Famine, Affluence, and Morality
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality" is an essay written by Peter Singer in 1971 and published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1972. It argues that affluent persons are morally obligated to donate far more resources to humanitarian causes than is considered normal in Western cultures. The essay was inspired by the starvation of Bangladesh Liberation War refugees, and uses their situation as an example, although Singer's argument is general in scope. The essay is anthologized widely as an example of Western ethical thinking.[1][2][3][4][5]
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[edit] Précis
One of the core arguments of this essay is that, if one can use one's wealth to reduce suffering — for example, by aiding famine-relief efforts — without any significant reduction in the well-being of oneself or others, it is immoral not to do so. According to Singer, such inaction is clearly immoral if a child is drowning in a shallow pond and someone can save it but chooses not to;[6] nor does placing greater geographical distance between the person in need and the potential helper reduce the latter's moral obligations:
It makes no difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards away from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away. [...] The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society. Previously [...], this may hardly have been feasible, but it is quite feasible now. From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.[7]
The affluent, says Singer, are consistently guilty of failing to recognise this, having large amounts of surplus wealth that they do not use to aid humanitarian projects in developing nations.
Here is the thrust of Singer's argument:
- "Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad".[8]
- "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it".[9]
- "It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbour's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away".[10]
- "The principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position".[11]
[edit] Criticism
John Kekes criticises Singer's essay in the article 'On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine'.[12] A common criticism of Singer's essay is the demandingness objection.
World Hunger and Moral Obligation by Arthur also critisizes Singer.
[edit] Quotations
- "[N]either our distance from a preventable evil nor the number of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to mitigate or prevent that evil."[13]
- "[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."[14]
- "People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look 'well-dressed' we are not providing for any important need."[15]
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972: 229-243.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Cottingham, John (1996). Western philosophy: an anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 461ff. ISBN 9780631186274. http://books.google.com/books?id=imkTo_sNrKcC&pg=PT473.
- ^ Shafer-Landau, Russ (2007). Ethical theory: an anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 523ff. ISBN 9781405133203. http://books.google.com/books?id=By9nCkAvS6EC&pg=PT523.
- ^ Pojman, Louis P. (2003). Moral philosophy: a reader. Hackett. pp. 344ff. ISBN 9780872206618. http://books.google.com/books?id=ILa7WmdUXIMC&pg=PA344.
- ^ Wellman, Carl (2002). Rights and Duties: Welfare rights and duties of charity. Taylor & Francis. pp. 227ff. ISBN 9780415939874. http://books.google.com/books?id=OHHZF5kyURUC&pg=PA227.
- ^ Chadwick, Ruth F.; Doris Schroeder (2002). Applied ethics: critical concepts in philosophy. Politics. Taylor & Francis. pp. 272ff. ISBN 9780415208376. http://books.google.com/books?id=yk5miXMJH-cC&pg=PA272.
- ^ Singer points out that saving the child "will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing." (Singer 1972, p. 231.)
- ^ Singer 1972, pp. 231-232, 237.
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 231.
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 231.
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 231.
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 232.
- ^ http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=126322
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 234.
- ^ This, according to Singer, is a qualified reassertion of the principle that governs his argument. (Singer 1972, pp. 233-234.)
- ^ Singer 1972, p. 234.
