Famine, Affluence, and Morality
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality" is an essay written by Peter Singer in 1971 and published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1972. It argues that affluent persons are morally obligated to donate far more resources to humanitarian causes than is considered normal in Western cultures. The essay was inspired by the starvation of Bangladesh Liberation War refugees, and uses their situation as an example, although Singer's argument is general in scope. The essay is anthologized widely as an example of Western ethical thinking.
One of the core arguments of this essay is that, if one can use one's wealth to reduce suffering — for example, by aiding famine-relief efforts — without any significant reduction in the well-being of oneself or others, it is immoral not to do so. According to Singer, such inaction is clearly immoral if a child is drowning in a shallow pond and someone can save it but chooses not to; nor does placing greater geographical distance between the person in need and the potential helper reduce the latter's moral obligations:
It makes no difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards away from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away. [...] The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society. Previously [...], this may hardly have been feasible, but it is quite feasible now. From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.
The affluent, says Singer, are consistently guilty of failing to recognize this, having large amounts of surplus wealth that they do not use to aid humanitarian projects in developing nations.
Here is the thrust of Singer's argument:
- "Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad".
- "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it".
- "It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away".
- "The principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position".
Reception and criticism
Gilbert Harman has stated that he considers 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality' as one of the most famous articles in ethics. James Rachels said of the article: "one felt intellectual interest in the argument, but also guilt for not having contributed more money to relieve starvation".
World Hunger and Moral Obligation by Arthur also criticizes Singer.
- "[N]either our distance from a preventable evil nor the number of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to mitigate or prevent that evil."
- "[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." today
- "People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look 'well-dressed' we are not providing for any important need."
- Singer, Peter (Spring 1972). "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton University Press) 1 (3): 229–243. doi:10.2307/2265052. JSTOR 2265052.
- Cottingham, John (1996). Western philosophy: an anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 461ff. ISBN 978-0-631-18627-4.
- Shafer-Landau, Russ (2007). Ethical theory: an anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 523ff. ISBN 978-1-4051-3320-3.
- Pojman, Louis P. (2003). Moral philosophy: a reader. Hackett. pp. 344ff. ISBN 978-0-87220-661-8.
- Wellman, Carl (2002). Rights and Duties: Welfare rights and duties of charity. Taylor & Francis. pp. 227ff. ISBN 978-0-415-93987-4.
- Chadwick, Ruth F.; Doris Schroeder (2002). Applied ethics: critical concepts in philosophy. Politics. Taylor & Francis. pp. 272ff. ISBN 978-0-415-20837-6.
- Singer points out that saving the child "will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing." (Singer 1972, p. 231).
- Singer 1972, pp. 231-232, 237.
- Singer 1972, p. 231.
- Singer 1972, p. 232.
- Helga Kuhse, ed. (2002). Unsanctifying human life: essays on ethics. New York: Blackwell. p. 2-3. ISBN 0631225072.
- James Rachels (1981). "Sociobiology and the ‘Escalator’ of Reason". The Hastings Center Report 11 (5): 45–46. doi:10.2307.2F3561299. Retrieved 16 June 2012. , page 45
- Singer 1972, p. 234.
- This, according to Singer, is a qualified reassertion of the principle that governs his argument. (Singer 1972, pp. 233-234.)
- Singer 1972, p. 234.