Eric T. Olson (philosopher)

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For other people of the same name, see Eric Olson.
Eric T. Olson
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western Philosophy
School Analytic philosophy
Main interests
Metaphysics
Philosophy of mind
Personal identity
Notable ideas
Animalism

Eric T. Olson is an American philosopher who specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Olson is most famous for his research in the field of personal identity, namely animalism. Olson received a BA from Reed College[1] and a PhD from Syracuse University. Olson is currently a professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, a position he has held since 2003, and previously held a lectureship at Cambridge University.

Bibliography[edit]

  • The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
  • What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Articles[edit]

  • "Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 173-86, 1994
  • "Human People or Human Animals?" Philosophical Studies 80: 159-81, 1995
  • "Why I Have no Hands." Theoria 61: 182-197, 1995
  • "Composition and Coincidence." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.77: 374-403, 1996
  • "Dion's Foot." Journal of Philosophy 94: 260-65, 1997
  • "Was I Ever a Fetus?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 95-110, 1997.
  • "Relativism and Persistence." Philosophical Studies 88: 141-62, 1997
  • "The Ontological Basis of Strong Artificial Life." Artificial Life 3: 29-39, 1997
  • "Human Atoms." Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 76: 396-406, 1998
  • "Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 161-66, 1999
  • "There is no Problem of the Self." Journal of Consciousness Studies 5: 645-57, 1998, and in S. Gallagher and J. Shearer, eds., Models of the Self, Imprint Academic 1999.
  • "A Compound of Two Substances." In K. Corcoran, ed., Soul, Body, and Survival Cornell University Press, 2001: 73-88
  • "Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem." Philosophical Quarterly 51: 337-55, 2001
  • "Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument." Analysis 61: 38-43, 2001
  • "What does Functionalism Tell Us about Personal Identity?" Noûs 36: 682-98, 2002
  • "Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I.'" Philosophical Topics 30: 189-208, 2002
  • "An Argument for Animalism." In R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., Personal Identity. Blackwell 2003: 318-34.
  • "Personal Identity." In S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 2003: 352-68.
  • "Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism." Philosophical Quarterly 53: 92-95, 2003
  • "Was Jekyll Hyde?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 328-348, 2003
  • "Warum Wir Tiere Sind." In K. Petrus, ed., On Human Persons. Ontos Verlag, 2003: 11-22
  • "Animalism and the Corpse Problem." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 265-74, 2004
  • "Imperfect Identity." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 81-98, 2006
  • "There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity?" In F. MacBride, ed., Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press, 2006
  • "Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood." Noûs 40: 738-752, 2006
  • "The Paradox of Increase." The Monist 89: 390-417, 2006
  • "What Are We?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 37-55, 2007, and in A. Laitinen and H. Ikäheimo, eds., Dimensions of Personhood (Imprint Academic, 2007)
  • "Was I Ever a Fetus?" (new version) In R. Nichols et al., eds., Philosophy Through Science Fiction, Routledge 2008.
  • "The Rate of Time's Passage." Analysis 69: 3-9, 2009
  • "The Passage of Time." in R. LePoidevin et al., eds., The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics 2009: 440-48

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ http://www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/profiles/eolson.html