Epistemic conservatism

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Epistemic conservatism is a view in epistemology about the structure of reasons or justification for belief. While there are various forms, epistemic conservatism is generally the view that a person's believing some claim is a reason in support of the claim, at least on the face of it.[1] Others formulate epistemic conservatism as the view that one is, to some degree, justified in believing something simply because one believes it.[2]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Fumerton (2007), p. 63.
  2. ^ Christensen (1994), p. 69.

References and further reading[edit]

  • Christensen, David. (1994). "Conservatism in Epistemology", Noûs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar.), pp. 69–89.
  • Fumerton, Richard. (2007). "Epistemic Conservatism: Theft or Honest Toil?", Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Vol. 2, ed. by Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press. ISBN 019923706