depending on individual and cultural views and/or the individual choice of life stance. Absolute intrinsic value, on the other hand, is philosophically absolute and independent of individual and cultural views, as well as independent on whether it discovered or not what object has it.

Absolute intrinsic value denial[edit]

There is an ongoing discussion whether absolute intrinsic value exists at all, for instance in pragmatism.

Pragmatism[edit]

In pragmatism, John Dewey's[7] empirical approach did not accept intrinsic value as an inherent or enduring property of things. He saw it as an illusory product of our continuous ethic valuing activity as purposive beings. When held across only some contexts, Dewey held that goods are only intrinsic relative to a situation. In other words, he only believed in relative intrinsic value, but not any absolute intrinsic value.

He held that across all contexts, goodness is best understood as instrumental value, with no contrasting intrinsic goodness. In other words, Dewey claimed that anything can only be of intrinsic value if it is a contributory good.

Positive and negative intrinsic value[edit]

There may be both positive and negative value regarding intrinsic value, wherein something of positive intrinsic value is something that for itself is purposed to be pursued or maximized, while is something of negative intrinsic value is best to avoid or minimize. For instance, in utilitarianism, pleasure has positive intrinsic value and suffering has negative intrinsic value.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Ivo de Gennaro, Value: Sources and Readings on a Key Concept of the Globalized World, BRILL, 2012, p. 138.
  2. ^ Environmental Values, based on Singer, Peter "The Environmental Challenge", Ian Marsh, edit., Melbourne, Australia: Longman Cheshire, 1991, 0-582-87125-5. pp. 12
  3. ^ Puolimatka, Tapio; Airaksinen, Timo (2002). "Education and the Meaning of Life" (PDF). Philosophy of Education. University of Helsinki. Retrieved 2007-07-26. 
  4. ^ The Catholic encyclopedia, Volume 6, Universal Knowledge Foundation, 1913, p. 640.
  5. ^ a b c Haught, James A. "Meaning and Nothingness: A personal journey". Free Inquiry magazine (Council for Secular Humanism) 22 (1). 
  6. ^ “Metaphysical Nihilism or Aliquidism? Against an Empty World,” presented at the Kentucky Philosophical Association, Transylvania University, Lexington, KY, 28 October 2006.
  7. ^ Theory of Valuation by John Dewey

External links[edit]